Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After defendant Jesse David Perez was released on his own recognizance (OR) on a felony drug charge, he was convicted of both the drug and felony failure to appear (FTA) charges and sentenced to prison. He appealed, voluntarily dismissed his appeal, and his conviction became final in early 2014. Later that year, California voters passed Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (the Act), which, among other things, reduced defendant's drug charge to a misdemeanor. Defendant petitioned to modify his drug sentence under the Act, and also sought to have the FTA reduced to a misdemeanor, reasoning that because the underlying charge was now a misdemeanor "for all purposes," the FTA should have been reduced to a misdemeanor. The trial court reduced the drug charge to a misdemeanor, declined to reduce the FTA, and sentenced defendant to prison based on the felony FTA. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the Legislature deemed willfully failing to appear more serious when the underlying charge was a felony. The outcome of the underlying charge is irrelevant to the degree of the FTA crime. The Court found nothing in the Act changed this view. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant's sentence. View "California v. Perez" on Justia Law

Defendant Tywayne Whitaker appealed a combined sentence that the trial court imposed after Whitaker committed a crime while on probation. Whitaker pled guilty to a new charge, and the trial court revoked Whitaker's probation in the earlier case. The court sentenced Whitaker to a combined term of 13 years eight months in state prison. Whitaker's sole contention on appeal related to the number of conduct credits the trial court awarded him for the time he spent in custody prior to sentencing: Whitaker argued that the trial court improperly calculated his conduct credits by using a two-for-two formula, rather than a one-for-one formula. He asserted that he was entitled to 327 days of custody credits, corresponding with the 327 days that he had served in custody at the time of his sentencing, based on one day of conduct credit for each day actually served in custody. Upon review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Whitaker's contention, and affirmed the trial court. View "California v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Under former Welfare and Institutions Code section 3200, a trial court could dismiss the criminal charges against a defendant who successfully completed a commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) and the dismissal had (with one exception not applicable here) “the same force and effect as a dismissal under Section 1203.4 of the Penal Code.” In this case, defendant Rickey Gross contended the dismissal of the criminal charges against him pursuant to former section 3200 following his successful completion of a CRC commitment operated to release him from the obligation to pay restitution to the victims of his crimes because direct victim restitution “qualifies as a ‘penalty and disability’ pursuant to . . . section 1203.4.” The Court of Appeal disagreed: the obligation to make a victim whole through direct victim restitution was a constitutional mandate that served to protect public safety and welfare, rather than to punish the defendant, and thus it was not a penalty or disability from which a defendant is released upon the dismissal of criminal charges pursuant to former section 3200 or section 1203.4. View "California v. Gross" on Justia Law

In 2014 California voters passed Proposition 47, which reclassified certain offenses from felonies to misdemeanors. Proposition 47 also enacted Penal Code section 1170.18, which created a procedure whereby a defendant who suffered a felony conviction of one of the reclassified crimes could petition to have his or her conviction redesignated a misdemeanor. After the passage of Proposition 47, Alejandro N. filed a section 1170.18 petition to change his juvenile felony adjudication to a misdemeanor. The superior court agreed that Alejandro's offense qualified as a misdemeanor for purposes of section 1170.18's sentence reduction provisions. Based on Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 (which provided that a juvenile offender could not be physically confined longer than an adult offender for the same offense) the court reduced Alejandro's maximum period of confinement to the misdemeanor level. However, the court declined to reclassify Alejandro's offense from a felony to a misdemeanor under section 1170.18's offense reclassification provisions, ruling that because section 1170.18 used the adult offender terminology of "conviction," the statute did not apply to juvenile offenders. Alejandro filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the superior court's ruling. Upon review, the Court of Appeal held that the offense reclassification provisions set forth in section 1170.18 applied to juveniles. Based on the reclassification of his offense from a felony to a misdemeanor, Alejandro also requested that the superior court: (1) order his DNA sample and information removed from the state's data base; and (2) reduce his fine to a misdemeanor level. The Court of Appeal agreed that a reclassified misdemeanor offense under Proposition 47 could not alone support retention of DNA materials in the state's DNA data bank, and the Court directed the superior court to expunge Alejandro's DNA unless there was another basis to retain it apart from his mere commission of the reclassified misdemeanor offense. As to Alejandro's request for a fine reduction, he did not refute the trial court's finding that his $50 fine was already at the misdemeanor level. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal granted the petition in part and directed the superior court to (1) reclassify Alejandro's felony offense as a misdemeanor, and (2) reconsider his request for DNA expungement. The Court denied the petition as to his request for fine reduction. View "Alejandro N. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2014 California voters passed Proposition 47, which reclassified certain offenses from felonies to misdemeanors. Proposition 47 also enacted Penal Code section 1170.18, which created a procedure whereby a defendant who suffered a felony conviction of one of the reclassified crimes could petition to have his or her conviction redesignated a misdemeanor. In August 2011 defendant Jaime Pinon pleaded guilty to a felony possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor possession of controlled substance paraphernalia. In support of the plea, he stated, “On 8/12/11, I willfully and unlawfully possessed: (1) a usable quantity of methamphetamine, a controlled substance and (2) a pipe used for smoking a controlled substance.” The court sentenced defendant to a state prison term of 16 months on count 1, and suspended imposition of sentence on count 2. Upon defendant’s release from prison, he was placed on post-release community supervision (PRCS). His PRCS was set to expire in April 2015. In December 2014, defendant petitioned to reduce count 1 to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (f), or, in the alternative, subdivision (a). The court granted defendant’s petition under subdivision (a) and sentenced defendant to 545 days in county jail (thus imposing a 180-day jail term on count 2 that had previously been suspended, and running that term consecutively), credited him for the full 545 days, and, over defendant’s objection, imposed one year of parole. Defendant appealed and argued the court should not have imposed parole, or, in the alternative, should have imposed a shorter period of parole. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the latter contention and remanded for a recalculation of defendant’s maximum parole period. View "California v. Pinon" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Francis LaBlanc was currently committed for an indeterminate term of treatment as a sexually violent predator (SVP). In this appeal, LaBlanc challenged the trial court’s order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 6608, subdivision (a), denying, as frivolous, his petition for unconditional discharge. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion. Therefore, the Court reversed the order and remanded for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the petition. The Court denied defendant’s request that on remand the hearing be assigned to a different judge. View "California v. LaBlanc" on Justia Law

Shortly after his birth in 2003, the County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) placed a dependent child named J.J. with appellant Rita Marshall. Marshall cared for J.J. for two and a half years and began the process of adopting him. However, in June 2006, the Agency commenced proceedings that led to J.J.'s removal from Marshall's care and his placement in another home for adoption. Marshall filed this action against the County of San Diego and several County social workers who were involved in the proceedings that led to J.J.'s removal. In the causes of action relevant to this appeal, Marshall brought two claims pursuant to 42 United States Code section 1983 claiming her right to due process in removing J.J. without providing her adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, and in making deliberately false statements to the trial court that led to the removal. Marshall also brought a section 1983 claim against the County, alleging that the social workers violated her constitutional rights pursuant to a County custom or policy. The trial court concluded that the social workers were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Marshall's claims against them because there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the social workers had violated Marshall's "clearly established" constitutional rights. The court also concluded that the County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Marshall's section 1983 claim. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that Marshall had a clearly established constitutional right not to have J.J.'s placement terminated based on a social worker's statement that was either deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for its truth. However, the Court concluded further that the social workers were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Marshall's claims premised on this theory of liability because there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that that J.J.'s placement with Marshall was terminated based on statements that were either deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for their truth. The Court rejected the remainder of Marshall's other claims, and affirmed the judgment. View "Marshall v. Co. of San Diego" on Justia Law

Castaic appealed a judgment dismissing its petition for writ of mandate. In the writ petition, Castaic sought to overturn certain action taken by Newhall on the ground that Newhall failed to comply with the open meeting requirements of the Ralph M. Brown Act, Gov. Code, 54950 et seq. The court affirmed the judgment dismissing the petition, concluding that there was no Brown Act violation by Newhall because the given notice substantially complied with the Act. In this case, although the given notice erroneously cited subdivision (c) of section 54956.9 instead of subdivision (d)(4), it adequately advised the members of the public that on March 14, 2013, the Newhall Board would be meeting with its legal counsel, in closed session, to discuss potential litigation in two cases. View "Castaic Lake v. Newhall Co. Water Dist." on Justia Law

Defendants and appellants James William Riley and Ryan Jay Robinson appeal their convictions on three counts each of commercial bribery. The charges were based on the premise that Riley, who was the insurance broker for Pechanga Resort and Casino, paid bribes to Robinson, who was the chief financial officer of the casino, in order to permit Riley to charge excessive fees for insurance products he obtained for the casino. On appeal, defendants argued there was insufficient evidence that they acted “corruptly,” (i.e., with the specific intent to injure or defraud Robinson's employer), as required by the applicable statute. They also argued there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions on two of the counts against each of them because the evidence showed that as of the date of those charged offenses, Robinson was no longer employed by Pechanga Resort and Casino. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence that Robinson was not employed by Pechanaga Resort and Casino as of the dates alleged in counts 6 through 9 compelled reversal of the defendants' convictions on those counts. However, the Court also concluded that there was substantial evidence to support their convictions on counts 4 and 5. View "California v. Riley" on Justia Law

Defendants Jose Rivas and Aaron Valadez participated with other Norteño gang members in an attack on Osvaldo Hernandez and Victor Arechiga. Gang members stole beer that Arechiga had just purchased. After the beer had been taken, defendant Valadez trapped Hernandez in the driver’s seat of Hernandez’s car while defendant Rivas reached in from the passenger side and slashed Hernandez’s face. Hernandez identified defendant Rivas as the one who slashed him, and defendant Valadez was identified as a participant in the attack by his palm print found on the driver’s side window of Hernandez’s car. In the published part of this opinion, the Court of Appeal found no merit in defendant Valadez’s contention that the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting fingerprint evidence even though, according to him, the scientific community has rejected the reliability of fingerprint evidence. In the unpublished part of the opinion, the Court concluded that two restitution fines had to be vacated, but in every other respect found no other reversible error. View "California v. Rivas" on Justia Law