Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other class members, settled a class action suit against Robert Half for $19 million. David Brennan, a member of the class objected to the settlement and the trial court overruled his objections, approving the settlement. Brennan appealed. The court concluded that the class notice did not violate the class members' due process rights; the trial court's method for calculating attorneys' fee was proper and the award was reasonable; and the inclusion of a clear sailing provision in the settlement agreement did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of class counsel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order approving the settlement and entering final judgment.View "Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against Walgreens, alleging that Walgreens violated employees' rights to meal breaks. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for class certification. The court concluded that the trail court used the right analysis to analyze plaintiff's motion where the trial court correctly applied the Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior court holding. Brinker adopted the "make available" standard and rejected the "ensure" standard where the employer merely must make meal breaks available, rather than ensure employees take breaks. The trial court said that Walgreens must make breaks available for its employees, but the employer need not ensure employees actually take the meal breaks. In this case, plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his motions through an expert opinion, emails, and declarations. The evidence was too weak to convince the trial court and the trial court's evaluations were valid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "In re Walgreen Co. Overtime Cases" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit seeking to represent a class of salaried managerial employees who worked at JCS restaurants in California on claims they had been misclassified as exempt employees and were entitled to overtime pay. The trial court subsequently permitted additional plaintiffs to join the lawsuit. The trial court denied class certification based on the ground that plaintiffs failed to establish that their claims were typical of the class, they could represent the class, common questions predominated the claims, and a class action is the superior means of resolving the litigation. The court concluded, however, that the class is adequately represented by plaintiffs and these claims are typical of the class; the trial court failed to adequately assess the means by which plaintiffs' theory of recovery could be proved through resolution of common questions of fact and law; the trial court must reconsider whether class certification provides a superior method of resolving plaintiffs' claim, and therefore, the court reversed the order denying class certification and remanded for further proceedings.View "Martinez v. Joe's Crab Shack Holdings" on Justia Law

In 2006, several borrowers sued their lender, CashCall, Inc., alleging CashCall monitored their telephone conversations without their knowledge or consent. Over CashCall's objections, the trial court certified a class on one of the claims, an alleged violation of Penal Code section 632, which imposes liability on a "person" who intentionally "eavesdrops upon or records [a] confidential communication" and engages in this conduct "without the consent of all parties." After class certification, CashCall successfully moved for summary adjudication on the section 632 claim. The trial court found as a matter of law a corporation does not violate the statute when one of its supervisory employees secretly monitors a conversation between a customer and another corporate employee, reasoning that two employees are a single "person" within the meaning of the statute. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statute applies even if the unannounced listener is employed by the same corporate entity as the known recipient of the conversation, concluding the trial court's statutory interpretation was inconsistent with section 632's language and purpose. The Court also rejected CashCall's alternative argument that summary adjudication was proper because the undisputed facts established the telephone conversations were not "confidential communication[s]." On remand, CashCall moved to decertify the class on grounds that the issue whether any particular class member could satisfy a reasonable-expectation test (as the Court discussed in its earlier opinion) required an assessment of numerous individual factors (including those identified in the earlier opinion) and these individual issues predominate over any remaining common issues, making a continued class action unmanageable. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing CashCall did not meet its burden to establish changed circumstances necessary for class decertification and, alternatively, common issues continued to predominate in the case. The court granted the decertification motion. Plaintiffs appealed the decertification, but finding no error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed.View "Kight v. CashCall" on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs initiated a class action lawsuit against AB Trucking, claiming that AB did not pay its drivers for all hours worked, misclassified some drivers as non-employee trainees and did not pay them at all, and failed to provide required meal and rest breaks. The trial court certified a class of drivers who performed work for AB out of its Oakland, facility. Plaintiffs prevailed on most of their claims and the court awarded the class a total of $964,557.08. In a post-judgment order, the court awarded attorney fees, litigation expenses, and class representative enhancements to plaintiffs. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that federal law preempts application of California’s meal and rest break requirements to motor carriers; that the order granting class certification was not supported by substantial evidence; that the court should have reserved individual determinations of damages for the claims administration process; that AB’s drivers are expressly excluded from coverage under Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) Order No. 9-2001; and that the award of attorney fees and representative enhancements must be reversed.View "Godfrey v. Oakland Port Servs. Corp." on Justia Law

In 2005 class counsel initiated a class action against Wells Fargo on behalf of thousands of mortgage consultants who had allegedly been misclassified as exempt employees. In 2006 ILG filed a putative class action alleging similar claims on behalf of a similar class. An ILG class was initially certified, but was decertified in 2010. Eventually, ILG filed multiple lawsuits, each with 30 to 90 plaintiffs, on behalf of 600 clients, including Maxon. ILG, Wells Fargo and class counsel mediated all pending claims. In 2011, class counsel moved for preliminary approval of a proposed class and settlement; Wells Fargo agreed to pay $19 million, including attorney fees to class counsel, to settle all class claims and $6 million for the ILG claims. At the preliminary approval hearing, the court was told that ILG’s clients would opt out of the class action. Contrary to that explanation, ILG assisted its class member clients in securing the benefits of the class action settlement rather than in opting out to seek recompense from the $6 million fund. ILG claimed that that settlement was for its attorney fees, but was willing to pay $1,750 to each plaintiff for a claim arguably not resolved in the class action. Maxon objected. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order requiring ILG to deposit the funds into escrow. The appeals court affirmed. The court presiding over the class action had jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the settlement of class member claims, even for class members represented by ILG and had a duty to ensure that ILG’s fees were reasonable in light of the overall result.View "Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, seeking to represent approximately 1,800 drivers engaged by Dynamex as independent contractors, filed suit against Dynamex for violation of California law when the courier and delivery services company converted the status of all drivers from employee to independent contractor. After Dynamex's motion to decertify the class was denied, the company petitioned for a writ of mandate. The court issued an order to show cause why respondent superior court should not be compelled to vacate its order denying the motion to decertify the class; granted the petition in part; concluded that the superior court correctly allowed plaintiffs to rely on the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) definition of an employment relationship for purposes of those claims falling within the scope of Wage Order No. 9-2001; with respect to those claims falling outside the scope of the Wage Order, the common law definition of employee will control; and as to those claims, the court granted the petition to allow the superior court to reevaluate whether, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., class certification remains appropriate by focusing its analysis on differences in the defendant's right to exercise control rather than variations in how that right was exercised.View "Dynamex v. Super. Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, appellants, and cross-respondents were consumers who purchased vehicles from defendant, respondent, and cross-appellant Raceway Ford. Plaintiffs raised numerous causes of action based on laws proscribing certain acts against consumers, unfair competition, and deceptive business practices, bringing both individual claims and claims on behalf of two certified classes. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Raceway and against plaintiffs on all causes, except that a single plaintiff was granted rescission on a single cause of action. Separately, the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to Raceway. In consolidated appeals, plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s judgment on the merits (case No. E054517) and fee order (case No. E056595); Raceway cross-appealed regarding one aspect of the trial court’s fee order. In their appeal, plaintiffs specifically argued that, as a matter of law, Raceway’s previous practice of “backdating” second or subsequent contracts for sale of a vehicle to the original date of sale violated the Automobile Sales Finance Act (also known as the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance Act (ASFA)), the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The Court of Appeal agreed that the practice of backdating could have resulted in inaccurate disclosures to class members, thereby violating the ASFA, at least in some cases. On the record, however, the Court declined to order entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff class, rather reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Raceway with respect to plaintiffs’ backdating claims. Plaintiffs also appealed the judgment in favor of Raceway with respect to claims of a second certified class, consisting of Raceway customers who purchased used diesel vehicles from Raceway and who were charged fees for smog checks and smog certifications that were only properly applicable to purchases of gasoline vehicles. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ smog fee claims. Additionally, plaintiffs appealed the judgment in favor of Raceway on certain individual plaintiffs’ claims that Raceway violated the ASFA by failing to provide them with copies of their credit applications. The Court found plaintiffs’ evidence in support of these claims was insufficient to overturn the trial court's decision, so that ruling was also affirmed. Lastly, plaintiffs appealed the judgment in favor of Raceway with respect to claims under the UCL and the CLRA brought by plaintiff Francisco Salcedo in his individual capacity. The trial court found in favor of Mr. Salcedo on his claim of fraud, and granted him the remedy of rescission, though it declined to award any punitive damages. Plaintiffs contended that the judgment in Mr. Salcedo’s favor on his fraud claim established as a matter of law that he should also have judgment entered in his favor on his UCL and CLRA claims. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed. The basis for the trial court’s award of fees to Raceway was, in part, undermined by the Court's partial reversal of the judgment. The case was therefore remanded with respect to Raceway's claims in light of remand on other issues. View "Raceway Ford Cases" on Justia Law

The purported class action against Apple alleged: violations of Business and Professions Code sections 17200, 17500; breach of express warranty; violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code 1792); negligence; negligent misrepresentation; and unjust enrichment. The complaint alleges that Apple falsely represented the iPhone 3G to be “twice as fast” as the previous version of the iPhone and that the problems with the iPhone 3G are not related to the ATTM network, but with the device itself.” The lawsuit was preceded by federal litigation, raising similar but not identical claims. In 2009, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) transferred the actions to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court dismissed, for failure to join AT&T Mobility—the cellular network carrier for the iPhone 3G—as a necessary party under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (a). Based on that decision, the California trial court dismissed. The appeals court reversed, finding that ATTM is not a necessary party.View "Van Zant v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against defendant for failure to pay overtime wages, among other causes of action. The complaint alleged that the putative class members were non-exempt employees who chauffeured vehicles for defendant, and that defendant failed to compensate them for periods when they were required to remain on-call in between trips transporting clients. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court's denial of their motion for class certification. The court reversed because the trial court's analysis of the numerosity factor was incorrect; the trial court improperly considered the merits of defendant's affirmative defenses; and the trial court denied plaintiffs due process by failing to grant them an adequate opportunity to perform discovery on and brief certification issues. View "Hendershot v. Ready to Roll Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law