Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Victoria Cook pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of driving with a suspended license. A jury convicted defendant of three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter for the respective deaths of Zaria Williams, Christine Giambra, and Cedric Page.1 The jury additionally found true three allegations attached to the count 1 offense that defendant had personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Giambra, Page, and Robert Valentine. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of incarceration of nine years, eight months, striking punishment for the enhancements as to Giambra and Page, but imposing a three-year consecutive term for the enhancement as to Valentine. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the court erred in excluding evidence of the victims' propensity for reckless driving as a potential defense of legal necessity; (2) the State committed prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct in alluding to the pristine driving records of the victims and witnesses; (3) the enhancements should have been reversed because the statute explicitly forbade its application to cases of manslaughter; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's request for release of juror information. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the true findings on enhancements. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Cook" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code 245(a)(1)), and found he inflicted great bodily injury (section 12022.7(a)) during the assault. Defendant admitted the five state prison priors more than seven months after the verdict. The court sentenced defendant to 11 years in state prison: a three-year midterm on the assault, a consecutive three-year term on the great bodily injury enhancement, and five consecutive one-year terms imposed under Penal Code 667.5(b) for the prior terms. The court of appeal found two prejudicial errors. The prosecutor repeatedly argued in ways that diminished the reasonable doubt standard, stating “Well, what does not guilty mean? It means he did not commit a crime.” Although the jury was properly instructed with regard to reasonable doubt, those instructions were weakened under the totality of the circumstances. There were credibility problems with witnesses on both sides. Had the prosecutor not misstated the law, there is a reasonable probability the jury would have returned a more favorable verdict for defendant. In addition, the court did not adequately advise defendant of his right to trial, to confront adverse witnesses, and to remain silent just prior to accepting defendant’s admission of his prior convictions. View "People v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant-appellant Shelby Shamblin of first degree murder, for which he was sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction under either of the prosecution’s theories, premeditated and deliberate murder or felony murder; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting post-Miranda statements he made during a police interview and during the booking process; and (3) that the trial court erred in responding to the deliberating jury’s note seeking clarification on the difference between first and second degree murder. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's conviction and sentences. View "California v. Shamblin" on Justia Law

After defendant Jesus Osorio violated a condition of his parole, he was arrested and jailed. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Adult Parole Operations recommended that defendant’s parole be revoked. Defendant demurred to the petition for revocation. The trial court overruled the demurrer, revoked defendant’s parole, credited him with time served, then reinstated him on parole. The Court of Appeal reversed, because the trial court erred in overruling the demurrer to the petition for revocation of parole. The petition was insufficient as a matter of law. View "California v. Osorio" on Justia Law

Defendant Roland Berry appealed the dismissal of his petition for recall of his indeterminate life sentence under Penal Code section 1170.126, enacted as part of the Three Strikes Reform Act (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012). Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate life term in 2000, following his guilty plea to counts alleging: (1) possession of a fraudulent check ; and (2) possession of a forged driver's license. The trial court's dismissal of defendant's petition was based on a determination he was ineligible for resentencing relief because he was armed with a firearm during his commission of the offenses to which he pled guilty. Defendant argued on appeal this was error for several reasons, all stemming from the fact that the counts alleging he was in possession of a firearm had been dismissed in conjunction with his plea agreement. Among other things, defendant argued that the initial determination of an inmate's eligibility for recall of his sentence under subdivision (e) of section 1170.126 must be based upon the convictions the indeterminate sentence is being served for, the offenses for which the "inmate's current sentence was . . . imposed," and the inmate's "prior convictions." None of those things could be established by reference to the evidence underlying dismissed counts. On the merits, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant: the resentencing provisions of section 1170.126 were "intended to apply exclusively to persons . . . whose sentence under this act would not have been an indeterminate life sentence." Thus, "the basic premise of section 1170.126 was that an inmate who is serving an indeterminate life sentence under prior versions of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, 1170.12), but whose convictions and related factual findings would not have warranted such a sentence under the revised provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act passed by the voters, [was] eligible to seek a recall of that earlier sentence." Under the two-part analysis required by section 1170.126, an eligible inmate would not be granted resentencing relief if the court determined, in its discretion, that "resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety." Because the trial court in this case relied on the evidence underlying the dismissed counts in assessing defendant's eligibility for resentencing, the Court of Appeal concluded it erred in dismissing his petition. The case was remanded for the court to determine whether defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public safety. View "California v. Berry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Lawrence Pasternack appealed an order that granted a special motion to strike his complaint for malicious prosecution against an attorney and his law firm, defendants-respondents Thomas B. McCullough, Jr. and Thomas B. McCullough, Jr., A Professional Corporation (the McCullough defendants). The parties agreed the complaint was based on protected speech and petitioning activity. They differed on whether the underlying action was terminated in favor of Pasternack, and thus whether Pasternack met his burden of stating and substantiating the favorable termination element of his malicious prosecution claim. The court concluded, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that Pasternack did not and could not prove the favorable termination element of his malicious prosecution claim. When Pasternack filed his malicious prosecution complaint, and when the special motion to strike was heard, he was still pursuing a cross-complaint in the underlying action against some of the same defendants he claimed maliciously filed the complaint in the underlying action. Thus, Pasternack's malicious prosecution complaint was premature, as a matter of law. View "Pasternack v. McCullough" on Justia Law

Defendant James Galvan appealed the dismissal of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126. He argued the trial court erred in ruling he was ineligible for resentencing because the crime for which he was given the indeterminate life sentence (assault with a firearm) was not considered a serious or violent felony at the time of the final judgment on his conviction, and thus it could not be treated as such for purposes of evaluating his present eligibility for resentencing. He also claimed that the separate finding that he committed his crime while armed with a firearm could not be used as grounds for denying him resentencing because his sentence on that finding was stayed pursuant to section 654, and consequently his current sentence “was not imposed” for an offense appearing in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iii) or section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C)(iii). The issue of whether the classification of an inmate’s prior conviction must be determined as of the time his judgment of conviction became final, rather than under the sentencing law in effect when section 1170.126 was enacted, was then-pending before the Supreme Court. However, because the Court has not yet issued an opinion resolving the issue, the Court of Appeal addressed it here and rejected defendant’s contention. "And even assuming the alternative language relied upon by defendant, taken from subdivision (a) of section 1170.126, could be read as supporting a different interpretation of eligibility, we would disregard it under the well-settled rule that in the case of inconsistency between statutory provisions, the more specific provision controls over the more general one. Under a proper reading of section 1170.126, defendant is ineligible for resentencing because his conviction for assault with a firearm qualifies as a serious felony for purposes of View "California v. Galvan" on Justia Law

In 2003, Diaz shot and killed a rival gang member and ran to Vargas's home. Diaz was convicted of second degree murder. In a 2008 appeal, Diaz cited juror misconduct. After a gang expert testified, Juror 1 asked about retaliation and was admonished that safety concerns could not affect her deliberations. She said that she could remain impartial. A Hispanic man approached Alternate Juror 2 and tried to discuss the case. Alternate 2 reported the matter and did not deliberate. Juror 2 submitted a note that Juror 12 stated that he knew that the Vargas family was in the courtroom. Juror 12 was questioned and denied knowing anyone involved in the case. Diaz's attorney conceded that the people in the courtroom were family members and the family resemblance was obvious. The court of appeal affirmed, finding no juror bias or misconduct. Diaz later unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. In 2014, Diaz sought to access confidential juror identifying information (Code Civ. Proc. 237(b)) to investigate bias and misconduct as a possible basis for habeas relief. The court stated that it was "a fishing expedition." The court of appeal affirmed. The petition was untimely and the denial did not affect "substantial rights" under Penal Code 1237(b). Diaz has no constitutional or statutory right to "two bites of the appellate apple." View "People v. Diaz" on Justia Law

In 1999, defendant-appellant Derrick Lee Sledge was sentenced under the “Three Strikes” law to a term of 25 years to life in state prison for crimes he committed in 1998. After passage of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, defendant filed a petition to recall that sentence and for resentencing. The court, in its discretion, determined resentencing defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, and therefore denied both the petition and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Defendant argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that the court abused its discretion by erroneously failing to consider certain facts and by improperly considering other facts. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion and affirmed. View "California v. Sledge" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Raul Rodriguez guilty of robbery and evading arrest with reckless driving. The jury also found true a prior strike conviction allegation and a prior serious felony conviction allegation. The trial court sentenced Rodriguez to a total term of 16 years four months in prison. On count 1 (robbery), the court sentenced Rodriguez to the middle term of five years, doubled to 10 years due to the strike prior. On count 2 (evading arrest with reckless driving), the court sentenced Rodriguez to eight months, doubled to 16 months due to the strike prior, to be served consecutively to the term on count 1. In addition, the court imposed a consecutive five-year term for the serious felony enhancement. On appeal, Rodriguez claimed that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the defense of duress, and in failing to stay execution of the sentence for evading arrest with reckless driving pursuant to Vehicle Code, section 654. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected Rodriguez's jury instruction claim. In the published portion, the Court rejected his section 654 claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court judgment. View "California v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law