Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant lived in a San Jose mobile home park. On September 3, 2013, the manager noticed a strong gasoline odor at her office, emitting from a metal drop box accessible to the outside through a wall slot. Liquid spilled onto the floor as she opened the box, which contained envelopes, each containing an open miniature liquor bottle, a partially burned rolled-up envelope, and matches. The manager used a towel to absorb the liquid, which she described as gasoline. She contacted the police after reviewing surveillance videos, which showed defendant approaching the box five times in various dress and placing objects in the slot, including flaming paper, then running away. A responding officer noticed an overwhelming smell of gasoline in the office. An arson investigator smelled gasoline there two days later and testified that the fire had insufficient air in the drop box. Defendant had many conflicts with management. He had complained to the district attorney and felt the office had not taken him seriously. Changing his story from his initial interview, defendant testified he decided to stage a crime to prove he was being treated unfairly but did not intend to cause harm. The court of appeal affirmed his conviction, rejecting defendant’s argument that the standard jury instruction, CALCRIM 1520, was constitutionally deficient as ambiguous and for failing to instruct on specific intent. The instruction accurately tracks Penal Code 455 and includes all elements of the offense. View "People v. Rubino" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Timothy Race pled no contest to attempted lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14, the lesser included offense of the count 2 charge. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years’ imprisonment. The court limited defendant’s conduct credit award to 15 percent pursuant to Penal Code section 2933.1. The court additionally issued a 10-year criminal protective order pursuant to section 136.2(i)(1) as to both defendant’s daughter and niece. On appeal, defendant contended the court erred in issuing a criminal protective order as to his daughter, the victim described in count 1 of the information, because he did not plead to any offense with respect to her. Thus, defendant argued his daughter was not a “victim” for purposes of issuing a criminal protective order. Defendant additionally argued the court erred in limiting his award of conduct credits to 15 percent pursuant to section 2933.1. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a proper custody calculation and correction of certain minute orders. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Race" on Justia Law

Defendant Dinh Van Nguyen had a prior first degree burglary conviction which qualified as: (1) a “strike” prior; (2) a one-year prior prison term enhancement; and (3) a five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement. The information in this case contained one paragraph alleging the fact of the prior and citing the statute that defined a strike. It also contained a second paragraph realleging the fact of the prior and citing the statute that defines a prior prison term enhancement. However, it never specifically alleged a prior serious felony conviction enhancement. Defendant admitted the fact of the prior; he did not expressly admit its legal effect. Then, at sentencing, the trial court used the prior as a strike and as a prior serious felony conviction enhancement, and defense counsel did not object. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by imposing the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. View "California v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

In 2013, the juvenile court declared defendant-appellant, R.G. (Minor, born in April 2000), a dependent of the court. In 2016, while Minor remained a dependent of the juvenile court, the State filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging Minor had committed misdemeanor battery. After denying Minor’s request to refer the matter for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.12 assessment and report, Minor admitted the allegation that she had committed misdemeanor battery. The court declared Minor a ward of the court, placed her on formal probation, placed her in the custody of Children and Family Services (CFS), and scheduled the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 241.1. After subsequently receiving a section 241.1 report, the court again declared Minor a ward of the court with “CFS lead jurisdiction.” On appeal, Minor contended the juvenile court prejudicially erred by refusing to refer the matter for a section 241.1 assessment, report, and hearing prior to taking jurisdiction, resulting in violations of Minor’s statutory and due process rights. Moreover, Minor argued the subsequent section 241.1 report and hearing were statutorily inadequate. CFS countered Minor forfeited any contention the section 241.1 report was untimely or inadequate and that any error was harmless. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the court erred by refusing to refer the matter for a section 241.1 report prior to making a determination of Minor’s status and holding the jurisdictional hearing. Furthermore, the subsequent section 241.1 report was inadequate to overcome the court’s initial error, and this error was not harmless. View "In re R.G." on Justia Law

Optional filed suit against DAS and its counsel, Akin and Parker, for conversion and fraudulent transfer. Akin and Parker filed special anti-SLAPP motions to strike all claims asserted against them. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' motions, holding that Optional v. DAS Corp. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1388, was not the "law of the case" for purposes of this appeal; defendants made a prima facie showing that plaintiff's claims arose from defendants' constitutionally protected petition rights where the gravamen of plaintiff's claims was protected activity, namely defendants' representation of DAS in litigation; and plaintiff did not show a probability of prevailing on its claims where the litigation privilege defeated plaintiff's claims. View "Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP" on Justia Law

An information charged defendant Marco Sandoval with inflicting corporal injury on a spouse resulting in a traumatic condition (count 1) and making a criminal threat (count 2); defendant had suffered two prison and two strike priors. The charges arose out of a 2016 incident in which defendant punched his wife, A.H., choked her to the point of unconsciousness, and threatened to kill her if she left him. He pleaded no contest to count 1 and admitted one prison prior. The plea included a stipulated five-year upper term, suspended; three-years felony probation; and a dismissal of count 2 and all additional allegations in the information. At sentencing, over the objections of defendant and A.H., the court reissued a criminal protective order (CPO) using Judicial Council form CR-160 preventing defendant from initiating any contact whatsoever with A.H. for three years. Defendant's sole contention on appeal was that the court erred in refusing to terminate the CPO or otherwise modify it to allow some contact between him and A.H. Respondent the State agreed with defendant and requested that this case be remanded to allow the trial court to consider a more narrowly tailored protective order. The Court of Appeal affirmed the CPO with a minor modification: to allow A.H. to initiate contact, if any, with defendant that was acceptable and welcomed by her. View "California v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit asserting its right to an administrative hearing to determine whether its chemicals constitute hazardous waste. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the divisions' anti-SLAPP motion to strike the petition and complaint. The court held that the division made a prima facie showing that plaintiff's cause of action arose from an act in furtherance of its right of free speech in connection with a public issue. In this case, plaintiff claimed that the division's decision and notice that Petromax was hazardous waste, by themselves, were causing plaintiff harm even without an enforcement action. The court also held that plaintiff failed to carry its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on its claim. View "Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. County of Ventura Environmental Health Division" on Justia Law

The same standard applies to an individual defendant's request for attorney fees under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) as applies to an employer defendant, and thus a fee award is only available in the discretion of a trial court when the court finds that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous. In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for attorney fees because plaintiff's FEHA claim was not frivolous. The court noted that individual employee defendants who prevailed on a FEHA harassment suit were not left without a means of recovering attorney fees and costs they may have incurred to defend themselves. The court also denied defendant's request for judicial notice. View "Lopez v. Routt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the City violated certain ordinances and selectively applied others in issuing the permit for a fence separating two neighbors while denying plaintiffs' permit for a deck they had built. The City filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute), because plaintiffs' complaint targeted "protected speech" where the City's decisions followed official government proceedings. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the special motion, holding that section 425.16 does not protect a governmental entity's decisions to issue or deny permits. The court agreed with the trial court that granting a special motion to strike in these circumstances would chill citizens' attempts to challenge government action. View "Shahbazian v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

Janice Dickinson filed suit against William H. Cosby, Jr. and his attorney, Martin Singer, for defamation and related causes of action after Singer issued a letter demanding media outlets not to repeat Dickinson's allegedly false accusations of rape against Cosby, and a press release characterizing Dickinson's rape accusations as a lie. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in striking Dickinson's first amended complaint, as it pertained only to a party, Singer, who had not filed an anti-SLAPP motion; the trial court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motion with respect to the demand letter; and the court correctly denied the anti-SLAPP motion with respect to the press release. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Dickinson v. Cosby" on Justia Law