Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff was terminated for refusing to work a shift that did not permit him to be home in time for his son's dialysis, plaintiff filed suit against DHE alleging claims for disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., as well as wrongful termination in violation of public policy. For several years, plaintiff’s supervisors scheduled him so that he could be home at night for his son’s dialysis. That schedule accommodation changed when a new supervisor took over. The court concluded that plaintiff has demonstrated triable issues of material fact on his causes of action for associational disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment and denial of plaintiff's motion to tax costs. View "Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express" on Justia Law

Defendant Santiago Sanchez was convicted by jury of four sex offenses: one count of sexual penetration, one count of attempted sexual intercourse, and two counts of lewd or lascivious conduct. These acts were committed against an eight-year-old girl, D.C. He was convicted of two additional sex offenses: two counts of lewd or lascivious conduct, committed against D.C.'s ten-year-old sister, M.C. The jury also found defendant committed lewd or lascivious acts against more than one victim. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 65 years to life in state prison and imposed other orders. Defendant appealed. After reviewing his arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's convictions and remanded the matter for resentencing. The Court found that while there was no direct evidence of the specific act of sexual penetration defendant was convicted of committing, other than his confession during interrogation, the circumstantial evidence was more than sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence purportedly relevant to impeach S.S. or by allowing the challenged CSAAS testimony. Defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct is forfeited by his failure to object and request a curative instruction. Nor did defense counsel's failure to so object amount to constitutionally deficient performance. Defendant's assertion of cumulative prejudice also failed. With regard to resentencing, the Court concluded that the trial court's imposition of three consecutive life terms was not unauthorized, and therefore defense counsel's failure to object to this sentence below arguably forfeit the issue on appeal. However, "it is apparent from the record that the trial court believed it was required to impose full, separate, and consecutive terms pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d), and rule 4.426 of the California Rules of Court that were not applicable to this case. Assuming the issue is forfeited, we conclude defense counsel's failure to object and correct the trial court's misunderstanding amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel." View "California v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

A jury convicted James Michael Poisson of mayhem and battery with serious bodily injury. The trial court sentenced Poisson to prison for 12 years, consisting of eight years for mayhem and four years for battery with serious bodily injury. Poisson appealed, contending he could not be convicted separately of both mayhem and battery with serious bodily injury because the latter was a lesser included offense of the former. The Court of Appeal rejected that contention. Battery with serious bodily injury was not a lesser included offense of mayhem. View "California v. Poisson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Leonel Reyes of (1) forcible oral copulation; (2) forcible rape; (3) lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14; and (4) first degree burglary. The jury found true allegations that the crimes of counts 1 and 2 occurred during the commission of a first degree burglary, that Reyes committed the crimes of counts 1 and 2 during the commission of a burglary with the intent to commit those crimes, and that the victim, Daniela R., was age 14 or older but under the age of 18. The trial court sentenced Reyes to eight years plus one consecutive term of life without the possibility of parole, consisting of life without the possibility of parole for the special findings under section Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (l), the upper term of eight years for the count 3 offense, a concurrent midterm of four years for count 6 (not listed above), and 15-year-to-life terms on counts 1 and 2 pursuant to section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e) stayed under section 654. Reyes argued on appeal of the conviction and sentences that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by arguing for the first time in rebuttal the relevance of evidence that Daniela was gay on the issue of consent, and also by explaining the reasonable doubt standard in such a way as to dilute the People's burden of proof in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Reyes further contended his sentence of life without the possibility of parole for committing two forcible sex offenses violated the proscriptions in the federal and California Constitutions against cruel and unusual punishment, and his counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to object on this ground under the California Constitution. In a supplemental brief, Reyes also argued the trial court sentenced him under section 667.61, subdivision (l) in counts 1 and 2 under the mistaken belief it had no discretion to impose a lesser sentence. The State asked that the Court of Appeal order the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the jury's true findings on the allegations under section 667.61, subdivision (l) attached to counts 1 and 2 as well as the court's oral pronouncement of judgment on those counts, and to indicate that Reyes was sentenced under that section. Reyes agreed with the State as to that point. The Court of Appeal concluded the abstract of judgment should be modified to reflect those changes. As so modified, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Both defendant Robert Jones and the Attorney General appealed after a jury convicted defendant of residential burglary, receiving stolen property, and resisting a peace officer and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 25 years under the Three Strikes law. Defendant contended that trial counsel’s representation violated his right to counsel because the attorney had a conflict of interest, and the Attorney General contended that remand was required because the trial court failed to provide written reasons in the court’s minutes for dismissing a strike. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that: (1) even assuming a conflict of interest violated defendant’s right to counsel, there was no resulting prejudice; and (2) then-current law did not require the trial court to provide written reasons in the minutes for dismissing the strike. View "California v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Ybarra appealed after he was convicted by jury on multiple counts related to two incidents: a group attack on a fellow prison inmate and a separate battery by gassing on a correctional officer. A jury found defendant guilty on five of seven counts. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for a term of thirteen years. On appeal, defendant contended that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the counts arising from the assault on the inmate from the counts arising from the gassing of the correctional officer; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts related to the inmate assault because the accomplice testimony was insufficiently corroborated. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court properly denied defendant’s severance motion because at the time the motion was made, defendant did not demonstrate prejudice and he has failed to demonstrate gross unfairness amounting to a due process violation based on anything that transpired during the trial. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court concluded that there was sufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony. View "California v. Ybarra" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Legislature adopted Labor Code section 1782, which prohibits a charter city from receiving or using state funding or financial assistance for a public construction project if the city has a charter provision or ordinance that authorizes a contractor to not comply with the state prevailing wage laws. Several charter cities, the cities of El Centro, Fresno, Vista, Carlsbad and El Cajon (the Cities), filed a petition for an alternative or peremptory writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants the State of California, David Lanier in his official capacity as the Secretary of the State of California Labor & Workforce Development Agency, Christine Baker in her official capacity as the State of California Director of Industrial Relations and Julie A. Su in her official capacity as the State of California Labor Commissioner. Among other things, the Cities sought a writ of mandate to prevent the enforcement of section 1782. The trial court denied relief and entered a judgment in favor of defendants. In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment upholding the constitutionality of section 1782 against the Cities' "home rule" challenge. View "City of El Centro v. Lanier" on Justia Law

Defendant Rolando Esteban Sanchez was convicted and sentenced on a number of felony convictions in this matter. The court originally sentenced him to an aggregate term of 63 years to life. A consecutive sentence of one year eight months on count five (possession of a concealed firearm in a motor vehicle) was part of the aggregate term. The court found that based on the sentence imposed on count five, Penal Code section 654 precluded punishing defendant on count eight (possession of a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle). On remand, the trial court held defendant had no right to appear for his resentencing. Defendant contended he was denied his right to counsel and to be present at his resentencing hearing when the trial court resentenced him in his absence on remand after the federal district court ordered defendant’s conviction on count five vacated and the matter remanded for trial on count five for resentencing. The Attorney General does not argue defendant’s right to be present or to have the assistance of counsel were not violated, but argued that defendant was not prejudiced. According to the Attorney General, defendant did not demonstrate he “could have received a more favorable result if he had been present or able to confer with his attorney.” The Court of Appeal disagreed: "Because the trial court changed the previously imposed term to defendant’s detriment, defendant has demonstrated he was prejudiced by not being permitted to be present and to confer with his attorney." The Court ordered the sentence imposed on count eight at the resentencing hearing vacated, and remanded the matter to the superior court for resentencing with the defendant present. View "California v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Daniel Rogers of (count 1) inflicting corporal injury to a cohabitant/child’s parent, (count 2) false imprisonment by violence or menace, (count 3) assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, and (count 4) simple assault, a lesser included offense to assault with a deadly weapon. The jury also found true allegations that defendant inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence and served a prior prison term. On appeal, defendant argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to object to the prosecution’s motion to amend the information to add counts 3 and 4 and the GBI enhancement after defendant waived a preliminary hearing. Defendant asked that the entire judgment be reversed, or alternatively, that his convictions for the new charges be struck. The State conceded that the information could not be amended to add the new charges, but argued that complete reversal was unprecedented, and the appropriate remedy was to strike the improper charges. As for the GBI enhancement, the State contended that it was properly added to the information, even though defendant had waived his preliminary hearing. After review, the Court of Appeal argued that when a defendant waived his or her right to a preliminary hearing, an information cannot thereafter be amended to add conduct enhancement allegations. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the GBI enhancement be struck along with counts 3 and 4. Because the Court concluded that defendant suffered no prejudice by the inappropriate amendments, it affirmed the convictions on the original charges and the prior prison term enhancement. The case was remanded for resentencing because defendant’s sentence on this case was part of a global settlement involving other cases. View "California v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek a writ of mandate enjoining WCAB from enforcing two recently enacted provisions of the Labor Code, sections 4903.05 and 4903.8. Petitioners contend that section 4903.05, which imposes a filing fee of $150 on certain medical liens filed in workers’ compensation cases, deprives them of their state constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and petition for redress of grievances. Petitioners also contend that section 4903.8, which restricts payment of lien awards to individuals other than those who incurred the expenses, substantially impairs their constitutional right to contract. Petitioners argue that both statutes contravene the constitutional mandate that workers’ compensation laws “accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without any incumbrance of any character.” The court concluded that petitioners Kalestian, Vounov, and Buie lack standing to obtain the writ relief they request; the challenged provisions of sections 4903.05 and 4903.8 do not violate any of the constitutional provisions identified in the petition; and, therefore, the court dismissed the petition as to petitioners Kalestian, Vounov, and Buie and denied the petition as to petitioner Chorn. View "Chorn v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law