Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Charles Best Jr. and Robbie Johnson Best alleged that defendants (collectively the Bank), attempted to collect a debt secured by the Bests’ home, despite having no legal right to do so. They alleged that, in the process, the Bank engaged in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent debt collection practices. Based on these allegations, they raised six causes of action, including one under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The trial court sustained the Bank’s demurrer to the entire complaint on the ground of res judicata; it ruled that the Bests were asserting the same cause(s) of action as in a prior federal action that they brought, unsuccessfully, against the Bank. In the nonpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that, as to three of the Best’s causes of action (including their Rosenthal Act cause of action) the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer based on res judicata. As to the other three, the Court found the Bests did not articulate any reason why res judicata does not apply; thus, they have forfeited any such contention. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court held that the Rosenthal Act could apply to a nonjudicial foreclosure; the lower federal court opinions on which the Bank relied were superseded by controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the California Courts of Appeal. View "Best v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

ABS REO Trust II (ABS) appealed an order denying its motion to correct/vacate the portion of a prior quiet title judgment adjudicating the rights of a defaulting party, Clarion Mortgage Capital, Inc. (Clarion), despite that Clarion had not been served with the operative amended complaint and the court did not hold a hearing on the plaintiff’s claims against Clarion. The Court of Appeal concluded the court erred in denying ABS’s motion. ABS had standing to bring this motion and it met its burden to show the prior judgment was void as to Clarion. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded with directions for the court to grant ABS’s motion and strike the portions of the prior judgment relating to Clarion. View "Paterra v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Smart Corner Owners Association (the Association), a California nonprofit mutual benefit corporation, filed a construction defect action against the developers of a residential condominium tower. In 2019, the trial court granted the developers’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the Association failed to obtain the consent of more than 50 percent of its condominium owner members before filing suit as required by the governing declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). In concluding the Association’s complaint was invalid, the court rejected the Association’s argument that a subsequent vote of ratification, held after the filing of the operative complaint, could satisfy the member consent requirement. After the Association filed its notice of appeal, the California Legislature enacted Civil Code section 5986 (eff. January 1, 2020), rendering prelitigation member vote requirements null and void. The Legislature also expressly provided the statute would apply retroactively “to claims initiated before the effective date of this section, except if those claims have been resolved through an executed settlement, a final arbitration decision, or a final judicial decision on the merits.” The Association sought reversal of the judgment on the ground that its claims had not yet been resolved through a “final judicial decision on the merits” when section 5986 became effective, and it was therefore entitled to the benefits of the new legislation. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the developer. View "Smart Corner Owners Assn. v. CJUF Smart Corner LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG) sued defendant Julio Fonseca, the former superintendent of the San Ysidro School District (District), alleging Fonseca caused the illegal disbursement of District funds in a settlement between District and third-party Enrique Gonzalez, a former District employee. The court bifurcated the trial and, after an evidentiary hearing, found SDOG lacked standing under newly amended Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded SDOG did not meet the taxpayer requirements for standing under section 526a and affirmed the trial court. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. Fonseca" on Justia Law

The Nunns refinanced the mortgage on their Nampa home in 2006 with a negative amortization loan. The payments jumped from about $2,900 per month to $4,300 in 2008. The Nunns defaulted and, in January 2009, applied for a loan modification. In 2010, Chase denied the application. In 2011, the Nunns filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure. The superior court granted Chase summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed; a remittitur was filed in the superior court on July 18, 2016. Chase sold the house in a foreclosure sale and acquired the property.In April 2017, the Nunns filed a notice of lis pendens. They had until July 18, 2019, to bring their case to trial, Code of Civil Procedure 583.320. In March 2019, Chase advised the court of its intent to complete discovery by “Summer 2019” and to move for summary judgment. In May 2019, a trial date was set for January 13, 2020. In August, the case was dismissed because the three-year deadline for bringing the case to trial had passed. The Nunns filed post-judgment motions, seeking to correct the minutes of the May 2019 hearing to reflect that the January 2020 trial date was set by agreement. Chase admitted requesting a trial date that would allow further discovery.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal for failure to prosecute. The parties’ agreement to a trial date outside the three-year period extended the statutory deadline to that trial date. View "Nunn v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's judgment sustaining CIT's demurrer without leave to amend based on res judicata. The court explained that appellant's present lawsuit involves the same primary right as three prior lawsuits that she brought against CIT, and plaintiff lost on the merits in all three prior lawsuits: one in the Los Angeles County Superior Court and two in the United States District Court. The court further explained that the prior adverse decisions by three trial and two appellate courts were not advisory opinions suggesting how appellant should proceed in the future. The court concluded that, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, the decisions constitute final judgments on the merits precluding further litigation against respondent concerning the same primary right. The court noted that, although the present appeal is frivolous, it will not order sanctions to be imposed on appellant. However, the court cautioned appellant that further attempts to litigate the subject matter of this lawsuit will result in sanctions. View "Colebrook v. CIT Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michael O’Shea hired attorney Susan Lindenberg to represent him in a child support action. After O’Shea’s ex-wife was awarded what he believed to be an excessive amount of child support, he filed this action, alleging Lindenberg should have retained a forensic accountant. The case went to trial and the jury concluded, in a special verdict, that Lindenberg owed a professional duty of care that she breached. The jury was unable to agree, however, on whether the breach of duty caused him damage, and the judge declared a mistrial. Lindenberg moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the evidence presented at trial did not support a finding of causation, specifically, that without the alleged malpractice, O’Shea would have received a better result. The trial court agreed and directed a verdict in Lindenberg’s favor. After review, the Court of Appeal found O’Shea failed to present sufficient testimony on the issue of causation, and therefore affirmed the directed verdict. View "O'Shea v. Lindenberg" on Justia Law

Kevin Johnson, APLC, Kevin Johnson, and Jeanne MacKinnon (collectively, the attorney defendants) filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint on behalf of their clients Christian Clews (Christian), Barbara Clews (Barbara), and Clews Land & Livestock, LLC (CLL) (collectively, Clews Horse Ranch) challenging a decision of the City of San Diego (City) to approve the construction of a private secondary school adjacent to the Clews’ commercial horse ranch. The petition asserted the City’s approval of the project and adoption of a mitigated negative declaration for the project violated the California Environmental Quality Act, the San Diego Municipal Code, and the City’s land use plan. The trial court denied relief and, in Clews Land and Livestock, LLC v. City of San Diego, 19 Cal.App.5th 161 (2017), the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Jan Dunning, Cal Coast Academy RE Holdings, LLC, and North County Center for Educational Development, Inc. (collectively, Cal Coast), the developers of the project and real parties in interest in the CEQA Litigation, then filed this lawsuit against Clews Horse Ranch and the attorney defendants for malicious prosecution. Cal Coast asserted the defendants lacked probable cause and acted with malice when they pursued the CEQA Litigation. The attorney defendants filed a special motion to strike Cal Coast’s complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, to which the Clews Horse Ranch joined. The trial court denied the motion after finding that Cal Coast established a probability of prevailing on its malicious prosecution claim. Clews Horse Ranch and the attorney defendants appealed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal concluded Cal Coast established a probability of prevailing on its malicious prosecution claim against Clews Horse Ranch, but not against the attorney defendants. Therefore, the Court affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion as to Clews Horse Ranch, and reversed the order denying the anti- SLAPP motion as to the attorney defendants. View "Dunning v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Rudy Alarcon filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to invalidate hearing officer Robert Bergeson’s decision upholding the City of Calexico’s (City) termination of Alarcon’s employment as a City police officer. The City filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging Bergeson’s decision to award Alarcon back pay based on his finding that the City failed to provide Alarcon with sufficient predisciplinary notice of allegations that Alarcon had been dishonest during the investigation that led to his termination. The trial court consolidated the petitions and issued a written ruling that denied both petitions. As to Alarcon’s petition, the trial court determined that Alarcon had not met his burden to establish the charges against him were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court also found that the weight of the evidence demonstrated that Alarcon had “used force” and “discourteous language” during the arrest that led to his termination. With respect to the City’s petition, the trial court determined that “the hearing officer’s lengthy finding that the dishonesty charges were not properly noticed does not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion.” After review, the Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment with respect to Alarcon; the Court determined the City’s cross- appeal was untimely and should have been dismissed. View "City of Calexico v. Bergeson" on Justia Law

Robert Smith’s employer, Najjar Lube Centers, Inc. dba Jiffy Lube, held a presentation for its employees to learn about a new Castrol product. Castrol employee Gus Pumarol led the presentation. Smith alleges that Pumarol made several comments to Smith during the presentation that he considered racist and offensive. Smith sued BP Lubricants USA, Inc. dba Castrol (BP) and Pumarol for harassment under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and for discrimination under the Unruh Act. Smith also sued Pumarol for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The trial court sustained BP and Pumarol’s demurrer without leave to amend, and Smith timely appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining BP and Pumarol’s demurrer to Smith’s FEHA claim without leave to amend, but concluded, however, that Smith sufficiently alleged claims for IIED and violation of the Unruh Act. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc." on Justia Law