Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Robert Velasco was convicted by jury of attempted first degree robbery, assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, and street terrorism. The jury also found as to counts 1 and 4, that defendant personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5 sub. A, Pen. Code. The jury found Defendant not guilty of first degree burglary, and returned a not true finding on the robbery in concert within the meaning of section 213 sub. A in connection with count 1. The jury was unable to reach verdicts that counts 1, 4 and 5 were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal street gang. Defendant subsequently admitted on prior strike, on prior serious felony conviction, and one prison prior. Given all this, the court sentenced defendant to a 28-year prison sentence. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him for street terrorism; (2) the verdict for count 1 should have been reduced to second degree robbery; (3) the trial court should have stayed portions of his sentence for counts 4 an 5. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that Defendant's conviction for street terrorism was not supported by substantial evidence. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant's other claims lacked merit. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Velasco" on Justia Law

Appellant, de facto parent of minor M.M., appealed a juvenile court’s order removing the minor from her home at the selection and implementation hearing. She argued on appeal she was entitled to notice and a hearing prior to the minor’s removal, and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in summarily ordering the removal. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed that appellant was entitled to notice and the opportunity to object and request a hearing prior to the minor’s removal. Furthermore, the Court agreed that the removal was an abuse of discretion, as it was unsupported by the evidence in the then-existing record. The order was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

In 1996, a jury convicted defendant Scott Smith of possessing methamphetamine for sale and the sale or transportation of it. The trial court found true allegations defendant had five prior burglary convictions and sentenced him under the "Three Strikes" law to 25 years to life on count 1 and stayed the sentence on count 2. In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. In defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, defendant contended he was entitled to automatic resentencing under Proposition 36, the 2012 update of the Three Strikes law. The Act changed “the Three Strikes law so that an indeterminate life sentence may only be imposed where the offender’s third strike is a serious and/or violent felony or where the offender is not eligible for a determinate sentence based on other disqualifying factors. Had defendant been sentenced after the Act became effective, he would not have been subject to an indeterminate life sentence because his commitment offenses for the transportation or sale, and possession of methamphetamine for sale were not serious or violent felonies. Defendant appealed that decision, and the Court of Appeal rejected all of defendant's arguments. View "California v. Smith" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on criminal convictions arising from two shootings separated by less than one month, both that were retaliation for stolen drugs. In the second shooting, Francisco (Frankie) Flores was killed. A jury found codefendants Vincent Rivera (the shooter) and Fred Huante guilty of first degree murder for Flores' death. The jury also found defendants guilty of, among other things, the attempted murders of Michael Flores, Aaron Amaro, and Paul Amaro. Both Rivera and Huante appealed, raising seven contentions. After review, the Court reversed Huante's first degree murder conviction pursuant to "California v. Chiu," (59 Cal.4th 155 (2014)), in which the California Supreme Court held "an aider and abettor may not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine." The Court rejected defendants' other challenges to the judgment, relating to trial counsel's effectiveness, the trial court's decisions to excuse a juror and consolidate the two shootings for trial, alleged instructional error, alleged error in allowing Huante's attorney to appear by speakerphone, and cumulative prejudice from the alleged errors. Defendants joined in each other's arguments to the extent the joinder benefitted them. On remand, the State could either accept a reduction of Huante's conviction to second degree murder or retry the first degree murder charge under a proper theory. View "California v. Rivera" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Charandeep Singh guilty of felony vandalism, making criminal threats, and assault with a deadly weapon (a baseball bat). It was unable to reach a verdict with respect to counts alleging assault with a gun and brandishing a gun. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for four years eight months. Defendant's appeal centered on the prosecution's successful motion contesting the exercise of defense counsel's peremptory challenges as being premised on invidious group bias against Caucasian potential jurors. Defendant does not challenge the nature of the remedy that the trial court imposed (reseating the potential juror who had been the subject of the most recent defense peremptory challenge). Rather, defendant argued that the trial court erred in granting the prosecution's motion, and further that this erroneous grant of the motion (coupled with a threat to impose sanctions against defense counsel for any further improper peremptory challenges) chilled his trial counsel's representation during the rest of voir dire and accordingly resulted in an unfair trial. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "California v Singh" on Justia Law

Defendant Derek Pierce appealed following the trial court’s modification of an order requiring defendant to pay restitution to various victims. Defendant argued: (1) the trial court erred in modifying the restitution order without vacating the prior order to avoid duplication of the restitution award; (2) the trial court erred in imposing restitution for damages caused by a codefendant because the People explicitly waived the claim; and (3) if both or either of these claims is forfeited due to trial counsel’s failure to object, counsel provided ineffective assistance. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) the trial court did not err in modifying the restitution order because its modification superseded the prior order; (2) the People’s decision not to seek restitution relative to the codefendant’s car crash in the initial restitution hearing did not waive the victims’ right to seek restitution later; and (3) trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object because such an objection would have been meritless. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Petitioner Universal Protection Service, L.P. petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition to challenge the superior court's order granting real party in interest Floridalma Franco's demand to arbitrate her employment-related disputes with Universal and ruling the arbitrator would decide the arbitrability of Franco's class action claims. Universal argued the court legally erred in its ruling because the parties' arbitration agreement did not clearly and unmistakably submit arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, and thus it was for the superior court to decide whether the agreement authorized class and/or representative arbitration. The Court of Appeal concluded the court erred by granting Franco's petition, but nevertheless agreed with Franco that the parties' reference to American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules, which unambiguously stated that the arbitrator was to decide whether the parties' arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration, constituted clear and unmistakable evidence of their intent that the arbitrator decide this issue (which was a threshold question of arbitrability). Because the trial court reached the correct conclusion, the Court of Appeal denied Universal's petition. View "Universal Protection Services v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition to challenge a superior court order granting its amended motion to compel arbitration in which the court ordered the parties to arbitrate all of real party in interest Denise Edwards's claims, including her class action and representative claims under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Securitas argued the court impermissibly rewrote the parties' written dispute resolution agreement, which contained an express waiver of class, collective or representative claims; Securitas maintained the parties did not mutually agree to arbitrate class and/or representative claims and the agreement should have been deemed silent on arbitration of any class or representative action. It further contended the court erred by refusing to enforce the lawful class action waiver, as well as the PAGA waiver, because as to the latter, Edwards's waiver was voluntary, rendering the circumstances unlike those in "Iskanian v. CLS Transportation." Securitas argued that because "Iskanian" did not apply, the parties' arbitration agreement should have been enforced in its entirety as to Edwards's individual claims. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court correctly ruled that Iskanian rendered the PAGA waiver within the parties' dispute resolution agreement unenforceable. However, the court then erred by invalidating and severing the waiver provision, including an enforceable class action waiver, from the agreement and sending Edwards's entire complaint, including her class action and PAGA claims, to arbitration. Though the Court granted Securitas's petition to the extent it sought to set aside the order compelling Edwards's class and PAGA claims to arbitration, it denied the remainder of its requested relief, and based on its de novo interpretation of the parties' agreement, directed the trial court to enter a new order denying Securitas's amended motion to compel arbitration. View "Securitas Security Services v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioners sought the disqualification of the law firm of AlvaradoSmith, which: (1) previously represented another law firm in an attorney fee dispute; and (2) in this case, represented an expert seeking consulting fees arising out of the same underlying litigation as the attorney fee dispute. The Court of Appeal issued a stay order and order to show cause, and later concluded that due to AlvaradoSmith's wide-ranging access to privileged information in the first representation and the substantial relationship between the two matters required the firm to be disqualified. View "Acacia Patent Acquisition v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Rebulloza pleaded no contest to one count of indecent exposure for exposing himself on a street corner in San José. The trial court granted a three-year term of probation to include one year in county jail as a condition of probation and ordered him to complete a sex offender management program as mandated by Penal Code section 1203.067. Under subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4), the court ordered defendant to “waive any privilege against self-incrimination and participate in polygraph examinations which shall be part of the sex offender management program” and “waive any psychotherapist/patient privilege to enable communication between the sex offender management professional and the probation officer.” Rebulloza challenged the constitutionality of the waivers. The court of appeal held that the condition requiring a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment under the 1984 Supreme Court decision, Minnesota v. Murphy, and construed the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege as requiring waiver only insofar as necessary to enable communication between the probation officer and the psychotherapist, so that it is not overbroad in violation of defendant’s constitutional right to privacy. View "People v. Rebulloza" on Justia Law