Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2010, 15-year-old Turner fired a gun at a group of young men, killing Allen, and grazing two others. Turner knew the victims from high school. A jury convicted Turner of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187(a)), and two counts of attempted murder, and found true the allegations that Turner, personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury. The court sentenced Turner to an aggregate state prison term of 84 years-to-life. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions, but modified the sentence, so that Turner will be entitled to a parole hearing after 25 years. The court upheld the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the theories imperfect self-defense and justifiable homicide based on self-defense; its use of the instructions on a kill zone theory. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue of cruel and unusual punishment below and failure to present readily available mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence. View "People v. Turner" on Justia Law

In 2010, 15-year-old Turner fired a gun at a group of young men, killing Allen, and grazing two others. Turner knew the victims from high school. A jury convicted Turner of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187(a)), and two counts of attempted murder, and found true the allegations that Turner, personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury. The court sentenced Turner to an aggregate state prison term of 84 years-to-life. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions, but modified the sentence, so that Turner will be entitled to a parole hearing after 25 years. The court upheld the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the theories imperfect self-defense and justifiable homicide based on self-defense; its use of the instructions on a kill zone theory. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue of cruel and unusual punishment below and failure to present readily available mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence. View "People v. Turner" on Justia Law

Defendant California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) employed plaintiff Corey Baughn as a firefighter at its Mendocino Unit. In 2009, Cal Fire terminated him for sexually harassing a female subordinate employee. Baughn appealed his termination to the State Personnel Board. Before the Board considered the matter, the parties settled the dispute by written stipulation. Baughn agreed to withdraw his appeal; resign from Cal Fire; and not apply for, seek, or accept employment with Cal Fire again. In exchange, Cal Fire agreed to remove any reference to its disciplinary action from Baughn’s personnel file and to accept Baughn’s resignation. The Personnel Board approved the stipulation. Baughn then worked for the Ukiah Valley Fire District, first as a volunteer firefighter and then as a temporary employee. Ukiah Valley had an agreement with Cal Fire to assign Ukiah Valley personnel to a Cal Fire facility during the winter months. The unit chief of Cal Fire’s Mendocino Unit, Christopher Rowney, became aware that Baughn was working for Ukiah Valley. Rowney knew that as result of Baughn’s employment duties, Baughn would likely be present in Cal Fire facilities when the victim of Baughn’s earlier harassment would also be present. Concerned about this possibility, Rowney wrote a letter to Ukiah Valley’s fire chief ordering Baughn not to be present in any Cal Fire facility. Baughn sought permanent employment with Ukiah Valley. However, when Ukiah Valley’s governing board members learned of Rowney’s action, they pressured the chief to terminate Baughn, which the chief ultimately did. Baughn and his union, plaintiff CDF Firefighters (the Union), sued Cal Fire for breach of the written settlement stipulation between it and Baughn, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. Cal Fire filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint as to the Union, but not as to Baughn. It contended the complaint arose from speech by Rowney that was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. It also asserted the Union was not likely to succeed on the merits. The trial court denied the motion. Cal Fire appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that defendant failed to demonstrate plaintiffs’ action arose from conduct taken by defendant in furtherance of its right of speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. The Court reversed and remanded an award of attorney fees, finding that the trial court relied on an improper basis for awarding fees to plaintiff. View "Baughn v. Dept. of Forestry" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated for refusing to work a shift that did not permit him to be home in time for his son's dialysis, plaintiff filed suit against DHE alleging claims for disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., as well as wrongful termination in violation of public policy. For several years, plaintiff’s supervisors scheduled him so that he could be home at night for his son’s dialysis. That schedule accommodation changed when a new supervisor took over. The court concluded that plaintiff has demonstrated triable issues of material fact on his causes of action for associational disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment and denial of plaintiff's motion to tax costs. View "Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against Farmers, contending that as a district manager for Farmers he had been wrongfully classified as an independent contractor rather than an employee, that he had been wrongfully terminated, and that Farmers had failed to pay wages due during and at the termination of his employment. Appellant asserted a common law claim, but did not assert a claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12940 et seq. While this case was pending, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Harris v. City of Santa Monica. Harris held that where an employee supports a FEHA claim by establishing that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision at issue, the employer may avoid liability for damages by establishing that it would have made the same decision without the wrongful motivation. However, other remedies might be available to a plaintiff, such as declaratory relief, injunctive relief and attorney fees. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in giving the Harris instructions in this case or in denying appellant alternative relief when the jury rejected his claim for damages. The court concluded, however, that appellant presented sufficient evidence to allow his wage claim to go to the jury. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for retrial. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exchange" on Justia Law

Lamar filed suit challenging the City's denial of 45 applications to convert existing offsite signs - billboards with commercial messages in locations other than at a property owner's business - to digital signs. Lamar alleged that the sign ban violates the free speech clause of the California Constitution and the trial court agreed, granting a writ of mandate. The trial court concluded that the sign ban was a content-based regulation that could not withstand strict scrutiny analysis. After addressing preliminary issues, this court concluded on the merits that the city's offsite sign ban is not content-based, and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny under high court or California Supreme Court precedent. Consistent with the many authorities finding no constitutional infirmity under the First Amendment in the distinction between offsite and onsite signs, the court reached a like conclusion under the free speech clause of the California Constitution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order denying plaintiff‟s petition for a writ of mandate. View "Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the County under Government Code section 12940, alleging disability discrimination based on the County’s removing him from his job as bailiff and placing him on an unpaid leave of absence because of its incorrect assessment that he could not safely perform his duties as a bailiff even with reasonable accommodation. Principally at issue on appeal is how to instruct a jury on the employer’s intent to discriminate against a disabled employee and, more specifically, what role “animus” plays in defining that intent. The court concluded that the instruction and special verdict form in this case contained error. Under Harris v. City of Santa Monica, plaintiff could prove the requisite discriminatory intent by showing his actual or perceived disability was a “substantial motivating factor/reason” for the County’s decision to place him on a leave of absence. The Legislature decided that the financial consequences of an employer’s mistaken belief that an employee is unable to safely perform a job’s essential functions should be borne by the employer, not the employee, even if the employer’s mistake was reasonable and made in good faith. The court further concluded that the instructional error was prejudicial and remanded plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim for a limited retrial. View "Wallace v. County of Stanislaus" on Justia Law

Defendants who are found mentally incompetent to stand trial (IST) are transferred to the Department of State Hospitals for treatment, under procedures set forth in Penal Code section 13701. Petitioners requested that the court order the Department to admit IST defendants from Contra Costa County to DSH-Napa within four weeks after a trial court makes an order of commitment. The trial court ordered that such admissions must take place within 60 days, not four weeks, of the commitment order. The court of appeal affirmed and remanded with directions to modify the order as necessary to conform to new statutory provisions enacted while the appeal was pending. The court rejected arguments that the order was inconsistent with section 1370; undermined DSH’s ability to carry out its statutory duties under section 1370, causing disruption and public harm, and subjecting DSH to potential equal protection and due process claims; and circumvented established habeas procedures. View "In re Loveton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims of negligence, fraud, breach of contract, common counts, and exemplary damages. On appeal, plaintiff challenged an order granting a special motion to strike her complaint by respondent, an attorney, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP motion). As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that respondent's motion was timely. On the merits, the court concluded that the allegations against respondent arose from protected speech - they occurred within the context of anticipated litigation and settlement - and plaintiff failed to include with her response any evidence suggesting that she had a probability of prevailing on the merits of her claims. Further, the trial court did not violate plaintiff's rights by failing to provide her with a copy of the tentative ruling on the day of the hearing. Finally, the exception set forth in section 425.17, subdivision (c) is inapplicable and respondent's alleged actions were not illegal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Karnazes v. Ares" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Proposition D, the current medical marijuana ordinance of the City of Los Angeles. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The court held that there is no constitutional or statutory right to possess, cultivate, distribute, or transport marijuana for medical purposes. The court concluded that Prop D's enactment did not violate Government Code Section 35804; if regulation of medical marijuana is a matter of statewide concern, Prop D, which regulates medical marijuana solely within the City’s borders, is still a municipal initiative on a wholly municipal matter – which was properly enacted without a planning commission hearing; Prop D's enactment did not violate City Charter Section 558; Prop D does not grant the equivalent of a conditional use permit or variance; and Prop D survives all of plaintiffs' substantive challenges regarding due process, equal protection, unconstitutional "special" law, drug house abatement, improper exercise of local regulatory power, violation of rights of privacy and association, disability discrimination, improper threats of criminal sanctions for plaintiffs' exercise of rights, taking without just compensation, waste of public funds, Fifth Amendment right/privacy, unnecessary regulation without rational basis/unfair stigma, and attorney's fees. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs are not entitled to leave to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Safe Life Caregivers v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law