Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appealed the trial court’s order granting Donta Campbell’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argued: (1) the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); (2) Campbell was not in custody on his prior convictions; and (3) Proposition 47 did not apply to prior prison terms. Because the Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, it did not address the other contentions. The trial court order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Campbell" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that a period of supervision following deportation is impractical and inconsistent with the goals and purposes of the legislation that mandates imposition of split sentences. At the time of his sentencing, the trial court considered Arce's request for a split sentence and denied it. The trial court noted that upon his release from physical custody, defendant Jose Arce was subject to deportation proceedings initiated by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The trial court found that, given the risk Arce would be deported during the period of any mandatory supervision, and thus not be subject to the probation department's supervision or able to participate in the rehabilitative services offered by the department, a split sentence was not a realistic disposition. On appeal, Arce argued the trial court should have considered the possibility that he would be able to challenge his deportation and stay in this country either temporarily while his immigration status was litigated or, although unlikely, permanently. He noted that a number of other factors that show he was amenable to mandatory supervision, including the fact that he has been in this country lawfully since 2000, had no prior criminal record, was married to a United States citizen and had three children, all of whom were also United States citizens. Split sentences are the preferred disposition in eligible cases because they provide released prisoners with close supervision and supportive services designed to substantially reduce the risk of recidivism. As a practical matter, such supervision and services are not available after a prisoner has been deported. View "California v. Arce" on Justia Law

A lawsuit filed primarily to chill the valid exercise of free speech is called a "SLAPP" suit and, if without merit, such an action may be dismissed early under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In this anti-SLAPP case, investigative newsource (inewsource), an independent, nonprofit journalism organization, entered into contracts with KPBS, San Diego's public radio and television station, to gather and produce news stories with and for KPBS, in exchange for the right to use KPBS offices, media equipment, and related news facilities. KPBS was a department of San Diego State University (SDSU), and inewsource and KPBS have jointly created hundreds of news stories. In February 2015 inewsource began publishing articles critical of attorney Cory Briggs. After inewsource published about a dozen more critical stories about Briggs, San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), an entity inewsource reported is controlled by Briggs, sued inewsource, along with its founder, Loretta Hearn, and also SDSU, California State University (CSU), and San Diego State University Research Foundation (SDSURF), alleging the contracts between KPBS and inewsource violate statutory prohibitions on self-dealing involving public funds because Hearn was allegedly influencing both sides of the transaction - for SDSU as a faculty member, and for inewsource as its executive director. SDOG also alleged inewsource and Hearn misappropriated the names KPBS and SDSU. Asserting SDOG's lawsuit was based on the exercise of their constitutionally protected speech rights and lacked merit, Defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions. The trial court granted the motions. SDOG appealed, contending the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because: (1) its lawsuit is a public interest lawsuit, exempt from the anti-SLAPP law under section 425.17, subdivision (b); and (2) the exception to that exemption for media defendants under section 425.17, subdivision (d) was inapplicable because its lawsuit has "nothing to do with stopping news reporting" but was instead directed to stopping "self-dealing by a public employee." The Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a middle school math teacher, filed suit against various defendants after she was involuntarily detained for mental health evaluation and treatment. Plaintiff alleged that school defendants did not have probable cause to detain her under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, that hospital defendants lacked probable cause to continue to detain her and to admit her to the hospital where she spent one night before being released, and that she was entitled to monetary damages for various alleged violations of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Welfare and Institutions Code 5000 et seq., and of her civil rights. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no private right of action for the violations of the Act plaintiff alleged; the school district and the school police were immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity; the hospital and physician were not state actors for purposes of plaintiff's section 1983 claims; most of the provisions of the California Constitution plaintiff invoked did not create causes of action for damages; plaintiff failed to state a claim for violations of those provisions that might provide such a cause of action; and, because the hospital defendants were not state actors for purposes of section 1983, they cannot be liable for plaintiff's alleged violations of the California Constitution. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision sustaining the hospital defendants' demurrers to plaintiff's third amended complaint and granting the school defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Julian v. Mission Community Hospital" on Justia Law

Oswaldo, age 14, was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation after he admitted the allegation of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition that he committed misdemeanor battery on the property of a school, park, or hospital. The court dismissed an allegation of felony resisting an officer. Another section 602 petition, filed a month later, alleged two counts of felony vandalism causing damage of over $400. Days later, the probation officer filed a notice, alleging that Oswaldo had violated probation by failing to obey all laws, comply with his court-ordered curfew, attend school and behave appropriately in school. He admitted the first count, reduced to a misdemeanor; the second count and probation violation allegations were dismissed. The court removed Oswaldo from parental custody and ordered conditions of probation, to which Oswaldo objected, including that Oswaldo “not be in any specific locations where gang members are known by him to meet or gather or specific locations known by him for gang-related activity or specified by his probation officer or a parent, in writing, as involving gang-related activity, nor shall he participate in any gang-related activity.” The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the condition was unconstitutionally vague for lacking an express knowledge requirement. View "In re Oswaldo R." on Justia Law

Psychotherapist-patient privilege does not protect subpoenaed records from disclosure to the Department of Consumer Affairs, because Business and Professions Code section 2225, a statute enacted after codification of the privilege, permits disclosure of records that the privilege would otherwise shelter when the Department and the Board are investigating potential improper prescribing of controlled substances by a psychiatrist. Furthermore, a psychiatric patient's constitutional right to privacy requires the Department to demonstrate a subpoena for the patient's records is supported by a compelling interest and that the information demanded is "relevant and material" to the particular investigation being conducted. In this case, the State had a compelling interest in investigating excessive or otherwise improper prescribing of controlled substances, and petitioner's declaration established most of the records demanded by the subpoena were relevant and material to that investigation. However, further narrowing of the Department's subpoenas was required to comport with the weighty privacy interests at stake. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals granted the petition in part and vacated in part. View "Cross v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made it clear that ordinarily, a conviction on any factual theory that is supported by the evidence will be upheld. The Court of Appeal concluded that this case, however, comes under an exception to that rule: when the prosecution has elected to proceed on one factual theory, and when that election has obviated the need for a unanimity instruction, courts are bound by the prosecution’s election. Darnell Brown was found guilty of rape in concert of a minor 14 or older, forcible rape, rape of an intoxicated person, and rape of an unconscious person. He was sentenced to a total of 29 years in prison, along with the usual fines. Defendant raised a host of contentions as grounds for appeal, including that there was insufficient evidence of force to support the convictions for rape in concert and forcible rape. Here, because the prosecution’s elected factual theory was not supported by substantial evidence, the Court reversed defendant’s rape in concert and forcible rape convictions and modified the judgment accordingly. View "California v. Brown" on Justia Law

R.S. acknowledged that he did not object to two issues he raised on appeal to the Court of Appeal; the Court determined R.S. forfeited those issues. R.S. was found trespassing on school grounds as a nonstudent. Officers detained him after he became belligerent. One of the officers suffered a hairline fracture to his thumb during the struggle. R.S. was arrested in connection with a robbery outside of a Starbucks approximately two months later. At the police station, R.S. at first denied punching the victim in the head, later admitting to striking the victim. R.S. conceded that he attacked the victim to steal his iPhone. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court imposed, among others, the following probation conditions: "Minor shall submit [his] person, property, or vehicle, and any property under [his] immediate custody or control to search at any time, with or without probable cause, with or without a search warrant, by any law enforcement officer or peace officers, probation officers, school officials or officers, and any other state security officers or agents engaged in the lawful performance of their duties [search condition]." "The minor shall not knowingly be in any privately owned vehicle with more than one person the minor knows or reasonably should know is under the age of 18 unless accompanied by a parent or legal guardian, a responsible adult, or with permission of the probation officer [supervision condition]." R.S. challenged these two conditions, arguing the search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague while the supervision condition was unconstitutionally vague. Because he was making facial challenges to the conditions, R.S. argues his claims of error raised pure questions of law that the Court of Appeal should review. The Court disagreed, concluding R.S. forfeited these challenges by not raising them sooner. View "In re R.S." on Justia Law

The trial court complied with California Rules of Court, rule 5.651(b)(2)(D) by sufficiently considering I.V.'s educational needs. I.V. appealed a dispositional order adjudging him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and placing him on formal probation, subject to various terms and conditions. On appeal, I.V. argued the juvenile court erroneously imposed a probation condition requiring him to enroll in the Reflections Day Center Treatment Program without making necessary findings about his special educational needs under Rule of Court 5.651(b)(2)(D). I.V. also argued that a probation condition allowing warrantless searches of his "person, property, vehicle, and any property under his/her immediate custody or control" was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it may encompass searches of his electronic devices and data. The Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re I.V." on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old defendant Adrian Vela and one of his fellow gang members confronted two suspected rival gang members. Vela’s accomplice pulled out a gun and shot the two victims, killing one of them. The prosecutor directly filed charges against Vela in “adult” criminal court. The jury found Vela guilty of murder, attempted murder, and found true the related firearm and gang allegations. Vela makes several interrelated claims of instructional error concerning accomplice liability. Vela also raises two constitutional challenges to his 72 years to life sentence. In the unpublished parts of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found the trial court committed no instructional errors. Further, Vela’s sentence did not violate either the equal protection clause or the Eighth Amendment. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court conditionally reversed the judgment: the electorate recently approved Proposition 57, which emphasized juvenile rehabilitation, prosecutors can no longer directly file charges against a minor in an “adult” criminal court. Vela was retroactively entitled to a transfer hearing because his case was not yet final on appeal. If, after conducting the hearing, the juvenile court judge determines that Vela’s case should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then his convictions and sentence will be reinstated. But if the juvenile court determined that Vela was amenable to rehabilitation, and should remain within the juvenile justice system, then his convictions would be deemed juvenile adjudications. View "California v. Vela" on Justia Law