Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Appellant pled guilty to felony aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of a billy club. He also admitted the allegations in the motion to revoke probation in an earlier case. Appellant was sentenced to three years’ probation and a 180-day county jail term. When he entered his pleas the court explained, and Appellant acknowledged, the possible immigration consequences of his convictions. Counsel stated he had advised Appellant accordingly. Appellant was placed in removal proceedings but was granted cancellation of the removal. In 2015, Appellant was found in possession of methamphetamine for sale, resisted arrest, and attempted to destroy evidence; he was placed on probation for five years. In the new criminal case, Appellant pleaded guilty to resisting arrest and was sentenced to 360 days in the county jail. In 2017, Appellant moved to vacate revocation of probation under Penal Code 1473.7(a)(1), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the immigration consequences of his admission and sentence. The court of appeal affirmed denial of the motion. Appellant, a convicted felon currently on formal probation, is not entitled to the relief under section 1473.7. He did not establish ineffective assistance; the trial court would not have tolerated any lesser sentence and it is unlikely Appellant would have gone to trial under the circumstances. View "People v. Cruz-Lopez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Karen Sims, a former attorney diagnosed with serious mental illness, was convicted of murdering her husband Henry Sims in 2006 and sentenced to prison for a term of 50 years to life. After her conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in 2008, she petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court in 2011, claiming her conviction was invalid because she was incompetent to stand trial. That petition was ultimately denied. In 2016, she filed another petition for habeas relief with the Supreme Court on the same grounds, but adding additional information about her postconviction mental health problems as they related to timeliness. The Court of Appeal determined that the trial court was confronted with objectively observable evidence of defendant’s bizarre legal defense, and heard her statements in open court. "Even to a casual observer, the manner in which defendant conducted her defense was not rational." Because Penal Code section 1367, subdivision (a), requires that a defendant be able to assist counsel or conduct her own defense “in a rational manner,” these additional circumstances required the appointment of counsel and/or the declaration of a doubt as to defendant’s competence. Further, the court was warned that defendant stopped taking antipsychotic medications prescribed for her, and that she would "likely become incompetent. ... If it is true that counsel attempted to communicate his concerns to the court, this would constitute evidence of changed circumstances that should have compelled the suspension of proceedings pursuant to Penal Code section 1367 et seq. to evaluate defendant’s competence." The Court granted Sims petition for habeas corpus, remanded the matter to the trial court for a hearing on petitioner's competence to stand trial. View "In re Sims" on Justia Law

Following a hung jury and mistrial, a second jury convicted Jorge Arebalos-Cabrera of transporting over 10 kilograms of heroin, transporting over four kilograms of methamphetamine, and using a false compartment. The trial court sentenced him to a total term of 17 years four months in prison. Arebalos appealed, contending the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his tractor-trailer and by denying his second motion to suppress on jurisdictional grounds. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed his convictions. View "California v. Arebalos-Cabrera" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment against plaintiff in an action alleging claims under state law and the United States Constitution. The Long Beach Transit Company Board of Directors allows a public speaker to speak for 3 minutes on an agenda item during meetings. Plaintiff, a frequent attendee at meetings of the Board, was not permitted to speak a second time during the same agenda item and was eventually asked to leave by a police officer.The court held that defendants' argument that the trial court determined that plaintiff's Bane Act claims were barred in their entirety because the principal purpose was a monetary recovery ignored both plaintiff's concession in the trial court and the trial court's ruling on defendants' Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 motion.The court held that the trial court correctly concluded that there was no violation of the Bane Act where nothing the officer said to plaintiff met the test of the statute; the three minutes per public speaker rule clearly met constitutional concerns, and there was no evidence it was applied based on the content of plaintiff's stated or intended remarks; plaintiff's remaining First Amendment claims were rejected; and plaintiff's contention that the second iteration of the Board's speech rules was void was also rejected. View "Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Defendant Sidney Hubbard received a third strike sentence in 1996, based on the commission of attempted robbery, and reckless evasion of a police pursuit, with enhancements for five prior strikes, and two prior prison terms. The Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction in 1999. He successfully petitioned for resentencing under Proposition 36, however he appealed that new sentence, arguing the sentencing court improperly refused to consider all aspects of his sentence, including exercising discretion under Penal Code section 1385. Furthermore, Defendant argued the Court should remand his case for further consideration of concurrent sentences and to apply Penal Code section 654. The Court agreed with defendant, vacated his sentence, and remanded to the sentencing court for consideration of a new sentence. View "California v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

Certain provisions of Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) regulations, adopted to implement Proposition 57, are inconsistent with Cal. Const., art. I, 32, subd. (a)(1) and thus invalid. The Court of Appeal held that CDCR's adopted regulations impermissibly circumscribe eligibility for Proposition 57 parole by barring relief for petitioner and other similarly situated inmates serving Three Strikes sentences for nonviolent offenses. The court granted the petition for habeas relief and directed the CDCR to void and repeal certain portions of the regulations and to make further conforming changes necessary. View "In re Edwards" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Bennett is currently serving an indeterminate sentence of life without the possibility of parole following his conviction for first degree special circumstance murder while aiding and abetting a robbery. In 2015, the California Supreme Court decided California v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015), and reaffirmed established law holding an aider and abettor of felony murder who lacks the intent to kill may be sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole only if he or she was a “‘major participant’” in the crime, and acted with “reckless indifference to human life.” In 2016, the California Supreme Court revisited the issue in California v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016). Where Banks focused its analysis more on the “‘major participant’” requirement, Clark more closely examined the “reckless indifference to human life” factor. Relying on Banks, Bennett filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s robbery special circumstance finding. The Court of Appeal reviewed the record in light of both Banks and Clark, and re-examined aider and abettor culpability along the "Enmund-Tison" spectrum. The Court found find that even though Bennett’s actions were essential to and instrumental in setting up the robbery, under Enmund there was not substantial evidence showing Bennett was a “‘major participant’” in the robbery. Similarly, the Court found that under Tison, Banks and (particularly) Clark, there was insufficient evidence Bennett acted with the necessary “reckless indifference to human life.” Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacated Bennett’s life without possibility of parole sentence, and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. View "In re Bennett" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Carter claimed cruel and unusual punishment in his sentence of 55 years to life in prison for a second-degree murder he committed at age 17, with personal use and discharge of a firearm causing death, possession of a firearm by a felon, and a prior strike conviction for robbery. The Attorney General acknowledged this sentence was the functional equivalent of a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole (LWOP). To address defendant’s cruel and unusual punishment claim in the trial court, the trial court considered defendant’s youth in the context of considering whether to strike the prior conviction for purposes of three-strikes sentencing in furtherance of the interests of justice under Penal Code section 1385 and California v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996). This would have reduced the sentence to 40 years to life in prison. The trial court considered defendant’s youth but declined to strike the prior conviction, finding that although defendant was able to change, he was unwilling to do so. While this case was pending on appeal, the California Supreme Court held that a statute giving trial courts discretion to impose a sentence less than LWOP on a juvenile who commits special circumstance murder (Penal Code section 190.5) must be construed without a presumption in favor of LWOP (as previously construed by case law), in order that the statute not violate the Eighth Amendment. Other recent changes in law demand that the Court of Appeal not only vacate the sentence, but also conditionally reverse the conviction and remand to the trial court with directions to transfer the case to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing to determine the propriety of prosecution in adult criminal court had the case originally been filed in juvenile court. The Court so vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Carter" on Justia Law

The subject of the public trust at issue in this case was the Scott River in Siskiyou County, California, a tributary of the Klamath River and a navigable waterway for the purposes of the public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeal surmised this appeal presented two questions involving the application of the public trust doctrine to groundwater extraction: whether the doctrine had ever applied to groundwater, and if so, whether the 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) abrogated whatever application it might have had, replacing it with statutory rules passed by the Legislature. The Court felt there was no specific and concrete allegation that any action or forbearance to act by the State Water Resources Control Board (Board) or permit issued by County of Siskiyou (County) to extract groundwater actually violated the public trust doctrine by damaging the water resources held in trust for the public by the Board or the County. Rather, the Environmental Law Foundation and associated fishery organizations Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Association and Institute for Fisheries Resources (collectively ELF), the Board, and the County sought the Court's opinion as to whether the public trust doctrine mandated the Board and the County a public trust duty to consider whether the extractions of groundwater adversely affected public trust uses of the Scott River and whether SGMA took those duties away. The scope of the Court's ruling was narrow; the Court found the Legislature had not released the Scott River from the public trust nor dissolve the public trust doctrine within the text or scope of SGMA. View "Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

Defendants challenged an order of the superior court partially denying their motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute in a putative class action brought by plaintiffs against defendants and others for marketing a posthumous Michael Jackson album. The Court of Appeal held that the challenged representation―that Michael Jackson was the lead singer on the three Disputed Tracks―did not simply promote sale of the album, but also stated a position on a disputed issue of public interest. In this case, the identity of the artist on the three Disputed Tracks was a controversial issue of interest to Michael Jackson fans and others who care about his musical legacy. Therefore, defendants' statements about the identity of the artist were not simply commercial speech but were subject to full First Amendment protection. Furthermore, they were outside the scope of an actionable unfair competition or consumer protection claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order as to this issue. View "Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment" on Justia Law