Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Charlene Deluca filed a complaint alleging defendants CVS Pharmacy, Inc., and Longs Drug Stores California, LLC (CVS), had a corporate policy of automatically terminating employees who do not work any hours for 45 consecutive days. Deluca sought injunctive relief to challenge the policy, which she argued discriminated against qualified individuals with disabilities in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. Deluca, an employee of Longs, was not disabled, nor had she been terminated under the alleged 45-day policy. CVS demurred to Deluca’s complaint. The trial court sustained CVS’s demurrer based on Deluca’s lack of standing and dismissed her individually without leave to amend, but granted 90 days’ leave to amend for Deluca to find a substitute plaintiff and granted her motion to compel discovery of the names and contact information of current and former CVS employees. CVS filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the trial court’s ruling. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the circumstances under which a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief on behalf of a class of which plaintiff was not a member, could obtain precertification discovery to seek out a legitimate plaintiff to support her case. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ of mandate, and found that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the proposed precertification discovery. View "CVS Pharmacy v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that they had violated the duty of loyalty owed to her under the Rules of Professional Conduct by pursuing her business partner's interests in the underlying dissolution and copyright actions. Plaintiff alleged that she had an implied attorney-client relationship with each defendant based on her status as a 50 percent owner of Purposeful Press, the company she and her business partner created. The trial court denied defendants' special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP). In this case, plaintiff's claims arise out of defendants’ breach of professional obligations they allegedly owed to plaintiff as the result of an implied attorney-client relationship arising out of defendants’ representation of Purposeful Press. The court concluded that defendants failed to establish that plaintiff's claims arise from protected activity and did not address the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sprengel v. Zbylut" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a dispute between outdoor advertising companies and the City over certain billboards with digital displays. Plaintiff Summit Media filed a motion seeking, among other things, an order that “[a]ll digital displays and sign structures” identified in the trial court's April 2013 order “shall be demolished and removed . . . .” Real parties CBS Outdoor wished to resume the use of their sign structures to display static advertising, as they had before the illegal digital conversion. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion to demolish the signs and denied plaintiff's request for attorney fees. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to require either the demolition of the structural improvements or the removal of the digital equipment, and that plaintiff offers no persuasive authority for its claim. Further, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff had a personal financial stake in this litigation that was sufficient to warrant its decision to incur significant attorney fees and costs in the vigorous prosecution of this lawsuit. View "Summit Media v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Chris Korpi and plaintiff-respondent Julie Collier were supporters of competing candidates in a local school board election. To educate voters about the candidates he supported, Korpi registered Collier's name and the name of an advocacy group she formed as domain names, and then redirected all Internet users who visited those Web sites to the Web sites for the candidates he supported. Collier filed this action against Korpi, alleging he registered the domain names and illegally used them to mislead the public into thinking she supported his candidates. Korpi moved to strike Collier's complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied Korpi's motion because it found he failed to show Collier's claims arose from free speech activities protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Although the court acknowledged political commentary was the quintessential form of free speech, it concluded Korpi's conduct in registering the domain names and redirecting Internet traffic did not further Korpi's free speech rights. The Court of Appeal disagreed, reversed and remanded. Registering the domain names and redirecting Internet users to the other Web sites assisted Korpi in exercising his free speech rights because those acts provided him with additional forums to reach the public with information about the school board candidates. "The statute required nothing more." Regardless whether Korpi's conduct advanced or assisted him in exercising his free speech rights, Collier argued the anti-SLAPP statute did not protect Korpi's criminal impersonation of another to deceive the public. "It is not enough that the defendant's conduct violated a civil statute; the defendant's conduct must be criminal to deprive the defendant of the broad protection the anti-SLAPP statute provides for free speech and petition activities. [. . .] Korpi does not concede his conduct was criminal and Collier failed to offer evidence establishing Korpi's conduct was criminal as a matter of law." Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Korpi's motion without determining Collier presented evidence establishing a probability of prevailing on her claims. "Our conclusion the anti-SLAPP statute applies to Korpi's conduct should not be construed as an approval of his conduct." View "Collier v. Harris" on Justia Law

Karen Nosal-Tabor was a registered nurse who previously worked in the cardiology department at Sharp Chula Vista Medical Center (Sharp). In 2011, Sharp implemented "nurse-led" cardiac stress testing in which a physician is not physically present during the tests. Nosal-Tabor repeatedly refused to perform nurse-led stress tests and made numerous complaints concerning the testing to Sharp's management. Among Nosal-Tabor's complaints was that stress testing constituted the practice of medicine and that Sharp had not adopted legally adequate standardized procedures to permit its nurses to perform such tests. Sharp's management told Nosal-Tabor that Sharp had adopted legally sufficient standardized procedures, and that these procedures permitted nurses such as Nosal-Tabor to conduct nurse-led stress testing. After Nosal-Tabor continued to refuse to perform nurse-led stress testing and to complain about its implementation, Sharp disciplined her and eventually terminated her employment. Nosal-Tabor sued Sharp, alleging wrongful termination and two causes of action premised on claims of improper workplace retaliation. Sharp moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted the motion, ruling that Nosal-Tabor presented "no credible evidence that the Standardized Procedures in place at the time of her termination were insufficient." On appeal, Nosal-Tabor claims that the trial court erred in granting Sharp's motion for summary judgment. Her primary contention is that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find that Sharp had failed to adopt standardized procedures that comply with the Guidelines. Nosal-Tabor contended that this error caused the court to improperly conclude that she would be unable to establish any of her causes of action. The Court of Appeal agreed: the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Sharp. The documents that Sharp held out as its standardized procedures did not contain several elements that are required by the Guidelines. In light of these deficiencies, a reasonable juror could find that Sharp improperly retaliated against, and wrongfully terminated, Nosal-Tabor when she complained about, and refused to perform, nurse-led stress testing pursuant to Sharp's legally deficient procedures. View "Nosal-Tabor v. Sharp Chula Vista Medical Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against CSU, his former employer, alleging that CSU discriminated against him based on his national origin when it denied his application for a tenured faculty position and consequently terminated him. CSU moved to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the gravamen of the complaint arises from protected activity. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to determine whether plaintiff demonstrated a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of his claims. View "Park v. Bd. of Trustees of CA State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants for false advertising on the Internet. The trial court denied defendants' Anti-SLAPP, Code of Civ. Proc. 425.16, motion, concluding that defendants had not met their threshold burden of showing that the alleged false advertising fell within the purview of section 425.16. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that the trial court correctly denied the anti-SLAPP motion, as the conduct alleged constituted purely commercial speech; plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating the applicability of the commercial speech exemption of section 425.17; with respect to the attorney fees motion, the court concluded that no reasonable basis existed for asserting that the allegedly false advertisements constituted conduct in connection with an issue of public interest, and that the motion was therefore frivolous; and therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorney fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "LA Taxi v. Indep. Taxi Owners" on Justia Law

The union representing deputy sheriffs in the LA County Sheriff’s Department filed suit to enjoin the LA Times from publishing news reports about the Department’s hiring of officers who used to work for the County’s Office of Public Safety. The trial court granted the Times' anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation), Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, motion. The court concluded that the trial court correctly found that the union's complaint arises from the Times' protected activity, which in this case is news reporting; the trial court correctly found the injunction the union sought would be an unconstitutional prior restraint; the union has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the Times' objections to the union's declarations; and, therefore, the court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Assn. for LA Deputy Sheriffs v. LA Times" on Justia Law

Lois Green filed an action for violation of civil rights and the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 United States Code section 1983 and wrongful death under California law against the County of Riverside, and Riverside County Deputy Sheriffs Christopher Cazarez, Mark Janecka and David Dietrich, arising out of the death of her son, Lawrence Rosenthal, while in the officers' custody. After an 18-day trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding that only Cazarez used unreasonable force, but that force was not a substantial factor in causing Rosenthal's death. The court entered judgment against Green and awarded costs of suit to the defendants. Green argued on appeal that the trial court: (1) committed prejudicial error in admitting evidence that Rosenthal was under the influence of cocaine; (2) erred in refusing to instruct the jury on negligence; and (3) improperly awarded paralegal fees as costs. Finding no merit in Green's contentions, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Green v. Co. of Riverside" on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit against defendants, alleging that they were denied service at respondents' restaurant due to their service dog. The trial court concluded that appellants could assert a claim under the Disabled Persons Act (DPA), Civ. Code, 54 - 55.3., but not under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act), Civ. Code, 51, 52. The trial court sustained a demurrer and granted summary adjudication to respondents. Determining that the order of dismissal is appealable, the court concluded that because there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between the Unruh Act and the DPA, a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination relating to the use of a service dog may assert claims under both statutory schemes, subject to any specific limitations stated in them. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Flowers v. Prasad" on Justia Law