Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ventura County District Attorney charged Defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm, ammunition and a machine gun. As to each charge, it was alleged that Defendant suffered a 2021 prior strike conviction for possessing a firearm for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Assembly Bill No. 333 amended section 186.22 to require evidence that the firearm possession provides more than a reputational benefit to the street gang. Because no such evidence supported Defendant’s prior conviction, the trial court concluded that it no longer qualified as a strike. Defendant pleaded no contest to the three charges against him and was sentenced to two years in state prison. The district attorney appealed.   The Second Appellate District vacated the judgment and reversed the order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss the strike allegations. The court explained that when it enacted Assembly Bill No. 333, the Legislature found that gang enhancements have not been shown to reduce crime or violence. The Legislature also found that these enhancements have been applied inconsistently and disproportionately against people of color. They have additionally been applied to minor crimes and have been used to “legitimize severe punishment.” However, the court explained that while these are valid concerns, it is not the province of the court to apply legislative concerns to a statutory scheme the Legislature has left unchanged. View "P. v. Aguirre" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his conviction, by jury, of the attempted willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder and fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly. It acquitted Appellant of a second count of attempted murder on the same victim. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison plus a 20-year enhancement term for the firearm use and a concurrent term of 27 months on the evading conviction. Appellant contends that numerous evidentiary, procedural, and instructional errors occurred at his trial. Further, the court noted that a primary issue is the contention that the prosecutor violated the RJA, section 745 and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue at the sentencing hearing.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court concluded that the Legislature acted within its law-making authority when it declared in the RJA that the use of racially discriminatory language in a criminal trial constitutes a miscarriage of justice, that the prosecutor violated the statute when she referred to Appellant’s complexion and “ambiguous ethnic presentation” as reasons to doubt his credibility, and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to bring this statutory violation to the attention of the trial court at the earliest possible opportunity. The court found that because Appellant’s trial counsel failed to raise the violation at the sentencing hearing, the trial court has not yet had the opportunity to exercise its discretion to select which of the enumerated remedies it would impose. Consequently, the court remanded the matter to the trial court so it may exercise its discretion in this regard. View "P. v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant both members of the State Bar, represent opposing parties in a dissolution/annulment proceeding pending in Los Angeles Superior Court. Following an incident at Plaintiff’s office relating to the canceled deposition of Defendant’s client, Plaintiff obtained a three-year civil harassment restraining order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 protecting her, as well as her paralegal and office receptionist, from further harassment by Defendant.   On appeal Defendant argued, in part, that all of the conduct upon which the trial court based its findings of harassment was constitutionally protected activity and there was insufficient evidence his actions, to the extent not constitutionally protected, were directed at Plaintiff, caused Plaintiff substantial emotional distress, or would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress as required to support issuance of the restraining order. Defendant also argued that the court erred in including in the order members of Plaintiff’s office staff as protected individuals.   The Second Appellate District reversed and directed the trial court to enter a new order denying Plaintiff’s request for a restraining order. The court explained that Defendant’s Emails regarding his client’s deposition constituted constitutionally protected activity. The court explained that because the emails were constitutionally protected, it was an error for the trial court to conclude they were properly considered part of a course of conduct of harassment. Further, the court found that the evidence of Defendant’s nonprotected conduct did not support the court’s findings of a willful or knowing course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person and did cause Plaintiff substantial emotional distress. View "Hansen v. Volkov" on Justia Law

In 1999, a jury convicted defendant Patrick Trent of first degree murder and street terrorism, but found not true the enhancements that defendant had personally used a knife and that the murder had been committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life plus eight months, and the Court of Appeal affirmed that judgment. Defendant’s first degree murder conviction was later reduced to second degree murder in light of California v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (2014), resulting in the reduction of defendant’s aggregate term to 15 years to life plus eight months. Thereafter, in July 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now 1172.6), which the trial court granted in a written ruling issued February 28, 2022. On March 28, 2022, the trial court redesignated the murder conviction as assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury with a great bodily injury enhancement and resentenced defendant. Defendant timely appealed, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) failing to retroactively apply Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) to his substantive gang conviction; and (2) imposing a great bodily injury enhancement to the redesignated offense. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the abstract of judgment needed to be corrected to reflect conviction by jury. The Court also agreed with defendant that he was entitled to the retroactive application of Assembly Bill 333, requiring reversal of his section 186.22 conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Trent" on Justia Law

Petitioner is serving a life term for the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Petitioner served 23 years and three months, the parole board granted him parole. The Governor reversed the parole board’s decision and denied Petitioner parole on the ground that Petitioner lacks insight into his crime. The superior court granted Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The People appealed from the court’s order granting the petition.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the Governor may rely on the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense as a basis for his decision to deny parole, but the aggravated circumstances do not in themselves provide some evidence of current dangerousness. The failure to gain insight into the cause of the crime is a factor that shows a continuing threat to public safety.   The court wrote that here, there can be no dispute that the circumstances of the murder were aggravated. Petitioner and his companions brutally murdered a 15-year-old girl. The Governor found that Petitioner remains a current risk to the safety of society because he lacks insight to the cause of the crime. Petitioner explained that at the time he committed the murder, he was hurt and angry. He thought that violence against someone who could not hurt him was an appropriate response. Nothing Petitioner said explains the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. The Governor could reasonably conclude that Petitioner lacks insight into his crime View "In re Casey" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder, attempted murder of two counts of robbery, and one count of receiving stolen goods and found firearm enhancements true. This is Defendant’s second petition; the Second Appellate District affirmed the denial of his first one. Subsequently, the Legislature amended former section 1170.95, expanding it to provide relief to defendants convicted under any theory in which malice was imputed to them based solely on their participation in a crime. The Legislature also amended the statute to encompass defendants convicted of attempted murder and manslaughter. Defendant filed his second petition under the amended statute, seeking resentencing for his murder and attempted murder convictions.   The Second Appellate District affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that although recent case law has held that a conviction for provocative act murder requires proof that the defendant personally harbored the mental state of malice, this was not the case when Defendant was convicted in 1994. Under the then-applicable Supreme Court authority, a defendant could be convicted for a killing by a third party provoked by an accomplice’s actions with malice aforethought, regardless of the defendant’s personal mental state. Defendant’s jury was so instructed. The court therefore concluded Defendant may have been convicted under a theory of imputed malice, and thus, he is not barred as a matter of law from relief under section 1172.6. The court rejected Defendant’s contention, however, that he is entitled to relief for his attempted murder conviction, which did not implicate the provocative act doctrine nor any theory of imputed malice. View "P. v. Lee" on Justia Law

In 2020, Lafayette City Councilmember and former Mayor, Burks, and his wife, Ackley, hosted an open house in their home in support of a school bond measure. The invitation stated Burks was “hosting this event as an individual resident of Lafayette and a father of school-aged children.” Peterson attended and had an “odd” and “stilted” conversation with Ackley in which Peterson referred to Ackley's birthday. Peterson later reposted on his Facebook page a family photo from Ackley’s public Facebook page. In the comments, Peterson wondered where they hid the girls during the open house. He mused, “They live near Burton Valley School … Burks, has a different name than his wife, I wonder what their daughters’ last name is?” Burks felt Peterson “could be a threat” to his wife and daughters. Later, Ackley received a “confusing” letter and check in the mail from Peterson, again mentioning the daughters. The rambling letter was a screed against local politics.Peterson was convicted of stalking and sentenced to two years of probation, with one year of home confinement. The court of appeal reversed. Peterson’s speech acts were constitutionally protected activities. A reasonable listener would not have found Peterson’s speech or speech-related acts a true threat of violence. View "People v. Peterson" on Justia Law

After defendant Christopher Esparza was pulled over for a Vehicle Code violation, a detective who specializes in gang enforcement recognized him and two of his passengers as members of a City Heights gang. The detective thought one of the passengers, Delfino Osnaya, was likely to be armed and told the other officers they needed to search him. After their patdown of Osnaya yielded a loaded gun, the officers searched Esparza as well and found another loaded weapon. Esparza contested the constitutional validity of his detention and search, arguing: (1) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous when they conducted his patdown; and (2) his detention was unreasonably prolonged because it lasted longer than necessary for the officers to issue him a citation for the Vehicle Code violation. The Court of Appeal found the detention lasted a mere seven minutes, during which the officers proceeded expeditiously consistent with reasonable concerns for officer safety. "The totality of the circumstances known to the initial investigating officer justified those concerns, which were only heightened as additional factors came to light during the course of the traffic stop." View "California v. Esparza" on Justia Law

At age 16, defendant Tory Bratton confessed to robbing a local market, with an accomplice, shooting the clerk dead, and taking $184. At his trial, his counsel argued that defendant’s confession was false and that he did not participate in the robbery at all. However, trial counsel did not argue that, even if defendant did participate, he was not the shooter. Defendant was convicted of (among other things) first degree murder, with a personal firearm use enhancement and felony-murder special circumstances. He appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed. When defendant filed a petition to vacate the murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6, the trial court denied it; it ruled that the Court of Appeal's opinion in defendant’s direct appeal showed that he was the actual killer. The State conceded that this was error, but that the error was harmless because the record of conviction established defendant was the actual killer. Anticipating this response, defendant argued that, under standard principles of issue preclusion (a/k/a collateral estoppel), preclusion did not apply here because: (1) Whether defendant was the shooter was not actually litigated; (2) Trial counsel had an incentive not to contest whether defendant was the shooter; (3) The significance of whether defendant was the shooter was small at trial but, due to the then-unforeseeable enactment of section 1172.6, has since become great; (4) Section 1172.6 was a significant change in the law that warranted reexamination of whether defendant was the shooter. The Court of Appeal agreed that standard principles of issue preclusion applied here. However, the Court held that the issue of whether defendant was the shooter was actually litigated. Moreover, trial counsel did have an incentive to contest this issue; evidently, he simply made a tactical decision not to. Because trial counsel did have an incentive to contest the issue, it did not matter that it was unforeseeable that the issue would have additional future consequences. And finally, while section 1172.6 was a significant change in the law, the Legislature intended that it not constitute an exception ipso facto to issue preclusion. View "California v. Bratton" on Justia Law

Defendant Wesley Panighetti and Jill Doe met in 2000 and began dating. According to the Court, the couple practiced bondage, discipline, sadism, and masochism (BDSM) together. When defendant went beyond the scope of Jill’s consent, his conduct became criminal. A jury rejected the argument that, by virtue of a written agreement to consent to BDSM at all times, Jill had irrevocably agreed to allow defendant to dominate all aspects of her life. The jury found him guilty of multiple sex offenses, attempting to dissuade a witness, and residential burglary. He challenged those convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his multiple requests for new counsel pursuant to California v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970); (2) instructing the jury it could consider prior uncharged offenses involving Jill Doe; (3) inflicting cruel and unusual punishment in imposing a 280 year-to-life sentence; and (4) failing to calculate and award presentence custody credit. After review, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to award presentence custody credit but otherwise affirmed. View "California v. Panighetti" on Justia Law