Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

HomeAway, an online forum that allows owners to list their properties for short-term rentals and connect with individuals who want to rent a house or apartment, rather than stay in a hotel, is not a party to those rental transactions. San Francisco requires owners who rent out property to obtain a registration certificate from the treasurer; short-term renters must pay a transient occupancy tax. A recent report on short-term rentals in San Francisco showed that most owners did not comply with those requirements. San Francisco obtained a court to enforce an administrative subpoena, requiring HomeAway.com to disclose data about San Francisco rental transactions. The court of appeal affirmed the order, rejecting arguments that the subpoena violated the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701–2712, which regulates the government’s ability to compel disclosure of some electronic data stored on the Internet, and that enforcing the subpoena would violate its customers’ constitutional rights. Even if HomeAway is “covered” by the Act, there is no violation because San Francisco used an authorized procedure. In addition, the subpoena does not require HomeAway to disclose electronic communications but seeks very specific information about hosts who use HomeAway to offer to rent property and about bookings. It does not command HomeAway to produce any customer's electronic communication or login information. View "City and County of San Francisco v. HomeAway.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The trial court granted an anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that plaintiff's action arose out of an underlying unlawful detainer action, which was protected petitioning activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, and that plaintiff could not establish a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits because defendant's appeal of the underlying unlawful detainer judgment was pending at the time plaintiff filed the instant action and was still pending at the time of the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the basis of remittitur because it was not newly discovered evidence, and the subsequent accrual of plaintiff's cause of action was not a valid basis for reinstating his complaint. Therefore, the court reversed the order granting the motion for a new trial. The court affirmed the order and judgment granting the anti-SLAPP motion and dismissing the complaint where plaintiff's cause of action arose from protected activity, and plaintiff failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of prevailing. View "Aron v. WIB Holdings" on Justia Law

The trial court granted an anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that plaintiff's action arose out of an underlying unlawful detainer action, which was protected petitioning activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, and that plaintiff could not establish a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits because defendant's appeal of the underlying unlawful detainer judgment was pending at the time plaintiff filed the instant action and was still pending at the time of the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the basis of remittitur because it was not newly discovered evidence, and the subsequent accrual of plaintiff's cause of action was not a valid basis for reinstating his complaint. Therefore, the court reversed the order granting the motion for a new trial. The court affirmed the order and judgment granting the anti-SLAPP motion and dismissing the complaint where plaintiff's cause of action arose from protected activity, and plaintiff failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of prevailing. View "Aron v. WIB Holdings" on Justia Law

Defendant Oswaldo Chavez knifed a man in the back, and defendant Daniel Gonzalez shot and killed another. Both were convicted by jury of second degree murder, and assault with a deadly weapon. On appeal, Chavez contended: (1) the trial court erred by admitting an eyewitness's in-court identification of him that was the result of an unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure; (2) the court erred by improperly limiting the scope of opinion testimony by his eyewitness identification expert; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of second degree murder; and (4) the court erred by instructing with CALCRIM No. 571 on imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of another but omitting imperfect defense of Gonzalez. Gonzalez joined these contentions, and also argued: (1) the trial court erred by instructing with CALCRIM No. 3471 on the right of self-defense but omitting language stating that an aggressor who initially uses only nondeadly force regains the right to self-defense when his or her opponent counters with deadly force; (2) the court erred by instructing with CALCRIM No. 3472, but not modifying it with language stating that a person who provokes a fight with an intent to use nondeadly force regains the right to self-defense when his or her opponent counters with deadly force; and (3) the court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting the testimony of an eyewitness regarding the death threat he (Gonzalez) made to dissuade that eyewitness from testifying at trial, and also abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial. Chavez joined in Gonzalez's contentions. After the parties submitted their briefs in this case, Gonzalez filed a supplemental brief arguing that the Court of Appeal should have: (1) concluded the provisions of 2017 Senate Bill No. 620, effective January 1, 2018, applied retroactively to judgments not yet final; and (2) remanded the matter for resentencing to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss the section 12022.53 firearm enhancement. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgments. View "California v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Defendant Oswaldo Chavez knifed a man in the back, and defendant Daniel Gonzalez shot and killed another. Both were convicted by jury of second degree murder, and assault with a deadly weapon. On appeal, Chavez contended: (1) the trial court erred by admitting an eyewitness's in-court identification of him that was the result of an unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure; (2) the court erred by improperly limiting the scope of opinion testimony by his eyewitness identification expert; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of second degree murder; and (4) the court erred by instructing with CALCRIM No. 571 on imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of another but omitting imperfect defense of Gonzalez. Gonzalez joined these contentions, and also argued: (1) the trial court erred by instructing with CALCRIM No. 3471 on the right of self-defense but omitting language stating that an aggressor who initially uses only nondeadly force regains the right to self-defense when his or her opponent counters with deadly force; (2) the court erred by instructing with CALCRIM No. 3472, but not modifying it with language stating that a person who provokes a fight with an intent to use nondeadly force regains the right to self-defense when his or her opponent counters with deadly force; and (3) the court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting the testimony of an eyewitness regarding the death threat he (Gonzalez) made to dissuade that eyewitness from testifying at trial, and also abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial. Chavez joined in Gonzalez's contentions. After the parties submitted their briefs in this case, Gonzalez filed a supplemental brief arguing that the Court of Appeal should have: (1) concluded the provisions of 2017 Senate Bill No. 620, effective January 1, 2018, applied retroactively to judgments not yet final; and (2) remanded the matter for resentencing to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss the section 12022.53 firearm enhancement. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgments. View "California v. Chavez" on Justia Law

A jury convicted D'Mare Franklin of one count of premeditated and deliberate attempted murder, and two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm. The jury also found that Franklin personally used a firearm in connection with each count, leading to firearm enhancements on each of his sentences. On appeal, he argued his attempted murder conviction should have been reversed due to errors that purportedly led the jury to give insufficient consideration and weight to provocation. Because Franklin failed to establish prejudice flowing from any such errors, the Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction. However, in light of recent legislative changes to the sentencing scheme for firearm enhancements, the Court remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Six judges who were elected to the superior court in mid-term elections in 2012, but who did not take office until January 7, 2013, claimed entitlement to benefits under the Judges’ Retirement System II (JRS II) as in effect at the time they were elected, rather than at the time they assumed office. On January 1, 2013, JRS II became subject to the California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013 (PEPRA), Government Code section 75500, which amended virtually all state employee retirement systems to address the state’s enormous unfunded pension liability and return these systems to actuarially sound footing. PEPRA increases employee contributions, provides for fluctuating contribution rates based on market performance and actuarial projections, and bases the amount of monthly pension payments on an employee’s final three years of compensation, rather than on only the final year. The court of appeal held that the judges did not obtain a vested right in JRS II benefits as judges-elect, but rather obtained a vested right to retirement benefits only upon taking office after PEPRA went into effect. PEPRA’s provisions pertaining to fluctuating pension contributions do not violate the non-diminution clause of the California Constitution nor do they impermissibly delegate legislative authority over judicial compensation. View "McGlynn v. State of California" on Justia Law

Petitioner purchased a rare 1947 Cisitalia automobile from Ohtomi, a Japanese company, then began restoration.The California Highway Patrol (CHP) received a stolen vehicle report on behalf of Takihana, a Japanese citizen who owned the Cisitalia before Ohtomi. CHP seized the car from a repair shop. Petitioner provided evidence that Takihana’s complaint was not that the car was stolen, but that Ohtomi had failed to pay the full amount due under their purchase agreement. CHP determined that the dispute was essentially civil in nature but refused to return the car without a court order. CHP indicated that it was unable to determine the true owner but was no longer investigating the report as a criminal matter; that one person had been arrested in Japan and there was no confirmation whether criminal proceedings would be instituted; and that the car was being properly stored. CHP submitted no evidence. The trial court denied Petitioner relief, pending CHP’s filing of an interpleader complaint. Takihana filed a cross-complaint, indicating that he had released the car for its evaluation as security for a loan and that the loan was not made and the car was not returned. The court of appeal vacated. CHP cannot demonstrate that the car was stolen or embezzled and must return it to Petitioner under the principles of due process. View "Lawrence v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A jury convicted both defendants in this case of first degree murder and found the special circumstances that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery and during the course of a kidnapping. The jury found that one of the defendants, Angelo Arredondo, had used a firearm in committing the murder. The jury found both defendants committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Defendant Arredondo appealed, claiming he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel conceded defendant was guilty of felony murder, but should have rejected the special circumstance allegation. The Court of Appeal found that prosecutors may express, in the most vivid and even emotional terms, their disgust with the conduct of defendants shown by the evidence. “However, prosecutors may not suggest to the jury that a guilty verdict is required because of the need to punish a group with whom the defendants are associated or because of some uncharged and unspecified crimes the defendants or others may have committed.” Here, the Court determined the prosecutor's “relentless” description of the defendants and the other participants in the crime as "cockroaches" who together with others posed a hidden threat to the community, plainly suggested in powerful terms just such guilt by association and responsibility for uncharged acts. Because of the overwhelming evidence, the defendants planned to rob the victim and then decided to kill him, and that in doing so they kidnapped him, the prosecutor's misconduct did not require reversal of their murder convictions or the jury's special circumstances findings. However, the Court reversed the jury's gang findings. The evidence that the robbery, kidnapping, and murder were committed to benefit or otherwise advance the interests of a criminal street gang was somewhat conflicting and the prosecutor's repeated reference to guilt by association was directly related to those gang allegations. The Court also reversed the firearms enhancement imposed on Arredondo so that on remand the trial court could exercise the discretion recently provided to trial courts under the current version of section 12022.53(h). View "California v. Arredondo" on Justia Law

Defendant Miguel Cabrera was currently serving a three strikes sentence for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (GBI) and battery with serious bodily injury (SBI). He appealed the denial of his Penal Code section 1170.126 petition for resentencing, arguing the trial court erred in declining to vacate the original sentencing court’s finding that his current convictions (for assault and battery) were serious felonies, which he argued would have paved the way to his eligibility for resentencing. After review, the Court of Appeal determined the serious felony findings (made in 2008 by the sentencing court) were not subject to review by the trial court assigned to hear the section 1170.126 petition in 2015. Furthermore, the resulting classification, even if incorrect, would not constitute an unauthorized sentence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the petition. View "P. v. Cabrera" on Justia Law