Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Avongard, d/b/a Hydraulx, filed suit against petitioner John Doe 2 for libel, alleging that Doe 2’s anonymous emails to a film producer and a film industry executive harmed its reputation. After Doe 2 filed a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the trial court granted Hydraulx’s request to conduct special discovery that would reveal Doe 2’s identity. Doe 2 filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking reversal of the discovery order. Under Krinsky v. Doe 6, First Amendment protection for anonymous speech requires a libel plaintiff seeking to discover an anonymous libel defendant’s identity to make a prima facie showing of all elements of defamation. Paterno v. Superior Court similarly holds that a libel plaintiff cannot establish good cause for special discovery under section 426.16, subdivision (g) without a prima facie showing the allegedly libelous statements are false and unprivileged. The court granted Doe 2's petition in this case, concluding that Hydraulx failed to make a prima facie showing that Doe 2’s emails are provably false and defamatory statements of fact or that the emails caused Hydraulx to suffer actual damage. View "Doe 2 v. Superior Court (Avongard Products)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Flowers, a parapalegic, along with his wife and stepsons, filed suit alleging violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code 512, and intentional infliction of emotional distress when defendants refused to rent them a room unless they first paid a non-refundable cleaning fee relating to their service dog. Because plaintiffs left the hotel without paying the fee, defendants argued, they did not have standing to assert an Unruh Act cause of action. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend. While the court agreed with the result of Surrey v. True Beginnings, the court concluded that its bright-line rule that, under the Unruh Act, a person must tender the purchase price for a business’s services or products in order to have standing to sue, is not applicable to the facts of this case. Section 52, which provides remedies for violations of the Unruh Act, states that any person aggrieved by conduct that violates the Unruh Act may bring a civil action. The court concluded that plaintiffs have stated facts sufficient to establish standing under the Act. The court held that a plaintiff is not required to pay a discriminatory fee to establish standing to sue under the Unruh Act, as long as the plaintiff alleges facts showing that he or she has directly experienced a denial of rights as defined in sections 51 and 52. In addition, when a disabled individual has standing to sue under section 52, subdivision (c), any person “associated with” that individual has standing if the associated person has also directly experienced the discriminatory conduct. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Osborne v. Yasmeh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the Department, alleging racial discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq. The trial court dismissed the complaint after sustaining a demurrer on the statute of limitations ground. The court agreed with plaintiff that the order sustaining the demurrer must be reversed because the complaint sufficiently alleges that the FEHA one-year limitations period was equitably tolled during the period of the EEOC investigation. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal and reinstated the first amended complaint. View "Mitchell v. Dept. of Public Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Paul Brodeur is a well-known author in the environmental field, pointing out health dangers of the use of various electrical devices and other household items. Defendants are producers and distributors of the motion picture American Hustle. A character in the film, Rosalyn, says that she read, in a magazine article by plaintiff, that a microwave oven takes all of the nutrition out of food. Based on Rosalyn's statement, plaintiff filed suit alleging causes of action for libel, defamation, slander and false light, asserting that he had never made the quoted statement. Plaintiff further alleged that, by misquoting him, defendants suggested to the movie audience that he made a scientifically unsupportable statement, damaging his reputation. The court held that plaintiff‘s causes of action arise from defendants‘ protected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, Code Civ. Proc. 425.16, subd.(b)(1), where plaintiff, by his own account, is a public figure, and the views expressed in his pioneering articles on the health hazards associated with exposure to microwave radiation were plainly a matter of public interest in the 1970‘s. Further, plaintiff's claims that the government safety standard for microwave ovens was inadequate have been rejected by numerous authorities. The court also concluded that plaintiff has failed to produce admissible evidence that, as his unverified complaint alleges, he has never written an article or ever declared in any way that a microwave takes all the nutrition out of food. Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying the motion to strike. View "Brodeur v. Atlas Entm't, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Deborah Moore appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendant The Regents of the University of California. Moore sued Defendant for claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the California Family Rights Act (CFRA). Moore began working in UCSD's Marketing and Communications Department (the Department) in 2008. In early September 2010, Moore was diagnosed with idiopathic cardiomyopathy. On or around September 10, 2010, Moore was prescribed and began wearing a heart monitor called a "LifeVest," a monitor and external defibrillator. Moore had to wear the "LifeVest" for two to three weeks. Moore testified that her relationship with the Department's new Executive Director, Kimberly Kennedy changed after Kennedy became aware of Moore's heart condition. Based on this perceived change, Moore believed that Kennedy did not like the fact that Moore had a heart condition. In approximately mid-November 2010, Kennedy demoted Moore, through a Department restructuring, to a new classification. Moore's new title became "Director of Marketing and Brand Management." Moore's salary did not change, but certain other benefits were reduced. On February 2, 2011, Kennedy sent an e-mail to Courtney Morris, a Director of Compensation and Benefits in the Human Resources Department, indicating that she wanted to eliminate Moore's position, effectively terminating Moore's employment, as of February 15, 2011. According to Kennedy, the job functions that Moore was performing had decreased to such a point that Kennedy could assume them, and therefore, Kennedy decided to eliminate Moore's position. Kennedy did not ask Moore if she would accept a pay reduction, nor did Kennedy consider Moore for a freelance position. There is no evidence that Kennedy offered Moore any of the positions that were filled around the time of, or after, her termination. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that summary judgment was improperly granted with respect to Moore's first, second, third, fifth and sixth causes of action. Summary adjudication in favor of Defendant was appropriate, however, with respect to Moore's fourth cause of action. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings in the trial court. View "Moore v. Regents of the University of Calif." on Justia Law

The trial court granted anti-SLAPP motions, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, against a city‘s exclusive agent in its action for breach of, and interference with, the agency contract and related causes of action. The court concluded that the alleged wrongful conduct in plaintiffs‘ tortious breach of contract cause of action is the City‘s violation of the terms of the Exclusive Agency Agreement (EAA) by allowing someone other than Rand Resources to act as its agent with respect to efforts to bring an NFL franchise to the City. Thus, the cause of action is not premised upon protected free speech or the right to petition for redress of grievances. The alleged wrongful conduct in plaintiffs‘ promissory fraud cause of action is the false representation regarding renewal of the EAA. Although the basis of the cause of action is a statement, the gravamen of the cause of action is the manner in which the City conducted itself in relation to the business transaction between it and Rand Resources, not the City‘s exercise of free speech or petitioning activity. The gravamen of the fourth cause of action with respect to the City is the City‘s violation of the terms of the EAA and the manner in which the City conducted itself in relation to the business transaction between it and Rand Resources, not the City‘s exercise of free speech or petitioning activity. The alleged wrongful conduct at the heart of plaintiffs‘ interference with contract and interference with prospective economic advantage causes of action is again the Bloom defendants‘ efforts to usurp Rand Resources‘s rights and role under the EAA. As addressed with respect to the fourth cause of action, this conduct arises from the Bloom defendants‘ private conduct of their own business, not their free speech or petitioning activities. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting the anti-SLAPP motions and reversed the award of attorney fees. View "Rand Resources LLC v. City of Carson" on Justia Law

Defendant obtained a degree in computer science in Nigeria and a Ph.D. in Canada. In 2013, defendant got a job and moved to Santa Clara, without his wife of 12 years and three children. In 2014, defendant called 911 “having numerous paranoid delusions ... for some time.” He was diagnosed with psychosis and admitted for a 72-hour hold. He had not slept in a week, had eaten only grapes for two days, and had contemplated suicide. He agreed to try a medication, risperidone, but never actually took it. His doctor believed defendant required further treatment. His wife and children moved to California. Defendant locked himself and his wife in the bedroom and assaulted her. The children called 911. Officers forced the door open, but defendant continued assaulting his wife and resisted the officers. Defendant’s wife stated defendant had significant changes in behavior for two weeks before the assault. His family returned to Canada; defendant was placed on a 72-hour hold (later extended) and on suicide watch and was charged with domestic violence and other felonies. Later, the court suspended criminal proceedings and ordered evaluation by a neuropsychologist and a psychiatrist. Both reported that defendant was mentally incompetent to stand trial, that it was medically appropriate to treat defendant with antipsychotic medication, and that defendant did not have the capacity to make decisions about medication. The court of appeal upheld the order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. View "People v. Lameed" on Justia Law

Phillips & Cohen, a law firm, issued a celebratory press release following the verdict in false claims act litigation in which the jury found J-M had knowingly misrepresented to Phillips & Cohen’s governmental clients that its PVC pipe had been manufactured and tested in a manner that assured it had the strength and durability required by applicable industry standards. J-M filed suit against the law firm for defamation and trade libel. The trial court denied Phillips & Cohen’s special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute), finding it was a question of fact for the jury whether the press release was privileged as a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 47, subdivision (d). The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the special motion to strike where J-M failed to establish a likelihood it would prevail on the merits of its defamation and trade libel claims. In this case, Phillips & Cohen's description of the evidence at trial and the jury’s special verdict in the press release falls comfortably within the permissible degree of flexibility and literary license afforded communications to the media concerning judicial proceedings. The court found the substance of its report was accurate and the release was privileged under section 47, subdivision (d). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "J-M Manufacturing Co. v. Phillips & Cohen" on Justia Law

John F. Stephens and Razmik B. Ekmekdjian appealed an order denying a motion to strike two causes of action in a second amended complaint for damages filed by Yasser and Daria Abuemeira. The Abuemeiras filed suit after Stephens and Ekmekdjian videotaped and distributed a video-recording of the parties to news agencies and various members of the public. The video-recording was taken while the parties were engaged in a road-side brawl. Stephens and Ekmekdjian responded with a motion to strike, challenging two causes of action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The court concluded that the trial court properly denied the anti-SLAPP motion because Stephens's conduct did not involve an act in furtherance of his constitutional right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. Moreover, Stephens did not present any evidence to establish that the Abuemeiras were anyone other than "private, anonymous" parties or that the dispute was anything other than a private controversy. The court also concluded that the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, does not protect Stephens because he has not established that the speech recipients are connected with the litigation or that his communications achieve any objective of the litigation. Also, Stephens's communications to the general public through the Internet and the media are not protected by the litigation privilege. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Abuemeira v. Stephens" on Justia Law

On June 13, 2011, Sanford was injured when a car driven by 17-year-old Jacy ran a stop sign and struck his motorcycle. The car was owned by Jacy’s father, William. On February 20, 2013, Sanford filed suit against the Rasnicks, alleging vehicular negligence against Jacy and general negligence against both Rasnicks. The Rasnicks made a joint Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer for $130,000. The offer lapsed, the case went to trial, and a jury returned a verdict for less than $130,000. The trial court held the 998 offer valid, and ordered that the Rasnicks could recover some expert witness fees and other costs. The court entered a separate order taxing certain of Sanford’s costs. The court of appeal reversed and remanded, holding that the 998 offer was not valid because it improperly contained a request for an undescribed “Settlement Agreement” and the court erred in connection with its rulings on the cost items. View "Sanford v. Rasnick" on Justia Law