Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Evidence Code 1158 requires medical providers to produce records demanded by patients before litigation and authorizes the requesting attorney to employ a photocopier to obtain the records. Reasonable costs may be charged, subject to limits: $0.10 per page for reproducing regular-sized documents, $0.20 per page for producing documents from microfilm, and clerical costs not to exceed $16 per hour per person for locating and making records available. Plaintiff was admitted to Saint Francis for treatment of burn injuries. Operating under a contract with Saint Francis, HealthPort responded to plaintiff’s attorney’s request for medical records, sending an invoice, stating: “HealthPort has agreed to copy records for you, upon your hiring of HealthPort .... The rates that HealthPort is charging do not fall under [section] 1158.” HealthPort’s invoice included a $30 “basic fee,” a $15 “retrieval fee,” $25.25 for copying 101 pages at $0.25 per page, $10.30 for shipping, and $5.97 for sales tax, and stated “Payment implies that you agreed to employ HealthPort … and ... accepted the charge.” Plaintiff’s attorney paid HealthPort’s invoice, “under protest ∙ in violation of CA EVID CODE 1158.” In 2013, plaintiff filed suit, alleging violation of section 1158 and of the Unfair Competition Law and sought class certification. The court of appeal reversed denial of that motion. The common question is the application of section 1158 to HealthPort’s uniform practices in response to attorney requests for medical records. The fact that each class member ultimately may have to establish his request was submitted in contemplation of litigation does not overwhelm the common question. View "Nicodemus v. St. Francis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that, after her employment terminated, defendants failed to pay all of her final wages. She filed a putative class action under Labor Code sections 201-203, also asserting a representative Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim seeking civil penalties on behalf of plaintiff and other aggrieved employees. Defendants submitted an arbitration agreement signed by plaintiff, stating any disputes would be submitted to arbitration and that “[a]ny such claims must be submitted on an individual basis only and I hereby waive the right to bring or join any type of collective or class claim in arbitration, in any court, or in any other forum.” Defendants conceded that the agreement cannot waive the representative PAGA claim. The trial court compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration. The court of appeal concluded the order is nonappealable; the order does not appear to constitute a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs. The putative class members/aggrieved employees under PAGA because their PAGA claims remain pending. View "Young v. REMX" on Justia Law

Penal Code section 849.5 provides that if a person is arrested and released and no accusatory pleading is filed, the arrest shall be deemed a detention only. Section 851.6, subdivision (b) provides that the arresting law enforcement agency shall issue the person a certificate describing the action as a detention. Subdivision (d) of the section provides that the official criminal records shall delete any reference to an arrest and refer to the action as a detention. Plaintiff filed a class action against the CHP, seeking a writ of mandate to compel the CHP to comply with sections 849.5 and 851.6. The trial court certified the class, awarded the writ petition, and awarded attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the private attorney general statute. The court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to have his arrest deemed a detention under section 849.5, entitled to a certificate from the CHP describing the action as a detention under section 851.6, subd. (b); and entitled to have his arrest deleted from the records of the CHP and the Department of Justice and have any such record refer to it as a detention under 851.6, subd. (d). The court also concluded that the trial court did not err in certifying the class where the class is ascertainable; there is sufficient evidence of numerous persons in the class; the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that a community of interest exists; and plaintiff's claims are typical of the class. Finally, the court concluded that the writ of mandate is not problematic, and the trial court was within its discretion in awarding attorney fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Schmidt v. Cal. Highway Patrol" on Justia Law

Fred Duran filed a putative class action complaint against Obesity Research Institute, LLC (ORI) and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) (collectively, defendants). Duran alleged defendants falsely claimed that ORI's products, Lipozene and MetaboUp, had weight loss benefits. The court approved a claims-made settlement providing that class members submitting a claim without proof of purchase would receive $15, and those submitting receipt(s) would receive one refund of double the unit price paid. The settlement also provided that ORI would cease making certain assertions in product advertising. Defendants also agreed to not oppose a motion seeking $100,000 in attorney fees to class counsel. Objectors, class members DeMarie Fernandez, Alfonso Mendoza, and Brian Horowitz appealed, contending the settlement was the product of collusion. Objectors claimed the class did not receive sufficient notice of settlement, and the settlement was unreasonable and inadequate. They also contended the attorney fee award was excessive. The Court of Appeal reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court's judgment had to be reversed because the class notice failed in its fundamental purpose, to apprise class members of the terms of the proposed settlement. "The erroneous notice injected a fatal flaw into the entire settlement process and undermines the court's analysis of the settlement's fairness." View "Duran v. Obesity Research Institute" on Justia Law

This appeal addressed a collective action alleging nonpayment of overtime, as required by state law under Labor Code section 510 and federal law under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). Plaintiff Jose Luis Morales and 177 other similarly situated plaintiffs (collectively, appellants) sued their employer, the 22nd District Agricultural Association of the State of California (the DAA), alleging nonpayment of overtime. Appellants were seasonal employees of the DAA who assist with amusement and seasonal operations. Appellants contended that reversal of the judgment in favor of the DAA on their FLSA claim was required because the trial court: (1) improperly denied their nonsuit motion; (2) erred in instructing the jury; (3) provided an erroneous special verdict form; and (4) improperly excluded party witnesses from the courtroom. The Court of Appeal found that appellants did not meet their burden to demonstrate reversible error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court properly sustained the DAA's demurrer to appellants' section 510 claim, but erred in denying leave to amend. View "Morales v. 22nd Dist. Agricultural Assn." on Justia Law

In December 2012, the Korean Ministry of Food and Drug Safety suspended the sales of Mario Badescu's Healing Cream after testing revealed the product contained two unlabeled corticosteroids, hydrocortisone and triamcinolone acetonide. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a nationwide class of face cream purchasers, filed suit seeking economic damages and equitable relief. Defendants agreed to settle the action before the class was certified. In this appeal, nine class members raise numerous challenges. In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that the one-time publication of the notice of settlement did not violate the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Civ. Code, 1750 et seq. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Choi v. Mario Badescu Skin Care, Inc." on Justia Law

The "Olson I" opinion examined the extent to which the 1976 amendment to the then-existing Government Code section 68203 aimed at placing a limit on cost of living adjustments (COLA's) for the salaries payable to active jurists and (derivatively) also limiting the pensions payable to certain judicial pensioners, could constitutionally be applied to those active jurists and judicial pensioners. Since Olson I, numerous courts have addressed issues stemming from Olson I, including whether a constitutional amendment designed to supersede Olson I and deprive active jurists and certain judicial pensioners of the benefits provided by the uncapped COLA's was constitutional, and whether interest was due on the payments owed to active and retired judges under the judgment announced in Olson I. This case represented the latest progeny of Olson I. Petitioner Faye Staniforth (and others similarly situated) alleged, as its principal claim against respondent The Judges' Retirement System (JRS), that JRS had not adhered to its obligations to pensioners under their interpretation of Olson I and that, as a result, over three decades worth of pension payments had been underpaid to pensioners. The Olson I claims raised by pensioners sought to compel the JRS to adhere to pensioners' interpretation of Olson I and to recalculate the amount of judicial pensions owed to pensioners using the uncapped COLA's, and to pay arrearages and interest for the decades of underpaid pension payments. The Court of Appeal concluded, contrary to pensioners' Olson I claims, pensioners were not entitled under Olson I to perpetual uncapped COLA increases to their pensions. JRS demurred to an amended petition, arguing that all the stated claims, which sought recovery for payments to the retired jurists that allegedly should have been paid over two decades before the present action was filed, were barred by the statute of limitations under any possibly applicable statute. Petitioners appealed, but finding no error in the trial court's sustaining JRS' demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissal of the action, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Staniforth v. The Judges' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and proposed class representatives Jeffrey Schermer, David Moravee, Tom Fisher, Janice Wenhold, Karen Vielma, Gloria Carruthers and George Rivera (collectively plaintiffs) appealed an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend to the class allegations in four of their causes of action in their second amended complaint (SAC). Plaintiffs' SAC involved 18 mobilehome parks allegedly owned and/or operated by defendants Thomas Tatum (Tatum) and Jeffrey Kaplan (Kaplan), which plaintiffs alleged were managed through defendant Mobile Community Management Company (MCM). Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of residents who live in the 18 mobilehome parks, alleging they were subjected to uniform unconscionable lease agreements and leasing practices by defendants. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial court prematurely dismissed their class allegations because their operative complaint adequately pleaded "a community of interest with typical class representatives and predominately common questions of law and fact" with respect to their four causes of action; and that in so doing, the court improperly assessed its action "on the merits and failed to properly credit [p]laintiffs' unambiguous allegations, which were supported by the actual form lease agreements attached to the [SAC]." After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, concluding the trial court properly sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the class allegations in each of the four causes of action at issue, when it found there was no reasonable possibility plaintiffs could satisfy the community of interest requirement for class certification. View "Schermer v. Tatum" on Justia Law

Class representatives filed suit alleging that RHI committed numerous violations of Civil Code section 1747.08, also known as the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act. The trial court found RHI was liable for as many as 1,213,745 violations of that statute and set a penalty recovery in the amount of $30 per violation, subject to RHI's right to dispute any specific claim. Francesca Muller, a class member and the person prosecuting the appeal, requested the court order notice of the attorney fee motion be sent to all class members. The trial court denied the request, granted the attorney fee motion, and entered judgment in the action. Muller appealed. Michael Hernandez, class representative, contests each of Muller's claims of error. The court concluded that, under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, the court must adhere to Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co. and dismiss the appeal. Even if the court were free to disregard Eggert, adhering to Eggert's approach would not leave nonparty class members without protection or appellate recourse. Under California law, where class members are given the option of opting out, they are not bound by the judgment in the class action but instead may pursue their own action. Intervention would have the effect of giving Muller a clear avenue from which to challenge the attorney fee award. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, seeking to certify a class of those employed by defendant as nonexempt agricultural employees, either directly or through the use of farm labor contractors (FLCs). The trial court denied the motion for class certification. The court concluded that the trial court properly found that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that common issues predominated in the causes of action. Because the lack of predominant common issues of law or fact was a sufficient basis for denial of certification of the direct employee portion of the class, the court need not address the other requirements for class certification. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cruz v. Sun World" on Justia Law