Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In an action alleging age and disability discrimination, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on plaintiff's constructive termination claim and defendant's motion for a new trial on all damages. The court held that the evidence showed only plaintiff's personal, subjective reactions to defendant's use of standard disciplinary procedures, all performed with no breach of confidentiality and with no harassment or other mistreatment of plaintiff. The court reasoned that, although the evidence allowed the inference of age or disability discrimination, nothing reflected any unusually aggravated working conditions or a continuous pattern of mistreatment necessary for constructive discharge. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Simers v. LA Times Communications" on Justia Law

A surety posted a $50,000 bail bond for a misdemeanor defendant. Throughout the case, defendant’s attorney appeared on his behalf. The trial court granted defendant probation, continued several probation violation hearings, and eventually ordered defendant to personally appear. When defendant failed to appear, the court ordered the bond forfeited. On appeal, the surety argued that Penal Code section 977 did not allow attorneys to appear on behalf of misdemeanor defendants at probation violation hearings; therefore, the surety contends that the trial court should have declared a forfeiture at an earlier point in time. The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that under section 977, an attorney may appear on behalf of a misdemeanor defendant at a probation violation hearing. View "California v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Roland Seau of first-degree for the death of Louiegie Bermas; the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Randy Lozano; assault with a deadly weapon on Lozano with the personal use of a knife and personal infliction of great bodily injury; and dissuading a witness, Vanessa Rivera. The jury found that each crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. In a bifurcated proceeding, Seau admitted two prison priors, a strike prior, and a serious felony prior. He was sentenced to 102 years to life in prison. The same jury found David Tua guilty of aiding and abetting second-degree murder in the death of Bermas, and the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon on Lozano. He was also found guilty of dissuading a witness. The jury found that each crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. In a bifurcated proceeding, Tua admitted a strike prior, a serious felony prior, and a prison prior. The court sentenced Tua to 75 years to life in prison. Seau and Tua contended the denial of their motions to sever the trials resulted in grossly unfair trials and a denial of due process. They argued on appeal the trial court erred by not bifurcating the gang element from the substantive offenses and denying their motions for mistrial after law enforcement witnesses repeatedly vouched for the credibility of a witness. In an issue of first impression, they also contended the court erroneously imposed a consecutive five-year prior serious felony enhancement as to the determinate sentence for assault with a deadly weapon, a count where sentencing was otherwise stayed. Separately, Tua argued there was no substantial evidence to support his conviction for second degree murder, attempted murder and assault. Seau argued the pinpoint references to his name in jury instructions were prejudicial to him. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that a prior serious felony enhancement imposed on a determinate sentence must follow the mode of sentencing imposed on at least one of the determinate counts. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded this case the trial court for resentencing. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Tua" on Justia Law

School administrator Cushman received a text message indicating that a student had a loaded gun at school. The tipster had received a SnapChat video showing a student, in a classroom, displaying a gun and a magazine clip. Cushman saw the video and identified the student as K.J., based on the tipster's description. The principal removed K.J. from class and escorted him to the hallway where a school resource officer and a backup police officer were waiting. A search of K.J. revealed a semi-automatic handgun and rounds of ammunition. Cushman knew but declined to reveal the tipster's identity due to her fear of retaliation. The parties stipulated that she would be treated as an anonymous tipster. Following a combined motion to suppress and jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging K.J. possessed a weapon on school grounds. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting K.J.’s argument that he was detained and searched without reasonable suspicion. Substantial evidence supported findings that the actions of the school officer, detaining K.J. on school property, were neither arbitrary, capricious, nor harassment. In balancing the grave threat to students and staff posed by a student carrying a firearm against the minimally intrusive nature of removing a student from class, the detention was lawful. View "In re K.J." on Justia Law

In 2014 a complaint charged Lee C. (L.C.) with corporal injury to a cohabitant. The trial court found L.C. incompetent to stand trial and committed him to a state hospital. After the state hospital reported he was unlikely to be restored to competency in the foreseeable future, his counsel requested a preliminary hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1368.1. The court then referred L.C. to the Shasta County Public Guardian (Public Guardian) to initiate proceedings for a Murphy conservatorship. The Public Guardian objected to the referral on the basis that two criteria for a Murphy conservatorship were not met, and also protested that there was no funding to pay for the conservatorship. The trial court ordered the Public Guardian to petition for a Murphy conservatorship. The Public Guardian, represented by (Shasta) county counsel, filed the petition but continued to resist proceeding with the case. The Public Guardian sought to dismiss the petition and vacate the court’s order to proceed to a conservatorship trial. On the State's invitation, the court disqualified county counsel and appointed the Shasta County District Attorney to prosecute the petition for a Murphy conservatorship. The Public Guardian appealed the disqualification order, claiming it was an unlawful means to control and limit his discretion with respect to Murphy conservatorships. The Public Guardian also argued: (1) the criminal trial court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with conservatorship proceedings assigned to another court; (2) there was no misconduct to discipline with a disqualification order; (3) the order violated the separation of powers doctrine; and (4) the district attorney lacked standing. The Court of Appeal found, after review, that the disqualification order was premised on the court’s orders to file the petition for the Murphy conservatorship and take the matter to trial. The court had no authority to make those orders. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal vacated the order disqualifying county counsel for its failure to follow the invalid orders. The trial court did, however, have authority to review the Public Guardian’s decision not to file the petition for an abuse of discretion. As to that issue, the Court of Appeal agreed the Public Guardian abused his discretion in determining that two criteria for a Murphy conservatorship could not be satisfied, because that determination was based on an incorrect interpretation of the law. However, because the trial court could not compel the filing of a Murphy conservatorship petition, the Court of Appeal vacated the orders to file the petition and take the case to trial. View "Conservatorship of Lee C." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with misdemeanor criminal contempt for allegedly violating a permanent anti-gang injunction. Defendant argued that he was not an active gang member covered by the injunction and that enforcement of the injunction against him violated his right to procedural due process. The trial court determined that the injunction burdened defendant's constitutionally-protected liberty interests, whereby defendant was entitled to some adequate predeprivation process to determine whether he was an active gang member covered by the injunction. Because no predeprivation process was available to defendant to challenge the determination that he was covered by the injunction, the trial court held that enforcement of the injunction against him violated his right to procedural due process. The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the misdemeanor criminal contempt charge predicated on the application of the injunction to defendant. View "People v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were five eyewitness identifications of a shooter at a party for the California State University Sacramento golf team. Tino Perez challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that supported a jury finding that he specifically intended to benefit the Norteno street gang. While the shooter was a gang member, there was no evidence the party was in gang territory, there were no rival gangs present or involved, there were no gang epithets or gang attire, and there was no evidence the shooting was in retaliation or for revenge. On appeal, defendant challenged the imposition of the gang enhancement on a number of grounds. He also objected to the admission of text messages exchanged between one of the victims and defendant’s girlfriend, the prosecutor’s closing argument, and the finding the four attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The Court of Appeal found the evidence insufficient to support the gang enhancement, and the life terms for willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder was unauthorized. Therefore the Court struck the gang enhancement and the four life terms and remanded for resentencing on counts one through four, but in all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Perez" on Justia Law

Defendant Jesus Lucero failed to appear during most of his trial in this case. The trial court nevertheless proceeded with the trial in his absence, and a jury found him guilty. Defendant’s appointed counsel, John Dorr, filed a motion for new trial, arguing that there had been good cause for defendant’s absence from trial. Dorr conceded, however, that the motion was untimely, and the trial court denied it as untimely, without even reading it. In a previous appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion was not untimely, and that Dorr rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by conceding that it was. On remand, the trial court duly held a hearing on the new trial motion; once again, Dorr represented defendant, and once again, defendant failed to appear. The trial court found that defendant was voluntarily absent; it then proceeded to deny the motion. Defendant appealed. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that, while Dorr’s previous ineffective assistance afforded sufficient grounds to relieve him and to appoint new counsel on remand, the trial court was not required to do so unless and until defendant asked it to. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court held the trial court’s finding that defendant’s absence from the new trial hearing was knowing and voluntary was supported by substantial evidence. View "California v. Lucero" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant-appellant, Thomas Tennard, Jr., of a nonstrike felony: inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon his cohabitant girlfriend, M.L. The court found defendant had four prison priors and two prior strikes, including a 1991 conviction for forcible rape, a “super strike.” Pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 ("Prop. 36," (Nov. 6, 2012)), defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison for his domestic violence conviction, even though it was neither a serious nor a violent felony. Because his prior forcible rape conviction was a “super strike,” defendant was disqualified from being sentenced to a lesser term of “twice the term otherwise provided” for a domestic violence conviction. Defendant was sentenced to a consecutive one-year term for one of his four prison priors. In this appeal, defendant claimed the court had no authority to impose the 25-year-to-life term, arguing the prosecution erroneously failed to specifically “plead and prove” that his prior forcible rape conviction was a super strike which disqualified him or rendered him ineligible to be sentenced as a second strike offender to twice the term otherwise provided for his current felony conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 667(e)(1). Defendant argued the court was only authorized to sentence him to a maximum of eight years on his current conviction. In addition to his statutory claim, defendant claimed he was deprived of his due process right to notice that the prosecution would seek an indeterminate term on his current conviction. After review, the Court of Appeal remanded this matter with directions to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that defendant’s presentence custody credits were awarded pursuant to section 4019, not section 2933.1. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the sentence. View "California v. Tennard" on Justia Law

Deputy Tanaka responded to a dispatch telling him that a bus driver had spotted the suspect in “a 288 case” (lewd act on a child) on a San Jose bus. Tanaka was aware of the case, having seen a news video of the suspect. Tanaka boarded the bus; the driver stated that he had seen a “picture” on a police-issued “Be on the Lookout” (BOLO) flier that “matched” a passenger. The BOLO concerned a child sexual assault two days earlier and described the suspect as “WMA, Age: 30, 5’10”, 155 lbs, dark or brown shaggy hair w/beard, tan complexion” and contained three color photographs. Tanaka had never seen the flier. The driver pointed out defendant, who was asleep on a seat. Tanaka awakened defendant, identified himself, handcuffed defendant, and removed him. Defendant identified himself. Tanaka learned that defendant was on parole. Other deputies observed that, “[j]ust by the descriptors alone, [defendant] did match.” Defendant was subjected to a parole search, which turned up narcotics. About 10-15 minutes later, deputies received clear photos and determined that defendant was not the person depicted on the flier. Defendant was charged with possession of heroin The court granted defendant’s suppression motion and dismissed. The court of appeal reversed. The information provided by the driver was sufficient to reasonably justify a brief stop to determine if defendant was the suspect in the “288 case.” View "People v. Stanley" on Justia Law