Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Khyle Armando Briscoe, then 21, participated in a robbery with Shaun P. During the robbery, Briscoe and Shaun P. both had guns. A struggle ensued, resulting in Ben P., the robbery victim, fatally shooting Shaun P. Briscoe was charged with first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary, with firearm-use enhancements and a special circumstance of murder during a robbery and burglary. A jury convicted Briscoe on all counts, and he was sentenced to life without parole.Briscoe filed a motion in 2022 for a parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, which allows certain youth offenders to seek parole but excludes those sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder. He argued that this exclusion violated equal protection under the California and U.S. Constitutions. The trial court denied his motion, adhering to the majority view that section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Briscoe appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court noted that section 3051’s exclusion of youth offenders sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder was previously upheld in People v. Hardin. However, Briscoe raised a narrower challenge, arguing that excluding youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for special circumstance murder, while including those convicted of first-degree felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3), violated equal protection. The court agreed, finding no rational basis for treating these equally culpable offenders differently.The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for a Franklin proceeding and a section 3051 parole hearing, holding that section 3051’s exclusion of youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for murder during a robbery or burglary violated equal protection. View "People v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

Deari Cole was committed to a developmental center under California's Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500, which allows for the commitment of individuals with developmental disabilities who pose a danger to themselves or others. Near the end of his commitment period, a petition to extend his commitment was filed, but it was too late for a trial to occur before the original commitment expired. Cole was held pending trial and subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus, arguing that equal protection principles required his release pending trial.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially found Cole incompetent to stand trial on charges including felony possession of a firearm and second-degree burglary. He was committed to the Porterville Developmental Center for one year. Two days before this commitment was set to expire, the People filed a petition to extend it, and the court ordered Cole held pending trial on the recommitment petition. Cole's petition for writ of mandate and/or habeas corpus was summarily denied by the Court of Appeal, but the California Supreme Court directed the appellate court to issue an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and rejected Cole's equal protection argument. The court held that the statutory scheme under section 6500, which allows for continued confinement pending a hearing on a recommitment petition, did not violate equal protection principles. The court reasoned that the differences between individuals with developmental disabilities and those with mental health disorders justified the disparate treatment. The court concluded that the legislative distinctions were reasonable and factually based, and thus, Cole's continued confinement pending trial was constitutionally permissible. The petition was ultimately dismissed as moot. View "Cole v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

George Loy Clarke challenged the California Department of Motor Vehicles' (DMV) decision to suspend his driver’s license following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). Clarke argued that the DMV's administrative hearing violated due process and that his refusal to submit to a breath or blood test should be excused. The DMV had conducted an administrative per se (APS) hearing, which led to the suspension of Clarke’s license.The Superior Court of Orange County initially denied Clarke’s petition for a writ of mandate, which sought to overturn the DMV’s decision. Clarke’s first APS hearing resulted in a suspension, but the trial court later granted his petition for a writ of mandate, remanding the case for a new hearing. At the second hearing, Clarke contested the allegations of refusal to submit to a chemical test. Despite his objections, the hearing officer (HO) admitted the DMV’s evidence and ultimately reimposed the suspension.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the DMV’s practice of having a single employee act as both advocate and adjudicator during the APS hearing violated due process, as established in California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles and Knudsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The court concluded that the HO in Clarke’s case failed to separate her roles adequately, resulting in a due process violation. This constituted structural error, necessitating a reversal of the trial court’s denial of Clarke’s petition.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case, directing the lower court to grant Clarke’s petition for a writ of mandate. The court also denied requests for judicial notice and to augment the record, leaving those issues to be addressed in a potential new APS hearing. View "Clarke v. Gordon" on Justia Law

In 1987, Michael Hill was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. Hill maintained that the murders were committed by Michael McCray, whose statements to the police incriminated both himself and Hill. McCray did not testify at trial, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination, but his statements were admitted under the hearsay rule. Decades later, Hill discovered that the prosecution had failed to disclose a promise not to prosecute McCray for his involvement in the case. Hill filed a habeas corpus petition alleging violations of Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois.The trial court dismissed Hill’s claims, finding he failed to establish a prima facie case. The court concluded that the evidence against Hill was overwhelming and that the failure to disclose the non-prosecution agreement did not undermine confidence in the verdict. The court also found that Hill did not plead that false evidence was presented to the jury, as required under Napue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that Hill established a prima facie case for both Brady and Napue violations. The court noted that McCray’s testimony at the preliminary hearing was misleading and that the prosecution’s suppression of the non-prosecution agreement allowed McCray to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, leading to the admission of his statements without cross-examination. The court concluded that the suppressed evidence was material and could have affected the jury’s verdict. The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the trial court to issue an order to show cause. View "In re Hill" on Justia Law

In 2017, a minor admitted to two counts of assault with intent to commit rape and was initially placed in a Level B program. Due to multiple probation violations, the juvenile court later committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in 2019. After being discharged from DJJ in April 2023, the juvenile court imposed a probation condition requiring the minor to register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290.008. The minor appealed, arguing that this requirement violated his equal protection rights because it treated him differently from minors who committed similar offenses after the juvenile justice realignment, which closed DJJ and transferred responsibilities to county facilities.The Superior Court of Sacramento County upheld the probation condition, rejecting the minor's equal protection argument. The court found that the sex offender registration requirement did not involve a loss of liberty and thus did not implicate a fundamental right, applying the rational basis standard of review. The court reasoned that the Legislature could have determined that minors in county facilities have a lower risk of recidivism due to more effective treatment, justifying the differential treatment.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the rational basis standard applied because the sex offender registration requirement did not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification. The court found that a rational basis existed for the differential treatment, as the Legislature could have reasonably concluded that minors already in DJJ custody posed a higher risk of recidivism and required continued registration to protect public safety. Thus, the court found no equal protection violation and affirmed the dispositional order. View "People v. I.B." on Justia Law

In 1997, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder with a firearm enhancement and sentenced to 15 years to life, plus an additional 10 years. In January 2020, he filed a petition under former section 1170.95, which was summarily denied. In January 2023, he filed a motion for relief under section 745 of the California Racial Justice Act (RJA), claiming racial bias in his conviction and sentence. The trial court denied the motion, citing improper service and failure to state a violation of the RJA.The defendant appealed, arguing that he made a prima facie case for a hearing under section 745 and that the denial violated his equal protection rights. The People contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion and that the denial was not erroneous. The defendant countered that his motion was authorized under section 745, subdivision (b).The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the defendant's motion was prematurely filed under the RJA’s phased-in retroactivity provisions. Specifically, the court noted that the defendant's case fell within the last phase of eligibility for relief, commencing January 1, 2026. As a result, the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to consider the motion, rendering its order void. The appellate court vacated the trial court's order and dismissed the appeal. View "People v. Vigil" on Justia Law

Jermaine Randy Howard was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting a man at an unlicensed nightclub in San Jose. Howard claimed he acted in self-defense, but the jury rejected this defense. Before sentencing, Howard filed a motion alleging the prosecutor violated the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) by questioning him about his connection to East Palo Alto, which he argued was racially biased. The trial court denied the motion, finding Howard failed to make a prima facie showing of an RJA violation, and sentenced him to 19 years to life in prison.Howard appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his RJA motion and that the prosecutor's cross-examination and closing arguments violated the RJA and his due process rights. He also contended that the jury instructions misstated the law regarding murder, imperfect self-defense, and heat of passion, cumulatively prejudicing his defense.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in concluding Howard had not made a prima facie showing of an RJA violation regarding the prosecutor's cross-examination about East Palo Alto. The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on Howard's RJA motion. The court rejected Howard's claims of instructional error, finding the jury instructions correctly stated the law and did not mislead the jury about the prosecution's burden of proof.The appellate court's main holding was that Howard made a prima facie showing of an RJA violation, warranting a hearing on his motion. The court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, affirming the conviction and sentence otherwise. If the trial court denies relief on remand, the judgment will be reinstated; if relief is granted, further proceedings will follow. View "People v. Howard" on Justia Law

Eddie Sorto was sentenced to over 100 years in prison for crimes committed at age 15, including first-degree murder, second-degree murder, assault, and shooting at an occupied vehicle. The jury found multiple special-circumstance allegations and enhancements true. After serving 15 years, Sorto petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP) and thus entitled him to relief under equal protection principles.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Sorto’s petition, stating that he was not eligible for relief under section 1170(d) because he had not been sentenced to an explicit LWOP term. The court did not address Sorto’s equal protection argument directly but noted that he was eligible for parole after 25 years under section 3051, which it found sufficient to deny the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that juvenile offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms are entitled to relief under section 1170(d) based on equal protection guarantees. The court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the case People v. Heard was wrongly decided and contrary to California Supreme Court precedent. The court also held that parole eligibility under section 3051 does not render offenders ineligible for relief under section 1170(d).The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of Sorto’s petition and remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether Sorto meets the other requirements for relief under section 1170(d). View "People v. Sorto" on Justia Law

Kathleen Saurman, who had mobility impairments, fell on a small stairway at a restaurant while celebrating her 60th birthday. She subsequently died from an infection following surgery for a broken hip. Her husband, Robert, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the restaurant's former owner and later sued the current owner, Peter’s Landing Property Owner LLC, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the Disabled Persons Act (DPA).The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the current owner, finding that Robert lacked standing to bring an ADA claim for injunctive relief and had not provided evidence of any act or omission by the current owner. The court also imposed nearly $100,000 in sanctions against Robert’s attorney for pursuing what it deemed a frivolous lawsuit.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that under California law, a successor in interest has standing to bring an ADA claim for injunctive relief in state court, even if federal standing requirements are not met. The court also found that there was a triable issue of fact regarding the current owner’s compliance with the Unruh Act and the DPA, as the property remained in the same condition as when Kathleen fell. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment on the ADA, Unruh Act, and DPA claims but affirmed the summary judgment on the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The court also reversed the sanctions against Robert’s attorney and denied the current owner’s motion for sanctions for a frivolous appeal. View "Saurman v. Peter's Landing Property Owner, LLC" on Justia Law

Harry Malbry, who was convicted in 1991 for committing lewd acts on a child, sought to terminate his obligation to register as a sex offender. His offenses involved daily sexual abuse of a five-year-old girl over three years. After serving a six-year prison term, he was released and required to register annually as a sex offender. In 2022, Malbry petitioned the trial court to end his registration duty, citing his crime-free record since 1991 as evidence that he no longer posed a danger to the community.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Malbry’s petition, emphasizing that community safety would be significantly enhanced by his continued registration. The court highlighted the persistence and severity of his offenses, his lack of insight into his actions, and his exploitation of a trusting child. The court also noted that Malbry had not sought any professional help or therapy to address his behavior.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court considered several factors, including the nature and facts of the offense, the age of the victim, and Malbry’s lack of participation in a certified sex offender treatment program. The court also noted that legislative changes, such as the enactment of section 288.7, which mandates lifetime registration for similar offenses, underscored the heightened danger posed by Malbry’s conduct. The court concluded that continuing Malbry’s registration as a sex offender significantly enhances community safety, given the severity and persistence of his past offenses and his lack of demonstrated rehabilitation. View "People v. Malbry" on Justia Law