Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Romeo was living in a garage attached to the home of two probationers. Police conducted a warrantless search of the home, detaining Romeo in handcuffs during the search, and found methamphetamine in the garage. While detained, Romeo admitted the drugs were his. He later pled guilty to possession (Health & Saf. Code, 11377(a)) and appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The court of appeal reversed. The justification for the search, advance consent, based on the probation status of Romeo’s hosts, does not overcome the presumption of unreasonableness. View "People v. Romeo" on Justia Law

Richmond Detective Bailey and a partner were investigating “recent gun violence” when he spotted Douglas in a parked car. He had arrested Douglas in 2011 for a firearms-related offense. Bailey knew Douglas was on post-release community supervision probation (PRCS) because his job required him to regularly monitor who was on probation. Bailey decided to speak with and search Douglas, but did not immediately consult the Automated Regional Information Exchange System. In an apparent attempt to flee, Douglas moved his car forward as Bailey approached on foot. Bailey ordered Douglas to stop. When Douglas’s car stopped, Bailey ordered him out and pinned Douglas between the door and frame. A scuffle ensued. Bailey handcuffed Douglas. Bailey later testified that, as he was handcuffing Douglas, a loaded semiautomatic handgun fell from Douglas’s hand or arm. Rejecting a motion to suppress, the judge found that Bailey had sufficient evidence to make contact and, before a detention was accomplished, Douglas moved the vehicle and increased the probability to believe that he was in violation of his probation or of the law. Douglas entered a guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm and admitted a prior prison commitment and was sentenced to 16 months. The court of appeal affirmed. Bailey’s knowledge gave him an “objectively reasonable belief” Douglas was on PRCS. View "People v. Douglas" on Justia Law

After a school counselor found a bag containing 30-45 orange pills, in Erica's purse, left in the counselor's office during a meeting, the counselor took one pill and called the police. The pill tested positive for amphetamine. A juvenile wardship petition (Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a)), alleged that Erica had possessed ecstasy (Health and Safety Code 11377(a)), a felony. The petition was amended to allege misdemeanor possession of ecstasy, which Erica admitted. The juvenile court adjudged Erica a ward of the court and placed her under the supervision of the probation office, with conditions, including that she submit to blood, breath, or urine tests to detect the presence of drugs and to searches of her vehicle, residence, or electronics. The court stated that “part of that search will include giving your passwords to your [probation officer.]” Erica’s counsel objected that the electronic search condition was overbroad, that there had not been any “issue with social media,” and that Erica did not have a cell phone. The court of appeal struck the condition as unreasonable because there was no evidence connecting an electronic device or social media usage to her offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct. View "In re Erica R." on Justia Law

Defendant Eric Scott Nelson was going through a contentious divorce. After his friend Laura Tatarzyn mentioned getting a hit man to kill her boyfriend, defendant started talking to her about having the same hit man kill his wife. He said to Tatarzyn, "You should ask for a two-for-one deal." Tatarzyn told defendant's wife, who told the police. After an undercover operation, defendant was ultimately arrested for solicitation of murder. While he was in jail, he phoned his wife, in violation of a restraining order. He also phoned his girlfriend and tried to talk her into recanting her statements incriminating him. Defendant was sentenced to a total of eight years in prison, and he appealed. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that defendant could commit solicitation of murder by soliciting Tatarzyn to solicit an unnamed hitman. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court held that defendant's conviction for dissuading a witness had to be reversed; otherwise, the Court found no prejudicial error. The case was remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Four male gang members lured a 15-year-old female victim to the bedroom of a house, got her drunk, then had sex with her against her will. She awoke to find herself on a mattress in a nearby vacant apartment. DNA recovered from the victim was identified as that of defendant Darnell Brown. A female accomplice testified that defendant was not one of the four gang members who participated in the initial rapes. However, she also testified that one “Big Dee” took the victim away from the house. A gang expert testified that defendant was a member of the same gang, with the moniker “Big Dee.” Thus, the prosecution argued to the trial court and to the jury that defendant must have taken the victim over to the vacant apartment and raped her there. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of rape in concert of a minor 14 or older, rape of an intoxicated person, and rape of an unconscious person. He was sentenced to a total of 29 years in prison, along with the usual fines. Defendant raised a number of issue on appeal, including that there was insufficient evidence of force to support the convictions for rape in concert and forcible rape. Within this argument was a preliminary question: whether the Court of Appeal was limited to reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the particular factual scenario that the prosecution argued at trial. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the prosecution’s theory that defendant raped the victim in the vacant apartment, there was insufficient evidence of force in that scenario. On the other hand, despite the accomplice’s denial, there was also sufficient evidence that defendant was one of the men who raped the victim in the bedroom; in that scenario, there was sufficient evidence that defendant’s rape was forcible. "The Supreme Court has made it clear that ordinarily, we can uphold a conviction on any factual theory that is supported by the evidence." The Court concluded that this case came under an exception to that rule: when the prosecution has elected to proceed on one factual theory, and when that election has obviated the need for a unanimity instruction, the Court is bound by the prosecution’s election. Here, because the prosecution’s elected factual theory was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal reversed the rape in concert and forcible rape convictions and modified the judgment accordingly. View "California v. Brown" on Justia Law

Delinquent minor Albert W. timely appeals from an order committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). The minor was made a ward at age 12 based on his May 1, 2008, admission to second degree robbery, after which a petition alleging residential burglary and knowing receipt of stolen property was dismissed with the understanding those charges could be used at disposition. The minor was sent to live with his father in Louisiana under the supervision of the probation department. Two sustained Louisiana petitions followed, alleging simple burglary, simple criminal damage, and disturbing the peace. In Spring 2010, Louisiana authorities closed the minor's case and returned him to his mother in California. Throughout 2011 and 2012, the minor would have multiple run-ins with the law including threatening his mother with a sawed-off shotgun, more burglary charges, and taking a loaded firearm to school. At a dispositional hearing in 2013, the juvenile court committed the minor to DJF for up to five years. On appeal, the minor argued: (1) insufficient evidence supported the finding that he was competent; (2) the most recent sustained petition filed against him was a Louisiana petition that precluded a DJF commitment; (3) he was misadvised about the possible consequences of his admission; and (4) the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to the DJF. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the minor's commitment. View "In re Albert W." on Justia Law

The State appealed an order granting defendant George Faranso a certificate of rehabilitation respecting a sex crime committed in the Michigan for which defendant had been convicted under Michigan law, placed on probation, and ordered to register as a sex offender. On appeal, the State argued that the Superior Court of the State of California: (1) lacked jurisdiction to issue a certificate of rehabilitation pertaining to a conviction from another state; (2) acted in excess of its authority by striking the words "and pardon" from the certificate of rehabilitation and pardon in recognition of the fact it could not issue a pardon; and (3) erred in granting the certificate of rehabilitation where defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief. Finding that defendant indeed did not satisfy the criteria for a certificate of rehabilitation, the Court of Appeal found the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the certificate. The trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Faranso" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant-appellant, Milad Anis Shenouda of committing a lewd act upon Brianna W., a 13-year-old girl. The jury acquitted defendant of felony child molestation against Brianna. The jury also acquitted defendant of charges that he committed sexual battery and sexual battery by restraint against Teri W., Brianna's mother, and acquitted him of the charge of first degree burglary. The trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant to the statutory middle term of six years in state prison. Defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed to present substantial evidence that he touched the victim "with the specific intent of obtaining sexual arousal or gratification." Defendant also appealed the trial court's decisions to deny probation and sentence defendant to the middle term of six years in prison on the ground the court improperly relied on findings that defendant lacked remorse and had committed sexual offenses against Teri and other women who testified at trial under Evidence Code section 1108. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Shenouda" on Justia Law

Defendant Garyon Nettles, was serving an indeterminate life sentence imposed pursuant to the three strikes law. He appealed the trial court's denial of his petition to recall his sentence and for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126, which became effective November 7, 2012, after California voters approved Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. Defendant argued: (1) he was eligible for resentencing under the Act because the crime of assault with intent to commit rape was not listed as a sexually violent offense in 1998 when he was sentenced to serve the present indeterminate life term under the three strikes law; (2) the record was insufficient to establish defendant's prior strike offenses were sexually violent in nature; and (3) defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the question of whether these strikes qualify as sexually violent offenses. Rejecting these arguments, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's conclusion that defendant was disqualified from resentencing. View "California v. Nettles" on Justia Law

Relators filed suit under the California False Claims Act, Gov. Code, 12650 et seq., alleging that DHL overcharged and fraudulently billed the State for delivery services. The trial court concluded that the action was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), and Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). The trial court then granted judgment on the pleadings. After remand from the California Supreme Court, the court concluded that People ex rel. Harris v. PAC Anchor Transportation, Inc. does not apply in this case. The court held, as it had before, that the application of the State Act in this case would constitute an impermissible regulation of DHL’s prices, routes and services in conflict with federal law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Grupp v. DHL Express" on Justia Law