Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dr. Leah Levi, a neuro-ophthalmologist, appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the Regents of the University of California (Regents), and Dr. Robert Weinreb, the chair of the department of ophthalmology at the University of California, San Diego (University). Levi asserted various causes of action against the Regents and Weinreb related to discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and due process violations. The retaliation claims alleged protected conduct under both California's Whistleblower Protection Act, and Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Levi contended the trial court granted summary judgment based on its mistaken application of the law. The Court of Appeal concluded Levi raised triable issues of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment on: whether she made a protected disclosure of improper governmental activity or a condition threatening the health and safety of the public to support her CWPA retaliation claim and whether the Regents and Weinreb denied her due process by failing to issue reports on grievances she had filed, failing to provide her notice before reducing her salary and appointment, and failing to provide her an opportunity to cure deficiencies and return to good standing. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment and directed the court to grant Weinreb and the Regents' alternative motion for summary adjudication on Levi's remaining causes of action for retaliation under the FEHA, gender discrimination, gender harassment, failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and Tom Bane Civil Rights Act violations. View "Levi v. Regents of the University of Calif." on Justia Law

Julio Martinez III, was convicted of possessing and transporting a controlled substance. In addition to three years of supervised probation, the trial court ordered Martinez to pay two mandatory fees: a $50 crime-lab fee and a $150 drug program fee. The court concluded both these “fees” were actually “fines” subject to additional assessments, penalties, and a surcharge (collectively referred to as penalty assessments). On appeal, Martinez contended statutory fees were not penal in nature and, therefore, not subject to penalty assessments. The Court of Appeal found a split of authority in the appellate courts on this issue. Almost all California appellate districts, except this court, have weighed in on the topic (albeit in unpublished opinions). As noted by one appellate court, "the conflict will likely require resolution by our Supreme Court." In the meantime, the Court agreed n the meantime, the case was remanded for recalculation of the criminal laboratory analysis and drug program fees on each count without the addition of penalty assessments. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Michael Brooks was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition; possession of controlled substance paraphernalia; and possession of a controlled substance. As to the first count, the information alleged that Brooks was prohibited from possessing a firearm as a result of a number of prior convictions. After a preliminary hearing, Brooks entered into a plea agreement in which he pled no contest to count 1 and admitted one prison prior. The remaining counts and allegations were dismissed. Brooks agreed to a sentence of three years for the conviction plus one year for the prison prior, with the sentence to be suspended and Brooks to be placed on formal probation for three years. The terms of probation included serving one year in local custody and a "Fourth Amendment waiver." The court's sentencing order set forth 29 terms of probation that were recommended in the probation officer's report. Brooks challenged three of those probation terms on appeal: (1) the term requiring him to "participate in a counseling/educational program as directed by the probation officer" he argued improperly delegated judicial decision-making power to the probation officer and is unconstitutionally vague; (2) the term requiring him to "follow all standard terms of probation" fails to provide the notice required by due process and is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the term requiring him to pay a drug testing fee under a county ordinance and Section 1203.1ab because Section 1203.1ab did not apply to his conviction of unlawful possession of ammunition. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with Brooks's contentions and reversed. View "California v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Guadalupe Ramirez petitioned for mandamus relief, asking the Court of Appeal to direct the superior court to vacate its order extraditing him to Arizona. Ramirez contended he was mentally incompetent and the court's order extraditing him violated his due process rights. Ramirez sought placement in an appropriate mental health facility, as described by California's criminal competency statutes, until he could be restored to competency. In 2006, Ramirez pleaded guilty in Arizona state court to three felony sex offenses involving minors. The Arizona court sentenced him to 10 years in prison, to be followed by lifetime probation. Following his release from prison, Ramirez applied to transfer his probation to California under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS). As part of his application, Ramirez waived extradition and agreed to return to Arizona if directed. After several months, during which Ramirez apparently lived in California, the Arizona court received information that Ramirez had violated the terms of his probation. Finding probable cause to believe Ramirez had violated the terms of his probation, Arizona issued a warrant for his arrest. The court appointed counsel, and Ramirez denied the allegations, with defense counsel expressing doubt about Ramirez's mental competency. Two mental health evaluators had seen Ramirez and submitted reports; both diagnosed Ramirez with schizophrenia. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that Ramirez was not competent, either under California's criminal competency statutes or in the specific context of extradition proceedings involving identity. But the court found that Ramirez's competence was "irrelevant" given the "overwhelming" evidence of identity. The court believed there would be nothing Ramirez could do, even if he were competent, to rebut the evidence of identity. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the superior court's extradition order had to be vacated, but for different reasons than those initially asserted by Ramirez. Finding that the trial court proceedings did not comply with ICAOS rules governing probable cause hearings, the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred by ordering Ramirez's extradition. View "Ramirez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Daylo Trujillo pleaded guilty to attempted robbery and assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury, for which he was sentenced to one year in county jail and three years' formal probation. Trujillo’s appeal of the conviction and sentence centered on an electronics-search probation condition imposed in both cases. He argued the condition was unreasonable under California Supreme Court standards and was constitutionally overbroad. The Court of Appeal found the infringement on Trujillo's privacy rights was outweighed by the state's strong need to closely monitor Trujillo's conduct and protect public safety, and there were no facts showing Trujillo's electronics contain the type of private information meriting heightened protection or that a search of these devices would be more intrusive than a warrantless search of his home, to which Trujillo has not objected. Furthermore, the Court determined the record did not support that the electronics-search condition was unnecessarily broad or would result in an unjustified invasion of Trujillo's privacy rights. View "California v. Trujillo" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the jury's verdict in favor of two officers in an action alleging that the Police Department discriminated against the officers. The court held that, while the evidence that the officers produced at trial might have been sufficient to support the theory of discrimination that they presented, that theory was legally flawed. In this case, the officers' theory was that the jury could and should consider whether the officers were treated differently, not simply because of their race, but because of the race of their victim. The court reasoned that this theory did not support the discrimination claim the officers brought. In deciding whether to return the officers to the field, the City could assess the political implications of doing so without violating employment discrimination laws. The City was not prohibited from assessing the risk management implications of returning officers of any race to the streets of Los Angeles who had been involved in a fatal shooting of an innocent, unarmed and autistic African-American man. Furthermore, the officers did not provide sufficient evidence to support their claim that the City retaliated against them for filing this action. The court remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the City. View "Diego v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

After the trial court denied a motion to suppress evidence, Megan Sandee pled guilty to possession for sale of a controlled substance and unauthorized possession of a controlled substance. The trial court granted felony probation to the court for a period of three years. Sandee appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of her cell phone. According to Sandee, although she was on probation at the time of the search and subject to a general search condition which allowed authorities to search her "property" and "personal effects" without a warrant, the scope of that search condition did not extend to a warrantless search of her cell phone. The Court of Appeal concluded the motion to suppress was properly denied, as a reasonable, objective person at the time of the search would understand a search of Sandee's cell phone to fall within the scope of the search conditions in her probation orders. View "California v. Sandee" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jason Leonard of robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, hit and run with injury, exhibiting a deadly weapon other than a firearm, vandalism, reckless driving while evading a peace officer, and two counts of possession of a leaded cane or baton. The trial court sentenced Leonard to six years eight months in prison. Leonard appealed, arguing: (1) the court erred by excluding impeachment evidence against a prosecution witness; and (2) the evidence did not support his conviction for reckless driving while evading a peace officer because he was not "assigned a traffic violation point" based on his conduct, within the meaning of section Penal Code 2800.2 (a). In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly excluded the proffered impeachment evidence under Evidence Code section 352. In the published portion, the Court concluded the statute defining reckless driving while evading a peace officer did not require evidence that Leonard was personally assessed traffic violation points. View "California v. Leonard" on Justia Law

The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations with respect to trained service dogs, but not to service-dogs-in-training. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action alleging violation of the Unruh Act, violation of the Disabled Persons Act, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff claimed that Fortune, the owner and operator of a chain of Seafood City markets, illegally denied him service when he tried to enter two different stores with his service dog. The court held that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Unruh Act claim because plaintiff did not offer any evidence, let alone substantial evidence, that his dog was a fully trained service animal at the time. The court also held that "persons authorized to train service dogs" under the DPA means any person who is credentialed to do so by virtue of their education or experience, and plaintiff failed to make this showing. Finally, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the emotional distress claims because there was no evidence that defendants intended to cause plaintiff any emotional distress. View "Miller v. Fortune Commercial Corp." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Alan Hunter and James Paschall of first degree murder under the provocative acts doctrine for the slaying of their accomplice in a botched robbery at a jewelry store. The jury also convicted defendants of attempted second degree robbery and, in a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found each had a prior serious or violent felony conviction. The trial court sentenced Hunter and Paschall each to a term of 30-years-to-life in prison, consisting of 25 years to life for the murder count and a five year enhancement for their respective prior convictions. The court stayed sentencing on the attempted robbery count under Penal Code section 654. On appeal, defendants argued the trial court erred in upholding a codefendant attorney’s claim of work-product privilege in declining to turn over a report of an interview the codefendant’s attorney and the attorney’s investigator had conducted with a jewelry store victim. The codefendant had pleaded guilty to reduced charges by the time defendants requested the interview midtrial or, alternatively, requested to call the codefendant’s attorney to testify about the interview. Defendants argued the interview was relevant to the provocative acts doctrine because it pertained to why the victim shot at the unarmed accomplice (Desmond Brown) whose death formed the basis of the murder charge against defendants. California's Penal Code does not provide for discovery among codefendants; each party is responsible for his own investigation and trial presentation. Exceptions exist to ensure the defendant’s right to a fair trial, but the Court of Appeal determined none applied here, particularly where defendants’ chief claim of the value of the codefendant’s interview turned out to be inaccurate, and where neither defendant suggested he could not secure an interview with the shopkeepers. In these circumstances, there was no infringement of defendants’ right to a fair trial. Defendants also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support their murder conviction under the provocative acts doctrine, but the Court of Appeal determined there was no merit in that claim and therefore affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Hunter" on Justia Law