Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A bakery, owned by Catharine Miller, refused to sell a predesigned, plain white cake to a same-sex couple, the Rodriguez-Del Rios, for their wedding reception. The bakery's policy prohibited the sale of any preordered cake for same-sex weddings based on Miller's religious beliefs that marriage is between a man and a woman. The couple ultimately obtained a similar cake from another bakery.The Civil Rights Department (CRD) filed a lawsuit against the bakery and Miller, alleging discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA). The Kern County Superior Court ruled in favor of the bakery, concluding there was no intentional discrimination and that Miller's referral of the couple to another bakery constituted full and equal access under the UCRA. The court also found that the bakery's refusal was protected by the First Amendment as both pure speech and expressive conduct.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the bakery's policy was facially discriminatory as it required a distinction in service based on the sexual orientation of the end user. The court concluded that the trial court erred in its determination that the policy was facially neutral and in its application of the intentional discrimination standard. The court also found that Miller's referral to another bakery did not satisfy the UCRA's full and equal access requirement.Regarding the First Amendment defenses, the appellate court held that the plain white cake was not pure speech or expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The court reasoned that the cake was a generic, multi-purpose product and did not convey any particularized message about marriage. The court also upheld the UCRA's application under the federal and state Constitutions' free exercise clauses, concluding that the law is neutral and generally applicable and that there are no less restrictive means to achieve the state's compelling interest in ensuring full and equal access to goods and services irrespective of sexual orientation. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Civil Rights Dept. v. Cathy's Creations" on Justia Law

Elijah Jackson, a Black man, was charged with carrying a loaded firearm after police found a handgun during a search of the car he was driving. Jackson filed a motion under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, arguing that the police stopped and searched his car due to racial bias. The superior court denied his motion, stating that Jackson failed to establish a prima facie violation under the Racial Justice Act.The superior court found that the police officers were conducting a saturation patrol in a high-crime area and stopped Jackson for having illegally tinted windows. The officers observed Jackson and his brother, who were wearing clothing associated with gang members, and conducted a traffic stop. During the stop, the officers found a baseball bat in the car and, after a search, discovered an unregistered loaded firearm. Jackson argued that the stop and search were racially motivated, supported by statistical evidence showing racial disparities in traffic stops and searches by the San Diego Police Department (SDPD).The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that Jackson had produced facts that, if true, established a substantial likelihood of a violation of the Racial Justice Act. The court noted the statistical evidence showing racial disparities in SDPD's traffic stops and searches, as well as Jackson's and his brother's repeated stops for the same tinted windows without receiving citations. The court also considered the officers' focus on Jackson's and his brother's appearance and the neighborhood they were in, which suggested implicit bias.The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to grant an evidentiary hearing to consider Jackson's motion under the Racial Justice Act. The court emphasized the importance of addressing implicit bias in the criminal justice system and ensuring that race does not play a role in seeking or obtaining convictions. View "Jackson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

David Paul Planchard was convicted by a jury of stalking Debra Doe and violating a protective order. Planchard and Doe had a relationship from 1997 to 2000 and had a son together in 2006. Despite a restraining order issued in 2020, Planchard continued to harass Doe through public Facebook posts from 2016 to 2023. These posts included threats, derogatory comments, and references to Doe's past trauma. Planchard also showed up at Doe's house in May 2023, violating the protective order.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found Planchard guilty of stalking and violating a protective order. The jury determined that Planchard's actions, including his Facebook posts and visit to Doe's house, constituted a credible threat and harassment. The court sentenced him to five years for stalking and a stayed term of six months for violating the protective order.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Planchard argued that his Facebook posts did not constitute direct contact and thus could not be considered harassment under the stalking statute. The court disagreed, citing precedent that indirect threats and harassment through third parties or public posts can still meet the statutory requirements for stalking. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, noting that the posts were intended to harass and threaten Doe, and it was reasonably foreseeable that she would see them.The court also addressed Planchard's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding no merit in his arguments. The court concluded that the Facebook posts were relevant and admissible, and that any failure to object by his counsel did not constitute ineffective assistance. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "P. v. Planchard" on Justia Law

The defendant, Aquil Qadir Lawson, was convicted of murder after shooting Madison Rose Weiss while she was in her car. Lawson, who is Black, argued that the trial court's evidentiary rulings were influenced by implicit racial bias, violating the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. He claimed that the court's decisions emphasized his criminality while minimizing the victim's, who was white. Specifically, Lawson contended that the exclusion of evidence regarding Weiss's illegal activities and the inclusion of his Instagram posts and fraud activities demonstrated racial bias.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the jury found Lawson guilty of second-degree murder and the firearm allegation true. The court excluded evidence of Weiss's involvement in sex work, vaccination card fraud, and other illegal activities, deeming them irrelevant to the case. The court also excluded evidence of a gun found near the crime scene, as it was not connected to the shooting. Conversely, the court admitted Lawson's Instagram posts, which contained statements related to the shooting, and evidence of his involvement in fraud, which was used to impeach his credibility.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court's evidentiary rulings were based on relevance and did not demonstrate implicit racial bias under the Racial Justice Act's preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. The appellate court found that the trial court's decisions were ordinary evidentiary rulings and that Lawson failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the rulings were motivated by racial bias or animus. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "P. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

A bakery refused to sell a predesigned white cake to a same-sex couple for their wedding reception, citing a policy against providing cakes for same-sex weddings based on the owner's religious beliefs. The California Civil Rights Department (CRD) filed a lawsuit on behalf of the couple, alleging discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA). The trial court ruled in favor of the bakery, finding no violation of the UCRA because the CRD failed to prove intentional discrimination and concluded that referring the couple to another bakery constituted full and equal access under the UCRA. The trial court also considered the bakery's First Amendment defenses, concluding that the UCRA compelled the bakery to speak a message about marriage to which they objected.The CRD appealed, challenging the trial court's interpretation and application of the UCRA and its conclusions regarding the bakery's affirmative defenses. The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and determined that the bakery's policy was not facially neutral and misconstrued the intentional discrimination standard. The court found that the policy was inherently discriminatory as it required a distinction in service based on the sexual orientation of the end user. The court also concluded that referring the couple to another bakery did not satisfy the UCRA's full and equal access requirement.The court further analyzed the bakery's First Amendment defenses, determining that the cake in question did not constitute pure speech or expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The court found that the cake was a generic, multi-purpose product and that its preparation and delivery did not convey any particularized message about marriage. Additionally, the court concluded that the UCRA is a neutral and generally applicable law that satisfies rational basis review and does not violate the bakery's free exercise of religion under the federal or state constitutions.The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Civil Rights Dept. v. Cathy's Creations" on Justia Law

Officer Victor Quezada and his partner, Officer Diego Millan, were patrolling a known gang territory in Harbor City after dark. They encountered three young men, including L.G., who was 15 years old. Millan recognized one of the men as a gang member. The officers attempted to engage the group in conversation, but L.G. did not respond and avoided eye contact, which made the officers suspicious. They decided to conduct a search, and when they ordered the group to step out and raise their hands, L.G. ran and was later found with a gun.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled that the search was proper and denied L.G.'s motion to suppress the evidence. The court did not address the officers' commands to the youths during the encounter.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the search was improper because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain L.G. The court emphasized that nervousness and avoiding police interaction do not reasonably suggest criminal activity. The court found that the officers' commands and coordinated approach constituted a show of force that transformed a consensual encounter into a detention without proper justification.The court reversed the judgment, vacated the adjudication, and remanded the matter. The trial court was instructed to vacate its order denying L.G.'s motion to suppress the evidence and to enter a new order granting the motion. View "In re L.G." on Justia Law

Mariano Albert Valdez was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a murder he committed at age 17. In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1), which allows juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP to seek resentencing after 15 years of incarceration. The trial court granted the petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life. In 2024, Valdez filed another petition for resentencing, arguing that his 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying resentencing relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP violates equal protection.The trial court construed Valdez's filing as a petition under section 1170(d)(10), which allows for resentencing after 20 years of imprisonment if the defendant was resentenced to LWOP or its functional equivalent. The trial court granted the petition, reasoning that Valdez's 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that excluding him from resentencing relief would violate equal protection.The People petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to deny Valdez's resentencing relief. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the reasoning in Heard does not apply to section 1170(d)(10) if the defendant was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence imposed at resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). Since Valdez was eligible for youth offender parole under his 50-year-to-life sentence, it was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. Therefore, Valdez was not entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(10).The court granted the petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting Valdez resentencing relief and to enter a new order denying the petition for resentencing. View "P. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Deari Cole was committed to a developmental center under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500, which allows for the commitment of individuals with developmental disabilities who are deemed a danger to themselves or others. Cole was charged with several crimes and found incompetent to stand trial. Subsequently, he was committed to the Porterville Developmental Center for one year. Just before the expiration of his commitment, the People filed a petition to extend it, and Cole was held pending trial on the recommitment petition. Cole filed a petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus, arguing that equal protection principles required his release pending trial.The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied Cole's request for release pending trial, relying on section 6506, which allows for interim placement at a suitable facility. Cole's petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus was summarily denied by the Court of Appeal. Cole then petitioned for review, and the California Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its order and issue an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and rejected Cole's equal protection arguments. The court held that the statutory scheme under section 6500, which allows for continued confinement pending a hearing on a recommitment petition, did not violate equal protection principles. The court reasoned that the differences between individuals with developmental disabilities and those with mental health disorders or found not guilty by reason of insanity justified the different procedures. The court concluded that the legislative distinctions were reasonable and factually based. Consequently, the court dismissed Cole's petition as moot, as he had already been released from custody for unrelated reasons. View "Cole v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2010, Juan Nuno was prosecuted and later pleaded no contest to attempted murder, admitting to several sentence-related allegations. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison. In 2022, Nuno filed a petition to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the trial court found made a prima facie case for an evidentiary hearing. Nuno then filed a motion for discovery of peace officer personnel records, seeking exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland and through Pitchess procedures. The trial court ordered limited disclosure of personnel information after an in-camera review but later denied Nuno’s petition after the evidentiary hearing.Nuno appealed, requesting the appellate court to review the trial court’s application of Pitchess standards. The Attorney General did not initially object to this request. The appellate court sought supplemental briefing on whether the trial court’s review should include Brady principles and whether Brady obligations apply in section 1172.6 proceedings. Both parties agreed that Nuno’s request encompassed Brady principles.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, decided that a petitioner may obtain disclosure of peace officer personnel information under Brady principles through Pitchess procedures in advance of a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Pitchess principles but did not clearly consider Brady principles. Consequently, the appellate court conditionally reversed the trial court’s order denying Nuno’s petition and remanded for further proceedings to ensure compliance with Brady principles. If additional information is found to be discoverable under Brady, the trial court must allow Nuno to demonstrate prejudice and potentially order a new evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Nuno" on Justia Law

The defendant, Freddy Rivera Corbi, was bullied by gang members in his community for years. In July 2019, he was seriously injured by a gang member. A month later, Corbi encountered another gang member, Lazaro Orozco, and fatally shot him after an argument. At trial, the main issue was whether the shooting was in self-defense or an act of revenge. The jury convicted Corbi of second-degree murder.The Superior Court of San Diego County reviewed the case. Corbi argued that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution’s gang expert to offer certain opinions and that the prosecutor violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 during closing arguments. He also claimed the court erred in considering whether to dismiss a firearm enhancement at sentencing. The trial court imposed a sentence of 15 years to life for the murder, plus 10 years for a reduced firearm enhancement.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found no reversible error regarding the expert testimony, determining that the gang expert’s opinions were not speculative and did not prejudice the jury’s decision. The court also held that Corbi forfeited his Racial Justice Act claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. Finally, the court concluded that the trial court properly imposed the firearm enhancement, as it had discretion to impose or dismiss the enhancement and had considered the relevant mitigating factors. The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Corbi" on Justia Law