Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Animal Legal Defense Fund (plaintiff) sued LT and Frank, the head chef at Napa restaurant La Toque, (defendants), alleging defendants sold foie gras in their Napa restaurant in violation of Health and Safety Code 25982. Frank has been a vocal opponent of the 2004 ban on foie gras. After the ban went into effect, plaintiff paid an investigator to dine at La Toque three times; each time he requested foie gras and was told that if he ordered an expensive tasting menu he would receive foie gras. Twice it was described as a “gift” from the chef. He ordered the tasting menus and was served foie gras. He was not told he was served foie gras in protest against the ban and was not provided information about defendants’ opposition to the ban. The city declined to prosecute. Defendants unsuccessfully moved to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure, 425.16. The court of appeal affirmed, construing the term “sold” in Section 25982 to encompass serving foie gras as part of a tasting menu, regardless of whether there is a separate charge, whether it is listed on the menu, and whether it is characterized as a “gift,” plaintiff established a probability of prevailing on its claim. View "Animal Legal Def. Fund v. LT Napa Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Time Warner Cable buys content from programmers, who require it to offer their channels as part of TW’s enhanced basic cable programming tier. TW paid the Lakers $3 billion for licensing rights to televise Lakers games for 20 years. Subscription rates rose by $5 a month as result. TW paid the Dodgers $8 billion for the licensing rights to televise games for 25 years, raising monthly rates by another $4. Subscribers filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that the arrangement violated the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200) because: acquisition of licensing rights to the games made TW both programmer and distributor; surveys showed that more than 60 percent of the population would not pay separately to watch the games; there were no valid reasons for bundling sports stations into the enhanced basic cable tier instead of offering them separately; TW expanded the reach of this scheme by selling its rights to the games to other providers, requiring those providers to include the channels as part of their enhanced basic tiers; and the teams knew the increased costs would be passed on to unwilling subscribers and were intended beneficiaries of these arrangements. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal: regulations implementing federal communications statutes expressly preempt the suit. View "Fischer v. Time Warner Cable Inc." on Justia Law

Bob has been the pastor of Visalia’s Calvary Chapel Church for 35 years; he wrote a book, “A Common Miracle,” runs a website to teach the Bible, hosts a radio show, and volunteers as a police chaplain. Bob has been married since 1977 and has four children, including Alex, a stepson who Bob raised since Alex was three years old. In 2004-2005, Alex accused Bob of emotionally and physically abusing him and his brothers. Tim joined the Church in 2005 and began an online discussion about Bob. Alex added comments. In 2010, Alex created his own website/blog where he writes about Bob and Calvary Chapel. Tim contributes comments. The two referred to Bob’s drug dealing, drug smuggling, child abuse, stealing money from the church, and spiritual abuse. Denying a motion to dismiss Bob’s defamation suit as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, the trial court concluded that the alleged defamatory statements concerned an issue of public interest and that Bob was a limited purpose public figure, but that Bob had shown a probability of prevailing on the merits. The court of appeal affirmed, while holding that Bob is not a limited purpose public figure. View "Grenier v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Foundation, a non-profit corporation, acts as a conduit for tax exempt gifts to benefit UCLA. Luskin, a director, pledged $40 million to support construction of a UCLA campus conference center. Save Westwood sought to rescind the donation and to require the Regents of the University of California to pay the city taxes allegedly owing, alleging that the Foundation is “mandated by its by-laws and incorporation documents to exclusively fund charitable undertakings,” that this limitation “applies to the financing of the construction of buildings for exempt purposes,” and that the Luskin grant was applied toward activities that exceed the Foundation’s powers. The defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Save Westwood argued that neither free speech rights, nor rights of petition were implicated because the claims sought enforcement of the Regents’s fiduciary duties, citing an exemption for public interest lawsuits. It voluntarily dismissed Luskin and the Foundation. The trial court granted the motion to strike. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that claims against Luskin were based on letters about the donation and constructon, which constituted an exercise of free speech on a matter of public interest. The Foundation’s pledge toward the conference center was also an exercise of free speech. Neither Luskin nor the Foundation was a governmental entity, so their actions cannot be “an illegal expenditure or waste.” They owed no mandatory duty to avoid donating funds in a manner that might jeopardize the Foundation’s tax exempt status. View "Save Westwood Vill. v. Luskin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff controls the Fig Garden Village outdoor shopping center, which has approximately 60 retailers. Plaintiff has a policy of prohibiting solicitation of donations on the shopping center property; it allows other forms of expressive activity, such as gathering petition signatures, in a designated public forum area only. Solicitors for Nu Creation solicited donations on sidewalk areas adjacent to the entrances of stores within the shopping center. Plaintiff explained its policy regarding solicitation and asked the solicitors to leave, but they refused. Officers would not arrest them without a court order. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief and a temporary restraining order. The trial court granted the ex parte application and issued a TRO. After a hearing, the court issued a preliminary injunction, which did not prohibit all solicitation on plaintiff’s property, but restricted it to a designated public forum area marked on a map attached to the preliminary injunction. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the store entrances and aprons are not a public forum. View "Donahue Schriber Realty Grp., Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach" on Justia Law

The trial court granted a motion to enforce a settlement between plaintiffs and defendants. The trial court found that defendant Fair’s printed name at the end of his email where he had agreed to settlement terms set forth in an email from plaintiffs’ counsel was an “electronic signature” within the meaning of California’s Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Civ. Code, 1633.1) and what it referred to as the “common law of contract” or “contract case law.” Subsequently, plaintiffs requested attorney fees under a provision in an arbitration agreement between the parties. The trial court found plaintiffs to be the prevailing parties but denied the request for attorney fees because the matter never proceeded to arbitration and plaintiffs had failed to show that any contract authorized fees in the litigation. The court of appeal reversed the order enforcing the settlement: the agreement was not signed by plaintiffs and the trial court erred in determining that Fair’s printed name at the end of his email was enforceable. Since plaintiffs are not the prevailing party, they are not entitled to attorney fees.View "J.B.B. Inv. Partners v. Fair" on Justia Law

Cohen and Cohen and Associates Law Corporation represented Slack in a personal injury action on a contingent fee basis. They withdrew from the representation and Drell took over the case. Cohen asserted an attorney fee lien, informing one of the insurers in the personal injury case that any payment of funds to Slack was subject to a lien for their fees incurred during their representation. Drell negotiated settlement of the case, but the insurer made the check payable to Cohen and Drell. Cohen filed a special motion to strike Drell’s complaint seeking declaratory judgment, claiming that it arose from their protected activity of asserting a lien in a demand letter that threatened litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16 (b)(1).)1. The trial court denied the motion, finding the gravamen of the complaint was not protected activity and denied Drell’s request for attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the declaratory relief action targeted protected activity.View "Drell v. Cohen" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a cable television services system operated by Charter within Glendale and the free public, educational, and governmental-affairs (PEG) requirements in connection with such services. Both parties appealed from the trial court's orders. The court held that federal law precluded Charter from obtaining a declaration of a right of offset against future franchise payments to Glendale for past overpayments of PEG fees to Glendale; Glendale did not breach any obligation in connection with its refusal to approve Charter's request to realign channel numbers for PEG programming that was broadcast on Charter's cable television system in Glendale; Charter had no further obligation to provide free video programming and cable modem services to Glendale; the trial court did not err in concluding that Charter had not conveyed to Glendale a permanent right to possess or use the fiber capacity for government intranet communications; and Charter established that Glendale improperly and contrary to law used PEG fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order judgment.View "City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

Navalimpianti, suing its former officers and employees (including Negro) in Florida, sought to obtain copies of e-mail messages stored by Google in California. Navalimpianti caused a subpoena to be served on Google, which Negro moved to quash. The California trial court ordered Google to produce the e-mails, based on its conclusion that Negro had consented, or was deemed to have consented, to their production. The court of appeal held that, at the time it was entered the order constituted an abuse of discretion. Since then, however, Negro has been ordered by a Florida court to give his express consent to disclosure, and he has complied with that order by e-mailing Google; the express consent takes the contemplated production outside of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2702 and permits Google to make the requested disclosure.View "Negro v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

The attorneys filed suit on behalf of Carabello, who was injured in a collision while acting in the course of his employment. Old Republic, the workers’ compensation insurer, intervened to seek reimbursement. Casby, the other driver, raised a defense that limits the ability of an employer, or its insurer, to obtain reimbursement out of an injured worker’s recovery against a third party where the employer’s own negligence contributed to the injuries. The drivers settled for her $100,000 policy limits. The check was deposited in the attorneys’ account, with signatures of both parties required to withdraw any money” Old Republic sought apportionment, claiming the entire settlement, but later withdrew its motion and filed a notice of lien seeking $111,026.33. It is not clear that the attorneys were notified of the dismissal. The attorneys later dismissed the Carabello complaint with prejudice and took the position that by dismissing its pleading, Old Republic had forfeited any right to litigate employer negligence and to recover on its lien. The attorneys later moved, under the anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16), to strike claims that they wrongfully withdrew the settlement. The trial court concluded that dismissal of all affirmative pleadings had deprived it of jurisdiction. The court of appeal affirmed. In determining whether a claim arises from conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP law, the focus is on the wrongful, injurious acts or omissions identified in the complaint and whether they fit the statute’s description of protected conduct. Because the withdrawal of funds was neither communicative nor related to an issue of public interest, the trial court properly denied the motion.View "Old Republic Constr. Program Grp. v. Boccardo Law Firm" on Justia Law