Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Liapes filed a class action against Facebook, alleging it does not provide women and older people equal access to insurance ads. The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits businesses from discriminating against people with protected characteristics (Civ. Code 51, 51.5, 52(a)). Liapes alleged Facebook requires all advertisers to choose the age and gender of users who will receive ads; companies offering insurance products routinely tell it to not send their ads to women or older people. She further alleged Facebook’s ad-delivery algorithm discriminates against women and older people.The trial court dismissed, finding Facebook’s tools neutral on their face and concluding that Facebook was immune under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230. The court of appeal reversed. Liapes has stated an Unruh Act claim. Facebook, a business establishment, does not dispute women and older people were categorically excluded from receiving various insurance ads. Facebook, not the advertisers, classifies users based on their age and gender via the algorithm. The complaint also stated a claim under an aiding and abetting theory of liability An interactive computer service provider only has immunity if it is not also the content provider. That advertisers are the content providers does not preclude Facebook from also being a content provider by helping develop at least part of the information at issue. View "Liapes v. Facebook, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Dominick Martin and Rusty Rendon filed suit under the Unruh Civil Rights Act for disability discrimination, contending that one of Thi E-Commerce’s Web sites discriminated against the blind by being incompatible with screen reading software. Plaintiffs contended the court erred by concluding that a Web site was not a place of public accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (incorporated into the Unruh Act). Although this was an issue that has split the federal courts (and California Courts of Appeal), the appellate court here concluded the ADA unambiguously applied only to physical places. Moreover, even if the Court found ambiguity and decided the issue on the basis of legislative history and public policy, it would still conclude that the ADA did not apply to Web sites. Plaintiffs alternatively contended they stated a cause of action against Thi E-Commerce on a theory of intentional discrimination. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded the allegations of the complaint did not state a claim under that theory either and affirmed the judgment. View "Martin v. THI E-Commerce, LLC" on Justia Law

San Francisco Officer Gunn testified that he observed a Buick parked in a “known high-crime area” and ran a license plate check, which came back as belonging to an Acura. Finley, who is Black, stepped out of the vehicle with his wife. Finley stated that they had recently purchased the vehicle and provided title and registration information, establishing the car was not stolen. After obtaining Finley’s driver’s license, Gunn learned that Finley was on federal probation with a search clause. Gunn searched the vehicle and retrieved a backpack, containing a loaded handgun without a serial number.Finley alleged a violation of the Racial Justice Act (Penal Code 745(a)(1)). The prosecution noted that the Supreme Court has stated that an area’s reputation for criminal activity is an appropriate consideration in determining the reasonableness of investigative detention and that it is “common practice” for an officer to run a query of a person’s name. The trial court concluded that Finley did not establish a prima facie violation of the Racial Justice Act under the totality of the circumstances, noting that the officer was courteous.The court of appeal ordered a rehearing. The trial court’s review of Finley’s motion went beyond the confines of determining whether it stated a prima facie case. The focus at this stage of the proceedings should be on Finley’s allegations and supporting evidence, not evidence supporting the prosecution’s argument. View "Finley v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

When the Covid pandemic struck, the California State University (CSU) directed that instruction be provided remotely. To provide such instruction, Plaintiff, a biology professor at CSU-Los Angeles, incurred expenses that CSU refused to reimburse for a computer and other equipment. Plaintiff sued CSU’s board of trustees on behalf of himself and similarly situated faculty, alleging Labor Code section 2802 obligated CSU to reimburse employees for necessary work-related expenses. CSU demurred, arguing that as a department of the state, it enjoys broad exemption from Labor Code provisions that infringe on its sovereign powers. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained CSU’s demurrer without leave to amend.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that absent express words or positive indicia to the contrary, a governmental agency is not within the general words of a statute. The court further wrote that although this exemption is limited to cases where the application of the statute would impair the entity’s sovereignty, subjecting CSU to Labor Code section 2802, in this case, would do so because it would infringe on the broad discretion CSU enjoys under the Education Code to set its own equipment reimbursement policies. Further, the court noted that because CSU did not violate section 2802, Plaintiff is not an aggrieved employee for purposes of PAGA. His PAGA claim therefore fails with his section 2802 claim. View "Krug v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. State Univ." on Justia Law

In the midst of a group contacted by officers for smoking cannabis on the street, 16-year-old T.F.-G. witnessed first one and then another of his companions be restrained, searched, and made to sit on the curb as the officers worked their way through the group. T.F.-G. ran. Chased, tackled, and punched, he was arrested for resisting or delaying a peace officer (Pen. Code 148(a)). In a search incident to that arrest, the police found a loaded handgun in his pocket, which T.F.-G. was not licensed to carry.The court of appeal affirmed his convictions. The totality of the circumstances, establishing the existence of probable cause for his arrest for resisting or delaying a peace officer—the asserted basis for the eventual search that revealed his possession of a loaded handgun in public–indicated that a reasonable person in T.F.-G.’s position would have understood he was not free to leave. The court also rejected a Second Amendment facial challenge to the prohibition on the unlicensed public carrying of loaded firearms. Although California’s “good cause” licensing requirement is undisputedly unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s 2022 “Bruen” decision, the unconstitutionality of a discrete licensing requirement does not render section 25850 facially unconstitutional. View "In re T.F.-G." on Justia Law

The Center for Scientific Integrity (CSI) was an organization that reported on academic retractions and accountability. CSI wrote an article about plaintiff-respondent Constance Iloh, a professor at the University of California, Irvine (UCI), after several academic journals retracted articles Iloh had written due to concerns about possible plagiarism or inaccurate citation references. In a follow-up to that article, CSI sent UCI a records request under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) requesting Iloh’s postpublication communications with the journals and UCI. Iloh petitioned for a writ of mandate, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief against UCI to prevent disclosure of her communications, and later added CSI as a real party in interest. She then filed a motion for preliminary injunction to prevent disclosure. Meanwhile, CSI filed a motion to strike Iloh’s petition under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The Court of Appeal’s first opinion in this case concerned Iloh’s motion for preliminary injunction. The trial court denied that motion on the grounds that Iloh had not established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and the Court affirmed that order. In this case, the Court considered CSI’s anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding that although protected activity may have led to the petition, it was not the “basis” for the petition. To this, the Court disagreed: in issuing the CPRA request, CSI was engaging in newsgathering so it could report on matters of public interest, such as how a public university funded largely by taxpayer dollars resolved quality or integrity problems in its professors’ publications. CSI was therefore engaged in protected activity when it issued the CPRA request. Iloh filed her petition for mandamus relief to prevent UCI from complying with the CPRA request. “This is the type of lawsuit the anti-SLAPP statute is designed to address, and it should be stricken if Iloh cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her petition.” The Court of Appeal found the trial court had not performed the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Therefore, the Court reversed the order denying CSI’s anti-SLAPP motion and remanded this case with directions that the trial court consider prong two of the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Iloh v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied to the trial court in March 2022 to change his name. On the ground that Petitioner has “outstanding warrant(s),” the trial court denied Harris’s petition.   The Second Appellate District affirmed because there was no abuse of discretion. The court explained that by statute, it was proper for the trial court to check law enforcement records when considering Petitioner’s petition to change his name. The California Legislature has directed courts to use the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) to determine whether a name change applicant must register as a sex offender. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

In 2016, San Francisco voters amended their city charter to authorize voting in local school board elections by noncitizen parents and guardians of school-age children. In 2018, the Board of Supervisors enacted an ordinance implementing Proposition N, including provisions requiring the City’s Department of Elections to develop a noncitizen voter registration form for school board elections. In 2022, after multiple school board elections in which noncitizens voted, this lawsuit was brought alleging the charter amendment violated the California Constitution. The trial court granted found the effective ordinance void and unenforceableThe court of appeal reversed and awarded the city costs. Neither the plain language of the Constitution nor its history prohibits legislation expanding the electorate to noncitizens. The relevant constitutional provisions authorizing home rule permit charter cities to implement such an expansion in local school board elections. This authority is consistent with the principles underlying home rule and permits the voters of each charter city to determine whether it is good policy for their city or not. View "Lacy v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Kelsey Carpenter gave birth to a baby girl at home, alone, after deciding that she would not risk having her child removed from her custody as had happened with her two older children when they tested positive for drugs after being delivered at the hospital. She again used drugs during her pregnancy. After Carpenter’s daughter was born, the baby struggled to breathe, and Carpenter attempted to provide her with CPR. Carpenter also cut the baby’s umbilical cord but did not clamp it, and the umbilical stump continued to bleed. Carpenter bathed, diapered, clothed, and attempted to breastfeed the baby before seemingly passing out. When she woke up, her newborn daughter was dead. Before Health & Saf. Code, § 123467(a) was effective, the State charged Carpenter with implied malice murder and felony child endangerment, contending that Carpenter intentionally chose an unattended at-home delivery, despite being warned of the dangers, in an effort to evade child welfare services and at the risk of her daughter’s life. According to the State, Carpenter’s acts and omissions, including her failure to seek medical assistance after realizing her baby was in distress, caused the baby to bleed to death. Carpenter challenged the superior court’s order denying her motion to set aside the information for lack of probable cause under Penal Code section 995. She contended she was immune from prosecution based on the new law, which went into effect after the preliminary hearing, but before the superior court ruled on her section 995 motion. While the Court of Appeal agreed that Carpenter could not be prosecuted for her decision to have an unattended home birth or any effect that her alleged drug use or lack of prenatal care during pregnancy may have had on her baby, the law did not preclude the State's prosecution for her acts and omissions after her daughter was born alive. The Court therefore denied Carpenter's petition. View "Carpenter v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2001, G.A. was charged with lewd acts with a child, sexual battery by restraint, and false imprisonment. Finding G.A. incompetent to stand trial, the court committed G.A. to the Redwood Regional Center. G.A. never regained competency but was released and received services through the Center until 2008. In 2010, G.A. was charged with kidnapping with the intent to sexually assault, rape, annoy, or molest a child under the age of 10 and sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under the age of 10. Finding G.A. incompetent to stand trial, the court again committed him.A 2021 petition to extend G.A.’s commitment alleged that G.A. suffers from developmental disabilities and that he represents a danger to himself or to others. A psychologist, who evaluated G.A. several times, calculated G.A.’s I.Q. at 42 and testified that G.A. poses a danger to himself and to others, particularly children. The court continued the commitment.The court of appeal dismissed an appeal because the commitment order has expired. The court found that Welfare and Institutions Code 6500 does not violate due process by dispensing with the need for proof of a recent overt act of dangerousness but that substantial evidence did not support the finding of G.A.’s danger to others--it was based on the testimony of an expert witness who relied on unsupported assumptions of fact about G.A.’s offenses. The court noted significant ambiguity as to the meaning of “danger to self.” View "People v. G.A." on Justia Law