Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in count 1, second-degree murder in count 2, and attempted murder in count 3. He admitted the truth of the personal firearm use enhancements in each count. Counts 4 and 5 and the special circumstance allegations were dismissed pursuant to the plea. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 25 years to life in count 1, plus two years for the firearm enhancement. On February 1, 2021, Defendant executed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court summarily denied Defendant’s petition in a written memorandum of decision. Defendant appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. However, the court modified the trial court’s memorandum of decision and minute order to reflect that Defendant, and not D.M., is the petitioner in this matter. The court explained that there is no merit to Defendant’s argument that the trial court engaged in premature fact-finding. The trial court reviewed and relied upon the plea colloquy, which is part of the record of conviction. The court also rejected Defendant’s assertion that he only admitted that he was guilty of murder and attempted murder, which did not require that he harbor malice at that time. The court wrote that regardless of whether Defendant was required to admit to being the actual killer/attempted murderer, or could stipulate to particular facts without admitting them, the only reasonable view of the record here is that Defendant did admit that he was the actual killer/attempted murderer. View "P. v. Fisher" on Justia Law

In August 2010, after the California v. Samaniego, 174 Cal.App.4th 1148 (2009) and California v. Nero, 181 Cal.App.4th 504 (2010) were decided, defendant Brandon Burns was convicted on one count of first degree murder arising out of his participation with a codefendant in a gang-related shooting. The jury was instructed using the now-disapproved version of CALCRIM No. 400, but his counsel did not argue he was guilty of a lesser crime than the codefendant. Neither did the attorney argue the instruction was given in error. In 2022 however, Burns petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, claiming he “could not presently be convicted of murder…because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.” He argued that based on the error in former CALCRIM No. 400, the jury might have convicted him based on some “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” This possibility, he argued, required he be granted an evidentiary hearing. Even accepting Burns’ argument regarding the flaw in the earlier version of CALCRIM No. 400, the Court of Appeal found the alleged error he identified had nothing to do with the 2018 and 2021 legislative changes that gave rise to section 1172.6’s petition process. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Burns failed to establish a prima facile case for relief under section 1172.6. View "California v. Burns" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that during the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendants Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD or the District) and its then Superintendent adopted distance-learning policies that discriminated against poor students and students of color in violation of the California Constitution. Plaintiffs rest their challenge on various side letter contract agreements between LAUSD and the teacher’s union, Defendant United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA), which Plaintiffs contend implemented the distance-learning framework established by the Legislature in a discriminatory fashion. However, the District has returned to in-person instruction, and both the side letter agreements and the statutory framework that authorized them have expired. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs continue to seek injunctive relief to remedy what they contend are ongoing harms caused by the allegedly unconstitutional policies. The trial court sustained, with leave to amend, LAUSD’s demurrer on mootness grounds and granted, with leave to amend, its motion to strike the prayer for relief, reasoning that the requested remedies would not be manageable on a class-wide basis.   The Second Appellate District reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded with instructions. The court held that the trial court prematurely struck the prayer for relief at the pleading stage, notwithstanding the end of distance learning. Because Plaintiffs propose a seemingly viable remedy for the past and continuing harms they allege, their constitutional claims are not moot. The court wrote that the constitutionality of expired policies is measured by reference to the statewide standards that existed when the policies were in effect. Accordingly, the trial court erred by sustaining LAUSD’s demurrer to the eighth cause of action on mootness grounds. View "Shaw v. L.A. Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

While his two teenaged children were across the hall, defendant Anthony Morones, Jr., fired a gun outside a bathroom window. After he was arrested and a complaint was filed against him, he attempted to persuade his children to lie to law enforcement about the incident. A jury found defendant guilty of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm, two counts of misdemeanor child endangerment, felon in possession of a weapon, and two counts of dissuading a witness. On appeal, defendant contended his witness dissuasion convictions under Penal Code section 136.11 should have been reversed because the statute only applied to efforts to dissuade a witness prior to charges being filed. He also contended the trial court erred when it failed to properly instruct the jury on elements of the offenses and consider section 654 in sentencing. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed two of defendant’s convictions for witness dissuasion, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Morones" on Justia Law

Defendant, while having an elevated blood-alcohol level, drove his 2008 Ford Focus at a high rate of speed off the highway, through a fence, and into agricultural equipment parked in an adjacent yard. His passenger was ejected from the vehicle and killed. Defendant was charged and convicted with various offenses related to this incident. On appeal, among other claims, Defendant contends remand is required for the court to resentence him in light of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), statutes 2021, chapter 731 (Senate Bill No. 567), and Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), statutes 2021, chapter 695 (Assembly Bill No. 124), and the court erred in ordering restitution in favor of Garton, the agricultural equipment company whose property was damaged in the collision, because the company was not a direct or derivative victim of a crime of which Defendant was convicted.   The Fifth Appellate District remanded the matter for resentencing consistent with Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124. However, the court affirmed in all other respects. The court explained that as the People concede, Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124 are ameliorative changes in law that apply retroactively to Defendant. Here, the trial court imposed an upper-term sentence on count 5, thus implicating Senate Bill No. 567. Additionally, Defendant’s statement in mitigation, submitted to the trial court at sentencing, suggests defendant may have a history of childhood trauma, including childhood abuse, thus potentially implicating Assembly Bill No. 124. View "P. v. Suazo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Davis Boat Manufacturing-Nordic, Inc. (Davis Boat), which prevailed in a breach-of-contract action against Defendant applied for an order to sell Defendant’s home. The Stanislaus County Superior Court denied the application on the basis of Code of Civil Procedure section 699.730, a recently added statute that prohibits the forced sale of a judgment debtor’s principal place of residence to satisfy a “consumer debt” except under certain circumstances.   The Fifth Appellate affirmed. The court rejected Davis Boat’s assertions on appeal and held that the definition of “consumer debt” in section 669.730 is not latently ambiguous, and that section 669.730 neither violates the contract nor the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. The court explained that section 699.730, subdivision (a) defines “consumer debt” as “debt incurred by an individual primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Thus, a debt incurred for business or commercial reasons would not be a debt incurred for “personal, family, or household purposes.” The court wrote that notwithstanding the plain meaning of the statute, Davis Boat suggests “consumer debt” is latently ambiguous. The court reasoned that it does not believe that the purpose of Assembly Bill No. 2463 is frustrated simply because the language approved by the Legislature means debt incurred by an individual primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Moreover, the court wrote that it cannot deem a statutory exemption that allows financial institutions to force the sale of a judgment debtor’s principal place of residence to satisfy a high-priced debt “so devoid of even minimal rationality that it is unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection. View "Davis Boat Manufacturing-Nordic, Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Santa Paula Animal Rescue Center, Inc. (SPARC) and Lucky Pup Dog Rescue (Lucky Pup) (collectively Appellants) appealed a judgment of dismissal following the trial court’s order sustaining, without leave to amend, Defendant County of Los Angeles’s (the County) demurrer to Appellants’ petition for writ of mandate. Appellants contend that the Hayden Act and, more specifically, Food and Agriculture Code section 31108 and similar provisions impose on the County a ministerial duty to (1) release a dog or other shelter animal to a requesting animal adoption or rescue organization with Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) status prior to euthanasia without first determining whether the animal has behavioral problems or is adoptable or treatable, and (2) release the aforementioned animal to the requesting animal rescue or adoption organization without requiring the organization to meet qualifications additional to having Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) status.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment and directed the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. The court concluded that the demurrer was improperly granted because the County lacks discretion to withhold and euthanize a dog based upon its determination that the animal has a behavioral problem or is not adoptable or treatable. However, the County has discretion to determine whether and how a nonprofit organization qualifies as an animal adoption or rescue organization. View "Santa Paula Animal Rescue Center, Inc. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants Jeff Jenkins, Jeff Jenkins Productions, LLC, and Bongo, LLC, for breach of contract and eight other causes of action. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged she conceived the idea for and worked to develop and coproduce a popular television program that came to be known as Bling Empire on Netflix. In the spring of 2018, Plaintiff presented the idea for the program to Defendant Jenkins during a series of discussions, and she gave Jenkins written development material concerning the program. Plaintiff alleged causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and other claims. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that adhering to the two-part test announced in FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (FilmOn), that while the creation of a television show is an exercise of constitutionally protected expression, in this case, there is no “functional relationship” between the activity challenged in the complaint and the issue of public interest, as required by FilmOn.  Further, the court wrote that the conduct challenged, while it “implicates” a public issue, does not “contribute to public discussion of that issue” Consequently, Defendants’ activity excluding Plaintiff and failing to compensate her was not undertaken “in furtherance of free speech ‘in connection with’ an issue of public interest.” View "Li v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Appellant purports to appeal from the trial court’s post-judgment order denying his petition to strike two prior prison term enhancements imposed pursuant to former Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) (667.5(b)). In a separate proceeding, co-Appellant purports to appeal from a similar post-judgment order.   The Second Appellate District dismissed both appeals. The court held that the orders appealed were non-appealable because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the petitions. The court explained that Appellants’ prior prison terms had been served for offenses that were not sexually violent. After the imposition of the prior prison term enhancements, former section 667.5(b) was amended to limit its application to prison terms served for sexually violent offenses. Appellants contend the trial court erroneously denied their petitions to strike the now invalid prior prison term enhancements. But, the court explained, the Legislature has not authorized their appeals from the trial court’s orders. View "P. v. Escobedo" on Justia Law

Defendant Curtis Slaton was convicted by jury of murder. The prosecution’s theory in the case was that defendant committed the murder because he affiliated with a gang that wore blue and the victim wore red—a color associated with a rival gang. The trial court allowed the prosecution to present limited gang evidence to advance this theory, including screenshots from a music video that, among other things, show defendant affiliating with a known gang member, displaying a symbol of the gang, and holding up a blue bandana. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court wrongly admitted these screenshots for three reasons: (1) this evidence was inadmissible to show his potential motive for the charged murder; (2) they were highly inflammatory and carried minimal relevance; and (3) a new statute governing the admission of music videos and other forms of creative expression—which became effective after the trial here— applied retroactively and requires reversal. Finding none of these arguments persuasive, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Slaton" on Justia Law