Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Officials of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) challenged the trial court's order granting a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Gregory Rhoades, a Native American prisoner incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison (Calipatria). In granting Rhoades's petition, the trial court concluded that the prohibition on the use of straight tobacco during prisoners' Native American religious ceremonies violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) and it ordered the California Department of Corrections to "formulate and implement policies permitting and reasonably regulating the possession and use of straight tobacco" during those ceremonies. The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court improperly granted relief in favor of Rhoades without holding an evidentiary hearing on disputed factual issues, and reversed and remanded matter with directions that the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing. View "In re Rhoades" on Justia Law

Defendant Brady Douglas’s former boyfriend, a male prostitute, told him “Jeffrey B.” had shorted him money following a prearranged sexual encounter. Defendant and codefendant Clifton Sharpe tracked down Jeffrey and demanded money. During a high speed freeway chase, Jeffrey swerved his car into defendant’s vehicle after defendant pointed a gun at him, shooting several times. Jeffrey was able to escape unharmed. A jury convicted defendant of attempted second degree robbery, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and other related crimes. The jury found true certain firearm enhancements attached to the robbery and assault charges. It acquitted defendant of pimping, and found not true other alleged firearm enhancements. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of six years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contended the court erred in denying his “Wheeler” motion after the prosecutor peremptorily excused two openly gay prospective jurors. He also argued the court erroneously instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 460, the pattern jury instruction for attempt, which he asserts is unconstitutionally vague and impermissibly creates a mandatory presumption concerning an accused’s intent. The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s instructional error challenge, but found the court did not properly evaluate defendant’s “Wheeler” motion. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Douglas" on Justia Law

A jury found appellants-defendants Marcellus Lee, Daniel Romero and Francisco Martinez, Jr. guilty of fraud in the offer or sale of commodities. Lee and Romero were also convicted of conspiracy and grand theft of personal property. The jury found that the takings exceeded certain dollar amounts and that the victims' losses were in excess of $150,000. The trial court subsequently granted the defendants' motions for a new trial on some of the counts and dismissed other counts for insufficiency of the evidence. The State appealed. In Lee, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion in reversing the jury's verdicts. The Court reversed the trial court's orders and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the verdicts rendered by the jury and sentence the defendants accordingly. In the interests of justice, the Court ordered the proceedings on remand to be heard before a trial judge other than the judge whose orders were reviewed on appeal. On remand, at the State's request, the sentencing court dismissed the counts on which the defendants were subject to retrial. The court sentenced Romero to a total of seven years in prison. Martinez received a one-year jail sentence and a five-year probation term. Lee was sentenced to a total of five years in prison. In the this appeal, Appellants asserted there was not sufficient evidence to support their convictions for commodities fraud because they entered into money management contracts with their clients, not contracts for the sale or purchase of commodities. Appellants claimed the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury that scienter was an element of the offense of commodities fraud. They also contended reversal was required because the sentencing court refused to consider a motion for a new trial on grounds not decided by the trial court. The State conceded certain sentencing errors, and that the trial court erred when it did not instruct the jury that scienter was an element of the offense of commodities fraud. However, regarding scienter, the State argued the error was harmless. The State asked the Court of Appeal to review the possibility the sentencing court may not have imposed a mandatory fine under Penal Code section 186.11, subdivision (c). After review, the Court concluded the restitution award to Ricky Lutz was incorrectly determined and vacated Romero's conviction on count seven and remanded for resentencing. Otherwise, the Court found no error and affirmed. View "California v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Sharpe, with several other men, went to someone else’s marijuana garden in the night to steal some plants. Confronted by the owner, the men knocked the owner down and fled. The owner pursued until one of the men brandished a gun. A few minutes later, defendant and the other men rammed the owner’s truck. Defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to state prison for six years. On appeal, defendant made several arguments as to why his convictions should have been reversed, but the Court of Appeal found they lacked merit. Defendant also argued the trial court abused its discretion in making the restitution award because it awarded the victim both (1) the decrease in fair market value of the truck resulting from the damage caused by the ramming and (2) the cost to repair the truck. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court could not apply both methods because it resulted in a windfall to the victim. The Court also concluded that the trial court improperly calculated restitution by awarding the victim the salvage value of the truck retained by the victim. The Court modified the judgment by reducing the restitution award, and as modified, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Sharpe" on Justia Law

Two consolidated cases involved the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (the Act), popularly known as “AB 32”). The Act was passed by a simple majority vote of both legislative houses. Its general purpose is to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to protect the environment. Plaintiffs attacked one part of the implementing regulations adopted by the California Air Resources Board (Board). The Board created a “cap-and-trade” program that included the auction sale of some, but not all, GHG emissions allowances. The Board distributed some emissions allowances for free, but sold others at quarterly auctions. On appeal plaintiffs asserted: (1) the auction sales exceed the Legislature’s delegation of authority to the Board to design a market-based emissions reduction system; and (2) the revenue generated by the auction sales amounts to a tax that violated the two-thirds supermajority vote requirement of Proposition 13. As to the first question, the Court of Appeal held that the Legislature gave broad discretion to the Board to design a distribution system, and a system including the auction of some allowances did not exceed the scope of legislative delegation. Further, the Legislature later ratified the auction system by specifying how to use the proceeds derived therefrom. As for the second question, although the Court's reasoning differed from that of the trial court, it agreed that the auction sales did not equate to a tax. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgments denying the petitions in these consolidated cases. View "Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law

Officers saw a vehicle rolling backwards without lights. Parrott exited from the driver’s side and pushed the car to the curb. The officers approached, offering assistance as Parrott began to lift the hood. Parrott said he did not need help. The officers noticed that Parrot was nervous and kept touching a large item bulging from the front pocket of his sweatshirt. While questioning Parrott, the officers learned that his drivers’ license was suspended. A pat-down search revealed a loaded gun in the sweatshirt pocket. After his motion to suppress was denied, Parrott pled guilty to two charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code 29800(a)), and admitted to two sentencing enhancements. He was sentenced to five years in state prison. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that Parrott’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an unlawful search and seizure resulting in the discovery of one of the firearms and that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at sentencing. While the record does not establish Parrot properly waived his right to counsel and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Parrott" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the parties asked the Court of Appeal to determine the value of a blank check for the purpose of distinguishing between misdemeanor and felony receiving stolen property after passage of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). Respondent Angela Vandiver pled guilty in 2012 to a single felony count of receiving stolen property based on her possession of blank checks she knew had been stolen. She later petitioned to have the conviction redesignated a misdemeanor under the new provisions of Proposition 47 on the ground the checks were worth $950 or less. The State opposed, arguing the balance of the victim’s checking account was greater than $950. The trial court found the value of the blank checks to be de minimis and granted the petition. The State argued on appeal the court erred by: (1) reaching the merits because Vandiver did not attach evidence of value to her petition; and (2) determining the checks’ value was de minimis. The State contended the court should have dismissed the petition as unsupported or found the checks were worth the full amount in the linked checking account and denied the petition on the merits. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Vandiver" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint charged petitioner Shawn Melcher with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer and other crimes. One of petitioner’s alleged assault victims was Alan Serpa. Serpa’s wife, Barbara Yook, was the Calaveras County District Attorney. Before the trial court, petitioner moved to recuse the Calaveras County District Attorney’s office from prosecuting his case because of the connection between the victim the district attorney. The trial court denied the motion, ruling petitioner failed to show the conflict of interest was so grave he was unlikely to receive fair treatment. Petitioner sought writ relief from the Court of Appeal. After review, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and therefore denied the petition. "The mere fact the victim and the district attorney are married does not establish a disabling conflict where there is no evidence she has influenced the prosecution, an ethical wall prevents the district attorney from influencing the case, and the district attorney waives any rights to participate in the case as a victim or a member of the victim’s family." View "Melcher v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the president and CEO of American Apparel, filed suit against Standard General, alleging several causes of action stemming from his claim that Standard General's press release, regarding investigations into allegations against plaintiff, contained false and defamatory information about him. The trial court granted Standard General's anti-SLAPP motion, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The court held that plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of showing there was a minimal chance his claims would succeed at trial. In this case, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the press release falsely stated he was investigated by an independent third party because such a claim did not allege a falsehood about plaintiff himself. Furthermore, because the press release did not articulate why plaintiff was terminated, plaintiff's allegation that it falsely stated he was terminated for "cause" did not constitute an actionable defamation. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Charney v. Standard General, LP" on Justia Law

This case involved the interplay between two criminal law statutes: Penal Code section 490.2 (petty theft) and Vehicle Code section 10851 (unlawful taking or driving a vehicle). Defendant Charles Van Orden appealed the trial court’s order denying his petition under the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47) to have his felony section 10851 conviction reduced to misdemeanor petty theft under section 490.2. The State argued the trial court was correct in concluding section 10851 offenses did not qualify as petty theft offenses under any circumstances. Penal Code section 490.2 redefined the crime of petty theft as “obtaining any property by theft where the value of the . . . property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).” Section 490.2 also directed any petty theft, so defined, would be punished as a misdemeanor. The issue on appeal was whether Van Orden’s conviction for violating section 10851, which criminalized the act of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, would have been a misdemeanor petty theft under section 490.2 had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time of the offense. As the California Supreme Court explained, “[u]nlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession is a form of theft, and the taking may be accomplished by driving the vehicle away. For this reason, a defendant convicted under section 10851(a) of unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession has suffered a theft conviction” and, it follows, must be punished under section 490.2 of petty theft. “On the other hand, unlawful driving of a vehicle is not a form of theft when the driving occurs or continues after the theft is complete (“ posttheft driving”).” Therefore, the Court of Appeals found that a conviction under section 10851(a) for posttheft driving is not a theft conviction, and need not be punished under section 490.2 as petty theft. View "California v. Van Orden" on Justia Law