Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a prior litigation, FLIR filed suit against their former employees for, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets. After the former employees prevailed in the underlying action, they obtained a ruling that the misappropriation of trade secrets claim had been brought against them in bad faith, which resulted in an order that FLIR pay the former employees their attorney fees and costs in an amount exceeding $1.6 million. Thereafter, the former employees brought the instant malicious prosecution action against Latham, the attorneys who had represented FLIR in the underlying action. The trial court granted Latham's motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the so-called anti-SLAPP statute. The former employees principally contend that the interim adverse judgment rule does not preclude this malicious prosecution action because the trial court’s finding of bad faith after a bench trial in the underlying action negates its prior ruling denying summary judgment. The court concluded that this hindsight approach is inconsistent with a core principle of the interim adverse judgment rule - namely, that an interim ruling on the merits establishes probable cause in the underlying action, even though that ruling is later reversed by the trial court, a jury, or an appellate court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Parrish v. Latham & Watkins" on Justia Law

In a prior litigation, FLIR filed suit against their former employees for, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets. After the former employees prevailed in the underlying action, they obtained a ruling that the misappropriation of trade secrets claim had been brought against them in bad faith, which resulted in an order that FLIR pay the former employees their attorney fees and costs in an amount exceeding $1.6 million. Thereafter, the former employees brought the instant malicious prosecution action against Latham, the attorneys who had represented FLIR in the underlying action. The trial court granted Latham's motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the so-called anti-SLAPP statute. The court reversed, agreeing with the former employees that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 is not the appropriate statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action, and that the former employees have presented sufficient evidence that they otherwise have a probability of prevailing. View "Parrish v. Latham & Watkins" on Justia Law

In March 2014, defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance. In April 2014, he was sentenced to 16 months in state prison. In August 2014, he was released to postrelease community supervision (PRCS) for a period of three years. In November 2014, defendant filed a petition to have his sentence recalled and to have his felony conviction reclassified as a misdemeanor. The court recalled his sentence, imposed a jail sentence of time served, and imposed one year of parole. In 2014 California voters passed Proposition 47, which reclassified certain offenses from felonies to misdemeanors. Proposition 47 also enacted a procedure whereby a defendant who suffered a felony conviction for one of the reclassified offenses could petition to have the conviction redesignated a misdemeanor. If the defendant was still serving a sentence, the defendant could have the sentence recalled and be given a misdemeanor sentence instead. Defendants who were resentenced are subject to one year of parole unless the court, in its discretion, waived the parole requirement. On appeal of his convictions, defendant argued he was not still serving a sentence and thus the court had no authority to impose parole, but could only redesignate the conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor. In the alternative, defendant argued his excess custody credits should have been counted against his parole time. The Court of Appeal disagreed with his first contention and concluded he was still serving his sentence when he petitioned to recall the felony conviction. However, the Court agreed he was entitled to credit his excess custody time against his parole. Furthermore, the Court agreed with defendant’s contention that he was entitled to have excess custody days credited against his fines. The case was remanded for a recalculation of his parole period and fines. View "California v. Morales" on Justia Law

Defendant served a two-year prison term and was released on parole to Sutter County. Thereafter, in violation of his parole conditions, defendant cut off his global positioning system (GPS) monitor and possessed pepper spray. The Sutter County District Attorney brought parole revocation proceedings, and during the proceedings defendant moved to modify his parole conditions so that he could reside in Butte County. The district attorney supported the motion, pointing out that defendant’s last legal residence was Butte County, that treatment and rehabilitation programs are available in Butte County, and that the plan was to place him in Butte County, but “for some reason,” he was placed in Sutter County instead. No one at the parole revocation hearing, including the district attorney and the parole agent, objected to the parolee’s request to reside in Butte, rather than Sutter, County. The trial court revoked his parole, and pursuant to section 3000.08 of the Penal Code, amended as a part of the Public Safety Realignment Act (Realignment Act), changed the conditions of his parole, including his county of residency. The court expressly stated it was not changing his parole placement. The Attorney General thereafter intervened on behalf of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and moved to vacate the condition that allowed defendant to reside in Butte County. The district attorney opposed the motion. The Attorney General argued, as she did on appeal, that by enacting the Realignment Act the Legislature did not intend to give superior courts the authority to transfer violent parolees to other counties without regard for the advance notice requirements of section 3058.6 or to abandon the comprehensive statutory scheme governing parolee placement (section 3003). As a matter of law and despite the many good reasons justifying the trial court’s order, the Court of Appeal agreed with the Attorney General and issued a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its order granting defendant’s motion to reside in Butte County. View "Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Evilsizor and Sweeney married in 2010. Sweeney claimed that her son from a previous marriage had access to her cell phones, which were not password protected. The couple’s daughter was born in 2012. Sweeney became concerned that he might not be the child’s biological father after he read a message on his stepson’s phone, indicating that Evilsizor had received fertility treatments without his knowledge. He downloaded the contents of Evilsizor’s phones and confronted her. He went, uninvited, to the home of Evilsizor’s parents and disclosed private, sensitive information about Evilsizor. The parties separated; dissolution proceedings were initiated. Evilsizor sought to increase Sweeney’s support payments on the ground that her income had decreased because her father had fired her from her job with his company. Sweeney alleged that Evilsizor had colluded with her parents to make it appear she had been fired. Sweeney attached text messages supporting his opposition. Evilsizor sought a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act to stop Sweeney from further disseminating the downloaded information. Finding that Sweeney’s actions amounted to abuse under the DVPA, the trial court prohibited Sweeney from distributing the information without court permission. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the order did not violate Sweeney’s constitutional rights to free speech. View "Evilsizor v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

One day in the summer of 2012, petitioner was at an Albertson's grocery store in Irvine. He snuck up behind a woman in the frozen food isle, reached under her dress with his cell phone and started videotaping. Although petitioner fled the scene, the store manager called the police and provided police with a surveillance DVD of the incident. Petitioner admitted using his cell phone to videotape underneath the victim's dress. He also admitted doing the same thing to various other women at the store about six times in the previous three months. The arresting officer in the supermarket matter, Irvine Police Officer T. Goodbrand, prepared a report detailing his investigation of the supermarket incident. Police Officer S. Crawford prepared a four-page supplemental report that became important in how this case has played out. Three other instances of "inappropriate touching" were referenced in the supplemental report (as pertinent here, the case number of one of the three cases was 11-14086). Based on this information, the District Attorney of Orange County charged petitioner with two misdemeanor offenses stemming from the supermarket incident. Petitioner retained Brian Gurwitz, a former senior deputy district attorney, to represent him on the case. Gurwitz personally requested discovery from deputy district attorney Tina Patel while she was handling misdemeanor arraignments in the superior court. Patel provided Gurwitz with Officer Goodbrand's police report, which actually contained information from several different officers. The sentencing court sentenced petitioner in accordance with the terms of a plea agreement worked out by the parties. After sentencing, Patel received a call from the Irvine police informing her they were now able to "make [a] case" against petitioner in case number 11-14086. The district attorney then filed a two-count felony complaint against petitioner alleging petitioner committed a forcible lewd act against two girls under the age of 14. A week later, Gurwitz filed a nonstatutory motion to dismiss the complaint. Because case 11-14086 was referenced in the police report in petitioner's misdemeanor case, Gurwitz argued it was resolved by virtue of petitioner's plea in that case. The prosecution argued the plea was unenforceable and subject to rescission because it was based on fraud and mistake of fact. The prosecution also claimed it would violate public policy to read the plea agreement so as to preclude prosecution of the felony child molestation charges. In this writ proceeding, the issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' review centered on whether the State could rescind the misdemeanor plea agreement under which they agreed not to pursue certain felony charges against petitioner. The Court disagreed with the State's argument, and granted petitioner's request to enforce the deal. View "Amin v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant Taheedah Forrest physically attacked and threatened her sister-in-law, Patria Smith, who was testifying as a prosecution witness against Forrest's brother (Smith's husband) during his robbery trial. IA jury convicted Forrest of: (1) dissuading a witness (Smith) from testifying; and (2) making a criminal threat. As to count 1 the jury found to be true an allegation that Forrest committed and attempted to commit that offense through the use of force and an express and implied threat of force. The court sentenced Forrest to three years' formal probation, conditioned on her serving 365 days in jail with credit for time already served. On appeal, Forrest challenged her convictions, contending: (1) the court prejudicially erred by allowing an investigator to testify for the prosecution that he had conducted a threat assessment for the district attorney's office and had determined that Smith should be placed in a witness protection program; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by prejudicially engaging in impermissible vouching in violation of Forrest's federal constitutional right to due process; and (3) the court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of attempting to make a criminal threat. Forrest also argued that three conditions of her probation were unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad and had to be either stricken or modified. In addition, Forrest argued that both an October 28, 2013 minute order and an October 28 probation order had to be corrected to reflect the court's oral pronouncement of sentence that she serve 365 days (not 372 days) in local custody as a condition of her probation. The Attorney General acknowledges the minute order and probation order needed to be corrected to conform to the oral pronouncement of judgment. After review, the Court of Appeal modified condition 12.g. of Forrest's probation in order to avoid unconstitutional overbreadth, and affirmed the judgment as so modified. However, the Court remanded the matter to the superior court with directions to correct the October 28 minute order and the October 28 probation order to reflect the court's oral pronouncement of sentence that she serve 365 days in local custody as a condition of her probation. View "California v. Forrest" on Justia Law

A jury found Billy Charles White guilty of rape of an intoxicated person and of rape of an unconscious person. The trial court sentenced White to three years in state prison and ordered him to register as a sex offender. White argued on appeal: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to prove under Penal Code section 261 that when he engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim, he knew the victim was unable to resist because of intoxication (count 1) or because the victim was unconscious of the nature of the act of intercourse (count 2); (2) the trial court prejudicially erred by refusing both to instruct the jury on mistake of fact and to grant his new trial motion based on juror misconduct; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied him probation. On its own motion, the Court of Appeal requested supplemental briefing from the parties whether White's convictions on counts 1 and 2 should have been consolidated under "California v. Craig," (17 Cal.2d 453 (1941))and its progeny into a single conviction given there was a single act of sexual intercourse. In an unpublished opinion filed April 10, 2013, the Court rejected White's contentions on appeal. After considering the supplemental briefing of the parties, the Court concluded that White was not properly convicted both on counts 1 and 2 and further, that the judgment had to be modified to reflect only one conviction for violation of section 261. The California Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review, but deferred further action on the matter pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in "California v. Gonzalez," (60 Cal.4th 533 (2014)). After the court issued its opinion in that matter, it transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to reconsider the case in light of Gonzalez. The appellate court complied with the Supreme Court's direction and affirmed the judgment as modified. Specifically, the Court of Appeal concluded that "Gonzalez" did not hold that White can be convicted of both rape of an intoxicated person and rape of an unconscious person based on a single act of intercourse under section 261. As such, the second count for rape was stricken. The judgment as modified was affirmed. View "California v. White" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Gabriel L. Roman and his live-in caregiver and former wife, filed suit alleging BRE had engaged in disability discrimination when the Romans attempted to view available units at the Villa Azure apartment complex. The court concluded that summary judgment was properly granted based on the Romans' failure to present any evidence that Gabriel suffered from a disability; the Romans did not request a continuance of the summary judgment hearing and have forfeited their argument on appeal; and the order awarding costs to BRE must be reconsidered in light of Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire District. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment on the merits in favor of BRE; reversed the postjudgment order awarding costs; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Roman v. BRE Properties" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Arturo Noriega raped and sodomized his girlfriend's stepdaughter from 2003 until 2010. Defendant was convicted of nine counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child by means of rape, for which he was sentenced to consecutive 15-years-to-life sentences on each count for a total state prison sentence of 135 years to life. He was ordered to pay a $10,000 restitution fine within the meaning of section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1), and a stayed parole revocation fine in the same amount was also imposed pursuant to section 1202.45. Defendant argued on appeal of his conviction and sentences: (1) the stepdaughter's direct testimony should have been stricken in its entirety because defendant did not have a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine her, which violated his federal constitutional due process and confrontation rights; (2) the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury with the lesser included offense of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (Pen. Code, sec 261.5 (c)) for all counts; (3) a statement made by the child's sister, who also was molested by defendant constituted "Griffin" error in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent; (4) testimony by the child's sister that she was also molested by defendant, admitted pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108, was improper propensity evidence; (5) admission of uncharged sexual offenses pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108 violated his federal constitutional rights of equal protection and due process right to a fair trial; (6) CALCRIM No. 1191, the standard instruction given to the jury when Evidence Code section 1108 evidence was admitted, erroneously interfered with the presumption of innocence and deprived him of a finding of guilt on proof beyond a reasonable doubt; (7) failure to instruct the jury regarding defendant’s reasonable and honest belief in Doe’s consent to the sexual acts as a defense to the charges constituted error; (8) the failure to instruct on consent deprived defendant of his federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial; (9) the prosecutor committed misconduct by making disparaging remarks about defendant; and (10) victim restitution fines are punitive and must be determined by the trier of fact rather than the trial court. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s claims and affirmed the judgment in its entirety. View "California v. Noriega" on Justia Law