Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

VeriPic, and its CEO, Kwan, sued a competitor, Foray, and affiliated individuals, including Foray’s president, Hennings, alleging business disparagement. Before trial, Foray and Hennings moved for sanctions against the plaintiffs’ former counsel, the Grellas law firm, seeking monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030(a), for misuse of the discovery process. The trial court sua sponte issued an order to show cause ordering the plaintiffs and Grellas to show why sanctions should not issue for “egregious and deliberate” “litigation abuse” in their filings. All the defendants subsequently moved for sanctions. The court ultimately ordered various sanctions against Kwan and VeriPic, including dismissal with prejudice of VeriPic’s remaining claims, for plaintiffs’ fraud on the court. However, the court denied the defendants’ motion for monetary sanctions against plaintiffs and Grellas for misuse of the discovery process.The court of appeal reversed in part, finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request for monetary sanctions against VeriPic and Kwan. The defendants have not carried their burden of showing error by the trial court in declining to impose sanctions on Grellas. There is no substantial evidence that Grellas advised the plaintiffs to engage in the misuse of the discovery process. View "Kwan Software Engineering, Inc. v. Hennings" on Justia Law

Macanthony Canady petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus seeking early parole consideration under Proposition 57. He asserted the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (Department) regulation purporting to implement Proposition 57 was inconsistent with the Proposition. Specifically, the Department’s regulation did not consider conduct credits inmates earned while incarcerated in the calculation of inmates’ nonviolent early parole eligible dates.The trial court agreed with Canady and invalidated the Department’s regulations as contradicting the stated purposes of the Proposition. The Attorney General appealed, contending the order had to be reversed because the Department’s regulation was: consistent with the plain language of the Proposition, authorized by the broad discretion granted to it by the Proposition, and consistent with the voters’ intent in passing the Proposition. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the trial court's order. View "In re Canady" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 authorizes only one judicial peremptory challenge for each side in a Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding under rule 3.516 of the California Rules of Court. The court explained that rule 3.516 modifies the normal procedures governing section 170.6 peremptory challenges in two ways to conform the procedures to the unique characteristics of a coordination proceeding. First, the rule requires the party making a peremptory challenge to submit it in writing to the assigned judge within 20 days after service of the order assigning the judge to the coordination proceeding. Second, the rule specifies that all plaintiffs or similar parties constitute "a side" and all defendants or similar parties constitute "a side" for purposes of "applying Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6." The court further explained that rule 3.516 does not displace section 170.6's fundamental directive that there shall be "only one motion for each side . . . in any one action or special proceeding."In this case, petitioners and other similarly situated California government entities filed suit against Real Parties, alleging claims for false advertising, nuisance, fraud, negligent failure to warn, and civil conspiracy arising out of Real Parties' manufacture and distribution of opioid products. Because the trial court correctly interpreted and applied the rule, the court denied the writ. View "Prescription Opioid Cases" on Justia Law

In this opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed three consolidated appeals relating to a judgment for the return of a child in an international custody dispute. This case was retried after the Court reversed an earlier judgment marred by due process violations. After remand, the trial court again granted father’s petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Convention) and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), for return of the child to her father’s custody in Denmark, her country of habitual residence. The court also awarded father his attorney fees and other expenses as the prevailing party under the Convention and ICARA. Mother filed separate appeals of the return order and the fees award and two post judgment sealing orders related to the parties’ use of the transcript of the trial judge’s confidential interview with the child during the trial. The Court of Appeal determined mother’s appeal of the return order was moot because the child was nearly 18 years old, and the Convention did not apply after the child who was the subject of the return petition turns 16. The Court reversed the fees award, because mother had no opportunity for a full and fair hearing on father’s motion for fees. As for mother’s appeal of the postjudgment sealing orders, the Court found no merit to the appeal and affirmed the orders. View "Noergaard v. Noergaard" on Justia Law

Defendants, who at the time of trial were current or former California Coastal Commissioners (Commissioners), appealed a nearly $1 million judgment after the court found they violated statutes requiring disclosure of certain ex parte communications. The Court of Appeal surmised the case turned on whether: (1) plaintiff Spotlight on Coastal Corruption (Spotlight) had standing to pursue these claims under Public Resources Code sections 30324 and 30327; and (2) the up to $30,000 penalty for “any” violation of the Coastal Act in section 30820(a)(2) applied to such ex parte disclosure violations. Concluding that Spotlight lacked standing and that section 30820(a)(2) was inapplicable, the Court reversed with directions to enter judgment for Defendants. View "Spotlight on Coastal Corruption v. Kinsey" on Justia Law

In 2001, a Minnesota state court ordered James to pay $89,582.15 in child support arrears to his ex-wife, Rosemary, for their two children. James was then living in California. In 2005 the Minnesota order was registered for enforcement purposes in Santa Cruz County Superior Court under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. In 2018, in connection with registration in California of a renewed judgment from Minnesota, the Santa Cruz County court stayed enforcement of a portion of James’s child support arrears determined by the 2001 Minnesota order because the children had intermittently lived with James between 1993 and 2002. The trial court found the remainder of the arrears enforceable. The Santa Cruz County Department of Child Support Services, which has assisted in the enforcement and collection of James’s child support arrears, contends that the court lacked authority under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act to stay the arrears owed by James because the 2001 Minnesota order at issue was registered and confirmed in California in 2005, and James did not timely challenge its registration. The court of appeal agreed and reversed the portion of the 2018 order staying enforcement of $28,890 of the arrears, while affirming that the remainder of the arrears ($60,692.15) was enforceable. View "Marriage of Sawyer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Sarah Coughenour worked for defendant-appellant Del Taco, LLC, starting when she was 16 years old. When she was first employed by Del Taco, she signed a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate” (Agreement). After Coughenour reached the age of 18, she continued working for Del Taco for four months. Coughenour quit and filed a lawsuit against Del Taco for sexual harassment committed by one of their employees, wage and hour claims brought pursuant to the Labor Code, and other claims under the Fair Housing and Employment Housing Act. Del Taco moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the Motion, finding that Coughenour’s filing of the lawsuit was a disaffirmance of the Agreement within the meaning of Family Code section 6710, which allowed a person upon reaching majority age to disaffirm a contract entered into while a minor. Del Taco appealed the denial of its motion, arguing that by working for Del Taco for four months after she reached the age of majority, Coughenour ratified the Agreement, which estopped her power to disaffirm the Agreement. In the alternative, Del Taco argued that Coughenour did not disaffirm the Agreement within a “reasonable time” after reaching the age of 18 as required by Family Code section 6710. The Court of Appeal affirmed denial of Del Taco's motion: [t]he filing of the lawsuit was notice that [Coughenour] disaffirmed the Agreement." The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Coughenour disaffirmed the Agreement within a reasonable time. View "Coughenour v. Del Taco" on Justia Law

In this case, the real parties in interest and plaintiffs were former store managers for petitioner-defendant Big Lots Inc., who claimed they spent less than 50 percent of their worktime on managerial tasks and, as a result, should have been paid overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of a standard 40-hour week. Big Lots was an Ohio corporation. When this lawsuit was first filed, it retained a California law firm, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP (Haight Brown), as counsel of record. Big Lots later sought the superior court’s permission for attorneys from an Ohio law firm, Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease LLP (Vorys), to also represent it. The trial judge ultimately granted applications filed by three different attorneys in the Vorys firm. But after later being advised that these Ohio attorneys were attempting to represent various current and former Big Lots managers in depositions noticed by plaintiffs, the court revoked pro hac vice authorization for all three lawyers. Big Lots petitioned for a writ of mandamus to overturn that order. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that there was a between an attorney’s representation of the defendant corporation in a lawsuit and his or her representation of current or former employee witnesses. "Pro hac vice admission as to one client does not necessarily allow a lawyer to represent a different client even if substantive law does not otherwise prohibit it." The Court nonetheless concluded the total revocation of pro hac vice status for the Vorys attorneys was not supported by the record then before the trial court. The petition to vacated the revocation order was granted, but the matter was returned to the trial court for additional hearings/orders deemed necessary. View "Big Lots Stores v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Proposition 218, the Right to Vote on Taxes Act, generally required local governments obtain voter approval prior to imposing taxes. Plaintiffs Jess Willard Mahon, Jr. and Allan Randall brought this certified class action against the City of San Diego (City) claiming that the City violated Proposition 218 by imposing an illegal tax to fund the City’s undergrounding program. Specifically, plaintiffs contended the City violated Proposition 218 through the adoption of an ordinance that amended a franchise agreement between the City and the San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E). The ordinance, together with a related memorandum of understanding, further specifies that part of the money to fund the undergrounding budget will be collected by SDG&E through a 3.53 percent surcharge on ratepayers in the City that will be remitted to the City for use on undergrounding (Undergrounding Surcharge). Plaintiffs claim that the surcharge is a tax. Plaintiffs further claim that the surcharge violates Proposition 218 because it was never approved by the electorate. Plaintiffs note that the City has imposed more than 200 million dollars in charges pursuant to the Undergrounding Surcharge during the class period. Through this action, plaintiffs seek a refund of those amounts, among other forms of relief. The City moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on two grounds: (1) the Undergrounding Surcharge constituted compensation for franchise rights and thus was not a tax; alternatively, (2) the Undergrounding Surcharge was a valid regulatory fee and not a tax. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly granted the City’s motion for summary on the ground that the Undergrounding Surcharge was compensation validly given in exchange for franchise rights and thus, was not a tax subject to voter approval. View "Mahon v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order amending a judgment to add alter ego judgment debtors. After Triyar entered into a contract to purchase a hotel property from WSI, Triyar filed suit against WSI for causes of action including fraud and specific performance. The trial court found that WSI had not breached the contract, because Triyar's failure to learn of the Hyatt agreement's termination was due to Triyar's fault in failing to conduct a sufficient investigation. The trial court then awarded WSI $2,172,615 in attorney fees and costs. After Triyar appealed, the trial court awarded an additional $193,273.20 in fees and costs. After WSI was unable to collect any amount of the judgment, WSI made a motion to amend the judgment to add Steven Yari and Shawn Yari. The trial court found that Triyar is not capitalized for buying major hotels, and the finding that the Yaris were alter egos was a fair outcome. The trial court also found that even if the alter ego doctrine does not strictly apply, the inequities are such that an exception can be made.Under either de novo or abuse of discretion review, the court held that WSI prevailed on its motion to add the Yaris as judgment debtors. In this case, the Yaris concede that they had control of the underlying litigation and were virtually represented in that proceeding. The court also concluded that there is overwhelming evidence of a unity of interest and ownership such that the separate personalities of the entity and the owners do not exist. Furthermore, it would be inequitable to preclude WSI from collecting its judgment by treating Triyar as a separate entity. View "Triyar Hospitality Management v. WSI (II) – HWP, LLC" on Justia Law