Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In August 2000, Pablo Gonzalez pled guilty to possession for sale of marijuana. The trial court sentenced Gonzalez to 74 days in custody After serving his 74 days in custody, Gonzalez was deported in October 2000. Gonzalez reentered the United States about a year later. He subsequently was convicted of possession of a controlled substance for sale, making criminal threats, and domestic battery. In June 2002, Gonzalez was deported again. He reentered the United States, but was deported yet again in April 2017. On January 1, 2017, Penal Code section 1473.7 became effective, allowing a person no longer imprisoned or restrained to move to vacate a conviction or sentence for one of two reasons, including that "[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party's ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere." In August 2017, Gonzalez moved to vacate his 2000 conviction under section 1473.7. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied Gonzalez's motion. Gonzalez appealed, contending the court erred in denying his motion under section 1473.7. Specifically, he claimed he established prejudicial error based on his counsel's failure to adequately advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea and failure to seek an immigration safe alternative disposition. The Court of Appeal concluded Gonzalez's arguments lacked merit, and as such, affirmed. View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sarah Sumner was the dean of A.W. Tozer Theological Seminary (Tozer Seminary), part of defendant Simpson University in Redding, California. Although Sumner had a written employment agreement, her employment was terminated by Robin Dummer in his capacity as acting provost of the university on the ground Sumner was insubordinate. In response to Sumner’s complaint alleging breach of contract, defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground Sumner’s employment was within the ministerial exception, an affirmative defense, and that as a result judicial review of her employment-related dispute was precluded by the First Amendment. The trial court agreed, and granted summary judgment. Sumner argues the ministerial exception was not applicable because she was not a minister, and the facts were in dispute as to whether Simpson University was a religious organization. She argues that even assuming the ministerial exception is applicable, it did not preclude enforcement of her contract and tort claims. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly concluded that Simpson University was a religious organization and that Sumner was a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception, but that her contract cause of action was not foreclosed by the ministerial exception. Defendants failed to show that resolution of Sumner’s contract claim would excessively entangle the court in religious matters. However, her tort causes of action were part and parcel of the actions involved in her termination, and were therefore barred by the ministerial exception. View "Sumner v. Simpson University" on Justia Law

San Francisco Officers Vannucchi and Vidulich saw an SUV in front of their marked patrol car speed up and then “abruptly” stop in a red zone. A check showed the SUV’s registration was expired. Vidulich activated his lights. The SUV's driver, Mims, quickly got out of the car. Vidulich repeatedly asked Mims to get back into the SUV; Mims did not comply. As Vidulich approached, Mims stood “reaching back into the vehicle,” while Fews was in the passenger seat making “furtive movements ... low on his body.” Vidulich smelled “recently burned marijuana. Mims admitted there was marijuana in his cigar, then reached into the passenger compartment again despite being told not to. Fews continued his “furtive” movements. Vidulich believed that Fews might be reaching for something, possibly a weapon. The area is known for narcotics sales and related shootings. Fews complied with a command to exit the vehicle. Vannucchi performed a patsearch, thinking Fews’s baggy clothing could conceal a weapon. Fews’s pocket contained a loaded semiautomatic gun. A magistrate denied Fews’s motion to suppress, finding the officers had probable cause to search the SUV, and concluded that Vannucchi’s patsearch of Fews was justified for officer safety. Fews pleaded guilty as a felon in possession and was sentenced to probation. The court of appeal affirmed the denials of the motion to suppress and of a motion to dismiss in which Fews claimed a delay in obtaining police body camera video after the hearing denied him due process. View "People v. Fews" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence credited by the trial court was sufficient to support a Qawi order, which authorizes the California Department of State Hospitals-Atascadero (Hospital or ASH) to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to treat defendant's severe mental disorder. In this case, the trial court found that appellant lacked the capacity to refuse medical treatment and issued a Qawi order authorizing the Hospital to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication. The court also held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the order furthered a compelling government interest that outweighed any religious belief and there was no due process violation in defendant's case. View "California Department of State Hospitals v. A.H." on Justia Law

Gavin Laird appealed the denial of his motion for expungement of his DNA sample from the state's data bank following a reduction in his conviction to an infraction "for all purposes" under Proposition 64. His appeal raised an issue of first impression: when an offender whose guilty plea to a felony marijuana conviction is later reduced to an "infraction for all purposes," does the redesignation justify expungement of his previously collected DNA sample from the state's database? The Court of Appeal concluded it did not and affirmed the trial court's order. View "California v. Laird" on Justia Law

J.C. was driving to his mother L.B.'s house when when he spotted, in front of a home’s garage, items that were taken from his property about a week ago. As J.C. pulled in to talk to the home’s owner, defendant Cynthia Hayes came out of the house and yelled at him. Shortly after J.C. arrived at his mother’s home, defendant pulled up in a pickup truck and started honking the horn. J.C. went outside, accused defendant of stealing his property, and told her to leave. Defendant responded by yelling at J.C. and punching him in the face. L.B. came out of the house and told defendant to leave. Defendant kept yelling, went to L.B.’s car and scratched the passenger-side door with her keys. When L.B. pushed defendant away from the car, defendant punched her, giving L.B. a black eye. L.B. and defendant engaged in a struggle until L.B.’s husband pulled defendant off of L.B. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon vandalism with damage exceeding $400, and misdemeanor battery. Before the jury rendered its verdict, defendant admitted five prior prison term allegations. The trial court struck two of the prison priors and sentenced defendant to a seven-year eight-month state prison term. On appeal, defendant contended she was denied representation at a critical stage of the proceedings, her prison priors should have been struck because the felony underlying the most recent prior was reduced to a misdemeanor after her sentencing hearing, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to continue sentencing. The Court of Appeal found an error in calculating the sentence, vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Hayes" on Justia Law

In 2014, Appellant pled guilty to felony aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of a billy club. He also admitted the allegations in the motion to revoke probation in an earlier case. Appellant was sentenced to three years’ probation and a 180-day county jail term. When he entered his pleas the court explained, and Appellant acknowledged, the possible immigration consequences of his convictions. Counsel stated he had advised Appellant accordingly. Appellant was placed in removal proceedings but was granted cancellation of the removal. In 2015, Appellant was found in possession of methamphetamine for sale, resisted arrest, and attempted to destroy evidence; he was placed on probation for five years. In the new criminal case, Appellant pleaded guilty to resisting arrest and was sentenced to 360 days in the county jail. In 2017, Appellant moved to vacate revocation of probation under Penal Code 1473.7(a)(1), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the immigration consequences of his admission and sentence. The court of appeal affirmed denial of the motion. Appellant, a convicted felon currently on formal probation, is not entitled to the relief under section 1473.7. He did not establish ineffective assistance; the trial court would not have tolerated any lesser sentence and it is unlikely Appellant would have gone to trial under the circumstances. View "People v. Cruz-Lopez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Karen Sims, a former attorney diagnosed with serious mental illness, was convicted of murdering her husband Henry Sims in 2006 and sentenced to prison for a term of 50 years to life. After her conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in 2008, she petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court in 2011, claiming her conviction was invalid because she was incompetent to stand trial. That petition was ultimately denied. In 2016, she filed another petition for habeas relief with the Supreme Court on the same grounds, but adding additional information about her postconviction mental health problems as they related to timeliness. The Court of Appeal determined that the trial court was confronted with objectively observable evidence of defendant’s bizarre legal defense, and heard her statements in open court. "Even to a casual observer, the manner in which defendant conducted her defense was not rational." Because Penal Code section 1367, subdivision (a), requires that a defendant be able to assist counsel or conduct her own defense “in a rational manner,” these additional circumstances required the appointment of counsel and/or the declaration of a doubt as to defendant’s competence. Further, the court was warned that defendant stopped taking antipsychotic medications prescribed for her, and that she would "likely become incompetent. ... If it is true that counsel attempted to communicate his concerns to the court, this would constitute evidence of changed circumstances that should have compelled the suspension of proceedings pursuant to Penal Code section 1367 et seq. to evaluate defendant’s competence." The Court granted Sims petition for habeas corpus, remanded the matter to the trial court for a hearing on petitioner's competence to stand trial. View "In re Sims" on Justia Law

Following a hung jury and mistrial, a second jury convicted Jorge Arebalos-Cabrera of transporting over 10 kilograms of heroin, transporting over four kilograms of methamphetamine, and using a false compartment. The trial court sentenced him to a total term of 17 years four months in prison. Arebalos appealed, contending the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his tractor-trailer and by denying his second motion to suppress on jurisdictional grounds. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed his convictions. View "California v. Arebalos-Cabrera" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment against plaintiff in an action alleging claims under state law and the United States Constitution. The Long Beach Transit Company Board of Directors allows a public speaker to speak for 3 minutes on an agenda item during meetings. Plaintiff, a frequent attendee at meetings of the Board, was not permitted to speak a second time during the same agenda item and was eventually asked to leave by a police officer.The court held that defendants' argument that the trial court determined that plaintiff's Bane Act claims were barred in their entirety because the principal purpose was a monetary recovery ignored both plaintiff's concession in the trial court and the trial court's ruling on defendants' Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 motion.The court held that the trial court correctly concluded that there was no violation of the Bane Act where nothing the officer said to plaintiff met the test of the statute; the three minutes per public speaker rule clearly met constitutional concerns, and there was no evidence it was applied based on the content of plaintiff's stated or intended remarks; plaintiff's remaining First Amendment claims were rejected; and plaintiff's contention that the second iteration of the Board's speech rules was void was also rejected. View "Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law