Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1971, Moreno was convicted of felony possession of barbiturates in San Mateo County and was placed on probation for two years with the condition that he serve one year in county jail. Moreno successfully completed probation. In 1973, Moreno was convicted in San Mateo County of assault with a deadly weapon, also a felony. Again, he successfully completed probation. Years later, Moreno petitioned the court to declare the felony offenses misdemeanors and dismiss them under Penal Code 1203.4. The trial court granted his petition. Two years later, Moreno sought a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon under section 4852.01. The trial court denied Moreno’s request because, once his crimes were reduced to misdemeanors and dismissed, he no longer qualified for a certificate of rehabilitation. The appeals court affirmed, rejecting an argument that denying Moreno the ability to pursue a certificate of rehabilitation while the opportunity is afforded to felons violates equal protection of the law. Felons who have had their crimes reduced to misdemeanors and dismissed are not similarly situated to those who remain felons following completion of parole or probation.View "People v. Moreno" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the owners of 26 properties in the city of Eureka, sued the city and several individuals, alleging harassment, intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, abuse of process, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, general negligence, municipal liability, public entity liability-failure to train, and supervisor liability, including three claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The city claims the properties have code violations; the plaintiffs claim that the city is attempting to gain control of their properties. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion (Code of Civil Procedure section 415.16), which the trial court granted as to the first seven causes of action, allowing plaintiffs to conduct discovery on the others. Following that discovery, defendants filed a renewed anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted, concluding that plaintiffs had not shown a probability of prevailing on any of their remaining claims. The court of appeals affirmed, noting that plaintiffs’ claims against defendants “involve actions allegedly taken by the defendants in the investigation and prosecution of plaintiffs regarding code enforcement violations occurring at real properties owned by plaintiffs.”.View "Squires v. City of Eureka" on Justia Law

Thompson filed a complaint, alleging that he operates a business and pays property taxes in Petaluma, seeking to enjoin the police from using taxpayer funds to order 30-day impoundment of vehicles pursuant to Vehicle Code 14602.6 when the driver has operated the vehicle without a valid driver’s license, but with consent of the vehicle’s owner. He alleged that section 14602.6’s notice provisions are insufficient to provide the owner with the factual grounds for the traffic stop or impound, the statutory basis for the driver’s license suspension or revocation, and the grounds for releasing the vehicle. The trial dismissed, finding that Thompson lacked standing because a taxpayer has no standing under section 526a in a matter that involves the city’s exercise of executive discretion. The court also rejected claims that the use of police officers to enforce sectionc14602.6 results in illegal government action or waste of taxpayer funds and that procedures implementing the statute violate procedural due process. The court of appeal remanded with directions to allow Thompson leave to amend his complaint. Assuming Thompson can allege facts showing the city’s actions violate the law, there is a reasonable possibility that the defects in his complaint can be cured by amendment.View "Thompson v. Petaluma Police Dep't" on Justia Law

This case centered two policy issues that are often viewed as controversial: (1) racial, ethnic, and gender preferences; and (2) the decennial redistricting process. In 2008 and 2010, the People of California, exercising their reserved initiative powers, changed the way California's State Senate, State Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization voting districts are adjusted after each national census, assigning the corresponding duties to the California Citizens Redistricting Commission. Plaintiffs Ward Connerly and the American Civil Rights Foundation (collectively, Connerly) sued defendants State of California (State), the State Auditor, and the Commission, alleging the method of selecting members of the Commission violated Proposition 209 (Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 31), in that it gave improper preferences based on race, ethnicity, and gender. Connerly then filed an amended complaint, again asserting the selection process for the last six commissioners violated Proposition 209, but adding that the "Applicant Review Panel" also improperly considered race, ethnicity, and gender. These were characterized as “facial” challenges to Government Code section 8252, subdivision (g) based on Proposition 209, for which various remedies were sought. The State and State Auditor demurred in part on the grounds that Proposition 209 did not apply to the selection of public officers, only to public employees. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on this ground. Connerly appealed. Connerly effectively abandoned his amended complaint, and proposed a new legal theory on appeal--but no new facts--in his opening brief, explicitly citing the authority of Code Civ. Proc. section 472c, subdivision (a). Both the State and State Auditor contended it was unfair for Connerly to raise this theory on appeal because they did not get a chance to disprove it factually. They almost entirely ignored section 472c, which allows a plaintiff to propose new theories on appeal. "Connerly has not strayed from his central factual claim that the composition of the Commission was infected by invidious discrimination. There is no reason to deviate from the well-established rule that section 472c allows a plaintiff to propose new theories on appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. [. . .] The fact that the instant complaint was found wanting raises precisely the circumstance section 472c was designed to address--to give the plaintiff a final opportunity to propose new facts or legal theories to establish a cause of action. Thus, from the parties' briefing, it appears Connerly can plead at least a prima facie case of equal protection violations. The answer is to apply section 472c, subdivision (a), allow Connerly to amend the complaint again to clarify his new theories, and give respondents the chance to defend the Commission's selection provisions to try to show they comport with federal equal protection principles." View "Connerly v. California" on Justia Law

Kao earned a Ph.D. in applied mathematics from Princeton, began teaching mathematics at University of San Francisco in 1991, and became a tenured professor in 1997. Kao was concerned about a lack of diversity of the faculty of the math and computer science departments, and submitted a 485-page complaint to the school in 2006 alleging race-based discrimination and harassment. He lodged a 41-page addendum to the complaint in 2007 school’s failure to advertise in professional journals. During meetings concerning the issue, Kao became “very, very upset,” and started “yelling and screaming.” USF directed Kao to have a fitness-for-duty examination after faculty members and school administrators reported that his behavior was frightening them, and the university terminated his employment when he refused to participate in the examination. Kao sued under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, 12900), the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, 51), the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (Civ. Code, 56), and the state constitution’s right to privacy. His defamation claim was dismissed and a jury ruled against him on his other claims. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that USF could not lawfully require an examination.View "Kao v. Univ. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Eddie Yau filed a complaint against his former employer, Santa Margarita Ford, alleging he was wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy. Yau alleged he was terminated after complaining to Santa Margarita Ford's management about fraudulent warranty repair claims being submitted to Ford Motor Company. Yau also alleged an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action against individual defendants who were his coworkers and supervisors, and the owner of Santa Margarita Ford. The trial court sustained demurrers without leave to amend and dismissed the action, entering separate judgments for Santa Margarita Ford and the individual defendants. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Yau adequately pleaded his wrongful termination cause of action and therefore the judgment in favor of Santa Margarita Ford was granted in error. The Court concluded that the trial court correctly dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, and the judgment in favor of the individual defendants was affirmed. View "Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford" on Justia Law

Police Chief Beck charged Officer Pedro with misconduct: use of a city police vehicle for personal business on two occasions, making a discourteous statement to a member of the public, and making a misleading statement to a supervisor conducting an official investigation. A Board of Rights found that three counts were time-barred. Beck disagreed; the board found Pedro guilty on all counts and recommended a 22-day suspension without pay. Beck approved the recommendation. The trial court found in favor of Pedro, finding counts one and four barred by the statute of limitations and counts two and three not barred. It concluded that Pedro was not informed that he was being investigated for misconduct prior to his interrogation, as required, and suppressed Pedro’s statements and set aside the guilty finding on count four. Although the court found that counts two and three were not barred by the statute of limitations, it determined that the Board had found that those counts were barred, and that its finding was final and binding because the city failed to challenge the decision. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the Board failed to proceed as required by law by deferring to Beck’s determination on the statute of limitations rather than making a decision consistent with its own findings, and that its findings do not support its decision. Ignorance of the accused officer’s identity does not postpone the commencement of the one-year limitations period under Government Code section 3304. The discovery rule applies; the trial court properly determined that count four is time-barred. View "Pedro v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit under Labor Code section 1102.5(b) against the County. The County subsequently appealed from a judgment entered after a substantial jury verdict in plaintiff's favor and plaintiff appealed from the postjudgment order denying his request for attorney fees. The court initially affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of past conduct and there was no substantial evidence to support the economic damages awarded to plaintiff. Both the County and the plaintiff petitioned for rehearing. The court granted the petitions and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of undisclosed reasons for terminating plaintiff where the record contained affirmative indications that the trial court considered and understood that the introduction of undisclosed reasons for the decision to terminate plaintiff was not relevant and was prejudicial. The court also concluded that there was no substantial evidence to support the jury's award of economic damages. Accordingly, the court reversed in that respect but affirmed in all other respects. The court also affirmed the order denying plaintiff's motion for attorney fees. View "Hager v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against John Travolta, Atlo, and others (collectively, "Atlo"), seeking a declaration as to whether a three-page agreement or a four-page agreement was the enforceable termination agreement between the parties, and whether a confidentiality provision, if one exists, is enforceable. Atlo filed an anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) motion to strike the first amended complaint under Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The court held that a declaratory relief action filed in response to an attorney's letters threatening litigation over the contract dispute does not come within the provisions of an anti-SLAPP lawsuit where the lawsuit sought a declaration regarding the terms of plaintiff's termination agreement, not whether Atlo may send demand letters or threaten litigation. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court properly denied the motion to strike the complaint and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Gotterba v. Travolta" on Justia Law

In 2000, a jury convicted Davis of first degree burglary and found that he had four prior first degree felony burglary convictions. The trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life in prison. The court of appeal affirmed. Davis is currently serving his sentence. In 2012, the San Francisco District Attorney’s office sought discovery of the personnel file of a police officer who testified at the Davis trial. The superior court conducted an in-camera review and issued an order finding that the officer’s records were not material to Davis’s case, either as evidence bearing on guilt or sentencing or as impeachment evidence. Although not a party to the 2012 motion, Davis sought independent appellate review of the records to determine whether they contain material that should have been produced pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and sought an order compelling the trial court to conduct a new hearing at which Davis would have the opportunity to be heard. The court of appeal held that Davis failed to establish that he has a right to appeal the post-judgment Brady order or that he is entitled to a writ of mandate. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law