Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At age of 19, defendant Montrell Woods shot Kenny Hernandez to death during a confrontation between the two men at an apartment complex. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm and also found he personally discharged a firearm causing death. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life for the murder and to a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53. At the time of defendant’s sentencing, the enhancement statute provided that “[n]otwithstanding [Penal Code s]ection 1385 or any other provision of law, the court shall not strike an allegation under this section or a finding bringing a person within the provisions of this section.” On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to bifurcate the possession of a firearm charge from the murder charge, the court erroneously excluded evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence, the prosecutor committed two acts of misconduct, the court committed multiple instances of instructional error, and cumulative error resulted. Defendant also argued should have been remanded to the trial court so that he can make an adequate record for a future youth offender parole hearing and so that the trial court can exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancement based on a recent change to Penal Code section 12022.53 that took effect on January 1, 2018. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found no merit to defendant’s claims of trial court error and prosecutorial misconduct. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded defendant already had sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing, but agree that remand was necessary to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancement under the recent amendment to Penal Code section 12022.53. View "California v. Woods" on Justia Law

Defendant Steven Mark Williams appealed a trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the Act). He contended the trial court abused its discretion in finding that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety and the court erred in failing to apply the definition of unreasonable risk to public safety enacted by Proposition 47 (The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014). The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the trial court’s failure to consider when, if ever, defendant would be released if the petition was granted was an abuse of discretion. On remand, the court must first determine which of defendant’s crimes were eligible for resentencing. If one or more of defendant’s crimes are eligible for resentencing, only then may the court determine whether resentencing poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. “In making that determination, the trial court must take into account when defendant could be released if the petition is granted and whether that release is contingent on considerations of public safety.” View "California v. Williams" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Hector Martinez guilty of: (1) driving or taking a vehicle valued at over $950, without the owner’s consent; and (2) possessing burglary tools. In regard to the vehicle offense, the jury found true the allegation that the crime was committed in association with a criminal street gang. The court found true the allegations that defendant suffered a prior conviction for driving or taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, and that defendant suffered three prior convictions for which he served prison terms. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of eight years. Defendant argued on appeal that the gang enhancement should have been reversed due to the gang expert’s reliance on testimonial hearsay and case-specific hearsay. The People conceded the gang expert’s testimony included inadmissible hearsay, but asserted the errors were harmless. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in part. With respect to the harmless error argument, the People contended: (1) defendant was arrested with a member of the Chino Sinners (street gang); (2) defendant was arrested in Chino Sinners’ territory; (3) vehicle theft was a primary activity of the Chino Sinners; and (4) the vehicle theft would permit defendant to commit additional crimes in support of the gang. The Court concluded the People failed to explain what properly admitted evidence supported a finding that the person defendant with whom defendant was arrested was a member of the Chino Sinners; the record reflected only inadmissible hearsay establishing that person's gang membership. Without that evidence, the record reflected that defendant committed a crime in gang territory and that gang members tended to commit the same crime. This evidence failed to establish that defendant had the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members because it failed to show defendant had any knowledge or awareness that he was in gang territory committing a crime that gang members tend to commit. View "California v. Martinez" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Hector Martinez guilty of: (1) driving or taking a vehicle valued at over $950, without the owner’s consent; and (2) possessing burglary tools. In regard to the vehicle offense, the jury found true the allegation that the crime was committed in association with a criminal street gang. The court found true the allegations that defendant suffered a prior conviction for driving or taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, and that defendant suffered three prior convictions for which he served prison terms. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of eight years. Defendant argued on appeal that the gang enhancement should have been reversed due to the gang expert’s reliance on testimonial hearsay and case-specific hearsay. The People conceded the gang expert’s testimony included inadmissible hearsay, but asserted the errors were harmless. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in part. With respect to the harmless error argument, the People contended: (1) defendant was arrested with a member of the Chino Sinners (street gang); (2) defendant was arrested in Chino Sinners’ territory; (3) vehicle theft was a primary activity of the Chino Sinners; and (4) the vehicle theft would permit defendant to commit additional crimes in support of the gang. The Court concluded the People failed to explain what properly admitted evidence supported a finding that the person defendant with whom defendant was arrested was a member of the Chino Sinners; the record reflected only inadmissible hearsay establishing that person's gang membership. Without that evidence, the record reflected that defendant committed a crime in gang territory and that gang members tended to commit the same crime. This evidence failed to establish that defendant had the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members because it failed to show defendant had any knowledge or awareness that he was in gang territory committing a crime that gang members tend to commit. View "California v. Martinez" on Justia Law

A jury found Jimmy Moore guilty of one count of possession of a controlled substance and two counts of vandalism, and found true an allegation that he caused damage of more than $400. The superior court sentenced him to three years of formal probation. Among other conditions of Moore's probation, the court required him to submit to warrantless searches of his person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers and recordable media, and to obtain his probation officer's approval as to his residence and employment. On appeal, Moore argued the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury regarding voluntary intoxication as a defense to the vandalism charges, and that the electronic search and residence and employment approval conditions are unconstitutionally overbroad. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined voluntary intoxication was not a defense to vandalism. Furthermore, Moore forfeited his arguments regarding the conditions of his probation. View "California v. Moore" on Justia Law

A jury found Jimmy Moore guilty of one count of possession of a controlled substance and two counts of vandalism, and found true an allegation that he caused damage of more than $400. The superior court sentenced him to three years of formal probation. Among other conditions of Moore's probation, the court required him to submit to warrantless searches of his person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers and recordable media, and to obtain his probation officer's approval as to his residence and employment. On appeal, Moore argued the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury regarding voluntary intoxication as a defense to the vandalism charges, and that the electronic search and residence and employment approval conditions are unconstitutionally overbroad. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined voluntary intoxication was not a defense to vandalism. Furthermore, Moore forfeited his arguments regarding the conditions of his probation. View "California v. Moore" on Justia Law

In August 2005, Modesto Perez pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine for sale. Over six months later, Perez was deported to Mexico based on his conviction. On January 1, 2017, Penal Code section 1473.7 became effective, allowing a person no longer imprisoned or restrained to move to vacate a conviction or sentence for one of two reasons, including that "[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to a prejudicial error damaging the moving party's ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere." Perez subsequently filed a motion to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7. The superior court denied Perez's motion. Perez appealed, contending the court erred in denying his motion. The People argued the statute did not apply retroactively and, even if it did, Perez's motion was untimely and the record showed he had sufficient knowledge of the immigration consequences of his plea. The Court of Appeal determined section 1473.7 did apply to Perez, however, Perez did not show he was entitled to relief under that statute. As such, the Court affirmed the order. View "California v. Perez" on Justia Law

In August 2005, Modesto Perez pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine for sale. Over six months later, Perez was deported to Mexico based on his conviction. On January 1, 2017, Penal Code section 1473.7 became effective, allowing a person no longer imprisoned or restrained to move to vacate a conviction or sentence for one of two reasons, including that "[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to a prejudicial error damaging the moving party's ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere." Perez subsequently filed a motion to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7. The superior court denied Perez's motion. Perez appealed, contending the court erred in denying his motion. The People argued the statute did not apply retroactively and, even if it did, Perez's motion was untimely and the record showed he had sufficient knowledge of the immigration consequences of his plea. The Court of Appeal determined section 1473.7 did apply to Perez, however, Perez did not show he was entitled to relief under that statute. As such, the Court affirmed the order. View "California v. Perez" on Justia Law

Land Partners, LLC, and Los Alisos Ranch Company (collectively, Land Partners) appealed a postjudgment order denying their motion for attorney fees brought pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 5152. Although the court had found the County of Orange Assessor (Assessor) used a constitutionally invalid methodology in valuing Land Partners’ property for property tax purposes, the court determined there was no evidence the Assessor’s actions were due to his subjective belief that a certain constitutional provision, statute, rule or regulation was invalid or unconstitutional. Because the court concluded proof of the latter was a statutory prerequisite to recovery of fees under the statute, it held Land Partners was not entitled to attorney fees. Land Partners argued on appeal the court erred in interpreting section 5152. It argued proof of the Assessor’s subjective mindset was not required; instead showing a violation of well-established and unambiguous law was sufficient for recovery of attorney fees. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Land Partners’ premise and affirmed the order. View "Land Partners, LLC v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Eric Robbins guilty of first degree murder, and attempted murder. The jury found true the allegations that: (1) the murder was committed by means of lying in wait; (2) the attempted murder was committed willfully and with premeditation and deliberation; and (3) during the murder and attempted murder, defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm proximately causing death to another person. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life. Defendant raised nine issues on appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant’s conviction on all but one contention: defendant argued his sentence for attempted murder should have been life, rather than seven years to life. The People conceded defendant was correct. The Court remanded the case for resentencing. View "California v. Robbins" on Justia Law