Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals’ review centered on the trial court’s partial denial of a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, directed at causes of action arising out of the manner in which defendants, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and Robert Barton, in his capacity as Inspector General, conducted interviews with five correctional officers who previously worked at High Desert State Prison. The interviews were conducted as part of an investigation into that institution’s “practices . . . with respect to (1) excessive use of force against inmates, (2) internal reviews of incidents involving the excessive use of force against inmates, and (3) protection of inmates from assault and harm by others.” As relevant here, these officers and the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) alleged in their first and second causes of action that defendants violated Penal Code section 6126.5 and Government Code section 3300 et seq. (the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights or the Act) by refusing the officers’ requests to be represented during the interviews. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion as to these causes of action, concluding: (1) defendants carried their threshold burden of demonstrating the gravamen of these causes of action arose from protected activity; but (2) plaintiffs established a probability of prevailing on the merits of these claims. The Court of Appeal agreed defendants carried their burden on the threshold issue, but concluded plaintiffs failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of these causes of action. The Court therefore reversed the portion of the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion with respect to the first and second causes of action and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to enter a new order granting the motion in its entirety and dismissing the complaint. View "Blue v. Cal. Office of the Inspector General" on Justia Law

R.W. appeals a judgment of dissolution of his marriage with his former husband, respondent, G.C. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed two of many claims R.W. raised. In particular, R.W. claimed the trial court erred in determining that the parties' date of union was in 2009 when the parties married, rather than in 2004, when they entered into a domestic partnership under New Jersey law. R.W. contended the parties' New Jersey domestic partnership was "substantially equivalent" (Fam. Code, sec. 299.2) to a California domestic partnership such that it could be dissolved pursuant to section 299, and thus, that the court should have considered the date of the parties' domestic partnership to be the date of union for purposes of the dissolution. After interpreting the meaning of "substantially equivalent" in section 299.2 as a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeal concluded that in light of the limited nature of the rights and obligations that the parties obtained in entering into a domestic partnership under New Jersey law, the trial court properly determined that the parties' 2004 New Jersey domestic partnership was not "substantially equivalent" to a California domestic partnership under section 299.2 so as to permit its dissolution under California law. Second, R.W. claimed the trial court erred in failing to divide equally the appreciation of the value of certain real property that the parties acquired as joint tenants during their marriage, as a community asset. Specifically, R.W. argued the trial court erred in applying a formula for apportioning separate and community property interests in the value of the appreciation because the joint title community property presumption contained in section 2581 applied to the property, and the appreciation therefore belonged entirely to the community. To this point, the Court of Appeal agreed with R.W. and concluded the trial court erred in failing to divide the appreciation in value of the marital residence equally. The Court rejected the remainder of R.W.'s claims in the unpublished portions of the opinion. View "Marriage of G.C. and R.W." on Justia Law

After defendant Brady Dee Douglas’s former boyfriend, a male prostitute, told him victim Jeffrey B. had shorted him money following a prearranged sexual encounter, defendant and codefendant Clifton Sharpe tracked down Jeffrey and demanded payment. During a high-speed chase, defendant pointed a gun at Jeffrey and shot at his car several times. A jury found defendant guilty of attempted second degree robbery, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, shooting at an occupied vehicle, exhibiting a firearm against a person in a vehicle, and carrying a loaded firearm with intent to commit a felony, and found true certain firearm enhancements. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for six years. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motion after the prosecutor peremptorily excused the only two openly gay prospective jurors. He also argued the trial court erroneously instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 460, the pattern jury instruction for attempt, which he asserts was unconstitutionally vague and impermissibly creates a mandatory presumption of intent. The Court of Appeal initially rejected defendant’s instructional challenge, but found the trial court did not properly evaluate defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion. The Court ordered a remand for the trial court to apply a mixed-motive analysis to the prosecutor’s proffered reasons to determine whether those veniremen would have been challenged regardless of their sexuality. The Court then granted defendant’s rehearing petition and obtained supplemental briefing by the parties and by amici curiae. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed for a new trial “before a jury uninfected by discrimination.” In light of this holding, the Court did not address defendant’s instructional challenge again. View "California v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Brady stabbed a former customer following a “street side jewelry transaction gone awry.” Based on that incident, defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting great bodily injury. By convicting Brady, the jury necessarily rejected his primary defensive theory: that he was acting in self-defense. On appeal, he defendant asserted no reasonable jury could reach that conclusion. While his argument ultimately challenged the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction, before arriving there, the Court of Appeal found defendant raised an interesting question as to the relevant legal standard. Because the objective standard looks from "the defendant's perspective," Brady contended it should take into account his mental condition and past traumatic experiences. “Essentially, Brady argued that the relevant question is what a reasonable person with bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and his personal history would have done in the situation—i.e., what would a reasonable Brady do?” That, the Court determined, was not the proper standard. Applying the correct legal standard (as the jury did), the Court concluded sufficient evidence supported its rejection of Brady's self-defense theory for want of objective reasonableness. Moreover, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to repudiate his self-defense claim on other grounds. “The jury may have concluded that Brady was not acting out of actual fear for his life since, contrary to his testimony at trial, he told police officers shortly after the event that he was acting to protect his property and made no mention of protecting his person. Alternatively, the jury may have determined that any threat to Brady was not imminent or that the force he used was unreasonable, given that video surveillance showed Brady acting more aggressively than his victim.” View "California v. Brady" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Brady stabbed a former customer following a “street side jewelry transaction gone awry.” Based on that incident, defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting great bodily injury. By convicting Brady, the jury necessarily rejected his primary defensive theory: that he was acting in self-defense. On appeal, he defendant asserted no reasonable jury could reach that conclusion. While his argument ultimately challenged the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction, before arriving there, the Court of Appeal found defendant raised an interesting question as to the relevant legal standard. Because the objective standard looks from "the defendant's perspective," Brady contended it should take into account his mental condition and past traumatic experiences. “Essentially, Brady argued that the relevant question is what a reasonable person with bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and his personal history would have done in the situation—i.e., what would a reasonable Brady do?” That, the Court determined, was not the proper standard. Applying the correct legal standard (as the jury did), the Court concluded sufficient evidence supported its rejection of Brady's self-defense theory for want of objective reasonableness. Moreover, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to repudiate his self-defense claim on other grounds. “The jury may have concluded that Brady was not acting out of actual fear for his life since, contrary to his testimony at trial, he told police officers shortly after the event that he was acting to protect his property and made no mention of protecting his person. Alternatively, the jury may have determined that any threat to Brady was not imminent or that the force he used was unreasonable, given that video surveillance showed Brady acting more aggressively than his victim.” View "California v. Brady" on Justia Law

Flint was sentenced to prison after pleading guilty to three counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on children under the age of 14. Flint was paroled, but pleaded guilty the following year, again under Penal Code 288(a). One month before his scheduled release, the Mendocino County District Attorney filed a petition to involuntarily commit him as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) (Welf. & Inst. Code 6600). Flint unsuccessfully moved to prohibit the prosecution from calling him as a witness, arguing that it was an equal protection violation to compel an SVP to testify because the prosecution could not call as a witness a person found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) or a juvenile in commitment extension hearings. The prosecution called as witnesses Flint, three of his victims, a psychologist and SVP evaluator. Flint called a behavior specialist at the hospital where he was confined, two psychologists who had evaluated him, and a friend who had offered him a job and housing on his release. The jury found Flint qualified as an SVP. The court ordered Flint committed for an indefinite term to a state hospital. The court of appeal remanded for consideration of the justification for the differential treatment of SVP’s and NGI’s in their respective commitment hearings. View "People v. Flint" on Justia Law

After an argument, the victim Christopher Sisoukchaleun, took off his shirt to fight defendant Antoine Blessett. Instead, defendant followed Sisoukchaleun into the street and shot him between the eyes at nearly point-blank range with a firearm he had retrieved only moments earlier from his pickup truck, which was parked nearby. Defendant then fired a second close-range shot, striking Sisoukchaleun in the torso. A jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found true enhancements that defendant personally used a firearm and proximately caused death or great bodily injury, that he personally used a firearm in the commission of a felony, and that he committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Defendant appealed, claiming numerous trial errors and that the 10-year sentence imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22 must be struck. Additionally, the Court of Appeal granted defendant’s request for supplemental briefing on the impact of Senate Bill No. 620 and whether the matter must be remanded for the trial court to consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike the Penal Code section 12022.5 and 12022.53 firearm enhancements. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant’s confrontation clause violation contentions under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) and California v. Sanchez, 63 Cal.4th 665 (2016) were forfeited: the boilerplate in limine motions filed prior to trial contained only a vague reference to the confrontation clause, and the oral arguments made during the in limine motion hearing, in which no confrontation clause claim was made, were insufficient to preserve the contentions defendant makes on appeal. Furthermore, the Court concluded defendant has failed to establish that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based on the forfeiture. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the 10- year term for the gang enhancement had to be struck. Defendant’s other claims of trial error were forfeited, without merit, or pertained to errors that were harmless or did not prejudice defendant. However, the case was remanded for the trial court to consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike the section 12022.5 and 12022.53 firearm enhancements, and, in the event that the court declined to exercise that discretion, for the court to impose sentences on the section 12022.5(a), and 12022.53(b), firearm enhancements and then stay execution of those sentences pursuant to section 12022.53 (f). Otherwise, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "California v. Blessett" on Justia Law

Joseph Bocklett appealed a jury verdict adjudicating him a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (the Act). On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of Penal Code section 3000 (a)(4), which tolled the parole period for an SVP on equal protection and ex post facto grounds. He also asserts that the procedure for obtaining conditional release under the Act violated equal protection. With respect to section 3000 (a)(4), Bocklett argued his right to equal protection was violated because he was similarly situated to mentally disordered offenders (MDOs) who do not have a similar tolling provision- that it does not serve a compelling governmental interest for SVP's to remain on parole after they have been fully discharged from their commitment. He maintains that once an SVP has been unconditionally discharged, the person is no longer an SVP. To this, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, concluding California has shown a compelling interest to toll the parole period for SVP's so that SVP's receive parole supervision after they have been fully discharged from their commitment. “Notably, this is not a situation where MDO's are treated differently. Rather, it is a legal impossibility to toll the parole period for an MDO because mental health treatment for an MDO is imposed as a condition of parole.” View "California v. Bocklett" on Justia Law

In California v. Woods, 19 Cal.App.5th 1080 (2018), the Court of Appeal held that Senate Bill No. 620 (and the associated amendment to Penal Code Section 12022.53, effective January 1, 2018) applied retroactively to nonfinal cases. Defendant Colleen Ann Harris filed a motion to recall the remittitur to either permit briefing on the application of Senate Bill No. 620 and the amendment to section 12022.53 to her case, which was final almost a year before the statute’s effective date, or remand the case to the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancement under the amendment. Noting that recalling a remittitur is an extraordinary remedy generally available in a limited number of instances, the Court found defendant relied on a narrow exception as announced by the California Supreme Court in California v. Mutch, 4 Cal.3d 389 (1971). The Court determined the narrow exception did not apply here. Accordingly, the Court denied the motion and held a motion to recall the remittitur was not the appropriate procedural vehicle through which to seek the requested relief in cases that are final and do not involve Mutch-type circumstances. View "California v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial in part of cross-defendants' anti-SLAPP motion that sought to strike certain allegations in a cross-complaint filed by Joel D. Kettler, alleging defamation and other causes of action. The court held that the trial court did not err in concluding that complaints to the Certified Financial Planners Board of Standards was not protected activity. The Board was not a public agency and there was no public interest issue. The court also held that the litigation privilege did not protect the communications in question (communications to AXA reporting cross-complainant's wrongdoing). View "Kettler v. Gould" on Justia Law