Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Goldstone and Lanz are Santa Rosa attorneys. Lanz represented Garcia-Bolio in a “Marvin” action and had a contingency fee agreement. The suit settled on the third day of trial. There was a dispute as to the value of the settlement and Lanz’s fee. Lanz sued Bolio, who failed to respond, and her default was taken. Goldstone became Bolio’s lawyer and, following relief from default, filed an answer and a cross-complaint, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and several ethical violations by Lanz, including that he acted with “moral turpitude.” Lanz defeated Bolio’s cross-claims, leaving only Lanz’s claim against Bolio. Lanz obtained a complete victory at trial, in a decision highly critical of Bolio’s conduct. Lanz then sued Goldstone for malicious prosecution. Goldstone filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to dismiss. The court of appeal affirmed denial, concluding that Lanz met his burden under prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis, demonstrating a probability of success on all three elements of malicious prosecution. View "Lanz v. Goldstone" on Justia Law

While Bikkina was in a Ph.D. program at the University of Tulsa, Mahadevan, Bikkina’s first dissertation advisor and supervisor, repeatedly charged that Bikkina falsified data in published papers and plagiarized Mahadevan’s work. In each case, the University found no wrong doing by Bikkina, but that Mahadevan had violated the University‘s harassment policies. Bikkina completed his Ph.D. and began working at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). Mahadevan contacted Bikkina‘s superiors to state that Bikkina had falsified data, then made a presentation at LBNL and told Bikkina‘s colleagues that Bikkina had published a paper using false data., Bikkina filed a complaint for damages against Mahadevan, who filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. Mahadevan argued that Bikkina improperly sought to chill public discourse on carbon sequestration and its impacts on global warming. Mahadevan asserted that his statements concerned important public issues and constituted protected speech. The court of appeal affirmed denial of the motion, finding that Mahadevan had not engated in protected conduct, even if the conduct arose from protected activity, Bikkina’s claims have sufficient merit to survive a motion to strike. View "Bikkina v. Mahadevan" on Justia Law

Allison, an elderly woman, suffering from dementia, had two daughters. For several years, a team of paid caregivers, consisting of personal friends, tended to Allison, including Barker. A rift developed between Allison’s daughters, and Wagner was appointed conservator of the person and estate of Allison. Wagner made changes to Allison’s care, began paying caregivers legitimately and reporting their wages as employees, and hired Fox, a registered nurse, as Allison’s case manager. Fox determined that Allison required nursing oversight, as none of the caregivers had any background or training in nursing or home healthcare. While being tended to by Newell, an employee of Fox, Allison “became combative and a quarrel resulted,” causing injuries to Allison. A series of emails followed, some critical of those involved in caregiving, and Barker was eventually terminated as a caregiver. Barker sued for defamation and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Fox and Wagner filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal reversed, holding that Barker had not met his burden to show that his complaint was legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing to support a favorable judgment. View "Barker v. Fox & Assocs." on Justia Law

Hunter and Sullivan were indicted on murder, weapons, and gang-related charges stemming from a drive-by shooting. Each served a subpoena duces tecum on Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter, seeking both public and private content from user accounts of the murder victim and a witness. The companies moved to quash the subpoenas, citing the federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2702(a), which provides that electronic communication services “shall not knowingly divulge” the contents of a user communication to anyone, with limited exceptions). Defendants responded that the requested information is necessary to properly defend against the pending charges, and that any statutory privacy protections afforded a social media user must yield to a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights to due process, presentation of a complete defense, and effective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motions to quash and ordered the companies to produce responsive material for in camera review. The court of appeal directed the trial court to issue an order quashing the subpoenas. View "Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

HP sued Oracle, based on Oracle's announcement that it would no longer make software products compatible with HP hardware products. After the court found that Oracle was obligated to adapt its products to the HP systems. Oracle announced that it would appeal. Oracle brought a motion under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, asserting that HP had “changed its damages theory” by relying on “customer uncertainty" resulting from Oracle’s announcement and refusal to accept the ruling. Oracle contended that this theory of damages arose in substantial part from its announced intention to appeal, which announcement was protected under the anti-SLAPP act because it constituted an exercise or attempt to exercise Oracle’s rights to freedom of speech and to petition the government for redress. The court denied the motion as untimely. Oracle appealed. The court of appeal affirmed, finding the appeal and underlying motion ”utterly without merit.” The motion was late under any reasonable construction of the facts and was properly denied because it could not possibly achieve the purposes for which the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted. The court declined to assess sanctions against Oracle “only because we do not wish to further delay the long-overdue trial of the merits.” View "Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp." on Justia Law

Evilsizor and Sweeney married in 2010. Sweeney claimed that her son from a previous marriage had access to her cell phones, which were not password protected. The couple’s daughter was born in 2012. Sweeney became concerned that he might not be the child’s biological father after he read a message on his stepson’s phone, indicating that Evilsizor had received fertility treatments without his knowledge. He downloaded the contents of Evilsizor’s phones and confronted her. He went, uninvited, to the home of Evilsizor’s parents and disclosed private, sensitive information about Evilsizor. The parties separated; dissolution proceedings were initiated. Evilsizor sought to increase Sweeney’s support payments on the ground that her income had decreased because her father had fired her from her job with his company. Sweeney alleged that Evilsizor had colluded with her parents to make it appear she had been fired. Sweeney attached text messages supporting his opposition. Evilsizor sought a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act to stop Sweeney from further disseminating the downloaded information. Finding that Sweeney’s actions amounted to abuse under the DVPA, the trial court prohibited Sweeney from distributing the information without court permission. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the order did not violate Sweeney’s constitutional rights to free speech. View "Evilsizor v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

The ACLU submitted a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request to Los Angeles County for invoices from any law firm in connection with nine lawsuits “brought by inmates involving alleged jail violence.” It also sought disclosure of service agreements between the County and two consultants and an “implementation monitor.” The County agreed to produce copies of the requested documents related to three lawsuits, which were no longer pending, with attorney-client privileged and work product information redacted. It declined to provide statements for the remaining lawsuits, which were still pending. It averred that the “detailed description, timing, and amount of attorney work performed, which communicates to the client and discloses attorney strategy, tactics, thought processes and analysis” were privileged and exempt from disclosure under Government Code 6254 (k), and 6255(a), and by Business and Professions Code 6149 and 6148. The superior court granted a writ of mandate insofar with respect to billing records, but denied the petition with respect to the agreement between the County and the implementation monitor. The court of appeal vacated, holding that because the CPRA expressly exempts attorney-client privileged communications, the tension must here be resolved in favor of the privilege. Because the invoices are confidential communications under Evidence Code 952, they are exempt from disclosure under Government Code 6254(k). View "Los Angeles Bd. Of Supervisors v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Utrecht represented Loanvest in a lawsuit arising out of a loan that was secured by an interest in Oakland property. Utrecht successfully opposed Madow’s motion for a preliminary injunction that would have prevented Loanvest from paying out of the proceeds of the property’s sale. In 2013, Madow became manager of Loanvest, which then sued Utrecht, claiming breach of the duty of loyalty and “looting” Loanvest to pay other obligations. The trial court dismissed under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16), finding that the claim was based on an act in furtherance of the right of petition and that Loanvest failed to make a prima facie showing of its ability to prevail in the action. The court of appeal reversed. Loanvest is not a third party allegedly harmed by Utrecht’s representation of another client, but Utrecht’s former client that allegedly was harmed as the result of his “egregiously breaching the duty of loyalty.” That the complaint refers to another as Utrecht’s “true client” and Loanvest as his “purported client” does not alter that admitted fact. A lawsuit that concerns a breach of duty does not depend on the exercise of a constitutional right. View "Loanvest I, LLC v. Utrecht" on Justia Law

Charter was Glendale’s cable service provider. Glendale sought a temporary restraining order preventing Charter from realigning its public, educational, and government channel numbers. Charter made several cross-claims. The trial court ruled in Charter’s favor on certain issues. The court of appeal affirmed. Charter sought to recover its costs of proof under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, under which, a party to a civil action that denies a pretrial request for admission without a reasonable basis can be ordered to pay to the propounding party the reasonable expenses incurred—including attorney fees and costs— in proving the matter covered by the request. Glendale argued that the request for costs of proof was barred under the Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. 521, which limits the relief that may be obtained against local franchising authorities in actions arising from the regulation of cable service to injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court rejected Glendale’s argument and granted the motion, in part. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the federal law precluded the award. View "City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable Assocs." on Justia Law

The California State Personnel Board upheld Telish’s dismissal from his position with the California Department of Justice based on findings that he intimidated, threatened to release sexually explicit photographs of, and physically assaulted a subordinate employee with whom he had a consensual relationship. The essential issue was the admissibility of recorded telephone conversations between Telish and his former girlfriend and subordinate employee, L.D., which was received at the administrative hearing. The court of appeal affirmed denial of relief. A participant may properly record a telephone conversation at the direction of a law enforcement officer, acting within the course of his or her authority, in the course of a criminal investigation (Pen. Code 633). Section 633 does not limit the use of duly recorded communications to criminal proceedings. Although Telish contends the criminal investigation was a “sham,” the Board determined L.D. duly recorded the telephone conversations pursuant to the direction of DOJ in connection with a criminal investigation, and the Board’s finding was supported by substantial evidence. View "Telish v. Cal. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law