Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Deron Gaines was charged by amended information with second degree vehicle burglary. It was further alleged defendant had suffered seven prior convictions (six felonies and a misdemeanor), and four prior prison terms. A jury found defendant guilty of vehicle burglary and felony theft, and the trial court found the prior conviction allegations to be true. The court sentenced defendant to a split sentence of four years in county jail and two years on mandatory supervision. Defendant challenged the conditions of his probation requiring that he may not: (1) go to any establishment where alcohol is the “chief item of sale,” (2) use or possess any “dangerous drugs,” and (3) own or possess any weapon that can be concealed on his person. Defendant argued these conditions were unconstitutionally vague and therefore violated his due process rights. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that, with the exception of the trial court’s reference to “concealed weapons,” the challenged conditions were unconstitutionally vague. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Gaines" on Justia Law

Natasha B. appealed a juvenile court order that terminated her parental rights to her daughter, T.G. At a dispositional hearing, Natasha was bypassed for reunification services because her rights to her other children had previously been terminated. On appeal, Natasha argued that bypassing her for reunification was improper because the orders terminating services and parental rights with respect to T.G.'s half siblings were on appeal at the time of T.G.'s dispositional hearing, and therefore were not an appropriate basis for bypass. The Court of Appeal found the decision to bypass Natasha for reunification was not improper, and affirmed the juvenile court. View "In re T.G." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit to invalidate the County's ordinance banning marijuana dispensaries, cultivation and storage of medical marijuana in all its zoning districts. Plaintiff argued that the ordinance created an unconstitutional conflict with the right to cultivate, possess and use medical marijuana provided by the Compassionate Use Act (CUA), Health & Saf. Code, 11362.5, and the Medical Marijuana Program (MMP), Health & Saf. Code, 11362.7 et seq. The trial court sustained the County's demurrer without leave to amend. The court concluded that the ban on cultivation adopted under the County’s authority to regulate land use does not conflict with the CUA or the MMP, which do not expressly restrict local government’s authority over land use; in regard to implicit restrictions, the court recognized the statutory provisions contain some ambiguities, but applicable legal principles require a clear indication of the Legislature’s intent to restrict local government’s inherent power to regulate land use; the ambiguous provisions fail to provide such clear indication and therefore the court upheld the County's ban on marijuana dispensaries, cultivation and storage of medical marijuana; and the provision in the ordinance that classifies the cultivation of medical marijuana as a misdemeanor is preempted by California’s extensive statutory scheme addressing crimes, defenses and immunities relating to marijuana. Because plaintiff has stated a narrow cause of action challenging the validity of the criminalization provision, the court reversed the judgment of dismissal. View "Kirby v. County of Fresno" on Justia Law

In early 1993, defendant, then 51 years old, was arrested for possession of methamphetamine; he was also found in possession of drug paraphernalia and a loaded firearm. While on bail in 1993, defendant fired a machine gun and injured a police officer, and the next day shot at an officer and a police dog. A jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) of two counts of attempted murder, two counts of assault on a custodial officer with great bodily injury, unlawful possession of a machine gun, and interfering with a dog being used by a police officer. Defendant’s adult criminal record also included molestation of his 10-year-old stepdaughter, three convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and carrying a concealed weapon. On July 11, 1994, defendant was committed to a state mental hospital. His maximum commitment date was April 5, 2014. When the State's petition to extend defendant's commitment to 2016, he appealed, arguing there was no substantial evidence: (1) that he had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior; (2) that he had a mental disease, defect, or disorder; and (3) that his mental disease, defect, or disorder created a substantial danger of physical harm to others. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal disagreed with these contentions and affirmed the extension. View "California v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant Tuyen Tran appealed a trial court’s denial of his motion to reduce his 2005 felony conviction for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury to a misdemeanor. In 2005, a complaint charged defendant with shooting at an inhabited dwelling. He pled no contest to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (a lesser related offense) and to being a misdemeanant in possession of a firearm. Defendant and Nho Dao got into an argument prior to shots being fired at Dao's home. Dao was not home at the time, but three of his brothers were. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted defendant formal probation. In 2009, defendant filed a motion to terminate probation early, to expunge his record, and to reduce his offense from a felony to misdemeanor. By the time of the hearing on the motions, defendant had successfully completed probation. The trial court denied the motions. Defendant argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that: (1) the trial court violated his due process rights by considering facts that were not elements of the charged offense and were not proven at trial; (2) the plea agreement itself provided the court would declare the offense a misdemeanor and barred the court from considering the facts underlying the offense in a motion to reduce; (3) having performed satisfactorily on probation, he was entitled to all statutory rehabilitation, including having the offense declared a misdemeanor; and (4) the trial court implicitly promised defendant in 2009 that it would grant defendant’s next motion to reduce his felony to a misdemeanor. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) the trial court properly considered the facts underlying the conviction in deciding whether to reduce defendant’s felony conviction to a misdemeanor; (2) the plea agreement did not restrict the trial court’s discretion and did not bar the court from considering the facts underlying the offense in a motion to reduce; (3) defendant was not entitled to have his felony conviction declared a misdemeanor upon successful completion of probation; and (4) the trial court did not promise it would grant defendant’s next motion to reduce his felony to a misdemeanor. View "California v. Tran" on Justia Law

In 2012, petitioner Byron Mason went with his wife, his two children, his dog, and friends to the Shirttail Canyon swimming hole in Foresthill for a party. It was fire season, and numerous fires had started in the surrounding area. Mason lit and threw an aerial firework into the middle of the swimming hole where it initially floated, then exploded, throwing flares in all directions and up in the air. A spark landed on a dry, grassy edge of the cliff about 27 feet above the surface of the pool and ignited some brush. The fire spread quickly and soon expanded beyond control. By the time a fire suppression crew arrived the fire had burned some 500 acres. A firefighter suffered a fracture of his right forearm when a large boulder hit his arm. In all, 2,650 acres of grassland and forest were destroyed. Mason tearfully confessed to law enforcement. Mason was initially charged by complaint with arson, and the lesser offense of unlawfully causing a fire. The arson charges were dismissed at a preliminary hearing and Mason was held to answer on the lesser offense. The People did not file an information in the Superior Court; instead they convened a grand jury and obtained an indictment charging Mason with arson that caused great bodily injury and the burning of an inhabited structure. The grand jury was instructed with a modified version of the standard CALCRIM instructions for an arson that causes great bodily injury and for an arson that causes an inhabited structure to burn. The trial court denied Mason’s motion to set aside the indictment. Mason challenged a modification to the standard instruction, and the grand jury evidence and procedures, claiming in part that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser offense of unlawful burning, and that an indictment does not lie where a complaint is not dismissed and the defendant is held to answer on another charge. He argued that arson required an intent to burn a property, that when he set off the firework he was on an outing with his wife and children to a swimming hole, into which the firework was thrown and did not intend to cause a forest and grassland fire. He claimed that his conduct amounted at most to the lesser offense of unlawfully causing a fire. The Court of Appeal concluded this case turned on the culpable state for arson. Because the Court followed the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of “causes to be burned,” it affirmed the indictment on the ground the grand jury proceedings showed there was probable cause to believe that the natural and highly probable consequence of the act of igniting and throwing a large, unlawful, aerial firework into the swimming hole in the middle of a forest and grassland in extreme fire conditions would be the burning of the forest land. View "Mason v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In November 2009, County of Alameda voters approved Measures I and J levying special parcel taxes by the Albany Unified School District. Plaintiff-appellant Golden Gate Hill Development Company, Inc. was the owner of a parcel of real property in the City of Albany subject to the tax. In February 2014, appellant filed suit against the County and District seeking a refund of taxes paid under the Measures. Golden Gage Hill alleged the tax rates in the Measures were improper because different rates are imposed on residential and nonresidential properties, as well as nonresidential properties of different sizes. The complaint referenced a recent decision in this district, “Borikas v. Alameda Unified School Dist.” (214 Cal.App.4th 135 (2013)), which declared invalid a different parcel tax with similar rate classifications. Respondents moved to dismiss, contending the complaint failed to state a claim because, under Code of Civil Procedure section 860, et seq. (“the validation statutes”), appellant was required to present its claims in a “reverse validation action” within 60 days of passage of the Measures. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Because appellant has not shown there was a basis for its refund claim independent of the alleged invalidity of the Measures, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Golden Gate Hill Development Co. v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

Minor J.B. appealed a condition of probation that the trial court imposed after he was convicted of petty theft. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, J.B. argued the trial court unconstitutionally imposed a condition of probation that required him to permit searches of and disclose all passwords to his electronic devices and social media sites. Because there was no evidence connecting the juvenile’s electronic device or social media usage to his offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct, the Court of Appeal concluded the condition was unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgment to strike this condition. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

The State appealed an order granting the petition of defendant Justin Peacock to reduce his felony conviction of a violation of Penal Code section 496d to a misdemeanor. In February 2012, defendant was charged in a felony complaint with receiving a stolen motor vehicle, and charged with allegations that he had suffered a previous conviction of the same offense in April 2010, and had served three prior prison terms. In April 2012, defendant entered into a plea agreement under which he pled no contest to section 496d, subdivision (a). The agreement provided that the prior allegations would be dismissed, and the district attorney would recommend a 16-month sentence to be served at “half time.” Defendant was sentenced consistently with the plea agreement. The State contends that the trial court’s order was in error because it was unauthorized under Penal Code section 1170.18, and any new sentence was unauthorized. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in redesignating defendant’s offense as a misdemeanor, and accordingly reversed the order. View "California v. Peacock" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether a lease-back financing plan the City of San Diego (City) adopted to fund public infrastructure improvements violated state and local requirements that municipal indebtedness exceeding annual income and revenue be approved by a two-thirds vote of the electorate. San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG) argued the court erred by entering judgment against it in this reverse validation action on the ground the debt limitation provisions were inapplicable under "Rider v. City of San Diego" because the bonds would not be issued by the City, but by a separate public entity formed under a joint powers agreement. SDOG argued "Rider" was factually distinguishable from this case in numerous respects, and thus it was inapplicable. After review, the Court of Appeal was unpersuaded by SDOG's arguments, and affirmed the judgment. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego" on Justia Law