Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The ACLU submitted a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request to Los Angeles County for invoices from any law firm in connection with nine lawsuits “brought by inmates involving alleged jail violence.” It also sought disclosure of service agreements between the County and two consultants and an “implementation monitor.” The County agreed to produce copies of the requested documents related to three lawsuits, which were no longer pending, with attorney-client privileged and work product information redacted. It declined to provide statements for the remaining lawsuits, which were still pending. It averred that the “detailed description, timing, and amount of attorney work performed, which communicates to the client and discloses attorney strategy, tactics, thought processes and analysis” were privileged and exempt from disclosure under Government Code 6254 (k), and 6255(a), and by Business and Professions Code 6149 and 6148. The superior court granted a writ of mandate insofar with respect to billing records, but denied the petition with respect to the agreement between the County and the implementation monitor. The court of appeal vacated, holding that because the CPRA expressly exempts attorney-client privileged communications, the tension must here be resolved in favor of the privilege. Because the invoices are confidential communications under Evidence Code 952, they are exempt from disclosure under Government Code 6254(k). View "Los Angeles Bd. Of Supervisors v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Utrecht represented Loanvest in a lawsuit arising out of a loan that was secured by an interest in Oakland property. Utrecht successfully opposed Madow’s motion for a preliminary injunction that would have prevented Loanvest from paying out of the proceeds of the property’s sale. In 2013, Madow became manager of Loanvest, which then sued Utrecht, claiming breach of the duty of loyalty and “looting” Loanvest to pay other obligations. The trial court dismissed under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16), finding that the claim was based on an act in furtherance of the right of petition and that Loanvest failed to make a prima facie showing of its ability to prevail in the action. The court of appeal reversed. Loanvest is not a third party allegedly harmed by Utrecht’s representation of another client, but Utrecht’s former client that allegedly was harmed as the result of his “egregiously breaching the duty of loyalty.” That the complaint refers to another as Utrecht’s “true client” and Loanvest as his “purported client” does not alter that admitted fact. A lawsuit that concerns a breach of duty does not depend on the exercise of a constitutional right. View "Loanvest I, LLC v. Utrecht" on Justia Law

Charter was Glendale’s cable service provider. Glendale sought a temporary restraining order preventing Charter from realigning its public, educational, and government channel numbers. Charter made several cross-claims. The trial court ruled in Charter’s favor on certain issues. The court of appeal affirmed. Charter sought to recover its costs of proof under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, under which, a party to a civil action that denies a pretrial request for admission without a reasonable basis can be ordered to pay to the propounding party the reasonable expenses incurred—including attorney fees and costs— in proving the matter covered by the request. Glendale argued that the request for costs of proof was barred under the Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. 521, which limits the relief that may be obtained against local franchising authorities in actions arising from the regulation of cable service to injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court rejected Glendale’s argument and granted the motion, in part. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the federal law precluded the award. View "City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable Assocs." on Justia Law

The California State Personnel Board upheld Telish’s dismissal from his position with the California Department of Justice based on findings that he intimidated, threatened to release sexually explicit photographs of, and physically assaulted a subordinate employee with whom he had a consensual relationship. The essential issue was the admissibility of recorded telephone conversations between Telish and his former girlfriend and subordinate employee, L.D., which was received at the administrative hearing. The court of appeal affirmed denial of relief. A participant may properly record a telephone conversation at the direction of a law enforcement officer, acting within the course of his or her authority, in the course of a criminal investigation (Pen. Code 633). Section 633 does not limit the use of duly recorded communications to criminal proceedings. Although Telish contends the criminal investigation was a “sham,” the Board determined L.D. duly recorded the telephone conversations pursuant to the direction of DOJ in connection with a criminal investigation, and the Board’s finding was supported by substantial evidence. View "Telish v. Cal. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

Animal Legal Defense Fund (plaintiff) sued LT and Frank, the head chef at Napa restaurant La Toque, (defendants), alleging defendants sold foie gras in their Napa restaurant in violation of Health and Safety Code 25982. Frank has been a vocal opponent of the 2004 ban on foie gras. After the ban went into effect, plaintiff paid an investigator to dine at La Toque three times; each time he requested foie gras and was told that if he ordered an expensive tasting menu he would receive foie gras. Twice it was described as a “gift” from the chef. He ordered the tasting menus and was served foie gras. He was not told he was served foie gras in protest against the ban and was not provided information about defendants’ opposition to the ban. The city declined to prosecute. Defendants unsuccessfully moved to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure, 425.16. The court of appeal affirmed, construing the term “sold” in Section 25982 to encompass serving foie gras as part of a tasting menu, regardless of whether there is a separate charge, whether it is listed on the menu, and whether it is characterized as a “gift,” plaintiff established a probability of prevailing on its claim. View "Animal Legal Def. Fund v. LT Napa Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Time Warner Cable buys content from programmers, who require it to offer their channels as part of TW’s enhanced basic cable programming tier. TW paid the Lakers $3 billion for licensing rights to televise Lakers games for 20 years. Subscription rates rose by $5 a month as result. TW paid the Dodgers $8 billion for the licensing rights to televise games for 25 years, raising monthly rates by another $4. Subscribers filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that the arrangement violated the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200) because: acquisition of licensing rights to the games made TW both programmer and distributor; surveys showed that more than 60 percent of the population would not pay separately to watch the games; there were no valid reasons for bundling sports stations into the enhanced basic cable tier instead of offering them separately; TW expanded the reach of this scheme by selling its rights to the games to other providers, requiring those providers to include the channels as part of their enhanced basic tiers; and the teams knew the increased costs would be passed on to unwilling subscribers and were intended beneficiaries of these arrangements. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal: regulations implementing federal communications statutes expressly preempt the suit. View "Fischer v. Time Warner Cable Inc." on Justia Law

Bob has been the pastor of Visalia’s Calvary Chapel Church for 35 years; he wrote a book, “A Common Miracle,” runs a website to teach the Bible, hosts a radio show, and volunteers as a police chaplain. Bob has been married since 1977 and has four children, including Alex, a stepson who Bob raised since Alex was three years old. In 2004-2005, Alex accused Bob of emotionally and physically abusing him and his brothers. Tim joined the Church in 2005 and began an online discussion about Bob. Alex added comments. In 2010, Alex created his own website/blog where he writes about Bob and Calvary Chapel. Tim contributes comments. The two referred to Bob’s drug dealing, drug smuggling, child abuse, stealing money from the church, and spiritual abuse. Denying a motion to dismiss Bob’s defamation suit as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, the trial court concluded that the alleged defamatory statements concerned an issue of public interest and that Bob was a limited purpose public figure, but that Bob had shown a probability of prevailing on the merits. The court of appeal affirmed, while holding that Bob is not a limited purpose public figure. View "Grenier v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Foundation, a non-profit corporation, acts as a conduit for tax exempt gifts to benefit UCLA. Luskin, a director, pledged $40 million to support construction of a UCLA campus conference center. Save Westwood sought to rescind the donation and to require the Regents of the University of California to pay the city taxes allegedly owing, alleging that the Foundation is “mandated by its by-laws and incorporation documents to exclusively fund charitable undertakings,” that this limitation “applies to the financing of the construction of buildings for exempt purposes,” and that the Luskin grant was applied toward activities that exceed the Foundation’s powers. The defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Save Westwood argued that neither free speech rights, nor rights of petition were implicated because the claims sought enforcement of the Regents’s fiduciary duties, citing an exemption for public interest lawsuits. It voluntarily dismissed Luskin and the Foundation. The trial court granted the motion to strike. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that claims against Luskin were based on letters about the donation and constructon, which constituted an exercise of free speech on a matter of public interest. The Foundation’s pledge toward the conference center was also an exercise of free speech. Neither Luskin nor the Foundation was a governmental entity, so their actions cannot be “an illegal expenditure or waste.” They owed no mandatory duty to avoid donating funds in a manner that might jeopardize the Foundation’s tax exempt status. View "Save Westwood Vill. v. Luskin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff controls the Fig Garden Village outdoor shopping center, which has approximately 60 retailers. Plaintiff has a policy of prohibiting solicitation of donations on the shopping center property; it allows other forms of expressive activity, such as gathering petition signatures, in a designated public forum area only. Solicitors for Nu Creation solicited donations on sidewalk areas adjacent to the entrances of stores within the shopping center. Plaintiff explained its policy regarding solicitation and asked the solicitors to leave, but they refused. Officers would not arrest them without a court order. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief and a temporary restraining order. The trial court granted the ex parte application and issued a TRO. After a hearing, the court issued a preliminary injunction, which did not prohibit all solicitation on plaintiff’s property, but restricted it to a designated public forum area marked on a map attached to the preliminary injunction. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the store entrances and aprons are not a public forum. View "Donahue Schriber Realty Grp., Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach" on Justia Law

The trial court granted a motion to enforce a settlement between plaintiffs and defendants. The trial court found that defendant Fair’s printed name at the end of his email where he had agreed to settlement terms set forth in an email from plaintiffs’ counsel was an “electronic signature” within the meaning of California’s Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Civ. Code, 1633.1) and what it referred to as the “common law of contract” or “contract case law.” Subsequently, plaintiffs requested attorney fees under a provision in an arbitration agreement between the parties. The trial court found plaintiffs to be the prevailing parties but denied the request for attorney fees because the matter never proceeded to arbitration and plaintiffs had failed to show that any contract authorized fees in the litigation. The court of appeal reversed the order enforcing the settlement: the agreement was not signed by plaintiffs and the trial court erred in determining that Fair’s printed name at the end of his email was enforceable. Since plaintiffs are not the prevailing party, they are not entitled to attorney fees.View "J.B.B. Inv. Partners v. Fair" on Justia Law