Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former on-air radio personality for Univision, filed suit alleging disability discrimination, wrongful termination and related employment claims. The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., claim for discrimination where plaintiff was not entitled to raise a medical condition as an alleged basis for discrimination for the first time in opposition to the motion for summary judgment; trial issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiff had a disability under FEHA; and trial issues of fact exist as to whether Univision acted with discriminatory intent. The court also concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to provide reasonable accommodation; the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to engage in interactive process; the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA), Gov. Code 12945.1 et seq., claims; and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's common law claim for wrongful termination. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1972, Dinslage was employed by the San Francisco Recreation and Parks Department. As part of a large-scale restructuring, Dinslage‘s employment classification was eliminated in 2010. He was one of many employees who were laid off. Although he applied to be rehired in a newly created classification, he was not offered a position. He then retired from city employment. Dinslage sued, alleging age discrimination, retaliation, and harassment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code 12940(a), (h), (j).) The defendants claimed, with supporting evidence, that their actions were taken for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Dinslage had refused to cooperate in the implementation of a new Department policy, moving away from separate recreational events for the disabled and toward inclusion in general events. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed rejection of Dinslage‘s age discrimination and retaliation claims. Dinslage‘s opposition to Department policies and practices he viewed as discriminating against disabled members of the general public is not protected activity because his opposition was not directed at an unlawful employment practice. View "Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

After defendant was taken into custody for psychiatric evaluation and treatment for up to 72 hours pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, she was released and banned from owning, possessing, controlling, receiving, or purchasing any firearm for five years. The Superior Court of Kern County denied her petition to lift the prohibition and found that the preponderance of the evidence established that defendant would not be likely to use firearms in a safe and lawful manner. The court found that the superior court’s order was appealable, but found that defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel; concluded that section 8103, subdivision (f)(6), employs a constitutional standard of proof and is not unconstitutionally vague; and concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s denial of defendant's petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "People v. Mary H." on Justia Law

Croft appealed the superior court's order denying their petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the City to return fees it collected when Croft applied for building permits. As an initial matter, the court concluded that Croft's facial challenge is time barred pursuant to Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B)-(C) where Croft raised its challenge more than 90 days after the City enacted the Ordinance and adopted the fee schedule. The court also concluded that Croft’s as-applied challenge improperly places the burden on the City and incorrectly states how the fee must be reasonable. In this case, the reasonableness test applies to the creation of the fee schedule, not its application. Croft mischaracterizes the nature of the reasonableness inquiry and does not present evidence relating to the correct inquiry; even if it had, the claim related to such an inquiry would be facial and time barred. Finally, the court concluded that the City correctly calculated the parks and recreation fee; Croft abandoned its traffic fees claim on appeal; and the City collected the fees at an appropriate time. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Trigg seeking rescission of the settlement agreement in Suarez I based on Trigg’s fraudulent concealment of the prospects for sale of the company, and quantum meruit. Trigg filed a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Civil Procedure section 425.16, asserting that plaintiff's claims arise out of communications that occurred during the course of Suarez I. The trial court dismissed the action without leave to amend. The court agreed with the trial court's finding that plaintiff's causes of action arose from litigation activities protected by the anti-SLAPP statute - the right of free speech - and that he failed to make a showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Suarez v. Trigg Labs." on Justia Law

The People filed a nuisance abatement action against defendants, alleging that Weedland was an illegal medical marijuana business under the City of Los Angeles Municipal Code, and seeking an injunction against the continuing operation of Weedland. The trial court found that Weedland did fall under the statute, and therefore the People showed a likelihood of prevailing. The court affirmed the trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction, concluding that the applicable Municipal Code section broadly defines a “medical marijuana business” as any location where medical marijuana is “distributed, delivered, or given away.” Weedland is a location that distributes medical marijuana to its “members,” and is therefore a medical marijuana business as defined in the Municipal Code. View "People ex rel. Feuer v. FXS Mgmt." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, DHE, alleging causes of action for disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., as well as wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Plaintiff alleged that, when DHE hired him to work as a truck driver in 2010, he told DHE he had a disabled son who required dialysis on a daily basis and he (plaintiff) was responsible for administering the dialysis. Plaintiff requested work schedule accommodations that his supervisor initially granted, permitting him to attend to his son in the evening. Plaintiff was terminated in 2013 when a new supervisor took over and fired plaintiff for refusing to work a shift that did not permit him to be home in time for his son's dialysis. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff’s motion to tax costs. The court reversed the judgment and the order denying the motion to tax costs, concluding that plaintiff has demonstrated triable issues of material fact on his causes of action for associational disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. View "Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two medical cannabis collectives/dispensaries and three medical cannabis patients, alleged 11 causes of action against the City and/or its employees. Plaintiffs' claims arose from the City's enforcement of municipal ordinances that first regulated and then entirely prohibited the operation of medical marijuana dispensaries within the City’s borders. Plaintiffs primarily allege that the city ordinances regulating, and then banning medical marijuana dispensaries discriminate against persons with disabilities. The court concluded that this claim has no merit and that the trial court properly sustained the city’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ causes of action for violations of the Disabled Persons Act (DPA), Civil Code section 54; the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 41 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court's conclusion is controlled by now well-established principles that the Compassionate Use Act (CUA), Health & Saf. Code, 11362.5, and the Medical Marijuana Program (MMP), Health & Saf. Code, 1162.7 et seq., remove state-level criminal and civil sanctions from specified medical marijuana activities, but they do not establish a comprehensive state system of legalized medical marijuana; or grant a right of convenient access to marijuana for medicinal use; or override the zoning, licensing, and police powers of local jurisdictions; or mandate local accommodation of medical marijuana cooperatives, collectives, or dispensaries. The court rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims of constitutional violations and state tort claims and affirmed the judgment. View "The Kind and Compassionate v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Avongard, d/b/a Hydraulx, filed suit against petitioner John Doe 2 for libel, alleging that Doe 2’s anonymous emails to a film producer and a film industry executive harmed its reputation. After Doe 2 filed a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the trial court granted Hydraulx’s request to conduct special discovery that would reveal Doe 2’s identity. Doe 2 filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking reversal of the discovery order. Under Krinsky v. Doe 6, First Amendment protection for anonymous speech requires a libel plaintiff seeking to discover an anonymous libel defendant’s identity to make a prima facie showing of all elements of defamation. Paterno v. Superior Court similarly holds that a libel plaintiff cannot establish good cause for special discovery under section 426.16, subdivision (g) without a prima facie showing the allegedly libelous statements are false and unprivileged. The court granted Doe 2's petition in this case, concluding that Hydraulx failed to make a prima facie showing that Doe 2’s emails are provably false and defamatory statements of fact or that the emails caused Hydraulx to suffer actual damage. View "Doe 2 v. Superior Court (Avongard Products)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Flowers, a parapalegic, along with his wife and stepsons, filed suit alleging violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code 512, and intentional infliction of emotional distress when defendants refused to rent them a room unless they first paid a non-refundable cleaning fee relating to their service dog. Because plaintiffs left the hotel without paying the fee, defendants argued, they did not have standing to assert an Unruh Act cause of action. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend. While the court agreed with the result of Surrey v. True Beginnings, the court concluded that its bright-line rule that, under the Unruh Act, a person must tender the purchase price for a business’s services or products in order to have standing to sue, is not applicable to the facts of this case. Section 52, which provides remedies for violations of the Unruh Act, states that any person aggrieved by conduct that violates the Unruh Act may bring a civil action. The court concluded that plaintiffs have stated facts sufficient to establish standing under the Act. The court held that a plaintiff is not required to pay a discriminatory fee to establish standing to sue under the Unruh Act, as long as the plaintiff alleges facts showing that he or she has directly experienced a denial of rights as defined in sections 51 and 52. In addition, when a disabled individual has standing to sue under section 52, subdivision (c), any person “associated with” that individual has standing if the associated person has also directly experienced the discriminatory conduct. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Osborne v. Yasmeh" on Justia Law