Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a massage therapist at a spa, filed an employment action against her employer, alleging that she was subjected to harassing and discriminatory conduct by two customers. She alleged: sex discrimination, sexual harassment, racial harassment, retaliation, failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent harassment and discrimination based on sex, and failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent harassment based on race (California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov. Code 12900). The court of appeal reversed an award in favor of plaintiff. There cannot be a valid claim for failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment if, as here, the jury finds that the sexual harassment that occurred was not sufficiently severe or pervasive as to result in liability. A claim for failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment cannot prevail when the necessary element of sexual harassment is not established. Similarly, the jury’s finding that defendant was not liable on plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim because there was no adverse employment action precluded defendant’s liability for failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent sex discrimination. View "Dickson v. Burke Williams, Inc." on Justia Law

Rebulloza pleaded no contest to one count of indecent exposure for exposing himself on a street corner in San José. The trial court granted a three-year term of probation to include one year in county jail as a condition of probation and ordered him to complete a sex offender management program as mandated by Penal Code section 1203.067. Under subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4), the court ordered defendant to “waive any privilege against self-incrimination and participate in polygraph examinations which shall be part of the sex offender management program” and “waive any psychotherapist/patient privilege to enable communication between the sex offender management professional and the probation officer.” Rebulloza challenged the constitutionality of the waivers. The court of appeal held that the condition requiring a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment under the 1984 Supreme Court decision, Minnesota v. Murphy, and construed the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege as requiring waiver only insofar as necessary to enable communication between the probation officer and the psychotherapist, so that it is not overbroad in violation of defendant’s constitutional right to privacy. View "People v. Rebulloza" on Justia Law

Horne filed an employment discrimination action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of District Council 16, reasoning that Horne was unable to establish that he was qualified for the union organizer position he sought and had failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code 12900). The trial court relied on after-acquired evidence of a prior conviction so that, at the time of the employment decision in 2010, federal law prohibited Horne from serving as a union organizer; the 13-year disability period established by that federal statute had not been shortened. The California Supreme Court remanded for consideration in light of its 2014 opinion in Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co. The court of appeal then reversed. Other than with respect to certain post-discovery period remedies, FEHA is not preempted by Section 504(a) of the federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act; although the trial court correctly concluded that Horne’s citizenship rights had not been fully restored for purposes of Section 504(a), its grant of summary judgment in reliance on after-acquired evidence was inappropriate during the liability phase of this FEHA litigation. View "Horne v. Dist. Council 16, Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades" on Justia Law

Three small political parties and several party members and candidates sought to invalidate California’s electoral system for statewide and legislative offices, contending the system, which consists of an open nonpartisan election followed by a runoff between the top-two candidates, deprives them of equal protection and associational and voting rights secured by the state and federal Constitutions. According to plaintiffs, because “minor” party candidates are typically eliminated in the primary election, they are denied the constitutional right to participate in the general election upon a showing of substantial public support. Plaintiffs also contend their associational rights are violated by the effective limitation of their participation to the primary election, when voter participation is typically less than half that of the general election; that the electoral system denies them equal protection because they are no longer able to regularly participate in the general election, as they were under the prior electoral system; and that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint, without permitting them a hearing on the evidentiary support for their claims. The court of appeal affirmed The dismissal. View "Rubin v. Padilla" on Justia Law

In 1995, Wilson, White and Carr, all age 17, approached a Pomona bank, wearing masks and carrying handguns. One of them fired at the security guard who stood outside the bank. The guard fled and alerted police. Inside the bank, they told the customers to “hit the deck.” Theresa Hernandez, a bank employee, was shot and killed during the robbery. The three fled in a car driven by Smith. Another car occupied by Brown also waited nearby. White later admitted to his girlfriend that he had shot Hernandez during the robbery because he thought she was activating an alarm. Brown was arrested. Wilson, Carr and White turned themselves into the police a few days after the robbery. Wilson, sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, sought habeas relief in 2013, asserting, that under the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama (2012) the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and that he is entitled to be resentenced based on the individual sentencing factors that the Miller Court directed trial courts to consider when sentencing a juvenile offender for a homicide conviction. The court of appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "In re: Wilson" on Justia Law

LeRoy Guillory and 12 other plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s entry of judgment after granting Orange County Sheriff Department (OCSD) Investigator Michelle Hill’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of evidence in a six-week trial on plaintiff’s civil rights claims. Plaintiffs were Halloween partygoers who were swept up and detained as long as 14 hours in a predawn police raid on a mansion by dozens of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) officers in armored vehicles. The party, an annual event with hundreds of costumed attendees, had drawn neighbor complaints over the years. Based in part on a flyer advertising a “Casino Room” at the party, together with information a confidential informant provided and other intelligence Hill gathered, she obtained a warrant to search for evidence of illegal gaming at the mansion. The search yielded two slot machines that the party host, Carl Vini Bergman, claimed were unplugged and inoperable, along with three grams of marijuana in one partygoer’s purse. After failing in his efforts to challenge the warrant in criminal proceedings, Bergman pleaded no contest to three misdemeanor counts of possessing prohibited gaming equipment. In the course of the civil litigation, several defendants including the various SWAT teams, unnamed “Doe” police officers, and County of Orange defendants dropped out, either by plaintiffs’ failure to name the “Doe” defendants or by settlement or summary adjudication, leaving only Hill. Among other things, plaintiffs contended Hill violated their right to be free from unlawful seizure by prolonging their detention beyond the conclusion of the search of the residence. The trial court was persuaded by defense counsel’s arguments. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded these justifications failed under clearly established law, and because as a factual matter a jury reasonably could conclude the search had ended before Hill’s questioning began, the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court affirmed the trial court’s directed verdict on plaintiffs’ other constitutional claims under section 1983, including the SWAT team and other officers’ allegedly excessive force in entering and securing the premises, seizing two individuals near the premises but outside the scope of the warrant, searching two vehicles off the premises, restraining the detainees with excessive force before Hill questioned them, and damaging property during the search. View "Guillory v. Hill" on Justia Law

In 1993, a jury convicted Young of the second degree murder of his former girlfriend in 1991. He was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life. Now 53 years old, he has been denied parole by the Board five times. The court of appeal previously held that the Board’s 2009 denial violated his due process rights and that stated reasons for denial were not supported by evidence rationally indicative of current dangerousness. The Board failed to conduct a new suitability hearing as ordered, but in 2012, held another hearing and denied parole, committing the same errors previously pointed out: it did not duly consider Young’s insights into why he committed the murder or the prolonged stresses he experienced prior to it; mischaracterized his insights and stresses; and failed to consider his post-conviction conduct. The heinous nature of the crime itself is not sufficient to deny parole. The Board violated his due process rights to a decision based on the evidence, not conjecture, and on consideration of all relevant suitability factors. The court ordered the Board to vacate its denial and immediately grant parole, subject to review by the Governor. View "In re Young" on Justia Law

After members of the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Gang Task Force allegedly conducted a warrantless search of her home, Pierce filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (section 1983) against the Sheriff’s Department and individual members of the Gang Task Force (Does 1–12). The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal affirmed as to the Department, but reversed as to the individual Doe defendants, none of whom appeared, and who, apparently, were never served. Binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent, on both the scope of liability under section 1983 and the import of the Eleventh Amendment makes clear that the meaning of the term “person” as used in section 1983 and the reach of the Eleventh Amendment are separate issues, that the Eleventh Amendment applies only in federal court and not in state court, and that, depending on state law, a county sheriff may not be subject to a suit for damages under section 1983 because he or she is not a “person” as that term is used in the statute, and not because he or she is “immune” from suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity. View "Pierce v. San Mateo Co. Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

Ferrick, a former employee of Santa Clara University (SCU), a private institution, charged Travis, allegedly SCU’s “Director of Real Estate” and Ferrick’s immediate supervisor, with extensive wrongdoing and inappropriate behavior. Only some of the claimed conduct was allegedly reported by Ferrick to SCU’s management. The complaint’s sole cause of action was for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, also known as a Tameny claim. The trial court dismissed without leave to amend, finding that the complaint failed to allege that her discharge violated any fundamental public policy. The court of appeal reversed. The allegations, liberally construed, indicate that Travis accepted a payment, not in trust for SCU, in return for using his position as an SCU employee to place SCU tenants with a private landlord; the complaint adequately pleads that Ferrick had a reasonable basis to suspect commercial bribery and disclosed her “reasonably based suspicions” to SCU. The complaint states a tort cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.View "Ferrick v. Santa Clara Univ." on Justia Law

A rear-end collision forced one vehicle down an embankment, so that the driver sustained injuries for which she sought treatment. The other car, a Toyota with major damage, was on the street unattended, with the air bags deployed. Its driver had reportedly fled on foot, headed westbound on the north side of the Parkway. Minutes later Jones was observed walking westbound on the north side of the Parkway about 400 yards from the collision, in an area where pedestrian traffic is prohibited. Jones had leaves on his person as if he had come out of the bushes. He had an alcoholic odor, watery bloodshot eyes, and unsteady gait. Jones denied having been involved in an accident, but admitted that he was on probation, with a search and seizure condition. A search of Jones’s person revealed apparent residue from a deployed airbag on his clothing and a key that operated the locks of the Toyota in the collision. After a Miranda admonishment, Jones admitted that he had been the Toyota’s driver. Jones was arrested and transported to the station, but refused to provide a breath sample. Jones was taken to a medical center where a blood sample was drawn by a phlebotomist. Analysis determined that Jones had a blood alcohol content of 0.25 percent. The trial court denied his motion to suppress. The appeals court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the intervening U.S. Supreme Court decision in McNeely required a warrant or exigent circumstances for the blood drawView "People v. Jones" on Justia Law