Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Sean Reardon was convicted for resisting an executive officer. He appealed, arguing the officer’s use of excessive force negated an essential element of that offense. In a related claim, defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to present the testimony of a use-of-force expert at trial. The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the resisting count. Further, although the trial court excluded defendant’s expert testimony for unsound reasons, defendant did not demonstrate prejudice. The case was remanded with directions to address sentencing errors and correct the abstract of judgment but otherwise affirmed. View "California v. Reardon" on Justia Law

On the afternoon of August 8, 2017, 43-year-old Veronica Aguayo was working on her bicycle in her parents' yard. Her 72-year-old father (Father) turned on the sprinklers to water the plants, accidentally wetting Aguayo's cell phone charger. Aguayo began yelling expletives and insults at Father, who turned around to go back inside. As he turned away, Aguayo hit him on the back with her bicycle lock and chain. Father grabbed the lock to prevent Aguayo from hitting him again, but as they struggled over the lock, Father slipped and let go of the chain. Aguayo then hit Father with the chain and lock about 15 times on the arms, chest, and head. Father again grabbed the lock, and during a struggle for possession, Aguayo fell to the ground, pulling Father with her. A jury found her guilty of assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (force-likely assault). The trial court placed her on probation. On appeal, Aguayo contended the Court of Appeal had to vacate her conviction for force-likely assault because it was a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon. The Court rejected this contention, and affirmed. View "California v. Aguayo" on Justia Law

In 2015, the City of Moreno Valley (the City) adopted an initiative to approve a development agreement in connection with the World Logistics Center (WLC) project. The WLC developers were known collectively as Highland Fairview (with the City, Respondents). Appellants the Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice and other environmental groups petitioned for a writ of mandate, contending that adoption of a development agreement by initiative violated the development agreement statute (Gov. Code sec. 65864, et seq.) and article II, section 12 of the California Constitution. The trial court denied Appellants' petitions, and they appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the California Legislature intended to exclusively delegate approval of development agreements to local legislative bodies and to make such approval subject to referendum, but not to initiative. The development agreement initiative adopted by the City was therefore invalid. View "Center for Community Action etc. v. City of Moreno Valley" on Justia Law

Defendant Danny Corder was convicted by jury of four counts of assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon or by means likely to produce great bodily injury, one count of felony evading a peace officer while driving in a reckless manner, and two counts of resisting an officer, along with an enhancement for personally inflicting great bodily injury. The trial court imposed a 12-year state prison sentence. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) he could not be convicted of felony evasion for driving that took place only on private roads; (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the felony evasion conviction; and (3) sentencing on the felony evasion count should have been stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Furthermore, Corder asked the Court of Appeal to conduct an independent review of the trial court’s ruling on his "Pitchess" motion. Finding no reversible error nor abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment and sentence. View "California v. Corder" on Justia Law

Petitioner William Avignone, at the time of this appeal, was in custody awaiting trial on charges of multiple counts of grand theft of personal property and fraud in connection with the offer, purchase, or sale of security. As part of a plea deal, Avignone pled guilty to three counts of fraud and two counts of grand theft while the prosecution dismissed the remaining counts. The trial court sentenced him to five years four months to be served in the custody of the sheriff. Before December 2017, he had been out on bail for four years. During that time, he made all court appearances and did not engage in criminal activity. Avignone appealed his sentence, arguing, among other things, the court abused its discretion in denying probation. The Court of Appeal rejected that contention, but allowed Avignone to withdraw his guilty plea. He did, and the superior court held a bail review hearing. After multiple hearings, the court increased Avignone's bail to $300,000. Avignone appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion in increasing his bail and setting it at an amount that violated In re Humphrey, 19 Cal.App.5th 1006 (2018), the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 12 of the California Constitution. To this point the Court of Appeal agreed that the sentencing court abused its discretion. As such, the court vacated the superior court's bail determination, and directed reconsideration of the amount of bail. View "In re Avignone" on Justia Law

Petitioner Peyman Heidary (Heidary) allegedly owned and oversaw a network of medical clinics to generate fraudulent billings to workers’ compensation and insurance carriers. A non-attorney, he also allegedly controlled the day-to-day operations of various law firms, including California Injury Lawyers (collectively, the law firm.). He allegedly controlled or directed hiring and firing, legal decision making, and income flow to and from the law firm. Codefendants (and petitioners in a related writ case discussed below) Abramowitz, a lawyer, and Solis allegedly assisted Heidary in these operations. Under the alleged fraud scheme, injured workers appeared at the law firm, which would fill out boilerplate paperwork and, on Heidary’s order, direct the workers to one of his clinics to begin treatment. Each provider would fill out a “ ‘super bill,’ ” describing services rendered, which would then go to support staff to review compliance with Heidary’s orders. They would forward the superbill to a medical billing company. Those companies would generate a form to start the claim process. The billing companies contracted with each provider to bill for services, on Heidary’s order, including sometimes by forgery. Payment came from two sources: workers’ compensation insurers and third-party accounts-receivable buyers. The defendants were indicted by grand jury on conspiracy, making false or fraudulent claims for payment of health care benefits, knowingly making false and fraudulent material representations for payment of workers' compensation, money laundering, forgery, and unlicensed practice of medicine. In Petitioner challenged challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside the indictment pursuant to Penal Code section 995(a)(1)(B). Finding no reason to disturb the indictment, the Court of Appeal denied the petition. View "Heidary v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Rudolfo Nuno hit a person with his car, causing serious injuries. He drove a few blocks away and called 911 to report the incident. He was later charged with assault with a deadly weapon, battery with serious bodily injury, making a criminal threat, and felony hit-and-run. The jury convicted him only of hit-and-run and acquitted him of the remaining charges. The court sentenced him to a middle term of two years after finding him presumptively ineligible for probation under Penal Code section 1203 (e)(2) as a person "who used or attempted to use a deadly weapon upon a human being in connection with the perpetration of the crime of which he . . . has been convicted." Nuno argued on appeal the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support hit-and-run because he called for assistance soon after the incident. He also claimed the trial court erred at sentencing in finding him presumptively ineligible for probation and not finding this an "unusual case[]" entitling him to probation "in the interests of justice." While the Court of Appeal determined there was sufficient evidence to support Nuno’s conviction, it remanded for resentencing because the court erroneously believed Nuno to be presumptively ineligible for probation. View "California v. Nuno" on Justia Law

Pedro Rodriguez met Rebecca on an online dating application when he was 41 and she was 16 years old. Rodriguez arranged an in-person meeting with Rebecca a few weeks later and, on numerous occasions over the next several months, engaged in various sexual acts with her in hotel rooms he had rented. A jury convicted Rodriguez of 11 offenses involving unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, one count of burglary and one count of attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime. Rodriguez contended on appeal there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for burglary because Penal Code section 459 required an invasion of a possessory interest in the subject room or building and, much like the lessee of an apartment, he had an unconditional possessory interest in the hotel room he rented. He argued the trial court should have either dismissed the charge or provided the jury with a pinpoint instruction regarding the significance of any such possessory interest. To the extent the Court of Appeal concluded there was a relevant distinction between a possessory interest in the hotel room and a homeowner or lessee's possessory interest in a home or apartment, Rodriguez argued the result would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection. In addition, Rodriguez contended there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for attempting to dissuade a witness pursuant to Penal Code section 136.1 (b)(1) because any attempt he made to dissuade Rebecca occurred only after she made an initial report to the police. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded there was sufficient evidence to support both of Rodriguez' convictions, the jury did not err in refusing to dismiss the burglary charge or its instruction to the jury concerning burglary, and that the equal protection clause was not applicable because individuals renting hotel rooms are not similarly situated to those owning or leasing a residence. View "California v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

A jury convicted James Webb of first degree murder, and found true the special allegation of using a knife in the commission of the offense. On appeal, Webb argued the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the defense of duress (CALCRIM No. 3402). He also claimed CALCRIM No. 548 erroneously instructed the jury it did not need to agree on the theory of murder when the two theories corresponded to different degrees. The Court of Appeal found after review of the record that "Webb repeatedly lied, kept changing his story, and could not paint a coherent picture linking any threats to his admitted conduct. ... even if some jury could believe he acted under duress, it is clear this jury didn't. Webb consistently denied carrying a knife or having anything to do with the actual killing. By finding that he had personally used a knife during the commission of the crime, the jury rejected his versions of events, including any possible theory of duress." Therefore, the Court determined the trial court did not have a duty to instruct the jury on the defense of duress. The Court also determined that to the extent CALCRIM No. 548 could be read to suggest unanimity was not required as to the degree of murder, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remand was required solely for a restitution hearing, but in all other respects the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Webb" on Justia Law

Defendant Tom Phung was 17 years old when he and fellow Tiny Rascal Gang (TRG) members, riding in about five cars, chased a fleeing vehicle containing eight rival gang members. A TRG member two cars ahead shot and killed one rival and seriously wounded a second. A jury convicted defendant, as an aider and abettor, of the lesser included crime of second degree murder (count 1), attempted murder (count 2), shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (count 3), and street terrorism (count 4). With respect to the first three crimes, the jury found true the allegations that defendant committed them for the benefit of a criminal street gang, and vicariously discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of 40 years to life. While defendant's appeal was pending, the electorate passed Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, which went into effect in November 2016. In March 2017, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion affirming the judgment against defendant. Defendant petitioned for review before the California Supreme Court. While that petition was pending, another panel of the Court of Appeal issued an opinion holding Proposition 57 operated retroactively under the rule announced in In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965). Defendant’s counsel, however, was unaware of the filing of the concurrent appellate opinion, and did not raise the issue before the California Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied review, following which the Court of Appeal issued a remittitur. Defendant moved to recall the remittitur on the ground that his counsel had provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to raise the retroactivity of Proposition 57 to his own case. Defendant’s counsel admitted the error. The motion was granted, the remittitur recalled, and supplemental briefing was ordered. The Court of Appeal ultimately affirmed defendant's conviction, but concluded Proposition 57 applied retroactively to defendant. Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded this case for a transfer hearing and resentencing. View "California v. Phung" on Justia Law