Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury found defendant Mark Goode guilty of: burglary (count 1) for opening a metal storm door on a residence; and attempted burglary (count 2) for jiggling a window on the same residence a few seconds later. The trial court sentenced defendant to 16 months in prison for the burglary at the front door and to a consecutive eight months for the attempted burglary at the window, finding that defendant had “[t]wo separate intents to enter and burgle [the victim’s] home.” On appeal, defendant argued his conviction for burglary should be reversed because, in his view, “[t]he evidence was insufficient to establish [he] actually opened the metal door,” and, in any event, “there was zero evidence . . . that he actually put some part of his body on the interior side of that door.” He further argued that he could not be separately punished for the burglary at the front door and the attempted burglary at the window because the evidence showed only a single, indivisible intent: to enter the victim’s residence to commit a theft. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with defendant that the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed a completed burglary at the front door, but agreed that he could not be separately punished for burglarizing the victim’s home at the front door and then, only a few seconds later, attempting to burglarize the home through a nearby window. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgment to stay an eight-month term on defendant’s conviction of attempted burglary at the window (count 2) pursuant to Penal Code1 section 654 and will affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Goode" on Justia Law

On November 4, 2014, California voters approved Proposition 47, The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act; it went into effect the following day. Penal Code section 1170.18 was added and provided that a person currently serving a sentence for a felony conviction, whether by trial or plea, who would have been guilty only of a misdemeanor had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time the plea was entered, or at the time of trial, may petition for a recall of the sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing. Prior to the passage of Proposition 47, defendant entered a guilty plea to a felony violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 for unlawfully driving and taking a 2002 Chevy Suburban. Defendant filed a petition to recall his sentence, arguing that his conviction for violating Vehicle Code section 10851 should be reduced to a misdemeanor violation of petty theft under Penal Code section 490.2. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that all Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions were not eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47. Defendant argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that: (1) Penal Code section 1170.18 should have been broadly interpreted to include violations of Vehicle Code section 10851; (2) the trial court should have provided the parties an opportunity to litigate the value of the loss to the victim prior to ruling on his Petition to determine if the offense committed was petty theft (loss to the victim was less than $950) within the meaning of Penal Code section 490.2; (3) the People had the burden of proving at the hearing on the Petition that the value of the vehicle taken exceeded $950; (4) the valuation of the loss for a temporary taking of an automobile should be that amount of compensation to make the victim whole, not the market value of the automobile; and (5) equal protection requires that offenses under Vehicle Code section 10851 be treated like violations of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (d)(1), and be reduced to misdemeanors. Finding none of these arguments availing, the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the Petition. View "California v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Marks appealed an order denying his petition for recall and reduction of sentence under Penal Code section 1170.18 and Proposition 47. Defendant contended that his prior convictions for violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350 were eligible for resentencing, and the Court of Appeal should construe his petition as requesting such relief. After review of defendant's arguments on appeal, the Court found that the relief defendant sought was not resentencing for his former convictions, but reclassification of those convictions as misdemeanors. Section 1170.18 provided no procedure for reclassifying prior offenses through a petition for resentencing on a current conviction. Rather, as to the prior offenses, defendant was required to file a petition under section 1170.18, subdivision (f), in the court in which he suffered those convictions. The complaint here showed shows that defendant was convicted of his Health and Safety Code section 11350 offenses in the County of Los Angeles in 1988, 1997, and 1998. Thus, to have those offenses redesignated as misdemeanors, defendant was required to file his petition “before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction,” the Superior Court for Los Angeles County. Finding, therefore, no reversible error in the denial of his petition for recall and reduction of sentence, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Marks" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant guilty of one count of pimping and one count of pandering. The court held a bench trial and found it to be true that defendant committed the offenses while out on bail. The court sentenced defendant to the midterm of four years on the pimping count, stayed imposition of the sentence on the pandering count, and imposed, but stayed, a two year on-bail enhancement. On appeal, defendant raised a single issue: that the court erred by permitting the People’s expert to testify that certain text messages sent from defendant to individuals other than the particular prostitute at issue were consistent with pimping activity. Defendant argued this was improper character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the evidence was relevant to rebut the defense that the prostitute was merely defendant’s girlfriend (a nonpropensity basis for relevance) and thus affirmed. View "California v. Scally" on Justia Law

Appellant Chase C. (a minor) was charged with resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. An adjudication hearing was held, at which the juvenile court found the allegation against Chase to be true. The court adjudged Chase a ward of the court and placed him on formal probation for one year or until Chase's 18th birthday, whichever was longer. These proceedings were instituted over an incident in May 2014, when a San Diego Sheriff's Deputy was conducting a foot patrol through Turtle Park, in the Forest Ranch area of San Diego. The deputy was not in full uniform at the time, but was wearing either an external raid vest with "Sheriff" written on it, or a Sheriff shirt with patches. The deputy was approached by a group of middle school children, who told him that two high school aged children had tried to sell them drugs. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on a novel issue regarding whether Chase (once the deputy caught up with a group of teens matching the middle schoolers' descriptions) who allegedly urged his cohorts not to cooperate with a police investigation, rose to the level of a violation of Penal Code1 section 148. This case called for the Court to determine when a refusal to cooperate with police becomes unlawful interference with police activity under section 148. The Court concluded that refusal to cooperate only becomes criminal when it obstructs lawful police activity. Here, substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding with regard to section 148(a)(1), and reversed. View "In re Chase C." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Leroy Burton III appealed his conviction on one count of first degree murder. Defendant was charged with the first degree murder of Ja’bari Jones and the personal use of a firearm causing death. The information also alleged that defendant had one prior strike conviction and had served three prior felony prison terms. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected: Burton’s contentions that the evidence was insufficient to show that he deliberated and premeditated the killing; that the court erred in its instruction on premeditation and deliberation; and that trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient representation. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court rejected the contention, based on "Morales-Garcia v. Holder," (567 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009)), that intimate partner battery, in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, was not categorically a crime of moral turpitude. The Court concluded that Burton’s two prior convictions for violation of that statute were properly admitted for impeachment purposes. View "California v. Burton" on Justia Law

In 2013, the California Court of Appeal determined that defendant John Tirey was eligible to apply for a certificate of rehabilitation pursuant to Penal Code section 4852.01. After a rehearing, a majority reached the same conclusion. The California Supreme Court granted the Attorney General’s petition for review, and has since transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal to reconsider its decision following "Johnson v. Department of Justice," (60 Cal.4th 871(2015))." In both Tirey I and Tirey II, the appellate court urged the Legislature to give attention to the statutes at issue. A bill was proposed following the issuance of Tirey I, and legislation amending the statutes was enacted after the issuance of Tirey II. Under the language of the relevant statutes as they now read, neither defendant nor a person convicted of committing a similar or more heinous sex crime against a minor would be eligible to apply for a certificate of rehabilitation; as a consequence, no constitutional issues are implicated. The Supreme Court held in "Western Security Bank v. Superior Court," (15 Cal.4th 232 (1997)) that when an appellate court issues an opinion, and the Legislature considers that opinion in clarifying the challenged law, courts are bound to apply the clarified law in the pending case. Doing so here, the Court of Appeal held that defendant was not eligible to apply for a certificate of rehabilitation, and affirmed the trial court’s order. View "California v. Tirey" on Justia Law

The Santa Clara Valley Water District Act vests the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District with the power to impose groundwater extraction fees. Great Oaks Water Company, a water retailer, brought this action challenging such a fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The trial court awarded Great Oaks a complete refund on the groundwater charges paid and, in the alternative, a partial refund, finding that the charge violated the Act and Article 13D of the California Constitution. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding (1) the disputed fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D and thus is subject to some of the constraints of that enactment, but the fee is also a charge for water service and, as such, is exempt from the requirement of voter ratification; (2) Plaintiff’s pre-suit claim did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for the violations of Article 13D found by the trial court; and (3) the trial court erred in treating the matter as a simple action for damages rather than a petition for a writ of mandate and thus failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question of whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

Defendant Lionel Johnson, Jr., while plainly drunk, admitted to the police that he had been driving an SUV that had just plowed into another SUV, injuring five people. In a previous appeal the Court of Appeal held, among other things, that the trial court erred by finding insufficient evidence to require a hearing on defendant’s post-trial motion for disclosure of jurors’ identifying information, because one of the supporting declarations did contain evidence of one instance of juror misconduct. Noting, however, that the declarations were in conflict, the Court directed the trial court to grant a hearing unless it found that that declaration was not credible. On remand, the trial court found that the declaration was not credible and once again denied the motion without a hearing. In this second appeal, defendant’s sole contention was that, in the previous appeal, the Court of Appeal erred by directing the trial court to consider the credibility of the declarations on remand. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court held that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the doctrines of forfeiture, stare decisis, and the law of the case did not prevent the Court from reaching defendant’s contention. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court held that, in deciding whether to hold a hearing on a motion for disclosure of jurors’ identifying information, the trial court must assume that the declarations supporting the motion are credible. The Court overruled its previous opinion to the extent that it held otherwise. Accordingly, the Court directed the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion. View "California v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In a previous decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment terminating Johneisha Kemper's parental rights to her daughter, rejecting Kemper's contention that she received ineffective assistance of her appointed juvenile dependency counsel. Kemper then brought a legal malpractice action against the same appointed juvenile dependency attorneys, their supervising attorney, and the County of San Diego.2 She alleged defendants' legal representation breached the applicable standard of care and caused the termination of her parental rights. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on the collateral estoppel doctrine. The court granted the motion and entered judgment in defendants' favor. Kemper appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed: "Causation is an essential element of a legal malpractice claim, and Kemper is barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine from relitigating the issue of whether her juvenile dependency attorneys caused the termination of her parental rights. We decline Kemper's request that we create a new exception to the collateral estoppel rule based on an analogy to the writ of habeas corpus procedure applicable in juvenile dependency cases." View "Kemper v. Co. of San Diego" on Justia Law