Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a complaint filed in November, 2014, defendant Colette Jean Eandi allegedly failed to appear in August 2014 on a felony charge of possessing a controlled substance, and also alleged an enhancement for committing this offense while released from custody on her own recognizance. She failed to appear for her arraignments in July and August 2014. The trial court issued an arrest warrant. The warrant was served and defendant was taken into custody on October 31, 2014. Defendant told the probation officer that her failure to appear stemmed from transportation difficulties because she does not drive. Defendant entered a plea of no contest the next day in exchange for dismissal of the enhancement with a "Harvey" waiver; the trial court also dismissed the underlying possession charge (case No. CM041535). Defendant was referred to probation for a presentence report. By operation of a November 2014 initiative, defendant's crime of drug possession had been reduced to a misdemeanor at the time of its dismissal on November 5, 2014. On this basis, at sentencing approximately a month later, the trial court concluded that it should amend the charge of a felony violation for failure to appear on felony charges to a misdemeanor violation for failure to appear on misdemeanor charges. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted probation to defendant subject to various conditions. The State appealed. Defendant did not cross-appeal the order of probation. The State argued the trial court's action was unauthorized. The Court of Appeal reduced the principal issue of this case to whether the November 2014 initiative had a collateral retroactive effect such that the pending felony drug possession charge at the time of the breach of promise of failure to appear in August 2014 became a misdemeanor as a matter of law retroactively, thereby negating a necessary statutory element of a failure to appear on a felony charge: having been "charged with . . . the commission of a felony" The Court of Appeal concluded the trial curt lacked authority to amend the complaint in this case to re-designate the offense as involving failure to appear on a pending misdemeanor charge. The order of probation was set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings on the original complaint, at which time the trial court could exercise discretion to reduce the failure to appear violation to a misdemeanor. View "California v. Eandi" on Justia Law

Defendant Malcolm Shepard, Sr. appealed an order denying his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation pursuant to Penal Code section 4852.01. In 1991, defendant pled guilty to the crime of forcible rape and admitted using a firearm in the commission of the offense He was sentenced to six years in state prison and was released on parole in 1994. In 1995, while still on parole, defendant was convicted of one count of possession of cocaine base for sale, one count of possession of a controlled substance for sale, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was sentenced to serve 11 years in state prison and was released on parole in 2004, which was discharged in 2007. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional right to due process by denying the petition in his absence, after the bailiff allegedly told him the petition had already been denied, handed him the court's tentative ruling, and sent him home. "The problem is there is no evidence in the record indicating defendant was sent home, as he claims on appeal." Based on the lack of evidence in the record, the Court could not conclude defendant was deprived of the hearing contemplated by section 4852.01 et seq. in violation of his right to due process. View "California v. Shepard" on Justia Law

The union representing deputy sheriffs in the LA County Sheriff’s Department filed suit to enjoin the LA Times from publishing news reports about the Department’s hiring of officers who used to work for the County’s Office of Public Safety. The trial court granted the Times' anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation), Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, motion. The court concluded that the trial court correctly found that the union's complaint arises from the Times' protected activity, which in this case is news reporting; the trial court correctly found the injunction the union sought would be an unconstitutional prior restraint; the union has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the Times' objections to the union's declarations; and, therefore, the court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Assn. for LA Deputy Sheriffs v. LA Times" on Justia Law

The Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA), Civ. Code,1 1786 et seq., and the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA), Civ. Code 1785.1 et seq., regulate agencies that gather information on consumers to provide to employers, landlords, and others for use by those persons in making employment, rental, and other decisions. This appeal involves investigative consumer reports – background checks – made on employees of First by HireRight. Plaintiff filed suit against First alleging violations of the ICRAA and the trial court dismissed the suit after granting First's motion for summary judgment based on the holding of Ortiz v. Lyon Management Group, Inc. In Ortiz, the appellate court held that the ICRAA was unconstitutionally vague as applied to tenant screening reports containing unlawful detainer information because unlawful detainer information relates to both creditworthiness and character. The court disagreed with the analysis in Ortiz, concluding that there is nothing in either the ICRAA or the CCRAA that precludes application of both acts to information that relates to both character and creditworthiness. Therefore, the court concluded that the ICRAA is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to such information and reversed the summary judgment. View "Connor v. First Student, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from three separate cases: in each case the trial court granted defendant probation. In the first case, the trial court suspended execution of sentence and imposed a restitution fund fine. In the second and third cases, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and imposed a restitution fund fine and a probation revocation fine. The trial court revoked probation in all three cases and, in each case, imposed an additional restitution fund fine of $300 and a parole revocation fine of $300. Defendant Lisa Marie Preston raised a number of issues relative to the imposition of these additional fines. "At its core," this case presented the issue of how these fines should be applied when a sentence is imposed but the trial court suspends execution and, alternatively, how these fines should be applied when the trial court initially suspends imposition of sentence but later imposes a sentence that includes a period of parole. Taking each of these four questions in order, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) when the trial court imposes sentence and suspends execution, and the suspended sentence includes a period of parole, the trial court must impose the parole revocation fine at sentencing; (2) when the trial court initially suspends imposition of sentence and orders a restitution fund fine, the trial court must impose a parole revocation fine when it later imposes a sentence that includes a period of parole; (3) when the sentence includes both a grant of probation and a sentence with a period of parole, the trial court must impose both a probation revocation fine and a parole revocation fine. To the extent that the trial court failed to impose a parole revocation file at resentencing, the Court of Appeal corrected. The Court held that the imposition of parole revocation fines was proper. The parties agreed the trial court was required to lift the stays on the two previously imposed probation revocation fines when it revoked probation in cases 2 and 3. The Court lifted those stays. The Court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred when it imposed a second round of restitution fund fines in the amount of $900. Accordingly, it struck those fines. As modified, the Court affirmed the trial court judgment. View "California v. Preston" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant Albert Amaya was found guilty of attempted extortion; two strike priors were found true, and defendant was sentenced, under the then-current “Three Strikes” law to 25 years to life in prison. A gang allegation was also found true, but it had no effect on the total sentence, and it was not reflected in the abstract of judgment. In 2013, defendant petitioned for resentencing under Proposition 36. Because of the gang finding, he was not actually eligible for resentencing. Nevertheless, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and even the clerk all mistakenly assured the trial court that the gang finding had been stricken. The trial court therefore resentenced him to less than the time he had already served, and he was released from prison. One month later, the State found the mistake. Defendant was brought back into court and re-resentenced to 25 years to life. Defendant appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal held that the reduced sentence was not unauthorized, because all of the evidence that was before the trial court at the time indicated that defendant was entitled to resentencing. Nevertheless, the reduced sentence was void on the face of the record. Accordingly, the trial court had the authority to vacate the reduced sentence and to reimpose the original sentence. View "California v. Amaya" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Kisling appealed a trial court’s denial of his petitions for unconditional and conditional release from his commitment as a sexually violent predator. Appointed counsel for defendant asked the Court of Appeal to review the record pursuant to "California v. Wende," (25 Cal.3d 436 (1979) to determine whether there exist any arguable issues in defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s order. The Court asked the parties for supplemental briefing on whether Wende review applied to appeals from denials of petitions for release from a sexually violent predator commitment. "Wende" applies only to “appointed appellate counsel’s representation of an indigent criminal defendant in his first appeal as of right.” Since proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predator Act are civil matters, it followed that the proceeding in this appeal did not directly implicate "Wende." Defendant admitted that SVPA proceedings were not criminal. Nonetheless, defendant asserted that they were sufficiently similar to criminal proceedings to warrant the protections of "Wende" review. Defendant also argued that "Wende" review was required as a matter of federal and state due process, requires more attention. Finding "Wende" review was inapplicable here, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "California v. Kisling" on Justia Law

Defendant Theodore Soria appealed after a jury found him guilty of rape of an unconscious person and rape of an intoxicated person. Defendant admitted habitual criminal prior serious felony and strike conviction allegations. Defendant was sentenced to a total aggregate term of 11 years. In sentencing defendant, the trial court imposed sentence on count two, but stayed execution of that sentence. On appeal, defendant originally argued that conviction on one of the two counts must be stricken because both counts were based on a single act of intercourse with the victim. The State originally agreed that defendant could not be convicted of two counts, but argued the correct procedure was to consolidate the counts. The Court of Appeal agreed. However, the State requested rehearing subsequent to the filing of the Court's original opinion, contending that "California v. Gonzalez," (60 Cal.4th 533 (2014)) compelled a different result: that defendant could be convicted of two counts and that the counts should not be consolidated or stricken. In addition to arguing about the controlling case law and whether the counts against him should have been consolidated or stricken, defendant also argued: the DNA evidence was unreliable and should not have been admitted; trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the DNA evidence; the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on adoptive admissions; and the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike the prior strike conviction. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred by staying the sentence on one of the rape counts, and held that defendant’s convictions for rape of an intoxicated person and rape of an unconscious person had to be consolidated into a single count reflecting rape under both subdivisions (a)(3) and (a)(4) of Penal Code section 261. In the unpublished portions of this opinion, the Court concluded that defendant forfeited his objection to the DNA evidence, and in any event that evidence was admissible and defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by not objecting to the DNA evidence. The Court also concluded that the trial court did not err in instructing on adoptive admissions and did not abuse its discretion when it refused to dismiss the strike allegation. The Court modified the judgment to order imposition of mandatory fees and assessments not imposed by the trial court. View "California v. Soria" on Justia Law

Real-party-in-Interest Johnny Morales was sentenced to the death penalty. He requested that the trial court enter an order requiring multiple public agencies to "preserve" 22 categories of documents and other materials he alleged pertained in some way to the proceedings upon which he received his sentence. The State petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction to make such an order absent any pending proceeding. The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court's order was made in order, and granted the State's petition for relief. View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Darius Knight was convicted by jury of robbery, and the jury found not true the special allegation that he inflicted great bodily harm on the victim. The robbery was his third strike, and as a result, was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in a posttrial, presentence "Marsden" hearing when the trial court advised defendant he would waive his right to remain silent if he discussed the circumstances of the robbery. Defendant argued the trial court's warning effectively prevented him from fully articulating the reasons his counsel had been ineffective. The Court of Appeal found that the judge's warning was erroneous and that on this record the Court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a second Marsden hearing. View "California v. Knight" on Justia Law