Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, Gabriel L. Roman and his live-in caregiver and former wife, filed suit alleging BRE had engaged in disability discrimination when the Romans attempted to view available units at the Villa Azure apartment complex. The court concluded that summary judgment was properly granted based on the Romans' failure to present any evidence that Gabriel suffered from a disability; the Romans did not request a continuance of the summary judgment hearing and have forfeited their argument on appeal; and the order awarding costs to BRE must be reconsidered in light of Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire District. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment on the merits in favor of BRE; reversed the postjudgment order awarding costs; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Roman v. BRE Properties" on Justia Law

In 1992, Sena was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 16 years to life imprisonment. In 2011, the Board of Parole Hearings granted Sena parole. The Governor reversed that decision in 2012. The superior court reversed, but, while still incarcerated, Sena exposed his penis to a female correctional officer and masturbated in front of her. Apparently unaware of Sena’s rules violation, the Board reinstated the parole grant. At a subsequent hearing, the Board found Sena to be unsuitable for parole and rescinded Sena’s parole grant, citing the rules violation as evidence that Sena posed a danger to society if released. Sena filed a habeas corpus challenge to the rescission, arguing that the Board lacked authority to rescind his parole grant based on prison misconduct that occurred after September 23, 2012. The Santa Clara County Superior Court directed that Sena be released on parole, stating that its September 18, 2012 order required Sena’s release on September 23, that Sena was “illegally confined” after September 23, and that the Board could not rescind parole based on prison misconduct that occurred after that date. The court of appeal reversed. Notwithstanding the previous unexecuted grant of parole, Sena’s misconduct on October 3, 2012 evidenced his current dangerousness and unsuitability for parole. View "In re: Sena" on Justia Law

Citing safety concerns, the jail commander at the Wayne Brown Correctional Facility gave notice in 2013 that lawyers would generally no longer be able to meet face-to-face with their incarcerated clients in visiting rooms that lacked glass partitions. Instead, they would generally be required to meet with clients in rooms with glass partitions. Several inmates moved for the restoration of what they characterized as "contact visits" in non-partitioned rooms. The trial court consolidated motions, held a hearing, and ultimately held that the attorney-client visits be made available absent circumstances justifying suspension of such visits in certain cases. Nevada County petitioned for a writ of mandate or prohibition with the Court of Appeal, and after review, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering attorney-client visits be made available at the jail absent circumstances justifying suspension of such visits in individual cases. The Court denied the writ petition and lifted the stay. View "County of Nevada v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Kimberli Hirst, an employee of American Forensic Nurses, Inc. (AFN), brought a Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claim against the City of Oceanside (City), alleging she was sexually harassed by an Oceanside police officer, Gilbert Garcia, while she was providing phlebotomist services on behalf of the Oceanside Police Department. The jury found Hirst proved her claim and awarded her $1.5 million in damages against the City. After reducing the amount for which Garcia was found responsible, the court entered judgment in Hirst's favor for $1.125 million. The City moved for a new trial and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). In the new trial motion, the City contended the damages award was unsupported by the evidence. In the JNOV motion, the City argued Hirst was not entitled to recover under the FEHA because she was not a City employee, special employee, or a "person providing services pursuant to a contract" under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j)(1). The court denied the motion, but granted the new trial motion finding the damage award was excessive. The court ordered a new trial on both liability and damages because "the issues are so interrelated that damages cannot be separated from the facts underlying liability." Hirst did not appeal the new trial order, but the City appealed the denial of its JNOV motion, contending Hirst did not have standing to recover damages on her FEHA claim against the City. The Court of Appeal determined the evidence supported that Hirst was a "person providing services pursuant to a contract" and therefore she was entitled to recover against the City for its employee's sexual harassment. Based on that conclusion, the Court did not reach the additional asserted ground for standing (whether Hirst was a "special employee" of the City). The trial court's denial of the City's JNOV motion was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings under the new trial order. View "Hirst v. City of Oceanside" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against CalPERs, alleging that he was treated differently because he is Latino. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from CalPERS' refusal to award an investment management contract to plaintiff to manage after the Attorney General began investigating whether CalPERS was unlawfully awarding contracts at the behest of influence peddlers and plaintiff was associated with several businessmen and individuals under investigation. The court concluded that plaintiff does not state a claim of relief under the anti-affirmative action provision originally enacted as Proposition 209 and now codified in Article I, section 31 of the California Constitution. Nevertheless, the court reversed the trial court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims on demurrer because plaintiff has demonstrated a reasonable possibility of amending his complaint and because dismissal of plaintiff's remaining claims was improper. View "Baez v. CalPERS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Connie Anderson alleged that deputies from the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department, Steve Geist and Daniel Shelton, unlawfully entered her residence on two occasions, attempting to arrest her daughter pursuant to a bench warrant that had been recalled, and in the process made defamatory statements about her and her family to her neighbors. The deputies appealed the trial court's denial of their special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP motion), arguing that they met their burden of showing plaintiff's causes of action arose from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Furthermore, the deputies argued that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing a probability she would prevail on the merits. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was one of first impression: whether a peace officer's execution of a warrant is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court answered that question in the negative, at least under the circumstances of this case. The Court therefore agreed with the trial court that the deputies did not meet their burden on the first part of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Anderson v. Geist" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code 245(a)(1)), and found he inflicted great bodily injury (section 12022.7(a)) during the assault. Defendant admitted the five state prison priors more than seven months after the verdict. The court sentenced defendant to 11 years in state prison: a three-year midterm on the assault, a consecutive three-year term on the great bodily injury enhancement, and five consecutive one-year terms imposed under Penal Code 667.5(b) for the prior terms. The court of appeal found two prejudicial errors. The prosecutor repeatedly argued in ways that diminished the reasonable doubt standard, stating “Well, what does not guilty mean? It means he did not commit a crime.” Although the jury was properly instructed with regard to reasonable doubt, those instructions were weakened under the totality of the circumstances. There were credibility problems with witnesses on both sides. Had the prosecutor not misstated the law, there is a reasonable probability the jury would have returned a more favorable verdict for defendant. In addition, the court did not adequately advise defendant of his right to trial, to confront adverse witnesses, and to remain silent just prior to accepting defendant’s admission of his prior convictions. View "People v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

In 2003, Diaz shot and killed a rival gang member and ran to Vargas's home. Diaz was convicted of second degree murder. In a 2008 appeal, Diaz cited juror misconduct. After a gang expert testified, Juror 1 asked about retaliation and was admonished that safety concerns could not affect her deliberations. She said that she could remain impartial. A Hispanic man approached Alternate Juror 2 and tried to discuss the case. Alternate 2 reported the matter and did not deliberate. Juror 2 submitted a note that Juror 12 stated that he knew that the Vargas family was in the courtroom. Juror 12 was questioned and denied knowing anyone involved in the case. Diaz's attorney conceded that the people in the courtroom were family members and the family resemblance was obvious. The court of appeal affirmed, finding no juror bias or misconduct. Diaz later unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. In 2014, Diaz sought to access confidential juror identifying information (Code Civ. Proc. 237(b)) to investigate bias and misconduct as a possible basis for habeas relief. The court stated that it was "a fishing expedition." The court of appeal affirmed. The petition was untimely and the denial did not affect "substantial rights" under Penal Code 1237(b). Diaz has no constitutional or statutory right to "two bites of the appellate apple." View "People v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Defendant Superior Court of Nevada County (SCNC) appealed a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and former employee Emily Gallup. Gallup brought this action alleging, in part, that SCNC retaliated against her in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) for engaging in protected activity when she complained to her supervisor, other court management, and the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) that the Family Court Services Department (FCS) was not providing services in compliance with the law, rules, regulations, and policies. SCNC demurred to this cause of action on the ground Gallup had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under section 98.7. The trial court overruled the demurrer. The case was tried before the jury on the section 1102.5, subdivision (b) cause of action alone, as all Gallup’s other causes of action were disposed of by demurrer or summary judgment. The jury found in Gallup’s favor, awarding her past economic loss in the amount of $168,206, future economic loss in the amount of $105,000, and past noneconomic loss in the amount of $40,000, for a total of $313,206. SCNC appealed, raising as the only issue the trial court order overruling the demurrer. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that "Campbell v. Regents of University of California," (35 Cal.4th 311 (2005)), and not the precedent relied upon by SCNC, was the controlling authority, and reversed for consideration under the correct caselaw standard. View "Gallup v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Marvalyn DeCambre, M.D., a physician specializing in pediatric urology, filed an action against Rady Children's Hospital-San Diego (RCHSD), Children's Specialist San Diego (CSSD) and the Regents of the University of California, alleging retaliation, harassment, racial discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination and wrongful termination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). DeCambre also brought claims against all defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), defamation, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and the Cartwright Act. DeCambre contended that throughout her tenure at RCHSD, defendants discriminated against her because of her race and gender. Each defendant filed a special motion to strike DeCambre's complaint. The trial court granted the motions in full on the ground that all of DeCambre's causes of action arose from RCHSD's decision not to renew its contract for DeCambre's services, which was the culmination of a peer review process that was protected as an official proceeding. The court also sustained defendants' demurrers to DeCambre's claims for IIED, defamation, unfair competition and violation of the Cartwright Act and denied DeCambre's request for leave to amend. On appeal, DeCambre argued the trial court erred in granting the special motions to strike because the defendants' peer review process was not entitled to protection under the anti-SLAPP statute and even it was, her claims did not arise from that process. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' anti-SLAPP motions as to DeCambre's claims for harassment and IIED. These claims did not arise from protected activity, and the Court rejected "defendants' attempt to cloak them in the protections afforded to peer review proceedings under the anti-SLAPP statute." Because the Court reversed this portion of the anti-SLAPP ruling, it also reversed and remanded the attorney fee awards. In addition, the Court remanded with directions that the court determine whether DeCambre should be afforded leave to amend her claim for defamation. View "DeCambre v. Rady Children's Hospital" on Justia Law