Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Brandon Berch objected to having a commissioner preside over his preliminary and final parole revocation hearings. His objection was overruled. The commissioner revoked defendant’s parole and committed him to 120 days in jail. The Court of Appeal found revoking parole and committing a defendant to jail for violation of parole were not subordinate judicial duties that could be performed by a commissioner in the absence of a stipulation by the parties. Because defendant did not stipulate to the commissioner revoking his parole and committing him to jail, the postjudgment order was reversed. View "California v. Berch" on Justia Law

Late one night, two officers were piloting a police helicopter when a laser struck their cockpit multiple times. The windshield on the aircraft refracted the light from the laser throughout the cockpit, which restricted the officers’ visibility and gave one of them a headache. However, they were able to trace the source of the laser to appellant Mengyan Sun's apartment, and officers arrested appellant there a short time later. Appellant was charged with two counts each of assault with a deadly weapon and aggravated assault on a peace officer. He argued on appeal his prosecution for that general offense was precluded by statutes that specifically pertain to the unlawful use of a laser. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed his convictions for assault with a deadly weapon. The Court published its opinion "to underscore the continued vitality and adaptability of the venerable Williamson rule, which we believe has aged well." View "California v. Sun" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Shauna Burton guilty of two counts of first degree murder and one count of second degree robbery, found true a multiple-murder special circumstance, and found true allegations that defendant used two deadly weapons (a flashlight and a knife). The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for life without parole plus seven years. On appeal, she argued the trial court improperly admitted evidence about a prior conviction, no substantial evidence supports first degree murder, and the court misinstructed on the use of willfully false prior statements. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's conviction shall affirm. View "California v. Burton" on Justia Law

Wilmot commenced employment with the Fire Protection District in 1985. He was a member of the retirement program, administered by the Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Association (CCERA). In 2012, Wilmot decided to retire. His final day on the job was December 12; he applied for a service retirement” to CCERA the following day. On January 1, 2013, the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act took effect, mandating the complete or partial forfeiture of pension benefits/payments if a public employee is convicted of “any felony under state or federal law for conduct arising out of or in the performance of his or her official duties.” (Gov. Code 7522.72(b)(1).) In February 2013, Wilmot was indicted. In April 2013, the CCERA approved his retirement application, fixing Wilmot’s actual retirement as December 13, 2012. Wilmot began receiving pension checks. In December 2015, pled guilty to embezzling county funds for 12 years, ending in December 2012. CCERA reduced Wilmot’s monthly check in accordance with the forfeiture provision. The court of appeal held that the forfeiture provision applies to Wilmot and declined to address whether it would amount to an unconstitutional impairment of his employment contract or an ex post facto law for someone in a different situation. Finishing the last day of work does not automatically make a public employee a “retired” former employee. View "Wilmot v. Contra Costa County Employees' Retirement Association" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph LaVoie carjacked a stranger in a parked car, forcing him to turn over his car keys and cell phone at gunpoint. When defendant was arrested, he was in possession of a handgun with a 15- round-capacity magazine. A jury convicted him of: (1) second degree robbery with a personal firearm use enhancement; (2) unlawful possession of a firearm; and (3) receiving a large-capacity magazine. In a bifurcated proceeding, after waiving a jury trial, defendant admitted two “strike” priors, two prior serious felony enhancements, and two prior prison term enhancements. As a result, defendant was sentenced to a total of 71 years 4 months to life. Defendant did not challenge his conviction of the substantive offenses; all of his appellate contentions related to the enhancements and the strikes. Primarily, he argued the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to amend the prior conviction allegations after the jury had been discharged. The Court of Appeal agreed as to one of the strikes; otherwise, the Court affirmed but remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Lavoie" on Justia Law

Officers Gragg and Morin responded to a report that a man (Neal) at the Antioch Marina was acting in a suicidal manner. Neal stated that he was previously in the military and had been a police officer and possessed weapons at his home. Neal, fluctuating between calmness and frustration, was transported to a hospital for psychological evaluation. Officers went to Neal’s residence and were met by Neal’s wife, Mimi, who “said something" like, "I don’t want these guns in my house.” She led them to the bedroom and asked them to look into a closet where they found six firearms. Neal had a prior felony conviction. Neal claimed that he intended to give the guns as gifts to his children and that he told the officers that the weapons were “part of [his father’s] probate estate" and had been delivered to the house. Neal testified that he believed that the rights he lost while on probation, including the possession of firearms, would be returned after his successful completion of probation. The court of appeal affirmed Neal's conviction for possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, upholding the denial of a motion to suppress. Gragg told Mimi her husband was on a section 5150 hold, but never suggested that any authority, empowered him to search her home. The court agreed that the probation supervision fee Neal was improperly imposed without any determination of Neal's ability to pay. View "People v. Neal" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Lamar McClinton to be a sexually violent predator (SVP), as defined within the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). The trial court then committed McClinton to the custody of the State Department of State Hospitals (SDSH) for an indeterminate term. On appeal, McClinton challenged several rulings made by the trial court; he also made four instructional error claims. McClinton argued there was insufficient evidence, and he claimed that the SVPA was fundamentally unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. McClinton" on Justia Law

Defendants Sandra Bonilla, Guillermo Bonilla Chirinos, and Juan Bonilla Chirinos appealed after juries found each of them guilty of felony vandalism. Defendants argued they received ineffective assistance of counsel because their trial counsel: (1) failed to raise Commercial Code section 9609 and other statutes as a defense to the vandalism charge; (2) failed to clarify the vandalism jury instruction after the jury asked which items were part of the charge; and (3) should have introduced Guillermo’s telephone records to support Guillermo’s credibility at trial. In addition, they argued the trial court abused its discretion by denying their: (1) request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and (2) motion requesting the trial court reduce their felony convictions to misdemeanors and not impose custody time. Finding no merit in these contentions, the Court of Appeal affirmed their convictions. View "California v. Bonilla" on Justia Law

Defendant Malanje Phea was found guilty of all counts in a 33-count information. Thirty-one of the counts charged defendant with sex offenses against one of his daughters and two other victims, each of whom was 16 years old or younger at the time of the offenses. In the other two counts defendant was convicted of furnishing a controlled substance to the daughter. At trial, two additional victims testified to uncharged acts of child molestation and sexual misconduct pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108. The trial court sentenced defendant to 46 years four months in prison. Challenging the sentence he received, on appeal defendant contended the trial court made multiple procedural errors. In the published portion of its decision, the Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s due process contentions and in doing so, concluded that reliance upon McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1993) was misplaced because that case had no application in the context of section 1108 evidence. The Court also rejected defendant’s contention that CALCRIM No. 1191 concerning uncharged acts of sexual misconduct and the circumstantial evidence instructions conflicted and reduced the burden of proof. The Court vacated the sentences imposed on counts one and two and remanded the matter for resentencing on those counts, at which the trial court had the option of choosing impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. The Court of Appeal also directed the trial court at resentencing to clearly impose a court operations assessment and a criminal conviction assessment on all 33 counts. Otherwise, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Phea" on Justia Law

Defendant, lawfully arrested for driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, moved to suppress evidence alleging: “The collection of blood, breath, or urine constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and must be done pursuant to accepted medical practices.” At a hearing, the only witness was the arresting officer, Ramos. He testified that, after defendant refused to submit to a breath or blood test, a blood draw was performed pursuant to a search warrant. The form DUI search warrant used by the Ventura Superior Court mirrors Penal Code section 1524(a)(13), which provides that a blood “‘sample will be drawn from the person in a reasonable, medically approved manner.’” Ramos testified that the blood was drawn in his presence at a hospital. The trial court suppressed the blood-test results. It explained that, although “[t]he defense pled in their moving papers that acceptable medical practices must be followed[,] . . . [n]o evidence was adduced as to that fact.” The appellate division reversed. The court of appeal agreed, holding that, where the circumstances of the blood draw are typical and routine, i.e., not peculiarly within the knowledge of the People, the burden of proof is on the defendant. View "People v. Fish" on Justia Law