Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury found defendant-appellant Eric Robbins guilty of first degree murder, and attempted murder. The jury found true the allegations that: (1) the murder was committed by means of lying in wait; (2) the attempted murder was committed willfully and with premeditation and deliberation; and (3) during the murder and attempted murder, defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm proximately causing death to another person. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life. Defendant raised nine issues on appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant’s conviction on all but one contention: defendant argued his sentence for attempted murder should have been life, rather than seven years to life. The People conceded defendant was correct. The Court remanded the case for resentencing. View "California v. Robbins" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Maria Arevalo of possessing methamphetamine for sale. The trial court suspended execution of sentence and granted three years formal probation on several conditions. On appeal, Arevalo contended the probation condition requiring her to maintain a residence approved by her probation officer was unconstitutionally overbroad and violated her right to travel and freedom of association. She also requested that the Court of Appeal independently review the in camera hearing of her “Pitchess” motion. With respect to the Pitchess motion, the Court reviewed the reporter’s transcript and concluded the trial court complied with the required Pitchess procedures. As such, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining there was discoverable information with respect to one incident; the remaining records were not related to false reports or dishonesty and were properly withheld from production. View "California v. Arevalo" on Justia Law

Defendants Karre Mullins and Arturo Russell were convicted by jury of robbery involving bank customers at ATM’s. Defendant Mullins was also convicted on a count of conspiracy to commit petty theft. Sentenced to determinate terms, defendants appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support robbery convictions; (2) the existence of an identity theft statute precluded convictions for robbery because the identity theft statute was more specific; and (3) the trial court improperly used argumentative language to instruct the jury on robbery. Additionally, defendant Mullins argued: (4) the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing on the conspiracy conviction as a felony rather than as a misdemeanor. Russell argued: (5) the sentencing minute order and abstract of judgment failed to properly reflect the sentence imposed. The Court of Appeal found merit only in the last contention, affirmed the convictions, but remanded for correction of the sentencing minute order and abstract of judgment. View "California v. Mullins" on Justia Law

School Boards sued, alleging that Government Code 17557(d)(2)(B)) and Education Code 42238.24 and 56523(f) “implemented . . . broad changes in mandate law that were intended to eliminate or reduce the State’s mandate reimbursement obligations” and shifted the cost of the Behavioral Intervention Plans Mandate ($65 million annually) and the Graduation Requirements mandate ($250 million annually), to districts and county offices of education. Plaintiffs claimed violation of California Constitution article XIII B, section 6 or article III, section 3; that Government Code 17557(d)(2)(B) “impermissibly burdens the constitutional right to reimbursement guaranteed by article XIII B, section 6 and is invalid to the extent it allows the State to reduce or eliminate mandate claims by claiming ‘offsetting revenues’ that do not represent new or additional funding . . . as reflected in the Legislature’s directives in Education Code sections [42238.24] and 56523.” The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of the claims, in part. Government Code 17557(d)(2)(B), as applied in Education Code 42238.24 and 56523(f), does not violate the state’s constitutional obligation to reimburse local governments for the costs of mandated programs and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. It is constitutional for the legislature to designate funding it already provides as offsetting revenue when reimbursing them for new state-mandated programs where the legislation operates prospectively only. View "California School Boards Association v. State of California" on Justia Law

Manuel Saldana was a 58-year-old legal Mexican immigrant with a sixth grade education who, with no notable criminal history, was charged with committing lewd acts on three girls, G.H. (age 11), M.H. (age 8), and Y.H. (age 6) (collectively the children), who lived in the trailer park where he resided. The veracity of the children's claims was open to question. Left mostly unsupervised, the eight-year-old and the 11-year-old​ watched a daily television soap opera which frequently depicted adult themes. After watching, the girls acted out episodes themselves. The day before accusing Saldana of molesting them, they watched an episode involving child molestation. In a police station interrogation (with no Miranda advisements) Saldana confessed to inadvertently touching G.H. and M.H. on the vagina, outside their clothes. The jury watched a video of his confession and during deliberations asked to watch it again. About two hours later, the jury found Saldana guilty of four counts of committing lewd acts, violating Penal Code section 288(a). The court sentenced Saldana to six years in prison. Saldana raised numerous issues on appeal; however, the crux of this case was whether Saldana was subjected to a custodial interrogation. Saldana denied the accusations more than 25 times, but ultimately, he confessed, stating he inadvertently touched M.H. and G.H. twice on the vagina, over their clothes. In response to the prosecutor's question, Saldana testified he believed he could not leave the police station unless he confessed. The Court of Appeal found it appropriate for police to use the kind of interrogation techniques used in this matter. "However, when police create an atmosphere equivalent to that of formal arrest by questioning a suspect who is isolated behind closed doors in a police station interrogation room, by repeatedly confronting him with the evidence against him, repeatedly dismissing his denials, and telling him at the outset he is free to leave, when all the objective circumstances later are to the contrary, Miranda is triggered." The Court of Appeal found the trial court prejudicially erred in receiving Saldana's confession into evidence. Accordingly, it reversed the judgment. View "California v. Saldana" on Justia Law

Defendants Rodolfo Villa and Michael Almeda appealed their convictions of first degree murder. They both contended the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Villa’s jailhouse confession and by failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Villa also contended the court erred by admitting uncharged offense evidence. Almeda also contended the court erred by denying his motion for severance. Both defendants claimed cumulative error. Finding no reversible errors leading to cumulative error, the Court of Appeal affirmed both defendants’ convictions. View "California v. Almeda" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped for a traffic infraction. The vehicle was searched following the deputy’s decision to impound it. Methamphetamine was found in a hidden compartment. Defendant was charged with possession for sale and transportation of methamphetamine and driving with a suspended license, with four prior narcotics convictions. Deputy Dorsey testified that the deputy who had initiated the stop found four blue baggies of equal size filled with a white substance in a paper bag under the driver’s seat. She showed those baggies to Dorsey. After field testing for cocaine produced negative results, Dorsey concluded it was a cutting agent, then noticed that the radio console “looked loose,” and suspected a hidden compartment. Using his pocket knife, Dorsey removed the loose console and between the air conditioning ducts behind the stereo, found bags of a white crystalline substance that he recognized as methamphetamine. Dorsey was trained in recognizing how illegal drugs are packaged and transported and was accepted as an expert. The court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant pleaded no contest. The court of appeal affirmed. While removal of the console exceeded the scope of a permissible inventory search, the search was supported by probable cause, based on the discovery of the baggies, and was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. View "P.eople v. Zabala" on Justia Law

In an eminent domain matter, the condemning agency, Tri-City Healthcare District (Tri-City), made a pretrial deposit of $4.7 million and sought to take immediate possession of the subject property, a partially completed medical building. Medical Acquisition Company, Inc. (MAC) stipulated to Tri-City's possession of the building and withdrew the $4.7 million deposited under the "quick-take" provision of the California Constitution. The eminent domain matter was consolidated with another case involving a lease between the parties and ultimately proceeded to trial where a jury determined just compensation for the taking was nearly $17 million. The court subsequently ordered Tri- City to increase its deposit by about $12.2 million. Among other procedural maneuvers, Tri-City filed a notice of abandonment of the eminent domain proceeding. However, the superior court granted MAC's motion to set aside the abandonment. Tri-City appealed that order in addition to the judgment. MAC argued that after judgment, withdrawing a deposit made in an eminent domain action was governed solely by Code of Civil Procedure section 1268.140. Under that section, MAC contended the superior court could not impose any undertaking regarding the prompt release of a deposit to a single claimant after judgment has been entered. In addition, MAC argued the bonding requirement here frustrated the purpose of the quick-take provision of the California Constitution, and thus, should be declared unconstitutional. This was a matter of first impression for the Court of Appeal. After review, the Court concluded MAC was correct that any postjudgment withdrawal of a deposit in an eminent domain case was governed by section 1268.140. However, that provision allowed a court, in its discretion, to impose an undertaking upon objection by any party to the proceeding. The Court concluded MAC did not show how the trial court abused its discretion under section 1268.140. Additionally, the Court determined that MAC's contention that the bonding requirement was unconstitutional was without merit. As such, the Court of Appeal denied the requested relief. View "Medical Acquisition Company v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Clews Land and Livestock, LLC; Barbara Clews; and Christian Clews (collectively, CLL) appealed a judgment in favor of defendant City of San Diego (City) on CLL's petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, violation of procedural due process, and equitable estoppel. CLL challenged the City's approval of a project to build a private secondary school on land neighboring CLL's commercial horse ranch and equestrian facility and the City's adoption of a mitigated negative declaration (MND) regarding the project. CLL contended the City should not have adopted the MND because the Cal Coast Academy project would cause significant environmental impacts in the areas of fire hazards, traffic and transportation, noise, recreation, and historical resources, and because the MND identified new impacts and mitigation measures that were not included in the draft MND. CLL further argued the City should not have approved the project because it is situated in designated open space under the applicable community land use plan and because the City did not follow the provisions of the San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC) applicable to historical resources. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded CLL's challenge to the MND was barred because it did not exhaust its administrative remedies in proceedings before the City. In doing so, the Court rejected CLL's argument that the City's process for administrative appeals (at least as implicated by this project) violated the California Environmental Quality Act by improperly splitting the adoption of an environmental document (e.g., the MND) from the project approvals. In addition, the City complied with all applicable requirements of the SDMC regarding historical resources and the City's approval of the project did not conflict with the open space designation because the project would be located on already-developed land. View "Clews Land & Livestock, LLC v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to stalking his ex-wife (Penal Code section 646.9(a)). As part of a negotiated disposition, the District Attorney agreed to dismiss several misdemeanor charges involving a trespass on the Apple campus in Cupertino in exchange for defendant’s no contest plea. Defendant was granted probation for a period of five years. One of the conditions of probation is that defendant “stay away from the Apple campus.” The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the “stay away” order was unconstitutionally vague because it did not specify a distance. A probation condition ordering someone to stay away from a particular location need only express the obligation it imposes in ordinary and understandable terms. The Constitution does not require more. The law does not always succeed in expressing concepts in a clear and understandable way. But an order that someone “stay away” from an identified location is a simple command stated in plain language. View "People v. Holzmann" on Justia Law