Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2013, defendant-appellant Zackariah Borynack pled guilty to one count of possession of a destructive device; 39 counts of possession of a destructive device and explosive; one count of possession of substances with the intent to make a destructive device and explosive without a permit; one count of possession of a zip gun; and one count of possession of a shuriken. The trial court sentenced him to two years for possession of a destructive device and concurrent two-year terms on all remaining counts. After applying defendant’s 117 days of custody credits, the court suspended execution of the entire remaining sentence and placed him on mandatory supervision. On appeal, the State challenged the court’s sentence as unlawful, contending that while defendant’s crimes were subject to local custody confinement by statute, Penal Code section 18780 prohibited suspending execution of his sentence to place him on mandatory supervision. The Court of Appeal agreed with the State and reversed. View "California v. Borynack" on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit against defendants, alleging that they were denied service at respondents' restaurant due to their service dog. The trial court concluded that appellants could assert a claim under the Disabled Persons Act (DPA), Civ. Code, 54 - 55.3., but not under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act), Civ. Code, 51, 52. The trial court sustained a demurrer and granted summary adjudication to respondents. Determining that the order of dismissal is appealable, the court concluded that because there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between the Unruh Act and the DPA, a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination relating to the use of a service dog may assert claims under both statutory schemes, subject to any specific limitations stated in them. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Flowers v. Prasad" on Justia Law

When voters chose to incorporate the City of Wildomar, voters also chose to elect city council members via by-district elections. In November 2009, voters chose to replace the by-district voting system with an at-large voting system. Plaintiffs Martha Bridges and John Burkett sued Wildomar for modifying the by-district means of electing city council members, arguing: (1) the modification of the voting system violated Government Code sections 57378, 34884, and 34871; and (2) the modification of the voting system was preempted by the California Constitution. The trial court granted Wildomar’s motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the trial court erred because: (1) the modification of the voting system violated state statutes; (2) the modification of the voting system was preempted by the California Constitution; (3) Wildomar lacked the authority to repeal enactments that predated its existence as a city; and (4) the modification was invalid because the relevant ordinance does not contain a severability clause. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Bridges v. City of Wildomar" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Joel Morales was tried by jury and found guilty of second degree murder. The jury found true the allegation that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon. Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison with the one-year enhancement. On appeal, defendant argued a police station interview turned custodial when officers pre-Miranda repeatedly accused defendant of lying and being deceitful, after informing defendant he failed a polygraph test. Defendant further contended the officers' subsequent midstream Miranda advisement was ineffective because his statements pre-Miranda were coerced, and thus all of his post-Miranda statements made during the same interview also should have been excluded. Concluding independently from the totality of the circumstances that after defendant took and (allegedly) failed the polygraph test, the Court of Appeal concluded a reasonable person in defendant's position would surmise that he or she was not free to leave the station. Furthermore, the Court concluded there was no substantial evidence to support the finding defendant's statements at the police station post-Miranda were uncoerced or were otherwise the product of his own free will. In light of its conclusion that the police subjected defendant to custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda when they questioned him for several hours at the police station, the Court also independently concluded the courthouse statements defendant made to the police four days later should have been suppressed as the product of such violation, as the record showed defendant was not given an additional Miranda advisement before questioning resumed. Lastly, the Court concluded the error in failing to exclude defendant's stationhouse and courthouse statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's conviction was reversed and the case remanded back to the trial court with directions to vacate its order denying defendant's motion to suppress and for further proceedings. View "California v. Morales" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Sigur was convicted by jury on eleven counts of contacting or communicating with a monir, kidnapping for the purpose of a lewd act, first-degree burglary, lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under fourteen and for failing to register as a sex offender. After meeting in an Internet chat room, defendant engaged in a sexual relationship with a thirteen-year-old girl for approximately two months, including in the home where the victim lived with her mother and grandmother after secretly entering through the victim’s bedroom window for that purpose. The trial court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of 103 years in prison plus an indeterminate term of 550 years to life. On appeal, defendant argued that: (1) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by misstating the law regarding reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s section Penal Code 1118.1 motion for judgment of acquittal as to the burglary counts because the evidence showed that the victim consented to his entry into the home knowing his intent to engage in sexual acts with her; (3) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by misstating the law regarding the consent defense to burglary; (4) the cumulative effect of the prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal of the burglary counts; (5) section 288.3 was unconstitutionally vague; (6) section 288.3 was unconstitutionally overbroad; and (7) the fifteen-year enhancement imposed under section 667.8, subdivision (b), had to be stayed because sentence was stayed on the underlying count. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the enhancement under 667.8, subdivision (b), had to be stayed. The Court rejected each of defendant’s other contentions. View "California v. Sigur" on Justia Law

John Beckemeyer was convicted of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. The offenses occurred during an incident in which he assaulted a woman he had been dating and her son. At sentencing, the trial court issued a 10-year protective order restraining defendant from having contact with the mother and son. The postconviction protective order was authorized in domestic violence cases pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1). Defendant argued on appeal that the protective order must be stricken as to the son because the son (unlike his mother) did not qualify as a domestic violence victim. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the statute encompasses a person, like the son, who was actually assaulted during the domestic violence incident, and who accordingly meets the broad definition of "victim" set forth in the statutory scheme. View "California v. Beckemeyer" on Justia Law

Esteban Nunez aided in the killing of Luis Santos in 2008. The attack took place near the campus of San Diego State University. Among other acts of violence, one of Esteban Nunez’s cohorts stabbed Luis Santos in the chest severing an artery in his heart after which Luis Santos almost immediately bled to death. Pursuant to a plea agreement entered into on the eve of trial, Esteban Nunez pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in the death of Luis Santos and pled guilty to two counts of assault with a deadly weapon arising from his having personally stabbed two other young men. In June 2010, he was sentenced to serve 16 years in prison. On January 2, 2011, his last day in office as Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger exercised his executive clemency power by commuting the prison sentence of Esteban Nunez from 16 years to seven years. The commutation came as a complete surprise to the crime victims and the prosecuting district attorney. Frederico and Kathy Santos, Luis' parents, were among those victims who sought to invalidate the commutation, arguing crime victims and district attorneys must receive notice and opportunity to be heard before a grant of executive clemency, pursuant to the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008, also known as Marsy’s Law, adopted by voter initiative Proposition 9 in 2008, amending California Constitution, article I, section 28, and statutes. The trial court concluded Marsy’s Law did not apply to a Governor’s clemency decision and entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Arnold Schwarzenegger, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, its director Matthew Cate, and prison warden William Knipp. After review of the case, the Court of Appeal felt "compelled to conclude that, while Schwarzenegger’s conduct could be seen as deserving of censure and grossly unjust," it was not illegal. "Marsy’s Law, despite its obviously expansive protection of victims’ rights does not restrict the executive’s clemency powers under California Constitution, article V, section 8, subdivision (a) or the clemency statutes." The Court therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Santos v. Brown" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Gary DeGraff and Veronica DeHoyos of possession of methamphetamine. The trial court suspended imposition of their sentences for three years and granted them formal probation. They both appealed. DeGraff argued his conviction should have been reversed because the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence against him. DeHoyos argued recent amendments to Health and Safety Code section 11377 required a reduction of her conviction to a misdemeanor and a remand for resentencing. The Court of Appeal was unpersuaded by either of these contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. DeHoyos" on Justia Law

Appellant has appealed his felony conviction for multiple counts of forgery and grand theft and is currently serving a sentence for his conviction. Following his sentencing, in November 2014, the California voters enacted Proposition 47, entitled “the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act.” Appellant tried to take advantage of Proposition 47’s postconviction procedure by petitioning the trial court to reduce the felony sentence for one of his forgery counts to a misdemeanor. The trial court declined to do so, on the ground it lacked jurisdiction to recall the sentence while appellant’s case was pending on appeal. Appellant and similarly situated defendants had a tactical legal choice: on one hand, they could wait to seek Proposition 47 relief until they complete their appeals from the underlying judgment of conviction (but by then, it might be too late to gain any benefit from a sentencing reduction because they already will have served the time in question). On the other hand, they could give up any pending appeal in order to obtain speedy Proposition 47 relief from the trial court. The Court of Appeal surmised there was a way out of this jurisdictional conundrum: a discretionary remand by the Court of Appeal to the trial court for the sole and express purpose of determining, within a specified time frame, a Proposition 47 petition to recall a sentence. The Court concluded it had the authority pursuant to Penal Code section 12601 to effectuate the resentencing provisions in Proposition 47 in a timely manner. The Court granted appellant’s motion for a limited remand, and stayed the pending appeal for a short period of time to allow the trial court to conduct a Proposition 47 postconviction hearing. View "California v. Awad" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Vukodinovich was the 73-year-old bus driver for Yolo Employment Services, a nonprofit agency providing work activity programs, job training, and job retention for individuals with disabilities, who was entrusted with taking clients to and from work. "L." was a 49-year-old female client of Yolo Employment Services with a mental age of three or four and an IQ of 37 who rode defendant’s bus. From 2009 through 2012, defendant and L. carried on a sexual relationship. Defendant was prosecuted for the sex acts on the sole theory that L. was incapable of giving legal consent. The jury found defendant guilty of one count of sexual intercourse, one count of attempted sexual intercourse, five counts of oral copulation, and four counts of digital penetration, all with a person who “is incapable, because of a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability, of giving legal consent.” The court sentenced defendant to 14 years in prison. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s contentions that these penal laws impinged on his and L.’s rights to privacy, and that there was insufficient evidence of a lack of legal consent to support these convictions. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court rejected defendant’s other contentions. View "California v. Vukodinovich" on Justia Law