Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Nijmeddin was sentenced to an indeterminate life term, consecutive to a determinate term, for murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of narcotics. In 2023, the Department of Corrections recommended that the court recall Nijmeddin’s sentence under the new compassionate release provisions, Penal Code 1172.2, that apply to defendants who have “serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory,” creating a “presumption favoring recall and resentencing . . . which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”Nijmeddin has advanced incurable pancreatic cancer, biliary adenocarcinoma, and other medical conditions. Nijmeddin is foregoing chemotherapy treatment. Nijmeddin, 65 years old, has committed prison rules violations, including fighting and violent threats. Nijmeddin’s doctor testified Nijmeddin “is barely able to get out of" his wheelchair and estimated Nijmeddin has three-six months to live. Nijmeddin’s brother, an attorney, is willing to be Nijmeddin’s caregiver. The court observed, “Nijmeddin looks quite good. … the doctors may say that he is terminally ill, he is not on that far end.” The court characterized Nijmeddin as “able to use his mental capacity to commit offenses” and declined to recall Nijmeddin’s sentence, finding that he poses an unreasonable risk to public safety.The Attorney General conceded that the court erred and that Nijmeddin is entitled to relief. The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to immediately enter an order recalling Nijmeddin’s sentence. View "Nijmeddin v. Superior Court of Monterey County" on Justia Law

Moss Gropen brought suit against, among other defendants, Cyrus Shabrang and Michael Noud (together, Real Parties in Interest) arising out of Gropen’s treatment at a hospital. Gropen appeared at the noticed deposition with his wife Laura Gropen. Defense counsel objected to Laura’s presence at the deposition because she was a percipient witness in the action and could be deposed in the future. Gropen’s deposition did not proceed beyond the parties stating their objections on the record. Real Parties in Interest subsequently filed a motion for protective order and sanctions, asking the court to exclude Laura from Gropen’s deposition. At the hearing on the motion, for the first time, Gropen’s counsel explicitly requested under California Rules of Court, rule 1.100, that accommodations be provided to Gropen because he was suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a recognized disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The court acknowledged that PTSD fell under the ADA but found Gropen’s request for an accommodation untimely. It thus granted the protective order and sanctioned Gropen. Gropen petitioned for a writ of mandate, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion in granting the protective order and erred by not considering the evidence that Gropen was diagnosed with PTSD. Gropen also maintained that his request that Laura attend his deposition was a reasonable accommodation. The Court of Appeal concluded Gropen’s request for accommodation was timely, the district court abused its discretion by failing to remand the matter to the superior court with instructions to deny the motion for a protective order and sanctions, and to properly consider Gropen’s request under Rule 1.100. View "Gropen v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 1988, Kerins was convicted of sodomy with a person under 18, a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) qualifying offense. In 1998, Kerins pleaded guilty to two counts of annoying or molesting a child under 18. The trial court sentenced him to 13 years in prison. Before Kerins’s scheduled release date in 2006, two psychologists concluded Kerins met the SVP criteria, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(a). After his probable cause hearing there were multiple continuances, reevaluations, and substitutions of attorney. In November 2020. Kerins filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the People did not bring him to trial in a timely manner and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.The trial court denied the petition in November 2021, describing the delay as “considerable,” but finding that the “overwhelming reason” for the delay was that Kerins’s counsel sought “continuance after continuance.” The court further observed that Kerins did not assert his right to a speedy trial until 2019 and that nothing indicated Kerins’s defense had been impaired. The court of appeal upheld the decision. The court’s findings about the reasons for the delays and concerning prejudice were supported by substantial evidence. Kerins offered no evidence to rebut the presumption that his attorneys provided reasonable assistance. View "In re Kerins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the State of California, and Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra in their capacities as the current and former Attorney General after a federally licensed firearms dealer refused to complete Plaintiff’s purchase of an antique shotgun. Plaintiff alleged the dealer had received a letter from the Department pursuant to section 28220, subdivision (f)(4), advising it that the Department had been unable within the statutory period to ascertain Plaintiff’s eligibility to purchase the firearm. Although the Department’s letter, in accordance with section 28220, subdivision (f)(4), authorized the immediate transfer of the firearm to Plaintiff at the dealer’s discretion, the dealer elected not to do so, telling Plaintiff it was unwilling to “take the risk.” In his operative second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged a federal civil rights claim and requested declaratory relief.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained Plaintiff’s causes of action are premised on the contention that section 28220, subdivision (f)(4), violates the Second Amendment or is preempted by federal law. Both arguments are wrong as a matter of law. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated how his complaint could be amended to state viable claims, the trial court did not err in sustaining the State’s demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend. View "Regina v. State of California" on Justia Law

In 2014, Lopez became the manager at La Casa’s domestic violence shelter. In 2016, Lopez gave birth and experienced complications. She provided La Casa with certifications relating to her condition. Lopez alleged La Casa sent harassing communications, failed to engage in an interactive process to determine if Lopez’s disability could be accommodated, and refused to provide “modest” accommodations suggested by Lopez’s doctor. Lopez alleged that her efforts to return to work were “rebuffed,” so she was forced out of her job, and that she was denied a job elsewhere because La Casa misrepresented the reasons for her termination.The court of appeal affirmed a judgment in favor of La Casa. A claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code 12945(a)(3)(A), requires proof that the plaintiff had a condition related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition; the plaintiff requested accommodation of this condition, with the advice of her health care provider; the plaintiff’s employer refused to provide a reasonable accommodation; and with the reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff could have performed the essential functions of the job. The trial court correctly applied those elements, properly placing the burden on Lopez to prove that she had a condition related to pregnancy and that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation. View "Lopez v. La Casa de Las Madres" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed sexual harassment, failure to prevent sexual harassment, wrongful constructive termination, discrimination, and retaliation actions against her former employer, Rite Aid Corporation and Thrifty Payless, Inc., dba Rite Aid. Plaintiff’s lawsuit stemmed from an offsite and after-hours text exchange she had with a Rite Aid district manager in which the latter sent lewd photographs to her. Plaintiff and the district manager knew each other and were friends from a time before Plaintiff started working at Rite Aid. The Rite Aid defendants brought a summary judgment motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Rite Aid defendants as to all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of material fact with respect to the required showing that her manager was acting in the capacity of a supervisor in the text exchange in which he sent the inappropriate texts. Rather, as the trial court found, Plaintiff and the manager had “an extensive texting relationship,” and their January 4, 2019, late-night text exchange, which “occurred outside the workplace and outside of work hours,” was “spawned from a personal exchange that arose from a friendship between [them].” Summary judgment is, therefore, proper as to Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims. Further, the court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that “as opposed to a constructive termination, the evidence shows that Plaintiff resigned her position.” View "Atalla v. Rite Aid Corporation" on Justia Law

This writ proceeding involves a statutory challenge for cause filed against a trial court judge presiding over a wrongful termination lawsuit. The parties are Plaintiff and his former employer, Defendant Bassett Unified School District. Following a multimillion-dollar jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff, the trial judge in this action, Honorable Stephanie Bowick, received a text message from another judge on the court, Honorable Rupert Byrdsong. According to Judge Bowick, Judge Byrdsong had previously informed Judge Bowick that attorneys from his former firm were trying the case. Pointing to Judge Byrdsong’s apparent support for Plaintiff and the resulting verdict in Plaintiff’s favor, the school district sought Judge Bowick’s disqualification, asserting that a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. The disqualification motion was assigned to Orange County Superior Court Judge Maria D. Hernandez. The assigned judge denied the disqualification motion. Defendant sought review by petition for writ of mandate   The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court held that the disqualification motion was properly denied. The court reasoned that there is no adverse inference arising from Judge Bowick’s final ruling on the evidentiary issue. Further, the court found that the facts Judge Bowick disclosed do not require disqualification. Moreover, the court wrote, the timing of Judge Bowick’s disclosure does not suggest an appearance of bias. View "Bassett Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In May 2020, the state transferred 194 inmates from CIM to San Quentin. The transferees were at risk of developing serious symptoms of COVID-19 (persons over the age of 65 and/or with underlying medical conditions); although they had tested negative two weeks prior, several had COVID-19 at the time of the transfer. Some exhibited symptoms before exiting the transfer bus. San Quentin then had no COVID-19 cases among its prisoner population. A month later, at least 1,400 inmates, including Malear, were diagnosed with COVID-19. Several inmates have died from it. Malear filed a putative class action, alleging failure to take reasonable action to summon medical care for prisoners who were in immediate need. The trial court dismissed, holding that Malear had not complied with the Government Claims Act, having filed suit before the rejection of his government claim.The court of appeal reversed, Although Malear filed suit before the denial of his government claim, he filed an amended complaint as of right after the denial and before the defendants were served with the original complaint or appeared in the action. The amended complaint alleged denial of his claim. Malear has established substantial compliance with the statutory requirement. Assuming the truth of the material allegations in the amended complaint, Malear has stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; the complaint does not disclose the existence of a statutory immunity defense as a matter of law. View "Malear v. State of California" on Justia Law

Over the objection of 12-year-old M.M.’s mother (“mother”), the juvenile court authorized the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services or the congregate care facility where M.M. was placed to vaccinate the child against the SARS-CoV-2 virus once his pediatrician approved. Several weeks later mother asked the court to rescind its order, explaining in greater detail her religious objection to M.M. receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition, finding insufficient evidence it was in the child’s best interest not to be vaccinated.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record at the section 388 hearing amply justified the court’s conclusion it would not be in M.M.’s best interest to revoke the vaccination order despite mother’s unsupported concerns about possible adverse side effects. As established by the Department’s response to mother’s petition, COVID-19 was one of the ten leading causes of death for children as of October 2021, COVID-19 infections were then increasing, M.M. was in contact with multiple individuals at his placement and his school, the Pfizer vaccine had been found safe for children his age and M.M.’s pediatrician had determined there were no known contraindications to M.M. receiving the vaccine. Moreover, as discussed, M.M. was not averse to receiving the vaccination, leaving it to the court to decide. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude its authorization to vaccinate M.M. should stand. View "In re Matthew M." on Justia Law

In consolidated proceedings, Petitioners each sought a writ requiring the Superior Court to dismiss their cases for violating their speedy trial rights under Penal Code section 1382.2. Petitioners argued there was no good cause to continue their cases past the statutory deadline because the Superior Court can no longer rely on the “exceptional circumstances” resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.The court of appeal denied the petitions. The pandemic and its adverse impacts on the courts did not end when the courts reopened; courts had to address both the backlog that had developed during the closure of the courts and new cases. Although the courts reopened, the pandemic continued to wreak havoc, with 36 judicial officers, court staff, sheriff’s deputies, attorneys, defendants, and jurors contracting COVID-19, being required to quarantine due to exposure, or having to care for family members. The persistence of a backlog during the period at issue was principally the result of continuing consequences of the pandemic. Not only the pandemic, itself, but its length, seriousness, and continuing effects were unexpected and unanticipated and resulted in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. The Superior Court did not, in these cases, abuse its discretion in concluding that exceptional circumstances justified the continuance of Petitioners’ trials past their statutory last days. View "Estrada v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law