Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Bobby Carothers, then-serving a prison term of 25 years to life imposed in 2008 under the three strikes law, appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. He argued the trial court erred in finding he was not eligible for resentencing because he was convicted of murder in Texas in 1978. Under the Act, a prior conviction for a number of enumerated offenses, including “[a]ny homicide offense, including any attempted homicide offense, defined in Sections 187 to 191.5” of the Penal Code, rendered an inmate ineligible for resentencing. Defendant’s argued: (1) only California convictions could render an inmate ineligible for resentencing under the Act; and (2) even if a prior out-of-state conviction could render an inmate ineligible for resentencing, the record of defendant’s Texas murder conviction did not necessarily show he committed a murder as that crime was defined under California law. The Court of Appeals concluded a prior out-of-state conviction would render an inmate ineligible for resentencing under the Act if the crime committed in the other state would have disqualified the inmate had that crime been committed in California. However, because the crime defendant was convicted of committing in Texas might not have been a murder in California, an enumerated disqualifying offense, the trial court incorrectly concluded he was ineligible for resentencing. The Court reversed for a determination as to whether or not resentencing him would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. View "California v. Carothers" on Justia Law

The Pitchess statutes, which require a criminal defendant to file a written motion that establishes good cause for the discovery sought, does not violate constitutional due process. In this case, the LASD created a so-called "Brady" list of deputies whose personnel files contain sustained allegations of misconduct allegedly involving moral turpitude or other bad acts relevant to impeachment. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that injunctive relief was proper in this case, but disagreed with its analysis of the constitutional question presented and thus with the limited scope of the injunction ordered. The court granted in part the petition for writ of mandate and modified the preliminary injunction. The trial court must strike from the injunction any language that allows real parties or any of them to disclose the identity of any individual deputy on the LASD's Brady list to any individual or entity outside the LASD, even if the deputy is a witness in a pending criminal prosecution, absent a properly filed, heard, and granted Pitchess motion, accompanied by a corresponding court order. The trial court must also strike any language that purports to address real parties' power or authority with respect to a Brady list involving non-sworn employees. View "Association for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After Turner refused to comply with an officer’s request that Turner leave a restaurant, he was arrested for interfering with a business establishment under Penal Code section 602.1(a). During an inventory search, a revolver, ammunition, and methamphetamine were found in Turner’s duffel bag. After considering the parties’ argument on whether there was probable cause to arrest Turner for various forms of trespass, a magistrate denied a motion to suppress without giving its reasons for doing so. A jury convicted him of various crimes and the trial court placed him on probation for three years. The court of appeal affirmed. The court properly denied the motion to suppress because the contraband was discovered in an inventory search after an arrest supported by probable cause and properly admitted evidence of Turner’s prior possession of the same type of ammunition because it impeached his specific testimony suggesting that the police planted the contraband in this case. View "People v. Turner" on Justia Law

This case is about the validity of a regulation governing a circumstance the Board of Parole Hearings (the board) can consider when determining whether a person convicted of a crime punishable with an indeterminate life sentence is unsuitable for parole: California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2402(c)(6). In challenging the validity of the regulation, petitioner contended: (1) the regulation lacked clarity because it did not define “serious misconduct,” and thus failed to inform prisoners they may be denied parole for committing minor or administrative infractions; and (2) he should have been permitted to amend his petition for a writ of mandate to include a claim that the regulation was unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of petitioner’s writ petition on grounds that he failed to state a claim for relief because the regulation at issue does not lack clarity. Furthermore, petitioner did not state sufficient facts to support a claim that the regulation was constitutionally vague. View "Menefield v. Bd. Of Parole Hearings" on Justia Law

There is no equal protection violation for the procedural difference between when a supervising agency files a petition to modify, revoke, or terminate a criminal defendant’s parole or postrelease community supervision, its petition must be accompanied by a written report containing information specified by statute and the California Rules of Court, and when a district attorney files such a petition, its petition need not be accompanied by such a report. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court correctly overruled the demurrer in this case. View "People v. Castel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Toyota, for discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., as well as for wrongful discharge. The trial court granted summary judgment for Toyota. The Court of Appeal reversed and held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that a substantial motivating factor for his termination was invidious sex or gender stereotyping related to his sexual orientation (the perception that he was "too gay"). However, the court held that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact to support his FEHA retaliation and related common law tort claim. Accordingly, the court remanded for the trial court to enter an order granting Toyota's alternative motion for summary adjudication as to these causes of action. View "Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp." on Justia Law

The Park and Malibu Bay petitioned the trial court to have Measure R, an initiative designed to limit large developments and chain establishments, declared invalid. The trial court granted the petition and defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal held that Measure R exceeds the initiative power because it invalidly annuls or delays executive or administrative conduct. The court also held that Measure R's conditional use permit (CUP) is illegal because it conditions the CUP on the character of the permittee or applicant rather than on the use of the land. The court declined to sever the invalid portions of Measure R and affirmed the judgment. View "The Park at Cross Creek v. City of Malibu" on Justia Law

Jose S., a former ward of the juvenile court, moved under Welfare and Institutions Code section 781 to seal juvenile records related to an admitted charge of lewd and lascivious conduct that occurred in 2002. The juvenile court denied the motion, finding Jose was precluded from relief under section 781 because of an additional admitted and disqualifying charge of assault with a deadly weapon in 2005. On appeal, Jose argued each offense constituted a separate case for purposes of section 781 and that the records related to his 2002 offense should have been sealed. Jose argued in the alternative that the court's denial of his motion to seal was improper because the 2005 assault did not fall within the list of disqualifying offenses set forth in section 707, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal rejected both these contentions and found the juvenile court did not err in refusing to seal Jose’s records. View "In re Jose S." on Justia Law

Luis Alford pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine for sale. The court sentenced Alford to eight years in custody, plus three years four months on mandatory supervision. The court also imposed various fines and assessments. Alford's appellate challenge concerns the court's imposition of a monetary penalty based on two statutory assessments: (1) a criminal laboratory analysis fee (laboratory fee); and (2) a drug program fee. Alford acknowledged the court properly assessed him for the laboratory and drug program fees, but contended the court erred in concluding the penalty statutes applied to require an additional penalty on top of those fees. There was a split in authority in the Courts of Appeal on this precise issue. The Court of Appeal determined the court's assessment of the additional penalties was proper. View "California v. Alford" on Justia Law

The Dissolution Law directed redevelopment agencies to continue making payments on enforceable obligations, but prohibited those agencies from incurring additional obligations, freezing all such activities. the day before the Dissolution Law was signed by Governor Brown and became effective, City of Big Bear Lake and its former redevelopment agency, knowing about the imminent change of law and the Legislature’s intent, signed the Cooperation Agreement, under which, the City agreed to transfer to City of Big Bear Lake $23.5 million and the city agreed to undertake specified public improvements. Also on that day, the City entered into an agreement with Matich Corporation for street and drainage improvements for about $2.5 million. The city also had a 2006 agreement with Wireless Consulting – Joseph A. Cylwik (also referred to as Cylwik Property Management) to provide engineering services on an as-needed basis. Under this contract, Cylwik Property Management provided services related to the Matich Corporation project. In this case, the issues presented centered on: (1) whether the Matich and Cylwik contracts (the contested transactions) did not create enforceable obligations of the former redevelopment agency; (2) whether the Dissolution Law’s invalidation of sponsor agreements (agreements between a city and its former redevelopment agency) did not violate the California Constitution; and (3) whether it was irrelevant that City of Big Bear Lake claimed it no longer possessed the funds it received from the former redevelopment agency. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court with respect to these issues, and concluded the statutory remedy of offsetting City of Big Bear Lake’s sales, use, and property taxes to capture a $2.6 million was unconstitutional. Therefore, the Court modified the trial court’s judgment to the extent it found the proposed sales, use, and property tax offsets constitutional. View "City of Big Bear Lake v. Cohen" on Justia Law