Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sarun, uninsured when he received emergency services from a hospital owned by Dignity Health, signed an agreement to pay the "full charges, unless other discounts apply.” The agreement explained uninsured patients might qualify for government aid or financial assistance from Dignity. After receiving an invoice for $23,487.90, which reflected a $7,871 “uninsured discount,” and without applying for any other discount or financial assistance, Sarun filed a putative class action, asserting unfair or deceptive business practices (Business and Professions Code 17200) and violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, 1750). The complaint alleged that: Dignity failed to disclose uninsured patients would be required to pay several times more than others receiving the same services, the charges on the invoice were not readily discernable from the agreement, and the charges exceeded the reasonable value of the services. The trial court dismissed, finding that Sarun had not adequately alleged “actual injury.” The court of appeal reversed. Dignity’s argument Sarun was required to apply for financial assistance to allege injury in fact would be akin to requiring Sarun to mitigate damages as a precondition to suit. Mitigation might diminish recovery, butt does not diminish the party’s interest in proving entitlement to recovery. View "Sarun v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against their employer, Pacific Bell, claiming that Pacific Bell violated California law (Lab. Code, 226.7, 512) by failing to relinquish control over their activities during meal and rest break periods, and moved for class certification. Plaintiffs asserted that the company’s guidelines converted them into “de facto security guards for their company vehicles during their breaks,” thereby failing to relieve them of all work-related duties. The trial court concluded plaintiffs failed to show Pacific Bell’s allegedly restrictive policies had been consistently applied to the putative class members. The court denied class certification on the ground that common questions do not predominate over individual questions, making the class action procedure an inappropriate method for resolving this dispute. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that it would be impractical to consider each possible combination and interpretation of the six rules at issue, have the trier of fact determine which combinations rise to the level of control so as to amount to a failure to relieve of all duties, and then have each class member show whether he was subject to one of the offending combinations of rules. View "Koval v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co." on Justia Law

Bower was hired by Inter-Con in 2007 and executed an arbitration agreement, covering claims for compensation and wages. In 2008, Bower executed a second arbitration agreement that added clauses prohibiting claims on behalf of a class or in a representative capacity and covering claims for breaks and rest periods. After his 2011 termination, Bower filed a putative class action, claiming failure to: provide meal and rest periods, pay wages, provide accurate itemized wage statements, pay wages upon termination, with claims under the Unfair Competition Act and the Private Attorneys General Act. Instead of moving to compel arbitration, Inter-Con answered, asserting, as an affirmative defense, that Bower’s claims were subject to arbitration. Inter-Con responded to discovery, but objected based on the arbitration agreement, and agreed to provide responses only to Bower in his individual capacity. Inter-Con did respond to an interrogatory concerning the number of class members employed during the class period and propounded its own discovery. Bower moved for leave to file an amended complaint to allege a broader class and additional theories and to compel further discovery responses. Inter-Con then moved to compel arbitration. The court held that “Defendant waived the right to arbitrate by propounding and responding to class discovery.” The court of appeal affirmed. View "Bower v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In July 2012, plaintiff-respondent Ernesto Ruiz filed a putative class action complaint alleging defendant-appellant Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. failed to pay Ruiz and other employees overtime and other wages for all hours worked, provide required meal and rest breaks, provide accurate and complete wage statements, reimburse business expenses, and pay final wages in a timely manner. Moss Bros. appealed an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of the employment-related and putative class action, representative, and Ruiz's individual claims. The trial court denied the petition on the ground Moss Bros. did not meet its burden of proving the parties had an agreement to arbitrate the controversy. No statement of decision was requested or issued, but the court implicitly found Moss Bros. did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that an electronic signature on its proffered arbitration agreement was "the act of Ruiz." After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded Moss Bros. did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that Ruiz electronically signed the 2011 agreement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order denying the petition. View "Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto" on Justia Law

Defendants-respondents Stella Stephens, Timothy Young, and Melissa Young purchased homes from plaintiff and appellant Lennar Homes of California, Inc. The agreements between Lennar and Stephens and between Lennar and the Youngs contained identical indemnity clauses. Lennar sought to enforce those indemnity clauses, seeking to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in defending a class action lawsuit, brought initially by Stephens, and later joined by Timothy Young (but not Melissa) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Lennar appealed the trial court’s order granting defendants’ special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP motion) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). Lennar argued on appeal that the trial court’s ruling that the indemnity clause at issue was unenforceable under California law, precluding Lennar from demonstrating a probability of success on the merits. Lennar also disagreed with the trial court’s finding that Lennar’s claim against Melissa Young arose from activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Lennar Homes of Cal. v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Nijjar hired Judge as a resident property manager. Nijjar terminated her employment. Judge filed claims for unpaid compensation, meal and rest period premiums, waiting time penalties, and wrongful termination. Under the Private Attorney General Act, Judge alleged similar claims on behalf of other employees. Judge also filed a class action, alleging similar claims on behalf of herself and class members. The trial court determined that the actions were related cases and designated the individual/PAGA action as the lead case, but denied Judge’s subsequent application to consolidate the cases. Based on an arbitration agreement that Judge had signed as an employee, the trial court granted a petition to compel arbitration and stay proceedings on the individual and PAGA claims. The court concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act governed the agreement and that Judge’s employment-related claims and individual PAGA claims were covered. The arbitrator issued a clause construction award, finding that the agreement permitted arbitration of class and representative claims. The trial court granted the defendants’ petition to vacate the n award. The court of appeal dismissed, stating that because the arbitrator has not ruled on any substantive issues, the order did not vacate a final arbitration award and is not appealable. View "Judge v. Nijjar Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

The 965 plaintiffs were people who borrowed money from Countrywide in the mid-2000’s. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the permissive joinder statute (Code of Civil Procedure Section 378). Had this case been filed prior to 2005, in all probability it would have been filed as a class action (in 2005, Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)). Plaintiffs' third amended complaint alleged that in the mid-2000’s, defendant Countrywide Financial Corporation developed a two-prong business strategy to increase its profits: Countrywide would use captive real estate appraisers to provide dishonest appraisals that would inflate home prices beyond levels that would otherwise prevail in an honest market; then Countrywide would induce its borrowers to take loans Countrywide knew they couldn’t afford by misleading them as to their ability to pay their loans, including misrepresenting key terms of the loans themselves. Plaintiffs alleged Countrywide did this because it had no intention of keeping the loans on its books, but intended to bundle them into saleable tranches and sell them to investors. This appeal raised two questions of state law: (1) despite the rather staggering number of joined plaintiffs, did the third amended complaint allege, to track the statutory language of section 378, the “same . . . series of transactions” that would entail litigation of at least one common question of law or fact; and (2) whether California's procedures governing permissive joinder were up to the task of managing mass actions like this one. The Court of Appeal answered "yes" to both questions: a few years after section 378’s enactment in 1927, the California Supreme Court declared the statute’s same-series-of-transactions language is to be construed broadly in favor of joinder, and there are sufficient common questions of law and fact in this case to satisfy section 378, including whether a mortgage lender has a duty to its borrowers not to encourage “high ball,” dishonest appraisals and whether Countrywide really had a deliberate strategy of placing borrowers into loans it “knew” they couldn’t afford. While the Court reversed the judgment dismissing all but one plaintiff for misjoinder, the Court emphasized that on remand the trial court would have to consider a variety of procedural tools with which to organize this case into appropriate and manageable subclaims and subclasses. "While the irony of requiring the case to be divided into tranches has not escaped as, we are confident the trial court can handle the task."View "Petersen v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

In plaintiff-appellant Dagmar Hale's second appeal in a class action against Sharp Healthcare and Sharp Grossmont Hospital (collectively, Sharp), she argued Sharp unfairly charged her and other uninsured patients more for emergency services than the fees it accepted from patients covered by private insurance or governmental plans. In the first appeal, the Court of Appeal partially reversed a judgment of dismissal following a demurrer. The trial court thereafter certified the class. After engaging in discovery, Sharp moved to decertify the class arguing a class action was inappropriate based on lack of ascertainability and lack of predominantly common issues. The trial court considered the evidence presented and found there was no reasonable means to ascertain the members of class without individual inquiries of more than 120,000 patient records and continued class treatment was not appropriate because individualized issues, rather than common issues, predominate, particularly with respect to whether or not class members are entitled to recover damages. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order decertifying the class.View "Hale v. Sharp Healthcare" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other class members, settled a class action suit against Robert Half for $19 million. David Brennan, a member of the class objected to the settlement and the trial court overruled his objections, approving the settlement. Brennan appealed. The court concluded that the class notice did not violate the class members' due process rights; the trial court's method for calculating attorneys' fee was proper and the award was reasonable; and the inclusion of a clear sailing provision in the settlement agreement did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of class counsel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order approving the settlement and entering final judgment.View "Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against Walgreens, alleging that Walgreens violated employees' rights to meal breaks. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for class certification. The court concluded that the trail court used the right analysis to analyze plaintiff's motion where the trial court correctly applied the Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior court holding. Brinker adopted the "make available" standard and rejected the "ensure" standard where the employer merely must make meal breaks available, rather than ensure employees take breaks. The trial court said that Walgreens must make breaks available for its employees, but the employer need not ensure employees actually take the meal breaks. In this case, plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his motions through an expert opinion, emails, and declarations. The evidence was too weak to convince the trial court and the trial court's evaluations were valid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "In re Walgreen Co. Overtime Cases" on Justia Law