Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fairfield police officers found a baton in defendant’s vehicle after defendant was stopped for a traffic violation and then arrested at the scene as a suspect in a domestic violence incident. Defendant was charged with possession of a baton or similar weapon, Penal Code section 22210. The trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence relating to the baton on the ground that it was obtained during an inventory search of his vehicle. The court of appeal reversed, noting that the state did not defend the search as a valid inventory search or otherwise contend it was constitutionally permissible but claimed that the police inevitably would have discovered the baton in the course of impounding the vehicle and taking an inventory of its contents. The court concluded there was no substantial evidence either that the evidence was obtained as the result of a valid inventory search, since the officers did not follow procedures or that the baton inevitably would have been discovered. View "People v. Wallace" on Justia Law

In 2013, Taleia Harris pled guilty to felony grand theft from a person for stealing a wallet from the victim's person. A year later, California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). Harris successfully petitioned to have her felony conviction reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, but the court denied her motion to expunge the DNA sample that law enforcement took by mouth swab when she was booked on her felony charge. Harris appealed that order, contending that when a felony is reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, the state is not permitted to retain an adult misdemeanant's previously collected DNA sample and genetic profile, and that the state's retention of her DNA sample and genetic profile violated her state and federal constitutional right to equal protection of the laws and right of privacy. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Erika Grotheer was a non-English speaking German citizen who took a hot air balloon ride in the Temecula wine country and suffered a fractured leg when the basket carrying her and seven or eight others crash landed into a fence. Grotheer sued three defendants for her injuries: the balloon tour company, Escape Adventures, Inc. (Escape), the pilot and Escape’s agent, Peter Gallagher (Gallagher), and Wilson Creek Vineyards, Inc. (Wilson Creek). The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Grotheer could not satisfy the elements of a negligence claim and, even if she could, she had waived the right to assert such a claim by signing Escape’s liability waiver before the flight. The trial court agreed Grotheer could not establish the element of duty, finding Grotheer had assumed the risk of her injury under the primary assumption of risk doctrine and, as a result, Escape and Gallagher owed her no duty of care whatsoever. The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, and Grotheer appealed. Grotheer argued the trial court erred in concluding her claim was barred by primary assumption of risk and reasserted on appeal that Escape was a common carrier. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, but on a different ground than relied on by the trial court: (1) a balloon tour company like Escape was not a common carrier subject to a heightened duty of care; (2) the primary assumption of risk doctrine bars Grotheer’s claim that Gallagher negligently failed to slow the balloon’s descent to avoid a crash landing; and (3) Escape does have a duty to provide safe landing instructions to its passengers, but the undisputed evidence regarding the crash demonstrates that any failure on Escape’s part to provide such instructions was not the cause of Grotheer’s injury. View "Grotheer v. Escape Adventures" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order setting aside a planned development permit (PDP) issued by the City. The court held that issues regarding the legal status of the individual lots under the Subdivision Map Act were not ripe for judicial review. In this case, the approval of the PDP in Phase 1 of the Project involved only the development of an infrastructure for the land involved, and the SMA was not implicated in Phase 1. View "Save Laurel Way v. City of Redwood City" on Justia Law

In Romano v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479, the court held that under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code section 12900 et seq., a party alleging that a discriminatory act led to the termination of his or her employment has until one year from the date the employment terminated to file an administrative claim. In light of Romano, the Court of Appeal held that the one year limitations period for plaintiff to file a timely Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) complaint began to run from the last day of his employment. Because he filed his DFEH complaint within that period, his claim was timely. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal of the third amended complaint. View "Aviles-Rodriguez v. Los Angeles Community College District" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Drew sexually assaulted Amber Oceja while she was in a diabetic coma, and within two hours of the assault, Oceja died from diabetic ketoacidosis. The experts all agreed that since Oceja was already unconscious when the sex crimes occurred, they did not materially contribute to her death. However, appellant did not just sexually assault Oceja while she was unconscious, he failed to seek medical assistance for her knowing she was in dire physical condition. The Court of Appeal held there was a sufficient causal relationship between that fatal omission and appellant’s sex crimes to support his conviction for first degree felony murder. The Court also upheld the jury’s true finding on the felony murder special circumstance allegations: appellant contended that finding had to be reversed for lack of evidence he killed Oceja to advance his sex crimes. The Court held such evidence was not required to warrant a true finding on that allegation. View "California v. Drew" on Justia Law

The trial court permitted the State to display to the jury an approximately twenty-foot long "timeline" of the alleged molestations that a therapist created with P.C. in preparation for a prior proceeding in this case. The timeline contained detailed statements describing the alleged abuse written by the therapist at P.C.'s direction, together with dates and photographs of P.C. at various ages. The court also permitted the prosecutor to directly question P.C. at trial about statements contained on the timeline. Defendant Michael Vasquez contended the trial court erred in permitting the jury to view the timeline and erred in admitting the related testimony. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court committed clear error in permitting the jury to view the timeline and allowing P.C. to read statements from the timeline into evidence. The timeline did not constitute demonstrative evidence that could properly be displayed to the jury in order to assist the jury in its understanding of P.C.'s testimony. Rather, the timeline contained inadmissible out-of-court statements that were improperly offered for their truth and to bolster P.C.'s credibility. View "California v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

Michael Brooks was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition (count 1); possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (count 2); and possession of a controlled substance (count 3). As to count one, the information alleged that Brooks was prohibited from possessing a firearm as a result of a number of prior convictions. After a preliminary hearing, Brooks entered into a plea agreement in which he pled no contest to count 1 and admitted one prison prior. The remaining counts and allegations were dismissed. Brooks agreed to a sentence of three years for the conviction plus one year for the prison prior, with the sentence to be suspended and Brooks to be placed on formal probation for three years. The terms of probation included serving one year in local custody and a "Fourth Amendment waiver." The court's sentencing order set forth twenty-nine terms of probation that were recommended in the probation officer's report. Brooks challenged three of those probation terms on appeal: (1) the term requiring him to "participate in a counseling/educational program as directed by the probation officer" improperly delegates judicial decision-making power to the probation officer and is unconstitutionally vague; (2) the term requiring him to "follow all standard terms of probation" fails to provide the notice required by due process and was unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the court erred in imposing the term requiring him to pay a drug testing fee under a county ordinance and Section 1203.1ab because Section 1203.1ab did not apply to his conviction of unlawful possession of ammunition. The Court of Appeal agreed with Brooks' contentions. View "California v. Brooks" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Alexander Ledesma of rape and kidnapping to commit rape. The jury found true allegations attached to count 1 under California's One Strike Law that Ledesma's kidnapping of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to her, and that Ledesma kidnapped the victim. The jury also found true the allegation under Penal Code section 667.8(a) that Ledesma kidnapped the victim to commit a sexual offense. The jury found not true additional allegations that Ledesma personally used a firearm to commit both counts 1 and 2. After the jury rendered its verdict, the court sentenced Ledesma to 25 years to life on count 1 under the One Strike Law. Under Penal Code section 654, the court stayed the sentences on count 2 and on the remaining allegations related to count 1. On appeal, Ledesma argued his conviction had to be reversed because both the crime of aggravated kidnapping and the One Strike Law sentence enhancement for aggravated kidnapping were unconstitutionally vague. Ledesma also asserts, and the Attorney General concedes, that the abstract of judgment should be modified to remove an inaccurate reference to a true finding of personal use of a firearm. The Court of Appeal rejected Ledesma's constitutional vagueness challenges and affirmed the judgment as modified to accurately reflect the sentence imposed by the trial court. View "California v. Ledesma" on Justia Law

D.H. was removed from, and failed to reunify with, his paternal grandparents, who had been caring for him under a probate guardianship. The entire case, from the petition, to removal, to termination of services, focused on the grandparents, not the child’s father. In this dependency appeal, D.H., Sr. (father), the presumed father of D.H., argues on appeal of that decision, the juvenile court violated due process by terminating his parental rights without making an unfitness or detriment finding against him by clear and convincing evidence at any point in the proceedings. Respondent Riverside Department of Social Services (DPSS) urged the Court of Appeal to adopt, in the dependency context, the best interest of the child standard for terminating parental rights under Probate Code section 1516.5. The Court declined: Probate Code section 1516.5 applied when a legal guardian seeks to have the child declared free from the custody and control of one or both parents and was designed to “mak[e] it easier for children in probate guardianships to be adopted by their guardians.” That provision did not apply in a case like this, where the only reason the court was considering terminating parental rights was because the state brought a successful dependency action against the guardians. “Father’s entitlement to the constitutional safeguards articulated in Gladys L. does not vanish simply because D.H. was under a legal guardianship at the outset of the dependency.” View "In re D.H." on Justia Law