Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal noted that effective January 1, 2019, Code of Civil Procedure section 998 will have no application to costs and attorney and expert witness fees in a Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) action unless the lawsuit is found to be "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." In regard to the litigation that predated the application of the amended version of Government Code section 12965(b), the court held that section 998 does not apply to nonfrivolous FEHA actions and reversed the order awarding defendant costs and expert witness fees pursuant to that statute. View "Huerta v. Kava Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Esteban Vera was convicted of possessing one kilogram of a controlled substance that was discovered through a dog sniff during a traffic stop of his vehicle. An officer had stopped Vera due to a tinted-window infraction. At issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the dog sniff unconstitutionally prolonged his detention for that traffic stop, requiring suppression of the drugs under Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Vera’s suppression motion. View "California v. Vera" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Richard Garcia was convicted by jury of first degree residential burglary. Defendant admitted having one prior strike/prior serious felony conviction and one prison prior, and he was sentenced to 14 years in prison, including a five-year consecutive term based on his prior serious felony conviction. In this appeal, defendant claimed the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him of his due process right to present a defense by excluding the expert testimony of Dr. Robert Shomer concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications. The Court of Appeal found no merits to these claims, but remanded the matter for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1393), which amended Penal Code sections 667(a) and 1385 (b), effective January 1, 2019, to give courts discretion to dismiss or strike a prior serious felony conviction for sentencing purposes. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant Michelle Franske and the State both appealed a resentencing proceeding pursuant to Proposition 47. The trial court granted defendant’s request to reduce her November 2010 conviction for felony second degree commercial burglary to misdemeanor shoplifting and reduced her punishment for that offense only. In doing so, the trial court rejected the State's argument that defendant’s conduct actually did not constitute shoplifting and also rejected defendant’s additional request to strike the associated on-bail enhancement. The Court of Appeal originally concluded the trial court got it right on both rulings and affirmed. Thereafter, the California Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for review and ultimately transferred the case with direction for the Court of Appeal to vacate its prior decision and to reconsider the cause in light of the recently decided California v. Buycks, 5 Cal.5th 857 (2018). Applying Buycks, the Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion. View "California v. Franske" on Justia Law

In October 2013, defendant Okouava Saelee was charged with manufacturing hash oil, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possessing marijuana for sale. The complaint alleged he had suffered a prior serious felony conviction based on a 1994 conviction for assault with a semiautomatic firearm. In September 2014, defendant pleaded no contest to possessing marijuana for sale and admitted the prior serious felony conviction allegation as well as a prior prison term allegation under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), which was added to the information by stipulation. The court sentenced defendant to a negotiated aggregate term of seven years. In December 2016, defendant petitioned to redesignate his offense as a misdemeanor. In February 2017, the prosecution filed written opposition to the petition, arguing that resentencing was inappropriate because defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The prosecution did not challenge defendant’s assertion that he was statutorily eligible for resentencing. Although the prosecution’s written opposition contained numerous factual assertions, it was not supported by any evidence. Through its opinion, the Court of Appeal made clear that the prosecution was required to admit actual evidence to establish an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety in the second step of Health and Safety Code section 11361.8 (b), enacted as part of Proposition 64. Furthermore, the Court held that the standard of proof was proof by a preponderance of the evidence. “Mere assertions of fact and argument by the prosecution, unsupported by evidence, is insufficient to establish an unreasonable risk of danger to the public, i.e., an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a ‘super-strike’ violent felony offense. Thus, while we disagree with defendant’s contention that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies to the risk of dangerousness finding under section 11361.8(b), we nevertheless conclude the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting defendant’s petition to recall and resentence his conviction as a misdemeanor because in determining that defendant presented an unreasonable risk of danger to the public, the trial court relied only on bald factual assertions and argument by the prosecution unsupported by actual evidence.” The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Saelee" on Justia Law

Petitioner S.V. (mother) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (8.452), challenging the juvenile court’s denial of reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361.5 (b)(3), and setting a section 366.26 hearing. Mother argued the court erred in applying section 361.5 (b)(3) to bypass reunification services with regard to her child, M.C. After review, the Court of Appeal disagree and denied mother’s petition. Furthermore, the Court concurred with the trial court that reunification was not in the child's best interest. View "S.V. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Eric Jones guilty of multiple counts of second degree burglary of a vehicle and additional offenses arising from a series of car break-ins throughout San Francisco that occurred over a 17-month period. The trial court instructed the jury that if it found Jones committed one or more of the charged auto burglaries (along with one uncharged auto burglary) by a preponderance of the evidence, it could consider that evidence in deciding identity and intent to commit theft for the other charged crimes. The instruction reminded the jury that the prosecution had to prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones argued on appeal this instruction had the effect of lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof, and was structural error requiring automatic reversal. The Court of Appeal concluded the instruction should not have been given, but there was no structural error. Any error in giving the instruction was harmless. View "California v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this writ proceeding, the State sought relief from a discovery order requiring them to produce certain materials related to DNA testing in a criminal action. Petitioner Florencio Dominguez was accused of conspiracy to commit murder. Pertinent here, one piece of evidence expected to be introduced at his upcoming trial was central: results from DNA testing conducted on a pair of blood-soaked gloves found near the scene of the crime. No one disputed DNA testing established the blood on the gloves' exterior to be that of victim. DNA on swabs from the gloves' interior, however, could not be tied to a single source. Rather, those swabs yielded a low template DNA mixture with multiple contributors. The San Diego Police Department Crime Lab (the lab) tested the swabs using the STRmix program. In February 2018, defense counsel informally requested discovery of materials related to the STRmix program from the State. After review, the Court of Appeal granted the state’s application and issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to: (1) vacate its order of March 29, 2018; (2) enter a new order denying defendant's motion to compel production of the STRmix software program, the program source code, and ESR's internal validation studies; and (3) conduct further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion with respect to the STRmix user manual. The stay issued on May 18, 2018 would be vacated when this opinion was final as to the Court of Appeal. View "California v. Superior Court (Dominguez)" on Justia Law

The California Coastal Act of 1976 requires local governments like defendant City of Solana Beach (the City) to develop a local coastal program (LCP). The City submitted an amended LUP (ALUP) to the Commission. The Commission approved the ALUP with suggested modifications and the City accepted those modifications. In April 2013, Beach and Bluff Conservancy (BBC) brought this action for declaratory relief and traditional mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, challenging seven specific policies of the City's ALUP as facially inconsistent with the Coastal Act and/or facially unconstitutional. The court granted BBC's motion and petition for writ of mandate as to two of the challenged policies and denied the motion and writ petition as to the other five challenged policies, and entered judgment accordingly. BBC's appeal and the cross-appeals by the City, the Commission, and Surfrider Foundation (Surfrider) centered on five of the seven policies at issue in the trial court. BBC contended the court erred in rejecting its claims that one of those policies is facially inconsistent with the Coastal Act, another was facially unconstitutional under the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine," and a third was both inconsistent with the Coastal Act and unconstitutional. In their cross-appeals, the City, the Commission, and Surfrider contended the court erred in granting BBC's motion for judgment and petition for writ of mandate as to two of the policies. The City and the Commission also raised a number of procedural challenges to the judgment. The Court of Appeal concluded BBC's exclusive remedy to challenge policies in the ALUP on the ground they were inconsistent with the Coastal Act was to file a petition for writ of administrative mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 rather than an action for declaratory relief and traditional mandamus. And assuming, without deciding, that administrative mandamus was not the exclusive remedy for BBC's facial challenges to two policies on constitutional grounds, the Court concluded those challenges failed on the merits. View "Beach & Bluff Conservancy v. City of Solana Beach" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Andrey Yushchuk guilty of second degree "Watson" murder, misdemeanor drunk driving (DUI) and misdemeanor aggravated DUI (over 0.08 percent blood-alcohol content); it acquitted him of felony DUI-with-injury charges. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for an unstayed term of 15 years to life. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to acquit at the close of the State's case-in-chief; and (2) the court misinstructed the jury regarding permissive inferences. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Yushchuk" on Justia Law