Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Keith Costella, shot his victim, dumped his body in an undeveloped area next to a highway, and set fire to it. A jury convicted him of second degree murder and arson of forest land. The jury also found defendant personally discharged a firearm and caused the death of his victim. The court sentenced defendant to 40 years to life for murder and the firearm enhancement and a concurrent term of two years for arson of forest land. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily there was insufficient evidence that “forest land” was burned within the meaning of the arson statute, and therefore, the Court of Appeal should reverse his arson conviction. After review, the Court concluded substantial evidence demonstrated this land was brush covered and thus constituted forest land. Defendant further argued the Court should order a limited remand pursuant to "California v. Franklin," (63 Cal.4th 261 (2016)), so that the parties could make a record in anticipation of his youth offender parole hearing during the 25th year of his sentence. The State conceded he was entitled to a limited remand for this purpose. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant’s arson conviction, but ordered the limited remand pursuant to "Franklin." View "California v. Costella" on Justia Law

In 2001, defendant Emigdio Valdez was convicted of possession of a sharp instrument in prison and assault by an inmate by means likely to cause great bodily injury. The trial court found true three prior strike allegations, for which the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 25 years to life on each count. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for recall of sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. As to each conviction, defendant argued: (1) the trial court was not authorized to make findings of fact and the State was required to plead and prove any disqualifying facts in the prosecution of his commitment offense; (2) substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s determinations regarding his ineligibility; and (3) the trial court employed the wrong standard of proof, in that it should have applied the “clear and convincing evidence” standard rather than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. In the published part of this opinion the Court of Appeal concluded there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that defendant was “armed” with the sharp instrument in prison. In the unpublished parts of this opinion, the Court rejected defendant’s other contentions. View "California v. Valdez" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant John Wismer was accused of sexual molestation by the nine- and 13-year-old daughters of Wismer's friend and business associate, Richard S. The physical evidence was inconclusive; the prosecution's case turned largely on the credibility of the two girls and, to a certain extent, their parents. The primary incident, involving the younger of the two girls, allegedly took place on an evening in late November. Roughly a week later, police arranged for Richard to make a recorded pretext call to Wismer in which he confronted Wismer with his daughter's allegations. Although the pretext call failed to elicit any admissions from Wismer, jurors nonetheless focused on the call during their deliberations, listening to it three times and discussing whether Wismer's reaction to the call was consistent or inconsistent with guilt. One of the jurors (of Asian descent) took it upon herself to conduct what she characterized as an "experiment" illustrating for her colleagues how a truly innocent person would respond to a fabricated allegation. Using racially charged language, she falsely accused a male Hispanic juror of slapping her behind, punctuating the accusation by claiming he said "he wanted to put his Mexican burrito in my chicken fried rice." The Asian juror's false accusation and the Hispanic juror's reaction were not part of the evidence in the case, yet they were presented to and considered by the jury in reaching a verdict. The Court of Appeal concluded that was juror misconduct of a fundamental nature that required reversal of the judgment. View "California v. Wismer" on Justia Law

Real Party in Interest Margarita Rodas was granted probation in 2007 after entering a negotiated plea of no contest to transporting heroin under former Health and Safety Code section 11352. At the time, the statute prohibited transporting a controlled substance for personal use. After violating probation on several occasions, Rodas eventually absconded and her whereabouts were unknown until 2015 when she appeared in court and filed a motion to vacate her felony transportation conviction and replace it with a misdemeanor sentence for simple possession. Rodas sought the retroactive benefit of a 2014 statutory amendment to section 11352 that required transportation for sale rather than merely for personal use. The trial court later granted her oral motion to withdraw her plea and reinstated the original charges. The State petitioned for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order allowing Rodas to withdraw her nearly nine year old plea. According to the State, Rodas’ conviction had long been final for review purposes because she did not challenge the probation order within the six-month time limit set forth in Penal Code section 1018. The court thus acted outside of its jurisdiction in granting the motion because Rodas was not entitled either to withdraw her plea or to the retroactive benefit of the intervening amendment to section 11352. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting Rodas’ motion to withdraw her no contest plea. The ruling vacating the no contest plea and reinstating the charges was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for appropriate proceedings on the probation violation allegation. View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Phillip Baranchik and Eric Baranchik filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, among other things, claims of excessive force, false arrest, and malicious persecution. The trial court subsequently granted a motion to strike Eric's malicious prosecution claim, denied a motion to reinstate the claim, and granted summary adjudication in favor of defendants on Eric's excessive force claim and Phillip's false arrest claim. The court concluded that the undisputed facts were sufficient to support the legal conclusion that Officer Fizulich had a reasonable basis to believe that Phillip was intoxicated and unable to care for the safety of others, in violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (f); the court rejected Eric's contention that the trial court erroneously concluded his excessive force claims against Officer Ho were barred under Heck v. Humphrey; Eric's civil claim for excessive force was barred under Heck because the criminal jury necessarily found Officer Ho's conduct to be lawful and not an unreasonable use of force; because Officer Ho fired his taser when Eric was ignoring commands to stay back, the actions were part of a continuous interaction and the Heck bar applies; dismissal under section 1203.4 does not invalidate Eric's conviction; and the court rejected Eric's malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Baranchik v. Fizulich" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, SCPMG, alleging that the company refused to rescind her resignation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12940 et seq., and public policy. Plaintiff alleged that while she was working for the company, she suffered a temporary disability, which arose as a result of a relatively uncommon side effect of the medication she was taking. The adverse drug reaction she suffered allegedly caused her to suffer from an altered mental state. While she was experiencing this altered mental state, she resigned from her job at SCPMG. After the company declined to rescind the resignation, plaintiff filed suit, alleging that SCPMG acted with discriminatory animus by refusing to allow her to rescind her resignation. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for SCPMG, concluding that the company's refusal to allow plaintiff to rescind her resignation was not an adverse employment action under the FEHA, and that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the SCPMG employees who accepted and promptly processed her resignation knew of her alleged temporary disability at the time they took those actions. In this case, summary judgment was appropriate because plaintiff failed to present evidence raising a triable issue of material fact about the legality of SCPMG's actions. View "Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group" on Justia Law

Shantel Jackson filed suit against former boxing champion Floyd Mayweather, Jr., alleging, inter alia, claims for invasion of privacy, defamation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff's claims were based, either entirely or in part, on Mayweather's social media postings about the termination of Jackson's pregnancy and its relationship to the couple's separation and his comments during a radio interview concerning the extent to which Jackson had undergone cosmetic surgery procedures. Mayweather filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, (the Anti-SLAPP statute). The trial court denied the motion. The court concluded that the challenged causes of action arose from protected activity under section 426.16, subdivision (e)(3); the statements concerned an issue of public interest; and Jackson failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her cause of action for defamation and most aspects of her causes of action for invasion of privacy. Accordingly, the court reversed with respect to Jackson's causes of action for defamation and false light portrayal and her cause of action for public disclosure of private facts based on Mayweather's comments about cosmetic surgery. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Jackson v. Mayweather, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-parents Gabrielle A. and Nicholas G., and John A. and Gregory A. (the children) appealed a judgment following the trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment by the County of Orange (the County) and several social workers. Plaintiffs’ claims related to the detention of the children for six months. Gabrielle went into early labor, and gave birth at Hoag Hospital to Gregory at 31 weeks. Three days later, Gabrielle was released, and she returned to her mother Barbara’s home. Gregory remained in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU). A few days later, Hoag employees filed a referral for an immediate response from the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA). Hoag staff reported to Villa that Gabrielle had appeared at Hoag with John and Barbara, wearing a trench coat with nothing on underneath, displaying “irrational and aggressive behavior,” including removing the trench coat and walking around unclothed. She had previously asked for Gregory to be placed back inside of her, and she asked a nurse to cut her ankles for blood letting. According to staff, she attempted to wheel Gregory’s isolette out of the NICU and became violent with them. Hospital employees informed Villa that Gabrielle had expressed thoughts of hurting her children and demonstrated paranoia. Gabrielle disputed this version of events, but did not dispute that she was placed on a hospital hold pending evaluation. The trial court found that exigent circumstances existed to detain the children without a warrant at Hoag, and that Nicholas’s arrival at Hoag after the children were detained did not alter matters; there was no evidence to show conduct by the social workers to establish a claim for deliberate indifference, or behavior that shocks the conscience; the social workers were entitled to immunity because there was no evidence of material false statements; numerous claims by the plaintiffs were barred by the parents’ pleas of no contest in dependency court. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the parents’ knowing and voluntary pleas of no contest to the jurisdictional allegations during dependency proceedings defeated their claims, and the social workers were entitled to immunity. “[E]ven if we were to disregard the no contest pleas and the relevant immunity doctrines, defendants correctly argue they met their burden to establish they were entitled to summary judgment on each cause of action, and plaintiffs failed to raise triable issues of material fact. Accordingly, we affirm.” View "Gabrielle A. v. Co. of Orange" on Justia Law

This case presents the question of whether sentencing judges, in cases where the state sentence is ordered to run concurrently with a foreign sentence, must issue an order directing the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) to comply with its statutory duty to make the prisoner available for transfer to the foreign jurisdiction. Jose Alberto Antonio pled guilty to one count of residential robbery, and admitted using a firearm during that robbery. Antonio was sentenced to an eight-year prison term. The court later recalled the sentence when it learned of a federal case in which Antonio had previously been sentenced to 110 months in federal prison. The court chose not to alter the initial eight-year state sentence. Antonio appealed, contending the trial court erred in failing to determine whether the state sentence should be served concurrently or consecutively to the federal sentence. On remand, the trial court ordered the state sentence to run concurrent with the federal sentence. Antonio requested the court sign an order directing the Department to have Antonio transferred to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) so that he could serve the federal and California sentences, "thus fulfilling th[e] court's duty to make the prisoner available to the foreign authorities." The trial court denied Antonio's request to sign the order. The Court of Appeal held the sentencing judge is not required to independently order the Department to perform its established legal responsibility. If the Department fails or refuses to carry out its duties the prisoner may resort to administrative review within the corrections system, and ultimately review by the courts by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the Court rejected appellant's claim that trial courts, at the time of sentencing, must issue a preemptive order to the Department to do its job. View "California v. Antonio" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant David Lua guilty of one count of transportation for sale of a controlled substance, as well as a misdemeanor count of simple possession of a controlled substance, a lesser included offense of the charged offense, possession for sale of a controlled substance. The trial court found true allegations that defendant had five drug-related prior convictions, and had served three prior prison terms. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of 17 years. Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing the trial court’s instructions to the jury with respect to the transportation for sale charge were erroneous; that the trial court failed to adequately respond to questions from the jury during deliberations; that the verdict form for the transportation for sale charge contradicted the jury’s instructions for the offense; that the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal; that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion; and that the sentence imposed constitutes an abuse of discretion, and an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. The Court of Appeal found the matter had to be remanded for resentencing, because some of the trial court’s remarks during sentencing suggest that it may not have properly understood the scope of its sentencing discretion. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Lua" on Justia Law