Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Edgar Espinoza was charged with one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale; defendant pled guilty to the charge. The court suspended imposition of defendant’s sentence and placed him on three years of formal probation with 220 days in local custody. Defendant moved to withdraw his plea, claiming he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his plea; this motion was denied. While on formal probation, he admitted a violation and was sentenced to 16 months in county jail. Defendant again moved to withdraw his guilty plea, now under the newly-enacted Penal Code section 1473.7. In his motion, defendant represented that he had been “placed into removal proceedings.” Again, the motion was denied. Defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which found section 1473.7 applied in this case and the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion filed pursuant to it. View "California v. Espinoza" on Justia Law

Defendant Eric Frahs tried to steal a can of beer and an energy drink from a small store. As he was leaving, Frahs got into a physical confrontation with the store owner and his son. At a jury trial on two robbery charges, Frahs put on evidence that he suffered from a form of schizophrenia. The jury found defendant guilty. In a subsequent bench trial, the court found that Frahs had suffered a prior “strike” conviction (an assault with a deadly weapon) and imposed a nine-year prison sentence. While Frahs’ appeal was pending, the California Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1001.36, which created a pretrial diversion program for defendants with mental disorders. Frahs argued that the mental health diversion program applied retroactively. The Court of Appeal agreed and conditionally reversed Frahs’ convictions and sentence. On remand, the trial court may consider granting Frahs mental health diversion. The Court rejected Frahs’ remaining claim that his prior assault conviction did not qualify as a strike. View "California v. Frahs" on Justia Law

In 2004, Cesar Loza handed a gun to a fellow gang member, who shot and killed a rival. A jury convicted Loza of first degree premeditated murder after being instructed on two derivative liability theories: direct aider and abettor liability, and the natural and probable consequences theory. In 2014, the California Supreme Court held that the natural and probable consequences theory could no longer support a premeditated murder conviction. In this habeas corpus proceeding, the Court of Appeal could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury relied on the legally valid direct aider and abettor liability theory; therefore, it vacated Loza’s first degree murder conviction. View "In re Loza" on Justia Law

In August 2000, Pablo Gonzalez pled guilty to possession for sale of marijuana. The trial court sentenced Gonzalez to 74 days in custody After serving his 74 days in custody, Gonzalez was deported in October 2000. Gonzalez reentered the United States about a year later. He subsequently was convicted of possession of a controlled substance for sale, making criminal threats, and domestic battery. In June 2002, Gonzalez was deported again. He reentered the United States, but was deported yet again in April 2017. On January 1, 2017, Penal Code section 1473.7 became effective, allowing a person no longer imprisoned or restrained to move to vacate a conviction or sentence for one of two reasons, including that "[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party's ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere." In August 2017, Gonzalez moved to vacate his 2000 conviction under section 1473.7. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied Gonzalez's motion. Gonzalez appealed, contending the court erred in denying his motion under section 1473.7. Specifically, he claimed he established prejudicial error based on his counsel's failure to adequately advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea and failure to seek an immigration safe alternative disposition. The Court of Appeal concluded Gonzalez's arguments lacked merit, and as such, affirmed. View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sarah Sumner was the dean of A.W. Tozer Theological Seminary (Tozer Seminary), part of defendant Simpson University in Redding, California. Although Sumner had a written employment agreement, her employment was terminated by Robin Dummer in his capacity as acting provost of the university on the ground Sumner was insubordinate. In response to Sumner’s complaint alleging breach of contract, defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground Sumner’s employment was within the ministerial exception, an affirmative defense, and that as a result judicial review of her employment-related dispute was precluded by the First Amendment. The trial court agreed, and granted summary judgment. Sumner argues the ministerial exception was not applicable because she was not a minister, and the facts were in dispute as to whether Simpson University was a religious organization. She argues that even assuming the ministerial exception is applicable, it did not preclude enforcement of her contract and tort claims. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly concluded that Simpson University was a religious organization and that Sumner was a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception, but that her contract cause of action was not foreclosed by the ministerial exception. Defendants failed to show that resolution of Sumner’s contract claim would excessively entangle the court in religious matters. However, her tort causes of action were part and parcel of the actions involved in her termination, and were therefore barred by the ministerial exception. View "Sumner v. Simpson University" on Justia Law

San Francisco Officers Vannucchi and Vidulich saw an SUV in front of their marked patrol car speed up and then “abruptly” stop in a red zone. A check showed the SUV’s registration was expired. Vidulich activated his lights. The SUV's driver, Mims, quickly got out of the car. Vidulich repeatedly asked Mims to get back into the SUV; Mims did not comply. As Vidulich approached, Mims stood “reaching back into the vehicle,” while Fews was in the passenger seat making “furtive movements ... low on his body.” Vidulich smelled “recently burned marijuana. Mims admitted there was marijuana in his cigar, then reached into the passenger compartment again despite being told not to. Fews continued his “furtive” movements. Vidulich believed that Fews might be reaching for something, possibly a weapon. The area is known for narcotics sales and related shootings. Fews complied with a command to exit the vehicle. Vannucchi performed a patsearch, thinking Fews’s baggy clothing could conceal a weapon. Fews’s pocket contained a loaded semiautomatic gun. A magistrate denied Fews’s motion to suppress, finding the officers had probable cause to search the SUV, and concluded that Vannucchi’s patsearch of Fews was justified for officer safety. Fews pleaded guilty as a felon in possession and was sentenced to probation. The court of appeal affirmed the denials of the motion to suppress and of a motion to dismiss in which Fews claimed a delay in obtaining police body camera video after the hearing denied him due process. View "People v. Fews" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence credited by the trial court was sufficient to support a Qawi order, which authorizes the California Department of State Hospitals-Atascadero (Hospital or ASH) to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to treat defendant's severe mental disorder. In this case, the trial court found that appellant lacked the capacity to refuse medical treatment and issued a Qawi order authorizing the Hospital to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication. The court also held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the order furthered a compelling government interest that outweighed any religious belief and there was no due process violation in defendant's case. View "California Department of State Hospitals v. A.H." on Justia Law

Gavin Laird appealed the denial of his motion for expungement of his DNA sample from the state's data bank following a reduction in his conviction to an infraction "for all purposes" under Proposition 64. His appeal raised an issue of first impression: when an offender whose guilty plea to a felony marijuana conviction is later reduced to an "infraction for all purposes," does the redesignation justify expungement of his previously collected DNA sample from the state's database? The Court of Appeal concluded it did not and affirmed the trial court's order. View "California v. Laird" on Justia Law

J.C. was driving to his mother L.B.'s house when when he spotted, in front of a home’s garage, items that were taken from his property about a week ago. As J.C. pulled in to talk to the home’s owner, defendant Cynthia Hayes came out of the house and yelled at him. Shortly after J.C. arrived at his mother’s home, defendant pulled up in a pickup truck and started honking the horn. J.C. went outside, accused defendant of stealing his property, and told her to leave. Defendant responded by yelling at J.C. and punching him in the face. L.B. came out of the house and told defendant to leave. Defendant kept yelling, went to L.B.’s car and scratched the passenger-side door with her keys. When L.B. pushed defendant away from the car, defendant punched her, giving L.B. a black eye. L.B. and defendant engaged in a struggle until L.B.’s husband pulled defendant off of L.B. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon vandalism with damage exceeding $400, and misdemeanor battery. Before the jury rendered its verdict, defendant admitted five prior prison term allegations. The trial court struck two of the prison priors and sentenced defendant to a seven-year eight-month state prison term. On appeal, defendant contended she was denied representation at a critical stage of the proceedings, her prison priors should have been struck because the felony underlying the most recent prior was reduced to a misdemeanor after her sentencing hearing, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to continue sentencing. The Court of Appeal found an error in calculating the sentence, vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Hayes" on Justia Law

In 2014, Appellant pled guilty to felony aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of a billy club. He also admitted the allegations in the motion to revoke probation in an earlier case. Appellant was sentenced to three years’ probation and a 180-day county jail term. When he entered his pleas the court explained, and Appellant acknowledged, the possible immigration consequences of his convictions. Counsel stated he had advised Appellant accordingly. Appellant was placed in removal proceedings but was granted cancellation of the removal. In 2015, Appellant was found in possession of methamphetamine for sale, resisted arrest, and attempted to destroy evidence; he was placed on probation for five years. In the new criminal case, Appellant pleaded guilty to resisting arrest and was sentenced to 360 days in the county jail. In 2017, Appellant moved to vacate revocation of probation under Penal Code 1473.7(a)(1), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the immigration consequences of his admission and sentence. The court of appeal affirmed denial of the motion. Appellant, a convicted felon currently on formal probation, is not entitled to the relief under section 1473.7. He did not establish ineffective assistance; the trial court would not have tolerated any lesser sentence and it is unlikely Appellant would have gone to trial under the circumstances. View "People v. Cruz-Lopez" on Justia Law