Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Relying on New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. __ (2022), individuals charged in California with unlawfully possessing a handgun have contended that their charges and resulting convictions were unconstitutional. They argued, unsuccessfully, that Bruen rendered California’s entire licensing scheme facially unconstitutional, and as a result, it was unconstitutional to punish nonfelons such as them for carrying a firearm in public solely because they did not have a license. Defendants-respondents Jaime Mosqueda and Juanita Mosqueda successfully raised the same contention against their unlawful possession charges by demurrer in the trial court. The Court of Appeal determined defendants had standing to raise the defense by demurrer, but also that Bruen did not render California’s entire licensing scheme or the charges against them unconstitutional. The offending “good cause” requirement was severable from the remainder of the licensing statute, as was the “good moral character” element which, for the sake of argument, presumed to violate the test laid down in Bruen. "Bruen is also not grounds for a facial attack on the discretionary nature of California’s licensing scheme, and it did not invalidate any of the other licensing provisions in [Penal Code] section 26150." The Court reversed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal, which concluded otherwise. View "California v. Mosqueda" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jefferey Lurner was a member of Marbella Golf and Country Club (Marbella) where he played golf. Defendants American Golf Corporation and Root’N USA Corporation owned and operated Marbella. At some point after plaintiff joined Marbella, he was diagnosed with pulmonary arterial hypertension (PAH). Given this disability, plaintiff claimed he had to drive his golf cart to wherever his ball landed on the golf course. But for safety reasons, Marbella had rules governing where golfers could drive their golf carts. Some of those restrictions applied to all members, including golfers with disabilities. Plaintiff filed suit alleging defendants failed to accommodate his disability and denied him full and equal enjoyment of the golf course. After the case proceeded to trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants. The jury found defendants did not “discriminate against or deny [plaintiff] full and equal access to and enjoyment of accommodations or advantages or facilities or services at [Marbella] at any time after May 14, 2016.” The court subsequently denied plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and motion for new trial. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court: "Assuming, without deciding, Marbella’s policies had a discriminatory effect in practice, there was substantial evidence defendants modified their policies for plaintiff. Any error regarding the testimony of defendants’ expert witness also did not result in a miscarriage of justice. We therefore affirm the judgment." View "Lurner v. American Golf Corp." on Justia Law

California State University’s (CSU) hired Plaintiff as the director of university communications of California State University at Northridge’s Marketing and Communications Department (the Department). The VP testified that after speaking with employees while investigating complaints against Plaintiff, he determined that Plaintiff could not be an effective department leader because he disregarded CSU’s direction regarding professionalism; staff could not work with him; and subordinates were intimidated and threatened by him. Plaintiff filed a complaint against CSU alleging gender, race, color, and sexual orientation discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); race, gender, and sexual orientation harassment; and failure to prevent harassment and discrimination. CSU filed a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. The trial court entered the order granting summary judgment to Defendants and Plaintiff appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court found that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s discrimination claims. The court explained that CSU established a legitimate reason for the termination. Moreover, the court held that Plaintiff failed to submit evidence that creates a dispute of material fact as to pretext. Similarily, the court explained that Plaintiff has not established a dispute of fact regarding whether CSU’s internal investigation was pretextual. The court wrote that Plaintiff failed to produce substantial evidence of any bias in the E&D investigation, and his statistical evidence is not probative of discriminatory motive. Further, Plaintiff’s evidence of CSU’s commitment to diversity does not create a triable issue of discriminatory motive. View "Martin v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. State University" on Justia Law

The court awarded Plaintiff fees after he prevailed on one of his six causes of action against his former employer ExakTime Innovations, Inc., on his complaint for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and related causes of action. The jury awarded Plaintiff $130,088 in damages on his claim ExakTime failed to engage in a good faith interactive process with him. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s order awarding him $686,795.62 in attorney fees after the court applied a .4 negative multiplier to its $1,144,659.36 adjusted lodestar calculation “to account for [p]laintiff’s counsel’s . . . lack of civility throughout the entire course of this litigation.” Plaintiff contends the $457,863 reduction in attorney fees based on his counsel’s incivility must be reversed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court agreed with the trial court that it may consider an attorney’s pervasive incivility in determining the reasonableness of the requested fees. A court may apply, in its discretion, a positive or negative multiplier to adjust the lodestar calculation—a reasonable rate times a reasonable number of hours—to account for various factors, including attorney skill. The court explained that the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff’s counsel was repeatedly, and apparently intentionally, uncivil to defense counsel—and to the court— throughout the litigation. View "Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations" on Justia Law

This is an appeal from an order granting Defendants Seyfarth Shaw LLP (Seyfarth) and Colleen Regan a portion of the fees they requested pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.161 (the anti-SLAPP2 statute) and resulting judgment. The trial court awarded the fees without finally ruling on Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike. Plaintiffs immediately thereafter dismissed their complaint. Plaintiffs appealed the fee award on three general theories. Defendants cross-appealed. They argue the trial court should have awarded all the fees they requested, not just a portion of those fees, because all of Plaintiffs’ claims were based on conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, no exceptions applied, and their request was reasonable.   The Second Appellate District affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that it agreed with Defendants that their motion to strike was wholly meritorious and their fee request therefore should not have been reduced on the grounds that they would have prevailed only partially on their motion. The court disagreed with Plaintiffs that the trial court erred in the ways they claimed. The court explained that under Coltrain, Defendants prevailed because plaintiffs dismissed their suit and failed to show it was for reasons unrelated to lack of merit. Further, under Liu, Defendants were the prevailing party because their Anti-SLAPP motion was entirely meritorious. View "Ross v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed the nursing facility where she worked as an aide for nine years was so chronically understaffed that she never took a rest break and frequently had to work through her meal breaks. After her termination, Plaintiff brought a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) against Respondents Southland Management LLC and The Ensign Group Inc. Respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring a representative PAGA action. The trial court granted summary judgment on a different issue, holding that Plaintiff had not offered any “competent proof that one or more cognizable Labor Code violations occurred during her employment in connection with her right to meal and rest periods.” The court entered a judgment of dismissal, and Plaintiff appealed.The Second Appellate District reversed. The court concluded that Respondents did not produce sufficient evidence to meet their initial burden of production on the standing issue, i.e., that Plaintiff had not suffered a Labor Code violation during her employment. The court explained that Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that “scheduling and understaffing issues, high patient-to-nurse ratio, and a heavy workload” made it functionally impossible for her to take meal and rest breaks. Respondents’ moving papers did not address or negate those allegations. Because Respondents did not furnish evidence tending to negate Plaintiff’s allegations that their practices conflicted with their written break policies, they did not meet their initial burden of production, and summary judgment should have been denied. View "Arce v. The Ensign Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In October 2021, L.O. petitioned for a restraining order against Defendant pursuant to section 527.6. The petition alleged that Defendant had been harassing L.O. because she is transgender by, among other things, posting disturbing YouTube videos about her, using a cell phone to film her, and committing an assault against her. The court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) pending an evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing at which L.O. and Defendant testified, the trial court found that L.O.’s testimony was “credible” and that Defendant had demonstrated “that he does, in general, have animus towards transgender people.” Accordingly, the court issued a five-year restraining order in favor of L.O. in accordance with section 527.6. The same day that the restraining order was issued on behalf of L.O., the City petitioned for a workplace violence restraining order against Defendant on behalf of five City employees pursuant to section 527.8. Defendant contends that both restraining orders were erroneously issued.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court wrote that it agreed with respondents that Defendant had forfeited his contentions by failing to comply with the applicable rules of appellate procedure. The court explained that Defendant’s briefs do not properly cite the record and are replete with unsupported legal and factual assertions. Because Defendant failed to appropriately cite the record, he forfeited any argument that the challenged orders were erroneously issued. Moreover, the court wrote that Defendant’s briefs do not set forth all the evidence upon which both restraining orders are based. View "L.O. v. Kilrain" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his conviction, by jury, of the attempted willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder and fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly. It acquitted Appellant of a second count of attempted murder on the same victim. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison plus a 20-year enhancement term for the firearm use and a concurrent term of 27 months on the evading conviction. Appellant contends that numerous evidentiary, procedural, and instructional errors occurred at his trial. Further, the court noted that a primary issue is the contention that the prosecutor violated the RJA, section 745 and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue at the sentencing hearing.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court concluded that the Legislature acted within its law-making authority when it declared in the RJA that the use of racially discriminatory language in a criminal trial constitutes a miscarriage of justice, that the prosecutor violated the statute when she referred to Appellant’s complexion and “ambiguous ethnic presentation” as reasons to doubt his credibility, and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to bring this statutory violation to the attention of the trial court at the earliest possible opportunity. The court found that because Appellant’s trial counsel failed to raise the violation at the sentencing hearing, the trial court has not yet had the opportunity to exercise its discretion to select which of the enumerated remedies it would impose. Consequently, the court remanded the matter to the trial court so it may exercise its discretion in this regard. View "P. v. Simmons" on Justia Law

In 2020, Lafayette City Councilmember and former Mayor, Burks, and his wife, Ackley, hosted an open house in their home in support of a school bond measure. The invitation stated Burks was “hosting this event as an individual resident of Lafayette and a father of school-aged children.” Peterson attended and had an “odd” and “stilted” conversation with Ackley in which Peterson referred to Ackley's birthday. Peterson later reposted on his Facebook page a family photo from Ackley’s public Facebook page. In the comments, Peterson wondered where they hid the girls during the open house. He mused, “They live near Burton Valley School … Burks, has a different name than his wife, I wonder what their daughters’ last name is?” Burks felt Peterson “could be a threat” to his wife and daughters. Later, Ackley received a “confusing” letter and check in the mail from Peterson, again mentioning the daughters. The rambling letter was a screed against local politics.Peterson was convicted of stalking and sentenced to two years of probation, with one year of home confinement. The court of appeal reversed. Peterson’s speech acts were constitutionally protected activities. A reasonable listener would not have found Peterson’s speech or speech-related acts a true threat of violence. View "People v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Liapes filed a class action against Facebook, alleging it does not provide women and older people equal access to insurance ads. The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits businesses from discriminating against people with protected characteristics (Civ. Code 51, 51.5, 52(a)). Liapes alleged Facebook requires all advertisers to choose the age and gender of users who will receive ads; companies offering insurance products routinely tell it to not send their ads to women or older people. She further alleged Facebook’s ad-delivery algorithm discriminates against women and older people.The trial court dismissed, finding Facebook’s tools neutral on their face and concluding that Facebook was immune under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230. The court of appeal reversed. Liapes has stated an Unruh Act claim. Facebook, a business establishment, does not dispute women and older people were categorically excluded from receiving various insurance ads. Facebook, not the advertisers, classifies users based on their age and gender via the algorithm. The complaint also stated a claim under an aiding and abetting theory of liability An interactive computer service provider only has immunity if it is not also the content provider. That advertisers are the content providers does not preclude Facebook from also being a content provider by helping develop at least part of the information at issue. View "Liapes v. Facebook, Inc." on Justia Law