Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury found defendant-appellant Raul Rodriguez guilty of robbery and evading arrest with reckless driving. The jury also found true a prior strike conviction allegation and a prior serious felony conviction allegation. The trial court sentenced Rodriguez to a total term of 16 years four months in prison. On count 1 (robbery), the court sentenced Rodriguez to the middle term of five years, doubled to 10 years due to the strike prior. On count 2 (evading arrest with reckless driving), the court sentenced Rodriguez to eight months, doubled to 16 months due to the strike prior, to be served consecutively to the term on count 1. In addition, the court imposed a consecutive five-year term for the serious felony enhancement. On appeal, Rodriguez claimed that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the defense of duress, and in failing to stay execution of the sentence for evading arrest with reckless driving pursuant to Vehicle Code, section 654. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected Rodriguez's jury instruction claim. In the published portion, the Court rejected his section 654 claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court judgment. View "California v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Appellants Delano Farms Company, Four Star Fruit, Inc., Gerawan Farming, Inc., Bidart Bros. and Blanc Vineyards, LLC, challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme that establishes respondent, the California Table Grape Commission, and required table grape growers and packers to fund the Commission’s promotional activities. Appellants argued that being compelled to fund the Commission’s generic advertising violated their rights to free speech, free association, due process, liberty and privacy under the California Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment in the Commission’s favor. The court held that the Commission is a "governmental entity" and thus its speech is government speech that can be funded with compelled assessments. Alternatively, the trial court applied the intermediate scrutiny test set forth in "Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura," (33 Cal.4th 1, 22 (2004)), and concluded that the compelled funding scheme did not violate the California Constitution. Appellants argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. According to appellants, facts relied on by the Commission to demonstrate that the funding scheme passed constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny were not proved by admissible evidence and were in dispute. Appellants further argued the court erred in finding the speech was government speech because the Commission did not demonstrate either that the Commission is a government entity or that the government controlled the Commission’s activities and speech. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Com." on Justia Law

The issue before the Court of Appeal in this case was one of yoga: whether a school district's implementation of a yoga program as a component of its physical education curriculum was an impermissible establishment of religion in violation of the California Constitution. Appellants Stephen and Jennifer Sedlock (and their two minor children), filed suit against the Encinitas Union School District, the school's superintendent and the District's five governing board members, alleging that an Ashtanga yoga program violated various religious freedom provisions of the Constitution. The Sedlocks sought a writ of mandate and brought claims for injunctive and declaratory relief in which they requested that the court enjoin the District from continuing to implement its yoga program and declare the program unconstitutional. The Sedlocks were ultimately unsuccessful in having yoga declared unconstitutional, and they appealed that judgment. "While the practice of yoga may be religious in some contexts, yoga classes as taught in the District are, as the trial court determined, 'devoid of any religious, mystical, or spiritual trappings.'" The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court properly determined the District's yoga program did not constitute an establishment of religion in violation of article I, section 4 of the California Constitution. View "Sedlock v. Baird" on Justia Law

Defendant Marcelo Virgen Guzman appealed a trial court’s denial of his petition to recall his prison sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, added by Proposition 36. In 2006, a jury found Guzman guilty of one count each of felony receipt of stolen property and misdemeanor possession of burglary tools with intent to break and enter. The evidence at trial showed that in July 2004, deputies from the Orange County Sheriff’s Department were dispatched to a residential neighborhood where they encountered Guzman walking toward a parked blue Toyota 4Runner. The deputies conducted a patdown search of Guzman and found items commonly used as burglary tools in his pockets, including a flathead screwdriver, a long flashlight, two AA batteries, and work gloves. The deputies also searched the Toyota 4Runner that Guzman had been driving, and found, inter alia, 27 pieces of jewelry that had been stolen two or three days earlier from a residence about a mile away from their encounter with Guzman. The Toyota 4Runner also contained a flashlight, several screwdrivers, a cell phone, a knife with a four- or five-inch blade, a two-way radio charger, and a pair of binoculars. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether the definition of the phrase “‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,’” set forth in Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (c), contained in the recently passed Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, added by Proposition 47, applied to petitions brought under Proposition 36.1 The Court held that the definition of “‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’” contained in section 1170.18, subdivision (c) of Proposition 47 did not apply to a petition under Proposition 36. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition brought under Proposition 36. Based upon its review of the record and in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court found Guzman’s release would present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety within the meaning of section 1170.126. View "California v. Guzman" on Justia Law

Since 1996, retired employees of the City and County of San Francisco) have been eligible for a supplemental cost of living allowance (COLA) as part of their pension benefits when the retirement fund’s earnings from the previous year exceeded projected earnings. In 2011, voters passed Proposition C, an initiative measure that conditioned payment of the supplemental COLA on the retirement fund being “fully funded” based on the market value of the assets for the previous year. POB, a political action committee representing the interests of retired city employees, challenged the amendment as an impairment of a vested contractual pension right under the contract clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. The court of appeal held that, with respect to current employees and employees who retired after the supplemental COLA went into effect, the full funding requirement cannot stand. Employees who retired before November 6, 1996 had no vested contractual right in the supplemental COLA; the 2011 amendment may be applied to their pensions. The court rejected POB’s claim that the full funding requirement must be set aside because the Board of Supervisors failed to obtain an adequate actuarial report before placing Proposition C on the ballot. View "Protect Our Benefits v. City & Co. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Javante Scott appealed the sentence he received at a resentencing hearing, when the trial court imposed the same 120-years-to-life term as at his original sentencing. Defendant was tried as an adult and convicted of three counts of attempted murder with firearm enhancements. Defendant argued the sentence is cruel and unusual because it imposed a de facto life sentence on him as a juvenile offender. The State argued that a new statute, Penal Code section 3051,1 which guaranteed defendant a future parole eligibility hearing, rendered the sentence constitutional. After review, the Court of Appeal held that section 3051 complied with the central constitutional requirement that the State provide a juvenile offender with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his or her expected lifetime. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 1994, at age 14, Ruelas admitted committing felony assault with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor annoying or molesting a child. Three years later, while Ruelas was still a minor, the juvenile court found true allegations that he had committed three felonies: robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and vehicle theft and committed Ruelas to the California Youth Authority. Upon his release, Ruelas was required to register as a sex offender because of his section 647.6 adjudication. In 2012, Ruelas sought relief on equal protection grounds, arguing that mandatory sex offender registration for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating Penal Code section 647.61 and committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities only after committing another offense, but not for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating section 647.6 and never committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities, violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. The trial court rejected the argument. On rehearing, the court of appeal affirmed. Ruelas is not similarly situated for purposes of mandatory sex offender registration to juvenile violators of section 647.6 who were never committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities. View "Ruelas v. Superior Court.\" on Justia Law

Defendants Rashon Abernathy, Seandell Jones and Shaquille Jordan were 17 years old at the time of a robbery and killing. The three were convicted of first degree murder, two counts of robbery, shooting at an occupied vehicle and unlawfully taking and driving a vehicle. Jones and Jordan were sentenced to 25 years to life, and because of a separate incident leading to an additional count of robbery, Abernathy was sentenced to 50 years to life. On appeal, all three defendants argued that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to instruct that, for the purposes of the felony-murder rule, the jury must find that the target felony (robbery) ended at the point defendants reached a place of temporary safety ("the escape rule"); (2) the sentences imposed by the trial court were unconstitutional under either the federal or state Constitutions because they constituted cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) at sentencing, the trial court incorrectly calculated the defendants' presentence custody credits. Jones and Abernathy further argued the evidence was insufficient to supports their convictions for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, and Jones argued the abstract of judgment did not accurately reflect that his five-year sentence for shooting at an occupied vehicle in count 4 was stayed by the trial court pursuant to section 654. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) although the trial court erred in failing to instruct with the escape rule for felony murder, the error was not prejudicial; (2) sufficient evidence supported Abernathy's and Jones's conviction for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle; (3) there is no merit to the defendants' contention that their sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment; (4) Abernathy's and Jordan's judgment should be modified to award an additional day of presentence custody credit; and (5) a clerical error in Jones's abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that the sentence on count 4 is stayed pursuant to section 654. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgment as to Abernathy and Jordan to award an additional day of presentence custody credit, and the Court ordered that the abstract of judgment be corrected as to Jones to accurately reflect that his sentence on count 4 is stayed. In all other respects, the judgments were affirmed. View "California v. Jordan" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Melvin James Anderson of residential burglary, first degree robbery, assault with a firearm, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury found true allegations that Anderson personally used a handgun within the meaning of section Penal Code 12022.5, subdivision (a) in the commission of the burglary and assault, and personally used a handgun within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b) in the commission of the robbery. Anderson admitted that he had incurred three prison priors, one serious felony prior, and one strike prior. Anderson argued on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on a claim-of-right defense; (2) the court erred by admitting impeachment evidence regarding his prior gun use and possession, which the court had previously ruled inadmissible, and defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecution's irrelevant examination that was designed to open the door to that impeachment evidence; (3) the court prejudicially erred in allowing the prosecution to impeach him with a 23-year-old prior robbery conviction; (4) the cumulative effect of the above errors deprived him of due process; and (5) his burglary sentence should have been stayed under section 654's prohibition against multiple punishment for crimes arising out of a single act. The State conceded that Anderson's burglary sentence should have been stayed under section 654. The Court of Appeal modified the judgment accordingly and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Sacramento County Public Defender (the Public Defender) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of David Osburn and others, contending the Sacramento County Sheriff had unlawfully detained petitioners at the county jail by failing to transfer them on a timely basis to a state hospital for restorative treatment. After several rounds of briefing, and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued an order (the Osburn Order) commanding that the Sheriff deliver to Napa State Hospital (NSH) all criminal defendants ordered committed to NSH within seven days of the commitment. The Osburn Order was amended to require the prisoners’ delivery within seven days or as soon as the packet of documents required under section 1370 (the 1370 packet) was available. There was no appeal of the Osburn Order. In 2013, the Public Defender sought an order to show cause for contempt, alleging the Sheriff had violated the Osburn Order by holding several defendants who had been found IST at the jail rather than timely transferring them to NSH. In response, the State Department of State Hospitals (the Department) moved to set aside the Osburn Order. The trial court denied the motion but modified the Osburn Order to extend the 7-day deadline to 14 days. The Department appealed from this 2013 order “denying [the Department’s] motion to set aside the transfer deadline established by this Court” in the Osburn Order. On appeal, the Department argued: (1) the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and violated the separation of powers doctrine, by inserting a 14-day deadline into section 1370 and thereby undermining the Department’s duties; (2) the original Osburn Order and the 2013 modification were contrary to established habeas procedures and constituted improperly promulgated local rules; and (3) the Osburn Order should have been set aside due to changes in the law and because it results in unequal treatment of defendants found IST in different counties. The Court of Appeal viewed the Osburn Order as an injunction (as did the trial court) and the Department’s 2013 motion to vacate as a motion to dissolve the injunction. During the pendency of this appeal, there was a material change in the law. Recent amendments to section 1370 and other statutes affected various aspects of the Osburn Order. Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter to the trial court to reconsider its ruling on the Department’s motion in light of the change in the law, and to conduct a new evidentiary hearing. The Court dissolved the Osburn Order pending reconsideration of the ruling. View "California v. Brewer" on Justia Law