Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Sidney Hubbard received a third strike sentence in 1996, based on the commission of attempted robbery, and reckless evasion of a police pursuit, with enhancements for five prior strikes, and two prior prison terms. The Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction in 1999. He successfully petitioned for resentencing under Proposition 36, however he appealed that new sentence, arguing the sentencing court improperly refused to consider all aspects of his sentence, including exercising discretion under Penal Code section 1385. Furthermore, Defendant argued the Court should remand his case for further consideration of concurrent sentences and to apply Penal Code section 654. The Court agreed with defendant, vacated his sentence, and remanded to the sentencing court for consideration of a new sentence. View "California v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

Certain provisions of Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) regulations, adopted to implement Proposition 57, are inconsistent with Cal. Const., art. I, 32, subd. (a)(1) and thus invalid. The Court of Appeal held that CDCR's adopted regulations impermissibly circumscribe eligibility for Proposition 57 parole by barring relief for petitioner and other similarly situated inmates serving Three Strikes sentences for nonviolent offenses. The court granted the petition for habeas relief and directed the CDCR to void and repeal certain portions of the regulations and to make further conforming changes necessary. View "In re Edwards" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Bennett is currently serving an indeterminate sentence of life without the possibility of parole following his conviction for first degree special circumstance murder while aiding and abetting a robbery. In 2015, the California Supreme Court decided California v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015), and reaffirmed established law holding an aider and abettor of felony murder who lacks the intent to kill may be sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole only if he or she was a “‘major participant’” in the crime, and acted with “reckless indifference to human life.” In 2016, the California Supreme Court revisited the issue in California v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016). Where Banks focused its analysis more on the “‘major participant’” requirement, Clark more closely examined the “reckless indifference to human life” factor. Relying on Banks, Bennett filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s robbery special circumstance finding. The Court of Appeal reviewed the record in light of both Banks and Clark, and re-examined aider and abettor culpability along the "Enmund-Tison" spectrum. The Court found find that even though Bennett’s actions were essential to and instrumental in setting up the robbery, under Enmund there was not substantial evidence showing Bennett was a “‘major participant’” in the robbery. Similarly, the Court found that under Tison, Banks and (particularly) Clark, there was insufficient evidence Bennett acted with the necessary “reckless indifference to human life.” Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacated Bennett’s life without possibility of parole sentence, and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. View "In re Bennett" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Carter claimed cruel and unusual punishment in his sentence of 55 years to life in prison for a second-degree murder he committed at age 17, with personal use and discharge of a firearm causing death, possession of a firearm by a felon, and a prior strike conviction for robbery. The Attorney General acknowledged this sentence was the functional equivalent of a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole (LWOP). To address defendant’s cruel and unusual punishment claim in the trial court, the trial court considered defendant’s youth in the context of considering whether to strike the prior conviction for purposes of three-strikes sentencing in furtherance of the interests of justice under Penal Code section 1385 and California v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996). This would have reduced the sentence to 40 years to life in prison. The trial court considered defendant’s youth but declined to strike the prior conviction, finding that although defendant was able to change, he was unwilling to do so. While this case was pending on appeal, the California Supreme Court held that a statute giving trial courts discretion to impose a sentence less than LWOP on a juvenile who commits special circumstance murder (Penal Code section 190.5) must be construed without a presumption in favor of LWOP (as previously construed by case law), in order that the statute not violate the Eighth Amendment. Other recent changes in law demand that the Court of Appeal not only vacate the sentence, but also conditionally reverse the conviction and remand to the trial court with directions to transfer the case to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing to determine the propriety of prosecution in adult criminal court had the case originally been filed in juvenile court. The Court so vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Carter" on Justia Law

The subject of the public trust at issue in this case was the Scott River in Siskiyou County, California, a tributary of the Klamath River and a navigable waterway for the purposes of the public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeal surmised this appeal presented two questions involving the application of the public trust doctrine to groundwater extraction: whether the doctrine had ever applied to groundwater, and if so, whether the 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) abrogated whatever application it might have had, replacing it with statutory rules passed by the Legislature. The Court felt there was no specific and concrete allegation that any action or forbearance to act by the State Water Resources Control Board (Board) or permit issued by County of Siskiyou (County) to extract groundwater actually violated the public trust doctrine by damaging the water resources held in trust for the public by the Board or the County. Rather, the Environmental Law Foundation and associated fishery organizations Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Association and Institute for Fisheries Resources (collectively ELF), the Board, and the County sought the Court's opinion as to whether the public trust doctrine mandated the Board and the County a public trust duty to consider whether the extractions of groundwater adversely affected public trust uses of the Scott River and whether SGMA took those duties away. The scope of the Court's ruling was narrow; the Court found the Legislature had not released the Scott River from the public trust nor dissolve the public trust doctrine within the text or scope of SGMA. View "Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

Defendants challenged an order of the superior court partially denying their motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute in a putative class action brought by plaintiffs against defendants and others for marketing a posthumous Michael Jackson album. The Court of Appeal held that the challenged representation―that Michael Jackson was the lead singer on the three Disputed Tracks―did not simply promote sale of the album, but also stated a position on a disputed issue of public interest. In this case, the identity of the artist on the three Disputed Tracks was a controversial issue of interest to Michael Jackson fans and others who care about his musical legacy. Therefore, defendants' statements about the identity of the artist were not simply commercial speech but were subject to full First Amendment protection. Furthermore, they were outside the scope of an actionable unfair competition or consumer protection claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order as to this issue. View "Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment" on Justia Law

Defendant Sean Reardon was convicted for resisting an executive officer. He appealed, arguing the officer’s use of excessive force negated an essential element of that offense. In a related claim, defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to present the testimony of a use-of-force expert at trial. The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the resisting count. Further, although the trial court excluded defendant’s expert testimony for unsound reasons, defendant did not demonstrate prejudice. The case was remanded with directions to address sentencing errors and correct the abstract of judgment but otherwise affirmed. View "California v. Reardon" on Justia Law

On the afternoon of August 8, 2017, 43-year-old Veronica Aguayo was working on her bicycle in her parents' yard. Her 72-year-old father (Father) turned on the sprinklers to water the plants, accidentally wetting Aguayo's cell phone charger. Aguayo began yelling expletives and insults at Father, who turned around to go back inside. As he turned away, Aguayo hit him on the back with her bicycle lock and chain. Father grabbed the lock to prevent Aguayo from hitting him again, but as they struggled over the lock, Father slipped and let go of the chain. Aguayo then hit Father with the chain and lock about 15 times on the arms, chest, and head. Father again grabbed the lock, and during a struggle for possession, Aguayo fell to the ground, pulling Father with her. A jury found her guilty of assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (force-likely assault). The trial court placed her on probation. On appeal, Aguayo contended the Court of Appeal had to vacate her conviction for force-likely assault because it was a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon. The Court rejected this contention, and affirmed. View "California v. Aguayo" on Justia Law

In 2015, the City of Moreno Valley (the City) adopted an initiative to approve a development agreement in connection with the World Logistics Center (WLC) project. The WLC developers were known collectively as Highland Fairview (with the City, Respondents). Appellants the Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice and other environmental groups petitioned for a writ of mandate, contending that adoption of a development agreement by initiative violated the development agreement statute (Gov. Code sec. 65864, et seq.) and article II, section 12 of the California Constitution. The trial court denied Appellants' petitions, and they appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the California Legislature intended to exclusively delegate approval of development agreements to local legislative bodies and to make such approval subject to referendum, but not to initiative. The development agreement initiative adopted by the City was therefore invalid. View "Center for Community Action etc. v. City of Moreno Valley" on Justia Law

Defendant Danny Corder was convicted by jury of four counts of assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon or by means likely to produce great bodily injury, one count of felony evading a peace officer while driving in a reckless manner, and two counts of resisting an officer, along with an enhancement for personally inflicting great bodily injury. The trial court imposed a 12-year state prison sentence. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) he could not be convicted of felony evasion for driving that took place only on private roads; (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the felony evasion conviction; and (3) sentencing on the felony evasion count should have been stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Furthermore, Corder asked the Court of Appeal to conduct an independent review of the trial court’s ruling on his "Pitchess" motion. Finding no reversible error nor abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment and sentence. View "California v. Corder" on Justia Law