Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600) provides for involuntary civil commitment of offenders who are found to be sexually violent predators (SVP’s) after completing their prison terms. To establish that a person is an SVP, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender has been convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense and has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes it likely the person would engage in sexually violent conduct if released. Curlee appealed an order committing him as an SVP, arguing that recent amendments to the Act rendered his commitment unconstitutional and that the trial court erred in denying his request for a continuance. Curlee also argued that he was deprived of his right to equal protection when he was compelled to testify during the government’s case-in-chief. Curlee argues that because a person found not guilty of crimes by reason of insanity (NGI) may not be compelled to testify at hearings to extend his commitment, neither should a person found to be an SVP be compelled to testify. The court of appeal rejected the first two arguments, but remanded to afford the government the opportunity to justify the differential treatment of SVP’s and NGI’s. View "People v. Curlee" on Justia Law

Defendant Danny Namphonh was convicted by jury of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14. The victim was his half-sister. Defendant was sentenced to serve 12 years in prison, and was subject to a 20- year six-month parole period following his incarceration. The trial court also ordered defendant to pay restitution and various fines associated with his prosecution and conviction. Defendant raised only one contention on appeal: that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay for the victim’s medical examination, because there was no evidence he is able to pay. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining defendant’s ability to pay, and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Namphonh" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant D.T. (minor) and the victim had been friends before the incident at issue in this appeal. D.T. was 13 years old, and the victim was 14 years old. D.T. and the victim used to play and joke with each other; they did not "rough play." On the day of the incident, the victim was trying to avoid minor and did not want to talk to him. He approached her anyway. When minor pulled at the hood on the victim’s sweater, she tried to pull away and told him to leave her alone. Instead of complying, minor retrieved a pocketknife from his pocket and, while still holding onto the victim’s clothing, opened it so she could see the blade. D.T. poked her multiple times in the upper back with the exposed blade of the knife. The knife felt "sharp" and "pointy," and the victim felt some pain. She did not think D.T. would hurt her, or that he was trying to cut or kill her. However, the victim was scared that an injury might occur because D.T. had a knife pressed to her back. A teacher approached, and D.T. stopped hitting her with the knife and went into class. The victim told both a teacher and a police officer about the incident. When speaking to the police officer, the victim was "visibly upset." On more than one occasion, she told the officer she was scared that minor might hurt her. The police officer noticed a red mark but no broken skin where the victim said she felt the most pain. The police officer escorted D.T. to the assistant principal’s office, where he produced the knife. The two-inch blade was sharp, and the tip of the knife was pointed. D.T acknowledged that the victim told him to stop and was "continually try[ing] to get away from him." According to D.T.'s statements to the police officer, the incident ended when the victim "pulled away and was able to run from him." He expressed remorse and said "he could have hurt" the victim. He also said that he and the victim had been "just playing," and that he did not intend to harm her. After the close of evidence at the jurisdictional hearing, the court found that "the knife in question [was] being used as a deadly weapon." It stated: "The knife blade was open. It was poked numerous times to the back of the victim in this case to the extent that it could have resulted in great bodily injury if more force were to be applied with the use of that knife." On appeal, D.T. argued insufficient evidence supported the allegation that he used a deadly weapon. He asked the Court of Appeal to reduce the allegation the court found true to simple assault. Because the Court of Appeal disagreed about the sufficiency of the evidence, it affirmed the adjudication order. View "In re D.T." on Justia Law

Defendants Samuel Navarro and Joseph Navarro are brothers. Defendant Eric Garcia is the brother of Lizbeth Robles, who is Samuel Navarro’s girlfriend; thus, Garcia is Samuel Navarro’s de facto brother-in-law. At one time, Garcia and Joseph Navarro were friends with Luis Arceo, who lived next door to Samuel Navarro. However, during a party at Arceo’s home, Arceo got into a fistfight with them. Garcia threatened to “get” Arceo. Meanwhile, Robles and/or Joseph Navarro, along with others, accosted one of the party guests. Either Robles or Joseph Navarro threw the first punch. After that, each of the three defendants was seen with a knife, and each was seen hitting or stabbing someone. By the time defendants left, three party guests had been stabbed. Two died; one survived. After a jury trial, Garcia and Joseph Navarro were found guilty on two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to 50 years to life in prison. Samuel Navarro was also found guilty on two counts of first degree murder; in addition, however, solely as to him, a multiple-murder special circumstance was found true, and he was found guilty on one count of unpremeditated attempted murder. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, plus nine years. Both appealed, raising a number of errors they contended warranted reversal of their convictions. The State conceded that the contentions regarding pretrial actual custody credit and the parole revocation restitution fine were well-taken. The Court of Appeal modified the judgment accordingly. Otherwise, the Court found no prejudicial error. View "California v. Garcia" on Justia Law

After Chan’s mother died from internal hemorrhaging related to Coumadin use following heart surgery, Chan successfully sued Curran for medical malpractice. Chan challenged the trial court’s post-verdict reduction of the $1 million noneconomic damages award to $250,000, as required by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), Civ. Code 3333.2. Chan challenged the MICRA cap as violating equal protection, due process and the right to jury trial, based on her assertion she is entitled to seek noneconomic damages sufficient to cover attorney fees. The court of appeal rejected Chan’s claims, stating that the legitimate debate over the wisdom of MICRA’s noneconomic damages cap remains a matter for the Legislature and state electorate. View "Chan v. Curran" on Justia Law

In an original wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602), Elias., then 13 years old, was alleged to have committed a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years, Pen. Code 288(a). Before and at the jurisdictional hearing, defense counsel moved to exclude inculpatory statements Elias made to the police on the ground they were involuntary and inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona. The motion was denied and the petition sustained. Elias was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation in the home of his parents. Elias claims his confession was involuntary under the due process clause, as it resulted from the type of coercive interrogation techniques condemned in Miranda, The court of appeal reversed. The voluntariness of inculpatory statements made during an interrogation conducted on the basis of no more than the interrogator’s “speculative, intuitive, and risky guess” that the subject is guilty warrants particularly careful judicial scrutiny. The prosecution failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Elias’s inculpatory statements were voluntary. View "In re Elias V." on Justia Law

At ten years of age, Joseph H. woke up early one morning and shot his father in the head as the father lay asleep on a sofa. Joseph had been physically abused and severely neglected by his mother, and was sexually abused by his mother’s boyfriend. Joseph lived with his father Jeff prior to Jeff's death, and Jeff's girlfriend Krista. Jeff was addicted to Percocet and methamphetamine, and was frequently violent towards both Krista and Joseph. A few days before the shooting, Jeff became violent with Krista. Jeff owned guns, which he frequently showed off, including a handgun that was kept in the closet of the bedroom. There were no child protection locks for the gun, which was kept loaded. Krista called 911 when she discovered Jeff on the sofa. When police arrived, Joseph volunteered that he had grabbed the gun and shot his dad in the ear. Joseph explained he did so because his father had beaten him and his mother, and his father had kicked Joseph “in the ass” the day before. Joseph also said he used his father’s gun and that he had put it under his bed after the shooting. When the residence was searched, the gun used in the shooting was found under Joseph’s bed. A wardship petition was filed alleging Joseph had committed acts which would have been crimes if committed by an adult, specifically, murder, with a special allegation of discharging a firearm causing death. After a contested hearing, the juvenile court found that Joseph understood the wrongfulness of his acts despite the statutory presumption of incapacity, had committed an act which would have been second degree murder if committed by an adult, and had discharged a firearm. Joseph appealed his commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice, arguing: (1) the court erroneously considered statements obtained in violation of his Miranda rights; (2) his evaluation by a prosecution expert during trial, without counsel present, violated his due process rights; (3) the court improperly weighed the evidence in finding that he knew the wrongfulness of his conduct; (4) the true findings must be reversed due to cumulative errors during the adjudicatory hearing; and (5) the court abused its discretion in committing him to the Department of Juvenile J View "In re Joseph H." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's application of the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 66499.37 to his inverse condemnation action and conclusion that the action was untimely. While the court agreed with plaintiff that a land owner may elect to pursue a damage claim for an unconstitutional taking after a mandamus proceeding results in a final judgment, the initial mandamus action must result in “a final judgment establishing that there has been a compensable taking of the plaintiff’s land.” In this case, plaintiff’s mandamus action did not seek or establish that an unconstitutional taking occurred when the county denied his subdivision application. Therefore, plaintiff does not qualify for the two-step procedure identified in Hensler v. City of Glendale. As a result, the unconstitutional taking claim in plaintiff's inverse condemnation action is time barred under section 66499.37. In regards to the cross-appeal involving the denial of sanctions against plaintiff, the court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that plaintiff's complaint was not frivolous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Honchariw v. Co. of Stanislaus" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Jeremiah Jones guilty of three counts of making criminal threats, obstructing an officer, first degree burglary, and two counts of misdemeanor child endangerment. Defendant admitted two strikes, which were also alleged as two prior serious felonies, and admitted serving three prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 25 years to life plus eight years. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by: (1) having him shackled during trial; (2) admitting evidence of his gang membership; (3) failing to advise him of his rights before accepting his admission to prior convictions; and (4) failing to strike an enhancement allegation and instead staying it. The parties agreed defendant’s two serious felony convictions were not “brought and tried separately” as required by Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1), but disagreed as to whether a trial court may impose and then stay sentence for one of those enhancements. In the published portion of its decision, the Court of Appeal answered "no." The Court vacated the enhancement, modified the sentence, and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Jones" on Justia Law

Jefferson Street Ventures, LLC appealed a judgment rendered in favor of the City of Indio in this combined petition for writ of administrative mandamus/inverse condemnation action. In 2007, the City conditioned approval of Jefferson’s 2005 application for development of a shopping center upon Jefferson leaving approximately one-third of its property undeveloped to accommodate the reconstruction of a major freeway interchange that was in the planning stages. The City could not acquire the property at the time Jefferson’s development application was approved due to funding constraints imposed by the "byzantine planning and review process" for the interchange that involved various local, state, and federal agencies, and which the City did not anticipate being complete for at least a few more years. When Jefferson’s development application was being approved, City staff explained the City could not allow development on the part of the site designated for the interchange because the City would incur additional costs for the property if and when it was later taken for the interchange. Jefferson sued the City contending the development restrictions were invalid because they constituted an uncompensated taking of its property. Following a hearing on the writ petition, the trial court found the development restrictions were permissible and denied the writ. On appeal, Jefferson argued: (1) the trial court erred by denying its petition for writ of administrative mandate because the City’s development restrictions constituted an uncompensated taking; and (2) regardless of the ruling on the mandamus cause of action, the trial court erred by denying it a trial on its inverse condemnation claims. The Court of Appeal concluded the restrictions constituted a de facto taking of the development restricted portion of Jefferson’s property and the trial court erred by denying Jefferson’s petition for writ of mandate. View "Jefferson Street Ventures v. City of Indio" on Justia Law