Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that they had violated the duty of loyalty owed to her under the Rules of Professional Conduct by pursuing her business partner's interests in the underlying dissolution and copyright actions. Plaintiff alleged that she had an implied attorney-client relationship with each defendant based on her status as a 50 percent owner of Purposeful Press, the company she and her business partner created. The trial court denied defendants' special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP). In this case, plaintiff's claims arise out of defendants’ breach of professional obligations they allegedly owed to plaintiff as the result of an implied attorney-client relationship arising out of defendants’ representation of Purposeful Press. The court concluded that defendants failed to establish that plaintiff's claims arise from protected activity and did not address the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sprengel v. Zbylut" on Justia Law

The Napa County District Attorney charged Linn with misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol. Linn successfully moved to suppress evidence, claiming she had been unlawfully detained before the police obtained the evidence. The appellate division reversed, concluding Linn’s encounter with the officer who arrested her was consensual until he reasonably suspected she had been driving under the influence. The court of appeal rejected a bright-line rule about an officer’s taking of a voluntarily offered identification card, but found substantial evidence that the officer’s actions in their totality constituted an assertion of his coercive authority before he had any reasonable suspicion to detain Linn. These actions included: stopping within three feet of Linn as she exited her vehicle to talk about her passenger’s flicking ashes out of the vehicle’s window; asking her for her driver’s license without explanation as he commanded her to put out her cigarette and put down her soda can; retaining her driver’s license as he conducted an unexplained record check; and questioning the passenger for personal details that the officer recorded. No objectively reasonable person would believe she was free to end the encounter under the totality of these circumstances, regardless of the officer’s polite demeanor and relatively low-key approach. View "People v. Linn" on Justia Law

Defendant was serving 35 years to life after a jury convicted him as an adult of attempted murder and other charges for robbing and shooting a woman in the face when he was 15 years old. In this appeal, defendant argued, the State conceded, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that a three-year enhancement for great bodily harm under Penal Code section 12022.71 was unauthorized and should have been stayed. This reduced his sentence to 32 years to life. Defendant also contended his overall sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because the sentencing court did not comply with the requirements in "Miller v. Alabama" (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)) and "California v. Caballero," (55 Cal.4th 262(2012)) that it consider his youth and consequent reduced culpability and impose a sentence reflecting these considerations. While the Court of Appeal recognized that considerations of defendant's youth did not, and by statute could not, play a major part in determining his sentence, the sentence passed constitutional muster because he “shall be eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year of incarceration at a youth offender parole hearing” pursuant to section 3051. View "California v. Garcia" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Eric Wolfgang guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a felon. Defendant was sentenced to a total term of one year four months in state prison with credit for time served. In case No. INF028639, the trial court revoked defendant's probation and sentenced defendant to three years in state prison with credit for time served to run concurrently with his sentence in case No. INF1200741. Defendant's sole contention on appeal was that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion in case No. INF1200741. The Court of Appeal rejected this contention and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Wolfgang" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants James Riley and Ryan Robinson appealed their convictions on three counts each of commercial bribery. The charges were based on the premise that Riley, who was the insurance broker for Pechanga Resort and Casino, paid bribes to Robinson, who was the chief financial officer of the casino, in order to permit Riley to charge excessive fees for insurance products he obtained for the casino. On appeal, defendants argued that there was insufficient evidence that they acted “corruptly” (i.e., with the specific intent to injure or defraud Robinson’s employer, as required by the statute). They also argued, in response to the Court of Appeal's request for supplemental briefing, that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions on two of the counts against each of them because the evidence showed that as of the date of those charged offenses, Robinson was no longer employed by Pechanga Resort and Casino. The Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence that Robinson was not employed by Pechanaga Resort and Casino as of the dates alleged in counts 6 through 9 compelled reversal of the defendants’ convictions on those counts. However, the Court also concluded that there was substantial evidence to support their convictions on counts 4 and 5. View "California v. Riley" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Jesse Isom guilty of (1) two counts of burglary (with forgery the crime underlying the burglary convictions); and (2) one count of possessing methamphetamine. Defendant used an altered receipt when returning items for a cash refund at Walmart. Defendant admitted suffering: (1) three prior convictions that resulted in prison terms; and (2) one prior strike conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of four years. Defendant raised three issues on appeal, contending: (1) Walmart’s right to control its receipts was not a legal right protected by the forgery statute, and therefore, defendant’s burglary convictions had to be reversed because defendant’s actions did not damage any legal right; (2) there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the finding that he intended to defraud Walmart; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Isom" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant-respondent, City of Ontario, with the consent of defendant-respondent, City of Rancho Cucamonga, established the Greater Ontario Tourism Marketing District (the GOTMD). The GOTMD was comprised of all lodging businesses operating in the two cities, and its mandate was to market and promote the businesses as "tourist, meeting and event destinations" with assessments imposed on the businesses based on their room rates and rental volumes. Plaintiff-appellant, The Inland Oversight Committee (IOC), sued the cities to invalidate the assessments on the ground they were a "tax" that was not approved by a majority or supermajority of the cities' voters as article XIII C of the California Constitution required. IOC claimed the assessments were either a general tax requiring majority voter approval or a special tax requiring supermajority voter approval. The trial court sustained demurrers, without leave to amend, on the ground that neither IOC nor any of its members had standing to challenge the validity of the assessments. IOC appealed. The cities filed a motion to dismiss the appeal along with their respondent's brief, claiming that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of IOC's appeal because IOC's notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the judgment was entered. The Court of Appeal agreed that IOC's notice of appeal was untimely filed, and it accordingly lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. View "Inland Oversight Com. v. City of Ontario" on Justia Law

Defendant Evan Taylor Armogeda pleaded guilty in 2011 to felony possession of heroin. The court sentenced him to two years in state prison. In 2013, he was released to postrelease community supervision (PRCS) for a period of around three years. In December 2014, while defendant was still serving PRCS, he petitioned under section 1170.18 for the reduction of his 2011 felony conviction to a misdemeanor conviction. Defendant alleged he had completed his sentence. At the hearing on defendant’s section 1170.18 petition, the court found defendant was still serving his sentence because he was still being “supervised by probation.” Accordingly, the court imposed a jail sentence of time served, and imposed one year of parole. The court gave defendant no custody credit against his parole period and fines. The court imposed a $200 state restitution fine and a $200 parole revocation fine. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it resentenced him to a misdemeanor and imposed parole pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivisions (a), (b), and (d). Alternatively, defendant contended his excess custody credits should have been counted against his parole time and outstanding fines. He further argued his restitution fine and parole revocation fine had to be reduced. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s imposition of parole and the court’s setting of the dollar amount of defendant’s restitution fine and parole revocation fine. But the Court of Appeal found that the court erred by failing to credit defendant’s excess custody days against his parole time and eligible fines. Accordingly, this matter was remanded back to the trial court for a recalculation of his parole period and fines. View "California v. Armogeda" on Justia Law

The trial court found the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) lacked authority to supervise defendant Charles Toussain on parole because his commitment offense, failing to register as a sex offender, was not a crime that subjected him to classification as a high-risk sex offender. The court dismissed CDCR’s petition alleging Toussain violated parole by tampering with his electronic monitoring device, and directed that county officials supervise Toussain under the post-release community supervision (PRCS) program. The Attorney General appealed the order dismissing the petition, contending the Legislature authorized CDCR to classify the risk of reoffense posed by all registerable sex offenders released from prison, and therefore the offender’s current commitment offense was not determinative if CDCR has assessed the person as a high-risk sex offender. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the Legislative scheme required parole supervision for anyone CDCR has classified as a high-risk sex offender, regardless of the current commitment offense. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "California v. Toussain" on Justia Law

Defendant Christy Ann Scarbrough was granted probation after she pled no contest to possession of hydromorphone and heroin and admitted an on-bail enhancement. She subsequently violated her probation and pled no contest to felony child endangerment. She was sentenced to state prison, and appealed. Appointed defense counsel asked the Court of Appeal to review the record independently to determine whether there were any arguable issues on appeal. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, the Court affirmed the judgment. The Court chose to publish this decision to address an issue the Court felt was likely to recur. In 2014, California voters approved Proposition 47, which added section 1170.18 to the Penal Code, permitting persons convicted of certain offenses to seek recall and resentencing from the trial court. While this appeal was pending, defendant sought and obtained an order from the trial court pursuant to section 1170.18 ostensibly recalling her sentence on two of the felony convictions that the Court reviewed in this appeal, designating those convictions as misdemeanors, and resentencing her. In light of defendant’s no contest plea, the Court's review was limited to reviewing the propriety of defendant’s sentencing. If the trial court’s resentencing of defendant while her appeal is pending was valid, the Court's review of her sentence for the subsequently recalled convictions would be rendered futile. Therefore, the Court addressed whether section 1170.18 granted the trial court concurrent jurisdiction permitting it to resentence defendant while this appeal was pending before the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence defendant and, therefore, its order ostensibly recalling defendant’s sentence and resentencing her was void. View "California v. Scarbrough" on Justia Law